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Zusammenfassung 
Die immer offensichtlicher werdende Verflechtung der vielfältigen sozialen und ökologischen Krisen 
stellt Risikogesellschaften weltweit vor der Herausforderung, grundlegende Transformationen der 
vorherrschenden gesellschaftlichen Modelle und Lebensweisen vorzunehmen, welche sich an den 
kulturellen Vorstellungen des wohlhabenden globalen Nordens orientieren. Bisher haben sich jedoch 
sowohl internationale als auch lokale Versuche, globale Entwicklungspfade in Richtung „faire und 
nachhaltige“ Zukunft zu lenken, als weitgehend erfolglos erwiesen. Der weltweite 
Ressourcenverbrauch und die Degradierung der Biosphäre haben sich weiter verschärft und 
beschleunigt. In Anlehnung an die deutsche hermeneutische Tradition sowie an den französischen 
Poststrukturalismus und den amerikanischen symbolischen Interaktionismus versucht diese 
theoretische und empirische Dissertation, die strukturellen Zwänge zu modellieren, mit denen 
individuelle change agents konfrontiert sind, und sie daran hindern, sozial-ökologische "reale Utopien" 
(Bloch) voranzutreiben. Darüber hinaus nimmt diese Dissertation eine Typisierung möglicher Wege 
zur Überwindung solcher Einschränkungen vor, nämlich durch Eingriffe einer bestimmten Art von 
auf der meso-gesellschaftlichen Ebene operierender Agency, die wir als Para-Governance bezeichnen. Die 
Dissertation schließt mit einer Reflexion über die sich verändernden Formen und Funktionen von 
Governance im Anthropozän, die über herkömmliche, eng definierte rationalistische und 
institutionalistische Ansätze hinausgehen. 
Schlüsselwörter: sozial-ökologische Transformation, Nachhaltigkeit, Transition, kollektives Lernen, 
gesellschaftlicher Wandel, sustainability governance, buen vivir, gutes Leben, Diskursanalyse.  
Abstract 
The increasingly apparent imbrication of the multiple social and ecological crises creates an imperative 
for “risk societies” worldwide to undertake fundamental transformations to the currently prevalent 
model of social organization shaped after the cultural imaginaries of the affluent Global North. So far, 
however, both international and local attempts at bending global developmental trajectories towards 
“fair and sustainable” futures have proven largely futile, with global resource-consumption and 
biosphere degradation further reinforcing and accelerating. Drawing on the German hermeneutic 
tradition, as well as on French post-structuralism and American symbolic interactionism, this theoretical 
cum empirical dissertation seeks to model the structural constraints weighting over ‘change agents’, thus 
preventing them from advancing social-ecological “real utopias” (Bloch), and typify possible ways of 
overcoming such constraints through interventions of a specific kind of agency identified as operating 
at the meso-societal level, which we refer to as para-governance.  The dissertation concludes by  reflecting 
on the changing forms and functions of  governance in the Anthropocene beyond conventional 
narrowly defined rationalist and institutionalist approaches. 
Keywords: social-ecological transformation, sustainability, transition, collective learning, societal change, 
sustainability governance, buen vivir, good living/ living well, discourse analysis.  
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Only a crisis - actual or perceived - produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are 
taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop 
alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible 
becomes the politically inevitable. 
Milton Friedman (1962), of all people 
PART I 
Transformation, collective learning, discourse, and agency. 
A theoretical inquiry and integration attempt 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
The future is radical. We just get to choose what type of ‘radical’ we want 
Naomi Klein1 
Only utopias are realistic: sustainability governance and the transformation imperative 
The current phase in the historical evolution of human societies has been variously characterized by 
social thinkers as the age of global capitalism, network society, liquid modernity, the age of information 
or the digital age, depending on the variable emphases on economic, cultural, socio-structural, 
technological dimensions, as well as the globality or spatiotemporal embeddedness of the 
corresponding flows and structures. 
Relevant for this research endeavor is departing from a perspective of existential risk of human 
societies. Back in the early 1990s, Ulrich Beck famously characterized the rapidly globalizing Western-
style modern civilization as “risk society”: a type of society signed by self-engendered existential risks 
(also called civilizational or systemic risks): nuclear weaponry, genetical engineering, petrochemical 
industry (now shown to be the cause of severe distortion in bio-geochemical cycles likely leading to 
major ecological disruption of planetary scope on a scale unprecedented in all of human history). 
Existential risks typically differ from conventional risks in that while the latter are personally 
experienced or at least cognoscible,  determinable and often quantifiable, the latter are indeterminate, 
non-quantifiable, global, and only cognoscible in a mediated fashion – chiefly through science. 
Furthermore, while conventional risk is exogenous and modern societies have sought to shield 
themselves through technological ingenuity, systemic or existential risk is endogenous to modern 
societies, i.e. it is self-engendered as a by-product of industrial development, and potentially carries 
the risk of self-destruction. (Beck, 1992) 
Since Ulrich Beck first formulated his epochal diagnosis, new existential risks have been added to the 
list: anthropogenic climate change, global biodiversity loss on a mass-extinction scale (Ceballos et al., 
2015), or even, some claim, recent developments in learning-capable machines (so-called artificial 
1 Keynote speech at the 2016 Six degrees Citizen Space (retrieved on 10th August 2017): 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M8Ru2ik_hEs 
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intelligence or A.I.). Unlike nuclear threats or A.I., however, ecological Earth-systemic disruptions are 
existential risks densely imbricated with the very fabric of social life, and therefore constitute an 
inherently sociological object of study. Global Environmental Change (hereafter: GEC2) thus poses a 
special case of existential risk: one that is the result of the global aggregate of production, 
consumption, and disposal patterns, with their respective cultural, political, and economic drivers. 
To be sure, at the latest since the Neolithic revolution some 12.500 years ago – i.e. the transition from 
nomadic hunter-gatherer to agricultural societies –, human activities have ostensibly affected their 
ecological environment. But it was not until the 20th century that human activities "rapidly changed 
from merely influencing the global environment in some ways to dominating it in many ways" (Steffen, 
Crutzen, & McNeill, 2007, p. 614). Various scientific reports impressively describe the enormous and 
accelerating growth in the use of natural resources (fossil fuels, biomass, and minerals) and multiple 
forms of pollution during the 20th century (Steffen, 2004; UNEP, 2011). Moreover, the interlinkages 
between changes in human production and consumption, indicated by gross domestic product, direct 
foreign investment, energy consumption and telecommunications, and changes in the Earth’s natural 
systems: climate (greenhouse gas levels, global temperature), ocean acidification, terrestrial biosphere 
degradation and fish capture have only recently been so systemically emphasized (Rockström et al., 
2009). As of the 1950s – over a single human lifetime –, the scale of human impacts on the Earth-
system has reached tectonic proportions (Steffen, 2004), arguably marking a new geological epoch in 
planetary history: the Anthropocene3 (Chakrabarty, 2009; Crutzen & Stoermer, 2000; Latour, 2014; 
Steffen et al., 2007; Syvitski, 2012). The historical singularity of these extraordinary recent 
developments – which are jointly known as “The Great Acceleration” – cannot be emphasized 
                                                 2 Global Environmental Change (GEC) is an umbrella term, coined in the natural sciences, lumping 
together a complex array of major alterations in planetary bio-chemical and physical systems, which 
are, however, studied in their complex interactions as a single system: the Earth-System (among many 
others: Schellnhuber, 2004; Steffen, 2004) 
 3 There is no scientific consensus in officially acknowledging the Anthropocene as a new geological 
epoch. Yet this does not diminish its metaphorical force to convey the idea of the scale, intensity, and 
potential consequences of human activities on the planet: the Earth-system is operating in a non-
analogue state as compared to the last half-million years, probably the last 2 million years (Open 
Science Conference Amsterdam, 2001). Yet despite the rapidly growing popularity of the term, 
increasingly also in the social sciences (reason for which it is also adopted here, to flatten 
communication), a more precise conceptualization would prefer terms such as “Econocene” or 
“Capitalocene”, which correct the naturalistic bias of the idea that ‘humans’ (per se) are to blame for 
Earth-systemic disruptions that is implicit in the term “Anthropocene”. (Malm & Hornborg, 2014) 
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enough. According to environmental historian John R. McNeill: “In time, the environmental 
dimension of twentieth-century history will overshadow the importance of events like the world wars, 
the rise and fall of communism, and the spread of mass literacy”. Framed in deeper historical context 
“reveals the absurdity of claims that ancient evolutionary traits inexorably led Homo sapiens to destroy 
earth systems” (Malm & Hornborg, 2014; Paulson, 2017, p. 441). The Anthropocene marks a historical 
– or, borrowing Dipesh Chakrabarty’s (2009) and Bruno Latour’s neologism (2014)4 – a geostorical 
singularity, both as an Earth-systemic phenomenon and as a political challenge (Biermann, 2011a). I 
refer to this singularity as geostorical exceptionalism and the social and political challenges derived thereof 
are hereinafter referred to as geostorical challenges. The development of modes of social organization that 
feed from and into a closed biological, chemical, and physical loop with the biosphere in a way that is 
functional to the reproduction of (human) life on Earth – usefully synthesized in the term sustainability 
-  is thus increasingly recognized as arguably the most “vital problem of [global] collective life” (Bajoit, 
2011). We will refer to the realm of deliberate interventions to advance sustainability as sustainability 
governance. 
Toward the 1970s, the rising awareness of the unintended effects of globalized Western-style 
development on the biosphere and its unbridled consumption of resources cast a shadow over the 
triumphant narrative of modernization (Beck, 1992; Pelfini, 2005; Reißig, 2009), along with its 
subjacent narratives of progress, and, in particular, with the more ideologically tainted narrative of 
‘development’ (Wolfgang. Sachs, 2010). This ideal of development, which throughout the second half of 
the 20th century asserted itself as a universal evolutionary horizon, modeled after Western standards 
and then disseminated globally, thus becomes the object of critical interrogation5: After 40 years of 
                                                 4 Dipesh Chakrabarty argues that Earth System research forces us to broaden our conceptualization 
of human beings from that of biological and historical agents, to that of geological agents. And Latour 
speaks of human beings having slipped from historical to geostorical time without taking due notice. 
 
5 A semantic digression is required between “development” understood as evolution, and 
“Development” (identified here through the use of upper case, italics, or else quotation marks), 
understood as an ideology, i.e. a particular discourse posing as a false universal. While analytically 
unequivocal, this distinction appears often blurred in empirical usage of the word. The critique of 
Development as ideology has been systematized particularly well in the current of thought known as 
post-development. While this trend of thought is wide and expanding, it is exemplified in the work of 
Wolfgang Sachs, Serge Latouche, Gustavo Esteva, Ivan Illich, Arturo Escobar, J. Martinez-Alier, 
Aram Ziai, i.a. Consider, by way of illustration, the texts compiled by Majid Rahnema and Victoria 
Bawtree in the Post-Development Reader (1997), or in the Postdevelopment dictionary (Kothari, Salleh, 
Escobar, & Demaria, 2018). For an in-depth discussion and a comprehensive literature review on the 
(sustainable) development discourse, see (Vanhulst & Beling, 2014a) 
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global ‘development’, the vast majority of the world keeps struggling to emulate the ‘developed 
countries’, while both ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ ones keep operating at an enormous ecological 
and social cost. Indeed: it is not only environmental crises that put the modernization model of the 
West6 under siege: much of the optimism and hopes for global economic prosperity and universal 
improvement in life-conditions heralded by the ‘development era’ have begun to crumble under the 
weight of evidence: persistent poverty and hunger (Hickel, 2016b; Woodward, 2015) , growing inter- 
and intra-national inequality (Jodhka, Rehbein, & Souza, 2018; Oxfam, 2016; Piketty, 2014; J. E. 
Stiglitz, 2012), rocketing public and private indebtedness (Streeck, 2013), hyper-financialization of the 
economy, and even the decoupling of economic growth from various measures of subjective well-
being and life satisfaction in affluent countries (so-called ‘Easterlin paradox’) (Dörre, Lessenich, & 
Rosa, 2015; Easterlin, 1974; W. Sachs, 2007) threw the worldview of Development into a crisis of 
legitimacy. 
This crisis of legitimacy of the Development worldview and the emergence of the environmental 
discourse in the global North upset socio-cognitive and cultural templates, leading to the diffraction 
of Development into a heterogeneous discursive field (Dryzek, 1997; Hopwood, Mellor, & O’Brien, 
2005; W. Sachs, 1997), including debates around the global environment, poverty, fair resource policy, 
debt relief or debt condonation for developing countries, and a fair framework for international trade. 
Especially in the 1970s, the debate on ecological sustainability and development yielded genuinely 
alternative proposals to the Development worldview, such as the limits to growth (D. H. Meadows, 
Meadows, Randers, & Behrens, 1972), de-growth (A. Gorz), eco-development (Maurice Strong, Ignacy 
Sachs), convivialism (Alain Caillé, Ivan Illich), or post-development (Illich, Gorz, Escobar, Latouche, W. 
Sachs). While these debates were largely confined to scholarly and policy spheres, strong counter-
cultures did emerge in parallel. Examples are the so-called 68-generation, the hippie movement, and 
                                                 
 6 As opposed to a monolithic conception of a single trajectory of modernity, which has characterized 
the classical theory of modernity and its structuring concepts of ‘progress’ and ‘development’, in this 
research we depart from a pluralist conception of “multiple modernities” (Eisenstadt, T. Larrain, 
Wittrock) – or else “entangled modernities” (J. P. Arnason, G. Therborn), “hybrid modernity” (García 
Canclini), global modernity (Dirlik, Domingues), or “modernity as experience and interpretation” (P. 
Wagner). The ‘classical’ monistic view of modernity has become the object of heavy criticism in the 
second half of the 20th century for its linear, ethnocentric, and colonialist character. This normative 
critique was reinforced by the empirical description of historically novel phenomena, such as a 
globalization of unprecedented scale, speed, and intensity; the emergence of divergent and conflictual 
evolutionary paths and dynamics in many parts of the world; the anthropogenic global ecological crisis; 
etc. 
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the environmental movement, in the North; and socialist-communitarian imaginaries (such as the 
Zapatista upheaval in Mexico), the utopian landless peasant and indigenous movements, and the 
‘environmentalism of the poor’ (Alier, 2002), in the South. 
In 1992, however, the Earth-Summit in Rio de Janeiro brought these debates to a closure through the 
political consensus-formula of sustainable development (hereafter SD), while radical discursive diversity 
was thereafter confined to the margins of society7 (Brand, 2016c; Paulson, 2017) or else subsumed 
under the label of “ecological modernization” (Jänicke, 1993; Mol, 1997; Spaargaren & Mol, 1992), 
with its hitherto unattainable promises of social, (capitalist-)economic, and ecological ‘triple win’. 
From the perspective of advancing sustainability, however, the discursive foreclosure that came with 
Rio 1992 proved, in hindsight, to be premature. Western-style societies had not even assimilated the 
type and scope of changes required to match the challenges of sustainability (Gomez-Baggethun & 
Naredo 2015; Asara et al. 2015 and Escobar 2015, let alone figured out how to implement them. In 
terms of the theoretical and conceptual framework to be introduced in Chapter 1: The shutdown of 
discursive contestation as of the 1990s halted or froze collective learning processes. Indeed, despite 
noteworthy innovations at the institutional (the UN Framework Conventions on Climate Change and 
Biodiversity, International Environmental Agreements, markets for so-called ‘ecological services’, etc.) 
and material-practical level (recycling, green technologies, etc.), as well as an impressive resonance 
with public opinion – to date, over hundred million websites feature the word ‘sustainability’ (Gómez-
Baggethun & Naredo, 2015) –, the empirical evidence unambiguously shows that 40 years of global 
sustainability governance efforts have been metaphorically akin to “re-arranging deck-chairs on the 
Titanic” (Schellnhuber): the world has never moved faster and farther away from ecological 
sustainability than today8. Life-support systems and the natural resource base continue to critically 
deteriorate at global scale and accelerating rates (Rockström et al., 2009; Steffen et al., 2015). This is 
                                                 7 The burial of agonistic sustainable development debates from the 1970s and 1980s coincided with 
the rise of neoliberalism as capitalist mode of regulation. For a political-economic theorization of the 
dynamics of capitalism and social stability and the fragile equilibrium fictitiously maintained 
throughout the post-war period, see Streeck (2011, 2013), Dörre (2009), Dörre, Lessenich & Rosa 
(2015).   
 8 To be sure, particular improvements of environmental indicators at the local and urban levels do 
exist, but they cannot be attributed pre-figurative character toward a virtuous systemic change, in so 
far methodological and measurement biases (e.g. methodological nationalism) largely explain such 
alleged ‘improvements’ (Jackson 2014). 
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coupled with arguably worsening general social life conditions and trends, both in the South and in 
the North, including unsustainable demographic and urbanization patterns (Demaria & Schindler, 
2016; WBGU, 2016), unprecedently broadening gaps in wealth and income distribution (Oxfam, 
2016), and renewed ‘apartheidization’ along class, ethnic or cultural lines, etc. (Escobar, 2012a; W. 
Sachs & Santarius, 2007). 
This severe underperformance (if not wholesale failure) of sustainability governance has had at least 
two explanations from a cultural-political vantage point. 
First, the much touted ‘value-action gap’ (also called ‘knowledge-action gap’): the need for deep changes 
in patterns of production, consumption, and disposal of Western-style societies is broadly 
acknowledged9, yet this acknowledgement has no observable practical consequence (Leiserowitz, 
Kates, & Parris, 2006; Misereor & IHS, 2013). The derived course of action is continuously investing 
more resources in understanding how to ‘close the gap’ (Shove, 2010a).  
The very concept of a ‘value-action gap’, however, faces heavy criticism because of its behaviorist bias, 
which makes praxis a dependent variable of ideational change, thus downplaying the dialectical 
character of the interrelation between the spheres of ideas and of social practice (Shove, 2010a). A 
more sophisticated understanding of the social world and of social change as resulting from altered 
contexts of practice is required10, yet hardly anywhere in sight. Another blind spot in the ‘value-action 
gap’-argument is the assumption that there is a rather consistent value-orientation which just needs to 
be properly translated into practice. But the interpretation of abstract ideas of the good is always 
contingent. Dipesh Chakrabarty writes: “whatever our socioeconomic and technological choices, 
whatever the rights we wish to celebrate as our freedom, we cannot afford to destabilize conditions 
(such as the temperature zone in which the planet exists) that work like boundary parameters of human 
existence" (Chakrabarty, 2009, p. 218). In practice, however, the widespread acknowledgement of the 
need to generate profound changes to production and consumption patterns is somehow assumed to 
                                                 9 Poll-based studies consistently show a steady increase in environmental awareness worldwide: see, 
for example, R. Inglehardt (1997), and more recently the studies by the BBC (2007), Brechin & 
Bhandari (2011), or the World Values Survey (2014) 
 10 In this vein, Oliver Stengel provides a more accurate version of this dilemma, as a gap between the 
true (i.e. the scientifically mediated evidence of global change) and the good (currently preferred lifestyles 
are still anchored in the pathos of an “age of exuberance”) (Stengel, 2011, p. 349) 
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be harmonizable with the logic of ever-expansive consumer capitalism11 through human ingenuity 
and technological progress. The possibility of alternative forms of economic organization and 
understandings of the good life are thereby rendered unlikely, laughable, or – worse even – invisible. 
Though this belief largely runs against accumulated evidence, it does not seem to be up for debate in 
the current cultural and political mainstream. Chakrabarty’s warning is turned a blind eye to. 
The stubborn denial of (even considering the possibility of there being) a conflictive relationship 
between ‘green’ and consumerist values that permeates public and policy debates points to a second 
possible understanding of the failure of sustainability governance:  In his address to the UN General 
Assembly in 2015, UN Good Will Ambassador, Leonardo di Caprio, drew an analogy between his 
profession as an actor and the way climate change has been addressed so far in global politics: “As an 
actor, I pretend for a living. I play fictitious characters often solving fictitious problems. I believe that 
mankind has looked at climate change in that same way”. Ingolfur Blühdorn (2007) has formulated 
the hypothesis of a “post-ecologist” pathos in politics and culture that draws on di Caprio’s 
appreciation: while the ecological imperative mandates adapting social ways of life to the carrying 
capacity of the biosphere, both governments and their constituencies are tacitly complicit  in a 
“performance of seriousness” whose unspoken aim is that of “sustaining what is known to be 
unsustainable, for as long as possible”. The failure of sustainability governance is therefore not to be 
understood as a “value-action” gap, but rather as an exercise in “societal self-delusion” by which we 
preach to each other about a ‘sustainable future’ that remains necessarily elusive. From a perspective 
of collective learning, the talk can no longer be of “simultaneous learning and non-learning”, but rather 
of halted, aborted or else co-opted collective learning processes. 
This glim picture should not be mistaken for misanthropic catastrophism, however. Rather, it is aimed 
at making the case for the relevance of our enquiry: When the continuation of reality becomes utopian, as it 
were, “only utopias are realistic” (Negt, 2012). Reactivating  – that is: reviving the utopian cultural and 
political imagination – becomes, at this point, more than ever before, a survival imperative for modern 
civilization, and possibly for the human species as such12. This is largely dependent on whether 
                                                 11 For an in-depth analysis of the tensions between the ‘consumer society’ and the ecological crisis, 
see Oliver Stengel’s (2011) comprehensive argument pleading for a culture and politics of sufficiency.  
 12 Statements such as this are, of course, discursively embedded, too. Yet in the framework of this 
thesis, the consistent accumulating body of empirically-founded scientific evidence over decades on 
the matter will be assumed a safe stepping stone for both scholarly as well as political reflection and 
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‘catastrophism’ can be rendered emancipatory: same as there are negative side-effects to the production 
of goods – so the basic storyline of the risk society thesis –, there are also positive side-effects to the 
anticipation of global catastrophe (Beck, 2015b). 
But does such anticipation have the potential to alter the social and political order of the world? 
‘Yes, it does’ is my answer, but in a very different way than we expect and imagine it. The scale 
of change is beyond our imagination. The idea that we are the masters of the universe has 
totally collapsed and has turned into its opposite. In the age of climate change, modernization 
is not about progress, or about apocalypse – this is a false alternative. Rather, it is about 
something ‘in-between’. We do not even have a word for this; we need a new public and 
scientific vocabulary. I propose the notion of ‘Verwandlung’ – ‘metamorphosis of the world’ 
(Beck, 2015b, pp. 75–76) 
 
Beck’s idea of “metamorphosis” remits to the type of whole-societal change described by Karl 
Polanyi13 in his opus magnum “The Great Transformation” (1944) to characterize the disruptive 
upheaval of productive systems and ways of life with the emergence of industrial capitalism in the 
18th-19th century England. There is now widespread scientific and political consensus that a “new 
Great Transformation”14 (Kates, Travis, & Wilbanks, 2012; Reißig, 2011; WBGU, 2011) – hereinafter 
referred to as social-ecological transformation15 (SET) – of contemporary societies on a Polanyian scale in 
                                                 
action. The epistemological nature and validity of this assumption are discussed more thoroughly in 
the closing section of Chapter 2. 
 
13 Inspired by Polanyi’s metaphor, the terms “Great Transformation” or else “Great Transition” are 
deployed today to visualize a historic shift of similar proportions for the 21st century by a variety of 
actors in the academia, civil society, and increasingly also in government (Brand, 2016a; Demirovic, 
2012; Narberhaus, 2012; Raskin, 2008; Spratt, Murphy, & New Economics Foundation, 2009; WBGU, 
2011)  
 14 The current deployment of the term ‘transformation’ to connote the idea of a sustainability-oriented 
restructuration of Western-style modernity should be clearly distinguished from the narrower use of 
the term established in the social sciences during the 1990s to refer to the study of societal change in 
Eastern-European countries after the fall of the “iron curtain”. 
 15 The choice of the particular term “social-ecological transformation” is aimed as facilitating 
communication, as the former became established as the umbrella term for the discussion around a 
whole-societal transformation towards sustainability in the German debate (Deutscher Bundestag, 
2013; W. Sachs, 2013). In other words, SET is an originally empirical concept turned into an analytical 
one (e.g. Brand, 2012a; Brie, 2014). Instead, I reserved the Polanyian term “Great Transformation” to 
refer to my object of inquiry (i.e. the empirical debate in Germany around a SET).  
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the coming decades is inevitably to unfold, be it “by design or by disaster”16. As the term ‘social-
ecological transformation’ connotes, the main object of this fundamental redefinition is the mode of 
relationality between society and their ecological base, between the ‘sociosphere’ and the biosphere.  
Indeed, trans-formation etymologically implies a radical semantics which could be reworded into 
something like ‘constitutive change’ (Brand, 2012b)17. The concept of ‘transformation’ has become a 
buzzword in social-ecological debates over the last few years, particularly in the global North. The 
concept has been adopted by flagship reports of international institutions and think tanks18, become 
the header of research programs (Future Earth, 2017; Hackmann & Moser, 2013b; Hackmann & St. 
Claire, 2012), and convening political debate (Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund & Deutsche 
Naturschutzring, 2012; Deutscher Bundestag, 2013; Felder & et. al, 2012). The rise of ‘transformation’ 
can be attributed to, perhaps, first and foremost, the ever broader recognition of the profound 
character of the global environmental crisis; second, to the increasingly obvious limits to existing 
forms of (global) sustainability governance (Blühdorn, 2007; Edwards, 2010; Huesemann & 
Huesemann, 2011; Santarius, 2012); thirdly, to the most immediately perceptible socio-economic 
consequences of the multiple crisis in the aftermath of the economic meltdown of 2008, and, fourthly, 
with intensified debates about the need for profound social change, in particular regarding the society-
nature relations (Brand, 2016b). The practical implications of the aforesaid are, however, far from 
consensual: the scope, the speed, and the means that are necessary to initiate and to advance such 
processes, are subject to controversial debate. 
There exists, however, a level of meta-consensus regarding these implications. Indeed, the “long 
breaking distance” – i.e. the time gap between the moment of generation of causes and the moment 
                                                 16 The concept of “by design” is often used in opposition to “by disaster” (see for example Welzer & 
Sommer, 2014; Zelik & Tauss, 2013), implying that fundamental societal change is inevitable under 
present global conditions: the relevant ethical and political question is how much and what kind of 
control we can and should exercise over this change process. For a discussion about the possibility, 
risks, nuances, and the historically peculiar imperative for such a transformation “by design” see, for 
example, Stirling (2015). 
 17 In German, the concept of transformation is often substituted by that of “Wende”, meaning a U-
turn or radical change (e.g. Energiewende, Agrar- or Nahrungswende, Wachstumswende, Forschungswende, etc.) 
 18 By way of illustration of this trend, consider the Global Environmental Outlook GEO 5 Report by 
UNEP (UNEP/PNUMA, 2012b, 2012a); the Transition to sustainability report by IUCN (W. M. Adams, 
Jeanrenaud, IUCN Future of Sustainability Initiative, & IUCN--The World Conservation Union, 
2008); or else the State of the World reports by The Worldwatch Institute, particularly the 2010 and 2012 
issues (Assadourian, 2012; Assadourian & The Worldwatch Institute, 2010), among many others. 
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of observability of effects with many global environmental changes (e.g. climate change) – implies 
that, if an ecological Armageddon is to be averted, the upcoming transformation cannot be awaited 
to unfold reactively in the form of gradual evolutionary change: it needs to be deliberately propelled 
“for reasons of insight, prudence, and foresight” (WBGU 2011, p. 5). It requires more than the 
gradual, evolutionary learning that has driven the succession of an epochal episteme into the next 
throughout human history (Foucault, 2012): it requires deliberate triggering, fostering, and accelerating 
sustainability-oriented collective learning processes at all levels of society (Escobar, 2013; Hackmann 
& Moser, 2013a; Tàbara, 2013). 
While the capacity or limitations of human agency to straightforwardly ‘design’ or ‘implement’ a 
transformation of social and cultural arrangements remain an open interrogation – let alone its 
desirability, considering the catastrophic experiences with attempts at “social engineering” in the 20th 
century – collective learning and transformation processes can surely be deliberately influenced19. In 
fact, learning is an emergent effect from the complex interactions of myriad ongoing intended and 
unintended agential interventions into the social fabric. Therein lies the historically unique challenge 
with regard to the upcoming transformation into an ecologically viable society, as opposed to the 
“Great Transformations” of the past. Due to the ‘long breaking distances’ involved, the next “Great 
Transformation” must be anticipated; that is, the standard historic reaction – i.e. a change of direction 
in response to crises and disasters – must be avoided (WBGU 2011, p. 5). This requirement for an 
actively ‘transformative agency’ is a constitutive dimension of what we have termed “geostorical 
exceptionalism”. 
 
Yet the above are normative assertions (albeit hardly controversial ones). Can such learning also be 
studied empirically? What processes of transformative learning can be observed in the empirical 
world? Where are the agents of such transformation, and how are they exerting their influence? What 
structural or contingent contextual factors are alternatively aiding or hindering transformative learning 
processes, as well as their materialization in the empirical world? 
At the beginning of the 21st century,  with the backwind of the great economic crises at the turn of 
the century in the global south, and at the end of the first decade of the 21st  in the global north, has 
unleashed a revival of the social (Occupy, Indignados in the North; indigenous and landless peasants, 
                                                 19 The role of human agency in deliberately advancing collective learning towards sustainability is 
discussed at length in Chapter 2. 
 
11 
 
in the South) and academic critique of capitalism (Brand & Wissen, 2017; Crouch, 2011; Dörre et al., 
2015; Streeck, 2011), and, more generally, of the ideology of development which sustains it (Burchardt, 
Peters, Weinmann, & Akademie der Diözese Rottenburg-Stuttgart, 2017; Escobar, 2012a; Gudynas, 
2014; Latouche, 2009; Ziai, 2007). In addition, the failure of current governance institutions not only 
to bend socio-economic and ecological, but also to imagine other development pathways beyond the 
resigned fatalism of TINA-managerialism (H. Rosa, 2010), has triggered a worldwide legitimacy and 
efficacy crisis of governance. These contradictions and deadlocks place hitherto resilient conventions 
and convictions under greater stress, bringing the historically developed ecological, socio-economic, 
and cultural critiques of Western-style modernization into convergence (Asara, Otero, Demaria, & 
Corbera, 2015). These convergent critiques are not only fostering a re-activation of debates, but also 
the production of alternatives20. 
Some scholars have raised attention to globally distributed yet convergent newly emerging collective 
learning processes (hereafter CLPs) which go beyond adaptive proposals that “offer Anthropocene 
conditions as solutions” (Escobar, 2013, p. 3). Such processes can be identified – in more or less 
institutionalized fashion, and at uneven stages of development – in multiple societal spheres, ranging 
from social movements at global (Via Campesina; Divest movement), regional (e.g. Degrowth), or local 
level (e.g. “Wir haben es satt” in Germany, a movement made of peasants and concerned citizens against 
the agribusiness model); in meso-level developments, such as the ‘silent revolution’ of the 
“democratization of science”21; but also, macro-scale political and cultural experiments such as Buen 
Vivir in the Andean-Amazonian countries of Latin America. 
These developments may appear of marginal importance, at face value (i.e. as measured by their 
observable impact in global macro-societal trends). Yet taken together in their mutual (potential) 
interactions, they point at a larger shift in the ‘deep structures’ of Western-style societies. This is, to 
                                                 
20 The ensuing fundamental critique of the development model of the West, however, coexists with – 
and is often overshadowed by – ardent conservative reactions, as visible in the rise of right-wing 
populism in the global north, both at the level of crisis-movements (e.g. PEGIDA in Germany) and 
governments (Trump). While such developments are proving increasingly disruptive in sociopolitical 
terms, they remain essentially reactive. The social and scholarly attention focus, however, tends to be 
all too readily displaced towards these eye-catching symptoms, leading to hasted misrecognition of 
causal linkages with (and distortion of the historical proportions vis-à-vis) the game-changing 
transformations coming up in the face of the rising “geostorical era” in the history of our species.  
 
21 For background, see section 4.2.3. in Chapter 4. 
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be sure, a line of inquiry that focuses on – thereby also making scholarly room for – nascent utopias, 
rather than on manifest social trends, adding to an emerging scholarly agenda (Escobar, 2013; Santos, 
2004; Schneidewind, 2015; Wright, 2013). But, following Ernst Bloch’s (1995) distinction, it does not 
amount to engaging in wishful thinking about what we would like the world to be (i.e. “compensatory 
utopias”), but rater intensively searching for concrete existing potentials and trends towards 
alternatives, which can be activated – i.e. “concrete utopias” or “real utopias” (Wright, 2013)22. 
Insofar this PhD thesis deals with (‘concrete’) utopias that only manifest materially in emergent form, 
knowledges, meanings, and imaginaries – notions which are operationalized here with the concept of 
discourse – take center stage. Or, more precisely, the “discursive practices” and their carrying agents, 
which make them echo (or not) in the resonance board of brader society, potentially triggering 
collective learning processes. Indeed, CLPs can arise “in the form of alternative discourses, sub-
political influences, and subversive topical contributions” (Pelfini, 2005, p. 38). Arturo Escobar has 
named such discursive projects aimed at breaking dominant imaginaries on sustainable development 
(SD) transition or transformation discourses (TDs). Variously conceptualized in terms of a paradigm-shift, 
system-change, or civilizational change, TDs share the common contention that the contemporary 
ecological and social crises are inseparable from the model of social life shaped after Western standards 
that has become dominant globally (Escobar, 2015, p. 452). While wide open in their specific 
discursive contents or “interpretative repertoires” (Keller, 2011), they can be generally characterized 
as articulating “veritable cultural and ecological transitions to different societal models, going beyond 
strategies that offer Anthropocene conditions as solutions” (Escobar, 2013, p. 3). 
This PhD thesis will theoretically address the issue from a two-fold perspective: 
First, discourse research will serve to identify discourses (or discursive elements: frames, narratives, 
categorial and phenomenal structures) that challenge the hitherto dominant SD orthodoxy (discourse 
as representation), on the one hand, and to reconstruct the typical agent practices and roles enacted to 
this effect (discourse as practice), on the other. The goal is assessing how particular “dramaturgical” 
conditions (actors performing discourses in a given socio-political and cultural setting) influence the 
ability of TDs to effectively challenge dominant structures of the discursive field of SD. 
                                                 
22 For a theoretical discussion on the epistemological status of utopias, see the Excursus on 
epistemological considerations at the end of Chapter 1. 
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Secondly, collective learning theory (CLP-theory) will serve as a broad critical theory of society23, from 
which changes can be assessed as positive or negative – not from a transcendentalist or evolutionist 
perspective, but vis-à-vis the ultimate telos of preserving the integrity of the biosphere, as assessed 
through socio-ecological megatrends and the historical record of (mostly failed) Earth-system 
governance-attempts. 
 
Case studies 
 
The empirical aspect of this research addresses two case studies: the German debate on a Great 
Transformation (GT), which gathered sustained momentum over the second decade of this century (e.g. 
Brand, 2015), and the Latin-American Buen Vivir (BV), which has permeated the socio-political 
scenario in the Andean-Amazonian region, particularly Ecuador and Bolivia over roughly the same 
time-frame. Both these transformation discourses (TDs) catalyzed in response to major situated and 
acute crises: BV emerged at the turn of the century, out of the crisis of Latin-American political 
economies at the turn of the century. Having been tailored to the Washington-Consensus for over 
two decades, the ensuing socio-economic meltdown in several Latin-American countries eventually 
resulted in the much touted ‘left-turn’ (Beasley-Murray, Cameron, & Hershberg, 2009; Castañeda, 
2006; Gudynas & Acosta, 2011b; Natanson, 2008) or ‘post-neoliberal turn’ (García Delgado & 
Nosetto, 2006; Pelfini, 2008; Radcliffe, 2012). The GT debate, in turn, gathered momentum towards 
the end of the 2000s against the backdrop of the greatest economic crisis in the industrialized world 
since the Great Depression of the 1930s, in what came to be known as the ‘Great Recession’, coupled 
with the crisis of multilateralism in climate policy, which became evident, at the latest, after the failure 
of the UN climate summit in Copenhagen, in 2009. Both TDs, however, reframed these conjunctural 
crises as global, systemic crises correspondingly demanding systemic solution-approaches: In the 
North, the talk is about a global “multiple interlinked crisis” (Brand, 2009; Germanwatch, 2012; 
Misereor & IHS, 2013; Reisch & Bietz, 2014), while in the South it was framed as a “civilizational 
crisis” (Escobar, 2010; Leff, 2004a). 
Each in their respective contexts of emergence, BV and GT can thus be viewed as two grounded, 
multi-agent-driven experiments staging the struggle among diverse imaginations to foster 
comprehensive societal transformation in response to a global systemic crisis. What is exceptional in 
                                                 
23 This framing of collective learning as a meta-theory significantly differs from its pioneering attempts 
at operationalization as a middle-range theory (e.g. Pelfini, 2005, 2007) 
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both these cases is that they have overflown societal niches of social practice and spilled into 
institutionalized platforms, informing the outlook, strategies, or programs of a variety of socio-
politically and culturally influential institutions: BV has prompted profound reflection processes in the 
political, public, and scholarly spheres at the national level in Ecuador, Bolivia, and beyond; while GT 
has become an established subpolitical24 discursive field in the German-speaking world, including 
sociopolitical actors such as NGOs, think tanks, state agencies in the development and environment 
sectors, and marginally also political parties and trade-unions, along with scientific bodies and research 
organizations. Hence both BV and GT – substantial and contextual differences notwithstanding – can 
be viewed as unlikely cases of ‘successful’ TDs in a discussion otherwise dominated by status-quo 
prone approaches. This makes them puzzling objects of enquiry. 
Both the disparate character of these TDs in terms of their respective discursive processes and 
spatiotemporal contexts of embeddedness, as well as the asymmetric methodological approach to the 
two case-studies (see point on methodology below) would not allow for a strictly comparative research 
design. Nevertheless, fruitful insights can be gained from a juxtaposed analysis of both cases, i.e. from 
bringing them into resonance with each other. Furthermore, this ‘dialogical perspective’ adds interest 
from a vantage point of interrogating co-constitutive global-local interactions, as well as 
complementarities and possible synergies in both ideational and material terms (practices, structures). 
 
Research question and goals 
 
Based on theoretical analysis in triangulation with the insights gained through the empirical study of 
agential practices (intended or unintendedly) advancing collective learning processes in the case-
studies of BV and GT, this PhD research aims at addressing the following general question: 
How can collective learning processes towards a social-ecological transformation be deliberately fostered? 
 
This general question can be broken down into the following sub-questions: 
a. What structural obstacles constraining a ‘transformative agency’25 can be identified and how 
can they be overcome? 
b. What ideational and material enablers towards a social-ecological transformation can be 
identified? 
                                                 24 I adopted Ulrich Beck’s concept of ‘subpolitics’ to refer to all forms of political activity taking place 
outside and beyond the formal political system. 
 
25 For a proper conceptualization of ‘transformative agency’ see Chapter 2, section ___ 
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c. What ideal-typical roles and practices of ‘transformative agency’ can be identified? 
d. What are the implications of the above for the theory and practice of sustainability 
governance? 
 
The overall goal of this PhD thesis is to gain understanding of the mechanisms by which current 
unsustainable symbolic orders26 are destabilized and new, transformative ones emerge in the case 
studies at hand, with th purpose of drawing insights for a theoretical and empirical outlining of the 
concept of transformative agency, and deriving implications for currently prevalent understandings of 
sustainability governance. 
 
Specific goals are: 
 
a. Analyze GT and BV as iconic TDs in North and South, both separately in their situated 
materiality and ideational dimensions, as well as in their reciprocal resonance and inter-
imbrications, , to derive insights from their successes and shortcomings in advancing collective 
learning towards a social-ecological transformation. 
b. Characterize the ideal-typical practices and roles of a ‘transformative agency’, as well as typical 
agent-constellations collectively steering societal learning and transformation processes 
towards sustainability. 
c. Identify structures enabling or constraining agents’ interventions towards a social-ecological 
transformation. 
d. Develop an empirical- and a conceptual-theoretical framework providing insights into how to 
potentiate enablers and remove or mitigate constraints weighting upon transformative agency. 
 
Methodological framework 
 
This research endeavor can be inscribed within the interpretative paradigm in the social sciences27.  
                                                 26 The concept of symbolic order is defined in Chapter 1, section 1.4. 
27 Precisions about the epistemological choices in this PhD thesis are laid out in the final section of 
Chapter 2. 
 
16 
 
The research dynamics was characterized by a dialectics between theory and empirical work, following 
an abductive logic (Swedberg, 2011, 2012a, 2012b) combining induction – from initial empirical 
observation (‘empirical literacy’) to the “kind of theorizing that takes place at the stage before the 
formulation of hypothesis” or research questions (2012a, p. 1) – and deduction: from the formulated 
theoretical problem to its empirical engagement. Lastly, the findings of empirical research feed back 
into theorizing. 
A theoretical and an empirical dimension are thus integrated into the research design. Theoretical 
aspects include agency-based theories of social change, collective learning, and governance of societal 
change towards sustainability, as well as the peculiarities of the agency-structure balance in the context 
of the Anthropocene. 
The empirical dimension poses greater challenges to the researcher: Insofar meaning-structures usually 
evolve in a rather fluid and continuous fashion, changes can be often recognized only ex-post, and only 
if they had a significant impact on social structures (thus becoming retrievable). An important part of 
social experience thus goes wasted. Furthermore, knowledge generated ex-post can be of little value 
when history has already taken a turn. In the face of geostorical challenges and the transformation-
imperative derived thereof, understanding of ongoing or emerging alterations in prevailing meaning-
structures may allow agents the necessary anticipation to engage in promoting presently unfolding 
learning processes, hence rescuing especially valuable (insofar transcending the prevalent symbolic 
order) social experience from oblivion and taking advantage of historical windows of opportunity. A 
methodological approach allowing to capture potentially significant discursive shifts in ongoing 
change processes is thus required; that is, one that captures the relevant empirically observable ‘clues’28 
– a more evanescent ontological and epistemological category than conventional conceptions of ‘hard’ 
evidence –  pointing at possible alterations in otherwise rather stable meaning-structures. In so doing, 
attention should be paid to the particular context of changes and their direction, allowing for the 
identification of discursive agents, their practices, dispositifs, and material or non-material effects. 
The empirical study was done deploying an integrated theoretical-methodological approach 
combining a three-legged structure of data collection and data analysis: 1) a reconstruction of the 
respective fields of discursive practice in the two case-studies at hand (including processual or 
diachronic elements); 2) an interpretative-content analysis of discursive representations in each field 
                                                 
28 Such an approach docks well with Santos’ ‘sociology of the non-existent’ (i.e. absences and emergences), 
which is discussed in some detail in Chapter 2. 
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through the Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse (SKAD)(Keller, 2011), 3) a 
‘dramaturgical analysis’ (J. C. Alexander, 2004) combining the two first stages into an integrated 
analysis of the pragmatic performativity of each situated discourse, merging materiality and 
imaginations embedded in structures, practices, and discourses into a single framework which allows 
us to distil enablers and obstacles to transformative collective learning. Each of these methods is 
outlined in detail alongside the respective empirical chapters. 
Regarding data sources, the analysis of the GT-debate was based on primary, mostly documentary 
data (grey literature, policy documents, position-papers, political manifestos, etc.), understood as 
representative utterances of the discourses analyzed (Keller, 2011). Exploratory expert interviews and 
a review of secondary literature (academic overview studies) allowed to draw an initial outline of key 
actors, events, issues, and processes, which was then used to gather a relevant corpus of data, out of 
which two theoretical samples were drawn for the distinct phases of analysis. The samples were subject 
to systematic coding and analysis. The analysis of the BV-debate, in turn, drew on the abundant 
secondary literature available on the topic (including own work published throughout the research 
process in international peer-reviewed journals). 
Partial elaborations were presented at academic events (conferences, colloquia), published in peer-
reviewed journals, and included in teaching syllabi for increasing validity through ‘social objectivation’ 
(Keller, 2011, p. 109) 
Ontological and epistemological assumptions 
 
This dissertation departs from the following foundational assumptions: 
First, as per current patterns in the Evolution of the Earth System (factoring in global ecological and 
worldwide socio-economic trends) a ‘great transformation’ of Euro-Atlantic modernity29 triggered by 
fundamental changes in bio-physical life-support systems – other possible social triggers 
notwithstanding – is, in all likelihood, inevitable in the course of the present century (inter alia Brie, 
2014; Daily & Walker, 2000; Homer-Dixon, 2009; Leggewie & Welzer, 2010; Reißig, 2011; W. Sachs, 
                                                 
29 This prospective view of a major societal transformation resulting from exogenous drivers (and 
normatively advocated by most TDs) should not obscure the fact that modern capitalist societies are 
steadily changing, they are societies in continuous state of flux as a result of endogenous drivers such 
as market competition and their expansionist logic, social interaction, contradictions, and crises 
(Brand, 2015; Demirovic, 2012). The idea of a social-ecological transformation as a transition to a 
different type of society should therefore be distinguished from that of a constantly changing society 
as a result of structure-immanent dynamics.  
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2013; Schneidewind, 2015; WBGU, 2011). The continuation of the current socio-economic order 
based on accelerating consumption and extraction of natural resources can therefore be considered as 
nothing short of delusional. The question is less about whether or not fundamental changes will occur, 
but rather about what the transformation will look like and how it will unfold, as well as who will be the 
‘historical agent’ (Touraine) carrying it forward, and in the interests of whom. This assessment 
underpins the assumption of a ‘transformation imperative’. 
Third: The paradigmatic framing of this dissertation within the interpretative tradition of Max Weber 
inherently conveys a set of assumptions about the way of grasping the world, and these have 
methodological implications: first, interpretation is only possible within the framework of a given 
‘hermeneutical horizon’, hence the importance attributed to the identification of frames or 
background cultural assumptions in data analysis (see Chapter 3). Secondly, interpretation is always 
contingent upon the vantage-point of the analyst (hence the importance of making assumptions 
explicit, and of systematization and third-party validation or “social objectivation” throughout the 
analysis), but also upon the familiarity of the researcher with the ‘universe of meaning’ in which the 
phenomenon under study is embedded, hence the importance of “empirical literacy”, i.e. the 
ethnographic involvement with the discussions constituting the object of observation, made possible 
through a long-term research stay in Berlin, in the case of the GT debate, and through ample familiarity 
with the BV debate though a range of peer-reviewed publications on the subject since 2012. Third, 
understanding is always contingent upon the aim at which the enquiry is directed, i.e. the question 
takes precedence over the answer: theory and methods should be tailored to the object of inquiry, not 
the other way around. 
This research also goes beyond naturalist notions of rationality. Indeed, canonical approaches such as 
rational choice (agents ‘pulled’ by reward incentives, moral persuasion, or rational arguments) or 
institutionalist (agents ‘puhsed’ by social norms) have proven ill-suited to sustainability governance. 
While the individualistic, behaviorist bias of the former upholds unrealistic assumptions about how 
social change happens, as seen with the failure of behaviorist policy approaches (Shove, 2010a) and 
of multilateral negotiations, the latter are better suited to explain the reproduction of socio-cultural 
matrixes than their transformation.30 
                                                 
30 Changing an institutional trajectory implies eliciting resistance from all those actors that have 
adapted their individual or collective strategies to the prevailing system of relations. Therefore, from 
an institutional perspective, changes can only be expected within the narrow tolerance range of 
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It should be kept in mind that while the theory and method adopted in this dissertation are rather 
descriptive (i.e. instrumental in the pursuit of interpretative aims), the overall intention of the doctoral 
thesis is clearly critical; that is, knowledge is produced with the aim of enabling emancipatory 
interventions in society. However, in the context of the Anthropocene – as will be discussed in greater 
detail in this chapter – the concept of ‘emancipation’ acquires new intra- and inter-generational and 
global dimensions. As it was at the beginning of the environmental movement in the early 1970s, it is 
not only about granting everyone a fair choice to participate in society anymore (i.e. achieving social 
justice), but about effectively addressing the socio-ecological pathologies of Western-style modern 
societies. 
However, this PhD thesis maintains a critical-realist outlook in its core assumptions about the world 
(i.e. the epochal diagnosis of risk society, and in particular the validity of the scientific discourse on 
global environmental change). Constructivist epistemologies are in order when it comes to 
understanding how individuals perceive and (inter)act in response to what we have called geostorical 
challenges, on the basis of their individual and collective, situated, contingent, and plural experiences. 
The knowledge about such challenges, however, poses a kind of ‘hard’ benchmark, which is drawn 
from a non-constructivist epistemology of the material world (Latour, 2000). In this integrative 
framework, the ‘realist’ sustainability imperative works as a functional substitute of an universalist 
conception of morality and rationality, thus allowing for the articulation of the neo-Kantian worldview 
underpinning the Habermasian collective learning theory and the constructivist assumptions of the 
post-structuralist approach to discourse research informing SKAD. The validity of such a dual 
epistemological stand is discussed at length in the Excursus closing Chapter 2. 
 
Disciplinary framing 
 
The complexity of the thematic area outlined here, crossing sustainability governance, collective 
learning, discourse research, and the Anthropocene as an epochal diagnosis places this research at the 
crossroads between various sub-disciplines in sociology: - Environmental sociology in terms of topical competence regarding ecologically-centered 
social diagnoses such as the Anthropocene and the derived ‘geostorical challenges’. 
                                                 
established institutional structures, and therefore changes tend to be incremental, alongside a defined 
trajectory (Aguirre & Lo Vuolo, 2013) 
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 - Cognitive (Eder, 2007) and cultural sociology (J. C. Alexander & Smith, 2003) regarding the 
actual object of observation: collective learning processes (i.e. making of meaning-structures) 
and the transformation discourses or utopias emerging therefrom. - Political sociology regarding the focal concern with agency and governance. 
 
An attempted synthesis could locate the present research at the interface of cognitive/cultural 
sociology (collective learning, post-structuralist discourse research) and political sociology 
(governance, discursive agonism) of socio-ecological change. 
Furthermore, while the object of inquiry – i.e. socio-cognitive or symbolic matrixes and their practical 
(re)production and transformation –, as well as the theoretical and methodological framework of this 
dissertation remain unmistakably sociological, the research ‘spark’ does not stem from disciplinary 
research agendas or intellectual traditions, but rather from the wish to contribute to addressing the 
empirical challenges of a transformative agency, as well as from transdisciplinary academic 
problematizations (political ecology, ecological economics, global studies, among other fields of 
inquiry). 
 
Overview of the thesis content 
 
 
The dissertation is structured in three parts. 
Part I progressively builds up the conceptual and theoretical frame of a collective learning approach 
to social-ecological transformation, and of the driving role of agency therein, focusing on the structural 
impairment constraining the transformative capacity of agents, and engages in theoretical exploration 
and hypothesis building for solutions, which are to be fleshed-out with insights gained from empirical 
observation in Part II. 
Chapter 1 starts by introducing the state of the art in collective learning theory as a macro-theory of 
socio-cognitive and cultural change, and establish conceptual-theoretical linkages with the concept of 
social-ecological transformation. CLP theory is tested for fit regarding its ability to explain 
transformative action in response to geostorical challenges. The second part of the chapter introduces 
discourse theory as a middle-range theory operationalizing the concept of collective learning, together 
with a corresponding ‘dramaturgical’ theory, which analyzes the spatiotemporally contingent 
performance of discourses to explain the greater or lesser degree of world-shaping power of a 
discourse in a given context, as well as the reasons behind it.  As a theory built on an emergentist 
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ontology, CLP theory, in its current state of development, largely blends out the issue of the micro-
foundations of such emergence. An enlargement of CLP-theory is then proposed to account for the 
role of agency in fostering emergence. 
Chapter 2 problematizes the social genesis of transformative agency. To this purpose, it recapitulates 
and tests the classical assumptions of agency-based theories of social change (as illustrated with 
Honneth’s recognition theory) in the context of geostorical challenges, concluding that conventional 
assumptions of such theories face problems when stretched to account for transformative, whole-
societal change. The dilemmas of would-be-transformative agents are theoretically worked out and 
systematized in a conceptual-analytical scheme, which will serve to orient the interrogation of data 
from the empirical case studies and frame the corresponding findings. Closing the chapter, relevant 
epistemological and ontological considerations regarding the theoretical framework just introduced 
are discussed at length. 
Part I having introduced the theoretical concepts of transformation as a specific type of social change, 
and discourse as a specific field of struggle where the socio-cognitive and socio-cultural preconditions 
for a transformation are shaped (or not) through collective learning, Part II covers the analysis of 
empirical cases: Great Transformation and Buen vivir. Each chapter in this block starts with an overview 
of state of the art literature, and presents an account of methodological proceedings. Analysis in these 
three chapters yields both ideational and discursive-practical tools and docking points for strategic 
dialogues and coalition-building towards a greater transformative leverage of agency, drawing on an 
in-depth analysis of the two situated TDs. This is the place to look for detailed empirical insights. 
Chapter 3 engages in exhaustive interpretative-content analysis of the GT debate. After an exploratory 
analysis to yield a broad picture of the field of discursive representation, fine-tuned analysis proceeds 
in three stages, following the SKAD- analytical framework: phenomenal or problem-structures, 
narratives, and frames or interpretative schemes are analyzed separately, followed by an integrative 
effort. The findings of this analysis are framed as building-blocks (opportunities and tools) for agential 
brokerage. 
Chapter 4 analyses the GT debate as a discursive process. It starts with a systematic exploration of the 
development of the GT debate in the various relevant discursive arenas, drawing from a theoretical 
sample of relevant textual sources. The second part of the chapter inquiries into the performativity of 
the discourse around a GT by considering the relationship between representations (analyzed in 
Chapter 3), on the one hand, and relevant pragmatic factors (performing agents, spatial and temporal 
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materiality, political, economic and hermeneutic power, contingent situation, and audience response), 
on the other. 
Chapter 5 brings on the case of Buen vivir, synthesizing both the ideational and practical dimensions 
of the analysis based on insights gained from secondary literature, paralleling what the two previous 
chapters had done with the GT-debate. 
The two closing chapters forming Part III synthesize partial findings, draw empirical and conceptual 
insights, and develop new conceptual tools aimed at the double purpose of orienting cultural and 
political practice, on the one hand, and contributing to the development of theory, on the other. 
Chapter 6 starts by drawing lessons from a relational (rather than strictly comparative) assessment of 
GT and BV, searching for generalizable insights, and for points of discursive connection and 
disconnection between the two, drawing on both observed empirical practice and actors’ 
representations in both case studies. Research outcomes include typical agential configurations, agency 
roles, and structural enablers helping to remove, mitigate, or circumvent the structural dilemmas of 
‘transformative agency’ identified in Chapter 2. 
These findings are found to stretch the idea of ‘governance’ beyond its conceptual boundaries in trying 
to account for system-transformative interventions by ‘change agents’. Chapter 7 thus explores the 
conceptual and practical implications of these limitations, proposing a conceptual extension I 
denominated ‘post-governance’ to cater for an ideal-typical characterization of a transformative 
agency. Armed with this new conceptual framework, the chapter explores the interface of post-
governance with macro-political, material, and cultural structures as an exploratory assembly attempt 
between post-governed collective learning and a broader transformation theory, indicating avenues 
for further research. The chapter closes acknowledging limitations of the study and stating the general 
conclusions of the dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 1  
Collective sustainability learning as pathway to a global socio-ecological transformation 
 
Contemporary societies are now engaged in a learning race 
against the speed and intensity of global environmental change 
J.D.Tàbara, World Social Science Report 2013 
 
 
1.1. Introductory remarks 
 
From the epochal diagnosis and the assumptions outlined in the introduction to this dissertation, 
emerges a first conceptual-theoretical construct and a series of open questions that will be fleshed out 
throughout the present chapter, aiming at the broader goal of contributing to the further theoretical 
development of a sociological theory of collective learning in the scholarly context of a 
“transformative science” (Schneidewind, 2013b, 2015). 
The chapter is structured as follows: First, the notions of transformation and collective learning will be 
introduced. Operating at the level of socio-cognitive and cultural structures, collective learning 
emerges from the diagnosis of an anthropogenic global environmental change as a necessary double 
moment – a deconstructive one, aimed at ‘unlocking unsustainability’; and a constructive one, aimed 
at the expansion of cultural and political imagination – as a precondition for a global social-ecological 
transformation (‘making sustainability’). Following, a sociological theory of collective learning will be 
outlined and discussed as a critical macro-theory of society with regard to currently prevalent 
unsustainable development trajectories. Yet a middle-rage theory is required to operationalize the 
otherwise almost metaphorical concept of collective learning for the purpose of applying it to 
empirical analysis. To this purpose, discourse and dramaturgical theoretical-methodological 
frameworks – accounting for discourse as representation and as practice or performance, respectively 
– are introduced and integrated with collective learning theory. Finally, the question of the role of 
agency in collective learning is raised. Indeed: The current scientific and political consensus 
acknowledging ecological sustainability as a survival imperative for the human species connotes an 
implicit teleology in this concept of collective learning, and thus raises the question of how such learning 
can be fostered; that is, the question of what type of agency mediates this learning process. 
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Our theoretical inquiry will then be resumed in Chapter 2, which further explores the question of a 
‘transformative agency’ by inquiring into its social genesis and structural constraints in the context of 
the geostorical challenges of the Anthropocene. 
 
1.2. Collective learning as macro-theory of societal change towards a social-ecological 
transformation 
 
1.2.1. Transformation as a (re-)emerging sociological concept and research program 
 
In the wake of the crisis of ‘grand theory’ in the social sciences, speaking of whole-societal 
transformation may raise some eyebrows. As Charles Tilly  (1991) argues, however, the de-legitimation 
of the idea of a single valid logic to explain the world does not amount to abandoning the study of 
“huge structures and processes”; rather, it demands new frames and methods for doing so. Indeed, 
rather than aborting the enterprise of ‘thinking big’, the epochal diagnosis of the Anthropocene 
demands exactly the opposite: in a time of global structural crisis of coupled social and ecological 
systems (Gallopin, Gutman, & Malleta, 1989; Manuel- Navarrete & Buzinde, 2010; Schellnhuber & 
Wenzel, 1998), re-directing scholarly attention to the fundamental pillars of (dysfunctional) social 
organization becomes a survival imperative. (Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1996) 
Furthermore, despite its current estrangement in many scholarly circles, ‘transformation’ is anything 
but a novel object of reflection and inquiry in the social sciences: In fact, in the early days of the social 
sciences, ideas of whole-societal transformation were all-pervasive (Westley, 2014). Sociology was 
born as a response to the “Great Transformation” of the day: industrialization. How and why it was 
happening? What fuel maintained it? How did it affect diverse groups in society and their individual 
members? Those were the questions driving sociological inquiry back in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries. In response to the challenges posed by the emerging industrial societies, diverse strands of 
sociological explanation and normative prescription unfolded: Marx longed for a proletarian-led 
revolution in response to the bourgeoise transformation, and thought it to be inevitable. For him, 
social analysis had the main purpose of speeding up the socialist transformation. In turn, other thinkers 
were concerned with the question of social order, rather than with revolution. While hard-core 
conservative milieus saw the possibility of returning to pre-industrial forms of social organization in 
the search for restoring order to a convulsed society, most of the sociological classics saw the answer 
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in ‘looking forward’, assisted by enlightened reason31: for Durkheim, the social science was objective, 
and could observe the world from an outsider position. Max Weber disputed this: following the 
hermeneutical tradition in philosophy, he deemed objectivity a mere illusion. Hence, the mission of 
the social sciences was to illuminate and understand the meanings, the social actions expressing those 
meanings, and the patterned material consequences derived from them, in particular their 
crystallization in the form of economic and political structures. (Westley, 2014) 
Eventually, the interest in social order prevailed over the revolutionaries, and informed further 
sociological theorizing. Indeed, the idea disturbances to the social order (or how to prevent them) are 
alluded to in a more or less explicit way by classical authors such as Durkheim (‘anomia’); Weber 
(‘residual irrationality’); Luhmann (‘operational closure’); or Habermas (‘colonized life-worlds’). 
However, the quest for the preservation of order comes at a cost, namely that of foreclosing alternative 
futures. This should not be read – at least not yet, at this level of theoretical abstraction – through the 
lens of a postcolonial ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’: indeed, the very vital possibility of even making 
some sense of the world in its constant state of flux requires restricting the flow of endless possibilities, 
and this implies that some of the complexity of existing knowledges, narratives, and voices necessarily 
get lost in the process. This is inevitable and even necessary a precondition for the maintenance of the 
integrity of the social bond (Eder, 2014). Yet this cannot be conflated with the systematic exclusion, 
marginalization, or banalization of particular knowledges and their social carriers. As shown in the 
preceding paragraphs, the prioritization of scholarly interest in order and stability instead of that in 
societal transformation is a historically contingent phenomenon, which comes with institutional 
conformity-pressure in the academia, in politics, and society. In other words, it is intersected by power-
vectors, as theorized by Foucault with his concept of power-knowledge regimes. 
But any established order remains provisional, and susceptible of being challenged and changed. In 
geostorical times, the question of fundamental societal transformation is certain to become central, once 
more, both in scholarly inquiry and in socio-cultural and political praxis. Not closing, but opening 
alternative futures is the call of the hour. “Succinctly, if we are at risk of self-destruction, we need to 
reinvent ourselves ontologically” (Fry 2012, cited in Escobar, 2013, p. 9). Technological and 
                                                 
31 Under the label of ‘enlightened reason’, what is meant is a transcendentalist and substantive 
understanding of ‘reason’ which up until today informs the positivist tradition in the social sciences. 
The Kantian tradition understands reason as a categorical norm-generator, while the Utilitarian 
tradition sees reason as an unchangeable yardstick for instrumental means-ends decision-making. 
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increasingly also social innovation are ubiquitously stimulated as a way to carve new paths forward. 
Yet the transformation to sustainability is not only a matter of finding new ways, but also – first and 
foremost, perhaps – of undoing old unsustainable ways (Shove, 2010b). The social-ecological 
transformation (SET) is a deconstructive moment, as much as it is a moment of innovation. Better: it 
requires a deconstructive moment before it can effectively yield a constructive one. Arguably, the 
tragedy of Western-style modern societies is not the lack of alternative – fairer and sustainable – ways 
of socio-economic organization, but rather its (infra)structural path-dependency on old, unsustainable 
production and consumption matrixes, as well as on the accompanying cultural schemata and the 
thereof derived meaning-structures (Welzer, 2011). The logical inference which follows is that 
innovation is not the main key to a sustainable world, as long as innovations continue to be 
accommodated to the prevailing cultural matrix. Boaventura de Sousa Santos puts it eloquently: “there 
are enough alternatives out there; what is lacking are alternative ways of looking at alternatives”32 (my 
emphasis). Hence, insofar the deconstruction of the current unsustainable social order is a prerequisite 
for the construction of a new sustainable social order, change takes precedence over order – at least in 
the chronological sense. Undoing unsustainability becomes a precondition for doing sustainability. 
With this double-aim at heart, Transformation research can draw from a rich pool of theoretical and 
methodological approaches and concepts, ranging from complex systems- and structural theories, 
cultural theories, as well as theories based on agency and action. Critical transformation scholars would 
emphasize social relations and processes, power- and property-structures, conflict, and 
domination/hegemony, usually drawing on Marx, Gramsci, and Polanyi; while scholars closer to 
modernization theory tend to resort to Durkheim, Schumpeter, or Parsons, and see functional 
differentiation, modernization and evolution/development concepts as critical to transformations. 
For their part, (non-idealist) cultural and agency-based approaches – on which this doctoral thesis 
largely draws – are closer to the Weberian and eventually the Critical tradition in the social sciences. 
In times characterized by ambivalence, rapid change, and mounting uncertainty, the co-existence of 
multiple (even contradictory) approaches in dialogue with each other should come as no surprise, and 
should rather be expected to become the norm in research on socio-ecological transformation. (Brand, 
2014d) 
Yet the risk is that – by lack of a condensed theoretical framework for the study of social-ecological 
transformations (integrating questions of process, action, power, structure, culture, and agency in their 
                                                 
32 Retrieved from http://alice.ces.uc.pt/en/ on 18.07.2016 
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changing mutual feedback loops) – substantively novel empirical phenomena are filtered through and 
accommodated to fit well-worn theoretical and methodological lenses: the object is thus adapted to 
the instrument, instead of the reverse. It goes without saying (and here the point of critiques of ‘grand 
theory’ is acknowledged) that – given the complexity, sophistication, and veering character of society 
(and, therefore, of societal change) as an object of theorizing – such integrated ‘transformation theory’ 
cannot be expected to sketch out more than general, typical premises and statements, and the 
designation of some key factors (Reißig, 2014, p. 92). Yet there is much which speaks for the 
development of such integrated “transformation paradigm”: the need for answers to critical questions 
such as what, why, and how, as well as the changes in meanings and material consequences of the 
fundamental transformations of our time, together with increasingly acknowledged as indispensable 
inter-disciplinary dialogue and learning among the social and human sciences (Brand, 2014d; 
Hackmann & St. Claire, 2012; Mauser et al., 2013). While necessarily much narrower in ambition, both 
the research questions and the theoretical framework of this doctoral thesis have been developed with 
the aim of contributing to this broader theoretical puzzle, i.e. as a sociological contribution to the 
development of an overarching transformation theory. 
In the presence of geostorical threats, however, descriptive theoretical efforts shedding light on the 
how of change amount to only half of the job: answers regarding the direction of change are equally 
needed, that is, knowledge that yields normative orientations for action33 and enables the evaluation 
of unfolding changes as positive or negative. In other words, what is needed is a theory of social learning 
capable of passing judgement on evolutionary events and processes. 
It should be noted that while ‘change’ merely denotes a (normatively neutral) alteration in a relatively 
stable order of things, ‘learning’ and ‘evolution34’ connote an implicit teleology, which has made them 
the target of critique as a form of Western ideology, particularly when conceptualized in terms of 
‘progress’ or ‘development’ – including sustainable development (see Introductory chapter). 
                                                 
33 In this sense, current transformation research distinguishes between transformation science (descriptive 
of actually occurring transformation processes) and transformative science (triggering transformation 
processes) (Schneidewind, 2013b; WBGU, 2011) 
 
34 The term ‘evolution’ was adopted from the natural sciences – especially from Darwin’s theory of 
evolution – by the mainstream of intellectuals in the human and social disciplines in the 19th Century. 
Yet unlike natural (genetic evolution), social evolution depends – among other things – on how culture 
evolves (epigenetic evolution), and the idea of cultural evolution implies a theory of collective learning, 
which explains the way in which culture changes. (Eder, 1999) 
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Therefore, it should be stressed right from the outset that the use of the terms ‘learning’ and ‘evolution’ 
in the framework of this thesis does not amount to endorsing any form of universalist theory that sees 
an upward trend in the historical direction of social change, or that sets given patterns (e.g. towards 
greater functional differentiation) as a necessary evolutionary feature35. Yet it does retain a certain 
teleological flavor in that it sets the preservation of the integrity of the biosphere – which constitutes 
a survival imperative for the human and most other living species on this planet – as the benchmark 
against which to measure the adequacy or inadequacy of trends in societal change. The sustainability 
imperative can thus be safely considered as a benchmark against which to test any possible culturally 
elaborated or politically agreed-upon “desired futures”36. 
It should be noted then that, despite drawing on (and adapting, where required) a general concept and 
theory for collective learning, conceptual definitions and theoretical claims in the framework of this 
dissertation will be limited to collective learning processes with reference to a social-ecological 
transformation, as conceptualized above (abbreviated hereinafter: transformative learning). The precise 
conceptual contours of this particular type of learning and its operationalization for empirical research 
will be attempted after considering more general features (and problems) of collective learning in 
general. 
 
1.2.2. Collective learning as a precondition for a social-ecological transformation 
 
There is a rapidly accumulating body of literature on social learning towards a sustainability 
transformation. Ironically, however, a properly sociological theory of social learning is virtually absent 
from this burgeoning discussion37. Such sociological theory of collective learning (hereinafter CLP 
                                                 
35 As will be shown in Chapter 3, for example, the emphasis on the communal and the ‘commons’ (as 
a form of collective property and/or usage) in the GT debate as a driver towards the sustainability 
transformation speaks for a transition from prevalently gesellschaftliche towards re-emerging 
gemeinschaftliche forms of organization of collective life, thus challenging Durkheimian assumptions 
about increasing specialization as a necessary feature of evolution in modern societies.  
 
36 This statement should not be read as a naturalistic retour. Naturalism seeks to provide explanatory 
accounts of social evolution based on naturalistic premises. Setting the preservation of natural life-
support systems as a benchmark for social evolution, however, is indeed a (hardly a disputable) 
normative choice, but certainly not a naturalistic one. 
37 By way of example, overview studies such as What is social learning? (Reed et al., 2010) or else the 
collection of essays Social Learning Towards a Sustainable World (Wals, 2009) retrieved texts from 
organizational studies, innovation studies, etc., but no sociological account binding these micro-/ 
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theory) was in fact developed in Germany in the 1970s and 1980s, mainly by Max Miller and Klaus 
Eder (Pelfini, 2005). While initially rooted in the cognitivist-psychological tradition of James M. 
Baldwin, Jean Piaget, and Lawrence Kohlberg, it later developed into a properly sociological approach 
merging the interpretative traditions of Alfred Schutz, Erwin Goffman, and Harold Garfinkel, on the 
one hand, and the Habermasian theory of Communicative Action, on the other (Eder, 2007). 
However, this theoretical enterprise was later largely discontinued due to difficulties in 
operationalization and in finding a suitable way of circumventing issues of veiled normativity 
embedded in its generative philosophical matrix (Eder, 2014). Piecemeal efforts have been undertaken 
later to bridge these issues and further develop the theory (i.a. Eder, 1999, 2007; Forchtner & 
Schneickert, 2016; Krügger, 2012; Pelfini, 2005, 2007). A reformulated version of collective learning 
theory appeared recently (Forchtner et al., 2018), after the defense of this PhD thesis, and is thus not 
accounted for in my line of argumentation. 
 
Part of the difficulty lies in the understanding of the concept of ‘learning’ itself (let alone ‘collective 
learning’!). Indeed, an overview of the relevant literature reveals a variety of possible understandings 
of ‘learning’38. These understandings vary according to diverging conceptualizations regarding mainly 
the subject (individuals, organizations, networks, institutions), the object (substantive knowledge 
about the world versus cultural or social meaning-structures), and the nature of the process of learning 
(e.g. diffusion versus emergence). Some particularly relevant features of this kaleidoscope of learning-
conceptions will be discussed in the next section. In addition, these diverse understandings are 
informed by equally diverse (even divergent) epistemological and ontological presuppositions: some 
classical conceptions see social learning as a linear ascension path towards moral universalism (in the 
ethical tradition of Hegel and Herder) or the technological mastery of nature (in the rationalist 
                                                 
meso-perspectives together is provided. In the concluding section, Reed et al.’s critical review article, 
aimed at summarizing and clarifying conceptualizations of social learning currently relevant in 
sustainability-related research, comes up with something closer to a sociological definition: “social 
learning may be defined as a change in understanding that goes beyond the individual to become 
situated within wider social units or communities of practice through social interactions between 
actors within social networks”. (Reed et al., 2010), yet no corresponding theoretical development is 
provided. 
 
38 For a thorough account, comparison, and discussion of each of these approaches, see, inter alia Eder 
(1999, 2007) and Pelfini (2005)  
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tradition of Descartes and Bacon). These so-called ‘evolutionist’ perspectives clash with pluralist 
modern and post-modern conceptions emphasizing socio-historical embeddedness and the 
contingent and reversible39 character of learning. Rationalist conceptions explain learning as the 
aggregated effect of individual learning based either on axiomatic assumptions about human cognitive 
capacities (be they transcendentalist, as in the Kantian philosophical tradition; or utilitarian, as in the 
rational choice tradition), or on naturalist premises (e.g. the cognitive-psychological tradition of 
Baldwin, Piaget, and Kohlberg). Their fundamental differences notwithstanding, what all these 
approaches have in common is that – against classical behaviorist approaches assuming an immediate 
linkage between external stimulus and response – they privilege the cognitive ability of humans 
(individual and/or collectively) to produce structured images about the world as the cornerstone of 
their ensuing theoretical explanations of human sociality and of individual and social action. 
Miller (1986) and especially Eder (1985, 1999, 2007) engaged in the theoretically difficult task of 
outlining and delimiting an empirically-based and properly sociological theory of collective learning. 
In light of my research questions and goals, engaging in this theoretical debate here would be of little 
relevance. Instead, I will outline the contours of Eder’s theory – the sociological theory on collective 
learning which is most compatible with the epistemological and ontological assumptions in my 
conceptual and theoretical working-framework – and problematize it in light of the referred research 
questions and goals, thereby indirectly advancing theorization in this field. 
The work of Eder was particularly concerned with the historical and epistemological contextualization 
of the concept of (collective) learning, seeking to distance it from Parsonian-functionalist, rationalistic, 
individualistic, and naturalistic explanations of the social bond and of their respectively envisaged 
mechanisms of social evolution. Instead, Eder brought collective learning closer to a culturalist- 
interactionist perspective, integrating the Habermasian and the symbolic-interactionist tradition, as 
represented mainly by Aaron Cicourel (1963, cited in Eder, 2007) and Ervin Goffman (1974, 1983). 
From a rational-choice perspective, the social bond is the result of a rational consensus towards the 
establishment of norms that would stabilize the social environment, thus enabling means-ends 
calculations on the part of egoistic subjects. Culturalist conceptions view such assumptions as 
                                                 
39 Indeed, as the quasi-apocalyptic warfare of the 20th Century has demonstrated, social learning is 
anything but non-reversible (Eder, 1985; Pelfini, 2005). Similarly, the hitherto successful cultural 
model of Western-style modernization may have just turned into a “doomsday model” (Beck) as a 
result of the generalization of self-engendered systemic risks, with the diagnosis of the Anthropocene 
as its apotheosis. 
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unwarranted, emphasizing the symbolic nature of the social bond, instead. From this perspective, 
instrumental reasoning is explained as a particular case of meaningful action, among other possibilities. 
For their part, individualist and naturalist conceptions pose a direct correspondence between 
subjective and collective learning, which is questioned by (symbolic-)interactionist perspectives that 
see collective learning as an emergent effect40 of social (symbolic) interaction, rather than a sum of 
increments in individual knowledge stocks. 
In fact, Eder’s theory builds on Goffman’s late concept of “interaction order” (Goffman, 1983) as a 
conceptual cornerstone. With this concept, Goffman refers to concrete networked interaction among 
actors, which in turn yields certain shared socio-cognitive structures, that is: shared meaning-structures 
configuring a hermeneutical horizon through which actors make sense of the world. I will hereinafter 
refer to this as symbolic order41. Goffman thus showed that, behind the conscious normative order of 
the social world (which constitutes the theoretical point of departure for rationalists), there exists a 
world that we take for granted, which works as a precondition for the existence and functioning of 
the former: the cognitive or symbolic world42. Empirically, it can be verified that social interaction 
continues even in the event of rules being breached – in fact, rule-breaching is an everyday occurrence 
in social life. Instead, social life is not possible in the absence of a shared cognitive or symbolic universe 
which provides the basic instructions for individuals to make sense of the world and engage with it. 
                                                 
40 The concept of emergence refers to the self-organization of a system of interconnected, relatively 
simple elements to form a more complex system, with new properties and improved adaptation 
capacities. Its roots lie with the General Systems Theory, Complexity theory, and Chaos Theory. These 
theoretical strands provide general guidelines to the concept. In the social sciences, the concept of 
‘emergence’ is a latecomer. Ernst Bloch (1995) was a forerunner with the concept of the “not yet” 
existent (see Chapter 2). Even though it never acquired paradigmatic status, the presence of emergence 
theory (under diverse labels) in several areas of social thought can be traced long back in history. An 
example is the sociology of collective action (e.g. Turner & Kilian 1957), the sociology of social 
movements, the sociology of disasters (e.g. D. Wenger 1978); the sociology of flows (J. Urry; S. Lash, 
M. Castells; A. Mol; J. Law), and environmental sociology (Hannigan). 
41 For the sake of terminological unambiguity, the term ‘symbolic order’ was preferred to ‘narrative 
order’ (Eder), since the term “narrative” constitutes an operational methodological concept in this 
dissertation (Keller, 2011). The term ‘symbolic order’ was also privileged for reasons of versatility – 
especially in establishing a clearer bridge to Foucault, whose notion of discourse I will seek to integrate 
to the collective learning framework. 
 
42 In its functional role of enabling social interaction, the symbolic world is analogous to what in the 
phenomenological tradition (and later taken up by Habermas) came to be known as the ‘life-world’, 
or, more generally, a shared phenomenological horizon. 
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Hence, unlike normative expectations, cognitive presuppositions are not amenable to negotiation. 
Abiding by the non-written rules of this symbolic order is a precondition to being accepted as a valid 
interlocutor, as a member of society: “If you break norms, you are sanctioned; if you break cognitive 
presuppositions, you are excluded as a stranger or a psychopath” (Eder, 2007, p. 397). 
Furthermore, and despite not having actually been agreed upon in the sense of the “social contract” 
metaphor, this symbolic world is still a rule-governed (though not rule-oriented) world; i.e. it has a 
structured order, which is constantly maintained-reproduced-transformed in the course of 
(meaningful) human interaction. Such interaction is, in turn, guided by the cognitive rules embedded 
in the prevailing symbolic order. 
From a sociological perspective, the question then arises of how can these symbolic orders (and their 
changes) can be empirically studied. Goffman came up with a methodological concept to study 
symbolic orders: he called it ‘frame analysis’ (Goffman, 1974). Yet unlike Eder and Miller, Goffman 
did not take interest in the question of how frames change as a result of ongoing interaction. Another 
possible answer is that the symbolic order of human sociability is rendered visible through patterns of 
social identity-building, which enables mutual recognition among social actors (i.a. Honneth, 1992). 
Hence, the study of identitary boundaries and their evolution would be one possible access point to 
the study of the structures of the socio-cognitive world and their evolution, which is the path chosen 
by Eder in his later work (see for example Eder, 2000, 2006, 2009) 
More generally, it can be said that the coordination of cognitive worlds ensues through a variety of 
cognitive devices (such as thematic frames, identity patterns, and categorial schemes) transported into 
communicative interaction situations mainly through narratives43. Over time, identity claims (as 
thematized by the literature on New Social Movements) and cognitive claims (the object of inter-
cultural and partly also of decolonial studies) mark turning points in the flow of narratives which make 
up the symbolic structure, introducing variability into what is otherwise a stable order. Such cognitive 
and identity claims arise in moments of crisis, when the taken-for-granted-world is questioned, and 
open up new paths of normality basing on a symbolic or cognitive project (Eder, 1999), that is, on the 
                                                 
43 The ‘narrative turn’ in the social sciences increasingly led to an understanding of social orders as 
narratively-constituted structures since the 1970s-1980s. The concept of narrative can be here broadly 
equated with that of ‘story’. It is through narratives that we come to know, understand, and make 
sense of the social world, and it is through narratives and that we constitute our social identities 
(Ricoeur, 1991; Somers, 1994) 
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selective retelling of stories and the selective mobilization of frames, images, etc. related to such 
narratives (Eder, 1999; Tilly, 2002). 
It is through cognitive projects that the agential dimension in the evolution of symbolic orders comes to 
the fore. Through such cognitive projects, agents seek to transform the prevailing symbolic order as 
a way to allow for broader opportunities for recognition and for making sense of the world. Yet 
cognitive projects necessarily remain embedded in a broader (and relatively stable) symbolic order, 
which renders the former more or less likely to succeed in establishing meaning44, and its potential 
impacts weaker or stronger in terms of reproducing/ transforming that very symbolic order. The 
concept of cognitive project will be equated here with that of discourse, and the situated performance 
of discourses in social praxis will be analyzed in terms of a dramaturgy, following in the footsteps of 
Goffman and J.C. Alexander (see Chapter 2). This theoretical construct builds on the fundamental 
assumption that changes in social structures result from a co-evolutionary, dialectical process between 
cultural and material dimensions, rather than seeking to explain either one as an epiphenomenon of 
the other (J. C. Alexander, 2005; Eder, 1999, 2007). Eder usefully summarizes this dialectical relation 
using a cognitivist metaphor: the social relations (and the material structures into which they crystalize) 
can be equated to the ‘social brain’, while the socio-cognitive or cultural structures constitute the ‘social 
mind’. Analytically, they are two different categories, though they cannot be empirically separated. 
It is discursive representations and their concrete dramatization which are the object of observation 
in the framework of this dissertation. The dramaturgies of interest to this research are the cultural and 
political deliberative processes around alternative futures, anchored in concrete networks of persons 
and organizations, artifacts (e.g. publications, research and political programs, funding lines, etc.), and 
practices (e.g. protests, research collaborations, alternative everyday-life practicalities, etc.) which are 
found in the empirical case-studies. The discourses of interest are the cognitive projects or 
representations emerging from such deliberative processes. In analogy with Eder’s metaphor, 
dramaturgies play out in the realm of the social ‘brain’, while discourses remit to the social ‘mind’. In 
processes of discursive reproduction, the force of the symbolic order is displayed. Conversely, 
discursive struggle signals a situation of crisis, of discontinuity in the course of time (Eder, 2006), and 
                                                 
44 The relative compatibility of the cognitive project at hand with the prevailing symbolic order, and 
thus its likelihood of success, is referred to by Eder as ‘narrative plausibility’ of the project (Eder, 
2006) 
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– as argued below -  opens up a structural window of opportunity for individual  and collective learning 
processes to unfold. 
In the mode of a summary of this section, and before going into deeper theoretical reflection and 
problematization of the sociological theory of collective learning, a systematic justification of why 
such theory is relevant in the framework of this dissertation is in order. Three different underpinning 
arguments can be distinguished: 
Substantive argument: As with any theory, the validity of CLP theory is dependent upon its adequacy vis-
à-vis the empirical object it seeks to understand/explain (see epistemological considerations in the 
Excursus at the end of this chapter). In geostorical times (Chakrabarty, 2009; Latour, 2014), a notion of 
telos of learning is required, which here can be re-interpreted as worldwide politically agreed upon 
‘transformation’ of Western-style production, consumption, and disposal patterns. For the reasons 
presented in the Introductory chapter, this amounts to a new “Great Transformation” of Polanyian 
scale of Euro-Atlantic modernity, even if all specific features of such ‘transformation’ cannot possibly 
be known beforehand. 
Pragmatic argument: CLP theory offers a sound theory of change compatible with the empirical object 
under study, that is: cognitive (i.e. discursive) projects. In addition, a CLP theory helps approach this 
object of study in as concrete a way as possible: by observing changes in communicative and 
discursive-dramaturgical interaction. Keeping things concrete here is important, since when the talk is 
about whole-societal change, the assumption of the possibility of a second-order observation (i.e. of 
an outsider position observing and assessing such change) becomes more problematic than ever. 
Scholarly argument: ‘social learning’ being an emerging concept in social-scientific sustainability-related 
research, a sociological theory of collective learning comes-in timely to engage in discussion with other 
conceptions. 
 
1.2.3. Theoretical considerations around collective learning 
 
Following Eder (1999, 2007) and Pelfini (2005, 2010), I will define collective learning as an emergent, 
(de)constructive process through which the symbolic-cognitive-narrative scaffolding that people use 
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to interpret the world and communicate with each other is altered, opening up the scope and span of 
what can be deemed desirable, possible or even thinkable45. 
This definition opens up an array of questions which require being addressed for a proper 
understanding of the conceptual-theoretical specificities and of the value-added of collective learning 
in the context of this dissertation. An accurate account of the defining features of this collective 
learning theory can be achieved through exploring the structuring questions the concept of learning 
gives rise to: the preconditions for learning (when learning takes place); the subject of learning (who 
learns), the object of learning (what is learned), the process of learning (how it is learned). What follows 
is a summary presentation of the conceptual and theoretical groundings of collective learning theory 
and their contextualization (problematization) in the light of geostorical challenges. 
In view of the peculiarity of a sustainability-oriented learning process, namely: its intentional character, 
one further key question can be raised: who can trigger CLPs opening up socio-cognitive and cultural 
perspectives towards a ‘Great Transformation’? 
The first of the questions posed above – when learning comes about – refers to the enabling structural 
preconditions for collective learning. The theory says collective learning happens in situations in which 
interaction processes yield modifications of collectively shared knowledge (e.g. a situation of clash of 
diverse cultural models or epistemes, as we will see in the case of the Buen vivir discourse, but also, in a 
less straightforward fashion, in the GT debate). Mutual understanding of the respective symbolic 
universes cannot be taken for granted anymore, and symbolic identification needs to be actively 
restored46. Learning thus emerges out of a juncture of uncertainty, of a situation where the normal 
state of (symbolic) order is interrupted (Siegenthaler 1993, cited in Eder, 1999). This theoretical claim 
                                                 
45 This disruptive character of the concept of collective learning is emphasized in other denominations, 
such as “transgressive learning”(Lotz-Sisitka, Wals, Kronlid, & McGarry, 2015). Yet while they may 
add value in terms of conceptual distinctiveness in the face of too broad an array of existent learning-
conceptions, such terminological innovations fall short of theoretical depth. I will therefore stick to 
the term ‘collective learning’ and its theoretical baggage.  
 
46 This proactive character of the learning process already suggests the intentionality at work in the 
very genesis of collective learning processes. This does not amount to saying that CLPs (or social 
evolution, for that matter) can be deliberately triggered, steered, or controlled. But it does highlight a 
dimension of collective learning which is largely overlooked in the theoretical current in which CLP 
theory is inscribed. I will come back to this in the following section, to elaborate on the key role of 
agency in ‘transformative’ learning processes. 
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is widely supported by historical evidence, particularly, in our domain of inquiry, by the study of the 
‘great transformations’ of the past: 
The history of transformations, especially the road to industrialization, teaches that conditions of 
evolutionary openness were most favorable to innovation. It was a combination of fragmentation, the 
absence of central control, facilitated communication and the chance of continuity, which led to 
industrialization. Perhaps these are also the conditions that favor a transition to a sustainable future 
(Sieferle, 2010, p. 26). 
A learning society is a society in a state of painful transition. Hence, it should be expected that societies 
tend to resist learning, so that learning processes only unfold when forced by traumatic socio-historical 
circumstances. In terms of the epochal diagnosis on which this research piece bases, the implication 
is that, Beck’s “risk society” – a society fundamentally characterized by its self-engendered existential 
risks – is, by implication, a learning-prone society (Beck, 2016; Eder, 1999). 
Due to the exceptionality of the preconditions required for successful collective learning, it needs to 
be stated a priori that collective learning is, correspondingly, an exceptional instance in social evolution. 
Yet its critical importance as a survival imperative in the context of geostorical challenges make their 
study not only worthwhile, but straightforwardly unavoidable. 
The question of who learns remits to the issue of the articulation of social developments between the 
micro-meso-macro levels of society. In social theory three broad positions regarding the subject of 
learning can be identified47: 1) individuals learn; 2) relations/ networks learn (with a greater or lesser 
degree of institutionalization); and 3) autopoietic social systems learn (i.e. macro-developments have 
no micro-foundations). 
From Parsons to Habermas, the dominant explanation for socio-historical evolution was ontogenetic, 
i.e. it relied on individualistic understandings of learning, while later prevailing theoretical strands leave 
individualistic assumptions aside and presuppose an interactionist learning-mechanism, i.e. a 
sociogenic explanation for social evolution: learning emerges out of the dynamic relationships among 
more or less organized individuals. Yet this leaves a broad range of possible learning-subjects, ranging 
from interpersonal learning networks, through organizations (organizational learning48), to 
                                                 
47 For a lengthy discussion on these diverse theoretical perspectives, see (Eder, 1999) 
 
48 Organizational learning is conceived as the process of adapting to evolving environments through 
complexity and uncertainty reduction, as a tool for the survival of the organization. This focus on self-
preservation and the conception of the world as an analytically out-bracketed “environment” clearly 
deviates from the conception of learning that is of interest to this research work. Hence, this 
‘cybernetic’ conception of learning (Pelfini, 2005) will be hereinafter excluded from consideration. 
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institutions, and societies as a whole (social or cultural learning49). According to the above definitions, 
our focus here is on how inter-personal and organizational networks and their cognitive projects may 
eventually influence re-articulations at the level of socio-cognitive and cultural structures, as 
observable in the pluralization of the discourse on sustainable development (SD) (see Introductory 
chapter). The peculiarity of this discursive field50 is double: in ideational terms, it traverses arguably 
every aspect of the organization of modern societies; in pragmatic-material terms, it spans across a 
wide spectrum of their cultural and (sub)political institutional infrastructure. This is to say that the 
phenomenon observed is arguably to be situated at the meso-societal level, with potential projection 
onto the macro-level. Hence the discursive field of SD goes well beyond the realm of an expert or 
special-arena discourse, as Foucault understood the term, and rather pertains to the general 
organization of society. It follows that discursive change in the field of SD is an asymptotic proxy for 
cultural learning. Pelfini (2005) has also located collective learning distinctively at the interface between 
the meso- and the macro-level of society, yet placing greater emphasis on how learning is mirrored in 
the evolution of formal institutions – or their less stabilized surrogates, which he refers to as 
‘institutional arrangements’. Similarly, from the perspective of Sociological New Institutionalism, 
Krügger (2012) sees institutionally mediated collective learning as a two-way process of bottom-up 
crystallization of emergent socio-cognitive and moral patterns, on the one hand, and a top-down 
diffusion from established institutions, on the other. In view of the barely incipient formal 
institutionalization of the discursive change processes in the empirical case-studies at hand, however, 
I will rather look at institutions in their constraining role, as inertial, self-stabilizing, and self-
reproducing formalized entities or socio-cultural patterns. In turn, I will rather conceive of networks as 
                                                 
49 Cultural learning refers here to the cognitive and normative rules that govern inter-organizational 
communication/ coordination: basically, a moral order (embodied in an institutional order) and a 
symbolic-cognitive space (that defines how information is to be interpreted, codified and classified). 
Eder (1999) refers to this as ‘institutional learning’. Yet for the sake of unambiguity, as in other authors 
(for example Hajer, 1995; Pelfini, 2005, 2012), as well as in lay language, the term ‘institution’ is usually 
conflated with a narrower understanding as formal institutions (such as marriage, the school, or the 
state), I prefer using the more general concept of “cultural learning”. The term ‘institution’, in turn, 
will be reserved for the narrower understanding of relatively formalized socio-cultural patterns or 
entities. 
 
50 A precise conceptualization of the terms ‘discourse’ and ‘discursive field’ is provided in Section 1.3 
of this chapter 
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the subject of collective learning51. This is, of course, a heuristic rather than a theoretical distinction: 
It goes without saying that, as these emergent CLPs unfold, formal institutions might be transformed. 
Moreover, a stable structure is as much enabling as it is constraining of agency and, therefore, of 
learning (Giddens’ ‘duality of structure’). But heuristically separating the ‘enabling’ and the 
‘constraining’ features of institutions when it comes to collective learning is in the interest of a clearer 
and pertinent conceptual-analytical device, hence I will conceive of networks as learning subject within a 
given institutional framework. 
The third question, which pertains the object of learning (i.e. what is learned), has largely been answered 
through the above considerations regarding the learning subject. As mentioned above, the perspective 
of symbolic interactionism, which lies at the foundation of CLP theory, not only assumes an 
interactionist grammar for collective learning, but further withdraws (idealized) rationalist 
assumptions: as defined here, collective learning is not mainly about the collective accumulation of 
substantive empirical knowledge or about adaptation to complex and changing environments, but 
rather about the transformations that interaction process yield at the level of socio-cognitive and 
cultural ‘deep structures’, i.e. transformations in the shared symbolic order. Hence, a collective learning 
theory is not primarily a theory about the accumulation of substantive or empirical knowledge(s)52 
about the world, but rather “a theory of organization and reorganization of [socio-cognitive and 
therefore pre-normative] rule-systems for the accumulation of knowledge” (Eder, 1999, p. 45); i.e. a 
theory that sheds light into how substantive or empirical knowledge is culturally metabolized or made 
sense of. In other words, a collective learning theory looks at the socio-cognitive structures regulating 
the genesis, stabilization and transformation of meaning. By implication, this includes how substantive 
knowledge is produced, which knowledge is validated and which is rendered invisible, etc. 
The above said notwithstanding, the question of how accumulating substantial knowledge about the 
world and the socio-cognitive or cultural rules to make sense of it are intertwined is one of utter 
relevance from the perspective of the necessary social-ecological transformation. More specifically, 
                                                 
51 The question about what the particular nodes in such networks (persons, organizations) is one to 
be answered through empirical inquiry. 
 
52 A further terminological digression pertains the concept of ‘knowledge’: whereas Eder builds up a 
binomial opposition between ‘culture’ and ‘knowledge’, where the former refers to the 
cognitive/symbolic scaffolding of interactively generated representations of the world and the latter 
to the concrete contents with which the aforementioned structure is populated, in the Foucauldian 
universe the term ‘knowledge’ is used more broadly to encompass both the above dimensions. This 
distinction is bridged here by referring to knowledge in the sense of Eder as “substantive knowledge”. 
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one could ask: where does the actual stuff fueling symbolic interaction (out of which learning results) 
come from? This question has hitherto had a default answer: it comes from history, i.e. it is our 
accumulated collective experience which provides the stuff, that is, the substantial empirical 
knowledge which we collectively reflect upon (Eder, 1985), including our factual knowledge about the 
world. Collective learning would thus consist in the constant re-elaboration of such knowledges and 
experiences in the light of new upcoming evidence, seeking to accommodate the latter to the 
sedimented deep structures (i.e. the prevalent symbolic order), whenever possible, and to adjust the 
latter to the former, when not. 
As argued in the Introductory chapter, however, learning from the repository available in history – i.e. 
the realm of social existence – implies a waste of social experience and representations which lurk in 
the realm of the socially inexistent. This insight cannot be dismissed as trivial vis-à-vis the idea of 
learning from history, as it has analytically distinct implications: indeed, the research-lens needs 
tailoring for exploring the realm of ‘non-existence’, which typically includes what history excludes – not 
only what did happen and was omitted due to historiographical bias, but also that which never actually 
crystallized into social structures, and could yet be relevant to present queries. Furthermore, the realm 
of non-existence also includes what is not yet, i.e. what is currently in the process of emerging into the 
realm of existence (Bloch, 1995; Santos, 2004)53. Furthermore, the anticipation of potential future 
risks to orient current transformative action implies an exercise in vivid anticipatory consciousness, 
implying that we also need to develop the capacity to ‘learn from the future’ (WBGU, 2011); and this 
implies not only gaining substantial knowledge or information to orient action from scientific 
projections, but that the future become a driver of cultural and identitary processes, as well54. This 
presents the learning subject with a capital challenge, as argued in Chapter 2. 
One key question, however, remains hitherto unraised: the question of why certain configurations of 
meaning/ knowledge happen to prevail over others. Answering this question requires investigating 
the power-dimension implicit in cultural schemata and social relationships of knowledge, as did Foucault. 
CLP theory, however, does not provide conceptual or methodological tools to investigate the power-
dimension of knowledge, hence there is need for complementing it with a middle-range theory which 
                                                 
53 An in-depth discussion on the space of social non-existence as a spring for learning is offered in 
Chapter 2 
54 Consider here, by way of illustration, the notions of a species identity (Chakrabarty, 2009) or else a 
global community of fate (Beck, 2010; Held & Hervey, 2009), or the various discursive traditions on 
cosmopolitism. 
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does. For this purpose, Chapter 2 introduces discourse research as a heuristic tool for the study of 
emerging transformative learning processes. The question of how social relationships of knowledge 
enable or block collective learning processes leads to our third question: the question about the process 
by which learning occurs, i.e. the how of learning. 
Collective learning theory being rooted in the symbolic interactionist tradition, it necessarily goes 
beyond assumptions of a substantive meaning of action towards the way in which such meaning is 
generated in the course of ongoing action and interaction. Learning thus cannot be regarded as the 
outcome of any particular argumentative interaction (e.g. a particular deliberation or a negotiation), 
but rather as an emergent phenomenon from a continuous stream of interaction, whose outcome is 
not a rational consensus among the participants, but rather a sense of collective identification; not a 
shared normative horizon – a ‘social contract’, in the rationalist sense of a deliberate agreement of 
individual members of a society –, but a shared hermeneutic or phenomenological horizon (which 
translates into, but cannot be reduced to, a shared normative horizon or moral order). Add the 
dimension of structure, and this phenomenological horizon becomes a symbolic order. 
Now, when are changes in the symbolic order to be regarded as learning? From the point of view of 
narrative structures, collective learning can be said to be dependent upon the open-endedness of 
stories, i.e. upon the possibility of further developing, contesting, or modifying the stories that make 
up the symbolic order – the contrary, i.e. the dogmatic or ideological closure of narratives (as with the 
infamous yet very much current Thatcherian TINA-narrative: “there is no alternative”), confronts 
learning with a blind alley (Eder, 2014). A logical inference from the above is that discursive 
pluralization constitutes a precondition to maximize the chances of “fundamental learning” (Miller, 
1986) through an enlargement of available symbolic docking-points, that is, offering a multiplicity of 
possible continuations for current narratives. 
Two issues arise from the above. First, just as social change cannot be engineered, symbolic structures 
are not manipulable at will (neither individually nor collectively). The fixation with individual, 
organizational and even institutional learning as the driver of social change is a misleading illusion of 
late modernity, and amounts to reproducing individualist and rationalist assumptions at higher levels 
of aggregation. In other words, neither individual nor collective learning processes – even if successful 
– translate directly and immediately into social change. It is rather the systemic impacts – the way in 
which interactively generated learning ‘echoes’ or resonates with macro-societal and macro-historical 
constellations – which engender social change and thus mark the path of social evolution (Eder, 1999). 
In that sense, “collective learning processes compete with stable power structures, sedimented 
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customary practices and dominant relations of production” as drivers of change (Pelfini, 2005, p. 46). 
Collective learning, then, does not produce change itself, but rather produces the repertoire of cultural 
variability required for social change to take place. It is a necessary though not a sufficient condition 
for social change. 
But even if subscribing this theoretical explanation in principle, it soon becomes apparent from the 
observation of history that social evolution has been unevenly impacted by various more or less 
deliberate cultural ‘inputs’ or practices of “ontological design” (Escobar, 2011). Obviously, certain 
cognitive or symbolic projects have had a greater influence in the course of historic evolution than 
others. This can surely not be attributed to power differentials alone; rather, the variegated creative 
individual and collective (re)appropriations of the world encounter greater or lesser resonance in a 
given social context, for a variety of reasons. But, as was the case with the power-dimension of 
knowledge, this largely falls out of CLP’s theoretical span. One probable reason for this can be derived 
from the paradigmatic positioning of CLP-theory in the field of social theory. Indeed, Eder’s 
interactive-emergentist thesis is to be read in the context of a theoretical debate with the rationalist 
paradigm, which sees social change as overdetermined by individual choices informed by instrumental 
rationality. In this sense, the symbolic-interactionist perspective informing Eder’s theory provides a 
sensible, balancing contribution. Yet with the emphasis placed on emergence, the question of the 
creativity potential of social actors to influence socio-cultural change (even if they cannot possibly 
control it) slips out of focus and remains unaddressed. As said before, there is no comprehensive 
theory outlining ‘success factors’ for deliberately triggering or steering social change, broadly defined 
– let alone a whole-societal transformation. Nevertheless, alongside Goffmann’s dramaturgical strand 
of analysis, I will argue that social interaction can be analyzed as a series of deliberate performances 
of cultural meaning, whose outcome is anything but random (or ‘self-organizing’). Furthermore, 
following J.C. Alexander (2004), it can be argued that the success or failure of such performances – 
even if not translating directly into societal change – do have practical consequences and can thus 
‘push’ the whole dialectical circle of learning and change in a specific direction. As will be shown in 
Chapters 4 and 5, however, the success of a cultural performance depends on a variety of controllable 
and non-controllable factors. Furthermore, social (let alone socio-ecological) systems are complex 
entities, hence not all relevant factors can be identified or properly understood. In that sense, Eder’s 
‘emergentist’ thesis holds full relevance. Yet insofar deliberately fostering a social-ecological 
transformation constitutes a survival imperative in the current geostorical context, it is worth enquiring 
deeper into how collective learning and its efficacy in unleashing a “Great Transformation” towards 
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sustainability can be actively fostered, thus moving us into a hybrid paradigmatic terrain merging 
agency-based- and emergent notions of learning, i.e. some sort of “weighted emergentism”. Section 
1.3 of this chapter is aimed at filling-in this theoretical gap, while Chapter 2 addresses the problems 
derived therefrom. The issue of agency in collective learning towards a transformation constitutes the 
cornerstone of this dissertation, giving rise to our main research question, namely: how can collective 
learning processes towards a social-ecological transformation of Western-style modernity be actively fostered? 
A second, related issue arising from the idea of a self-organizing, interactively generated symbolic 
order – as anticipated above – is the role of power relations and power imbalances in the interaction 
process. While the ubiquity of power relations in social interaction processes, regardless of the 
theoretical lens used to observe them, can hardly go unnoticed, I identify two main ways of 
approaching the issue in the theoretical currents reviewed here: For Eder (1999, 2007), the socio-
cognitive scaffolding (the ‘deep structures’) upon which every form of social interaction builds is 
autopoietically constituted, i.e. it emerges from diffuse self-organization. As a consequence, in this 
theoretical scenario, power is exerted at the level of superficial structures (e.g. via uneven playing fields 
in negotiations), and only extends transitively into the deep structures, therefore falling largely beyond 
the scope of the study of CLPs. For authors in the Foucauldian and decolonial traditions, in turn, 
power comes very explicitly to the fore in day-to-day social relationships of knowledge. By implication, 
the power-dimension cannot be bracketed out when studying meaning-making processes. Boaventura 
de Sousa Santos, for example, considers power-knowledge regimes so central that he conceives of 
social justice primarily as an issue of “cognitive justice”55 (Santos, 2008; Santos, Nunes, & Meneses, 
2007). 
The theoretical strands purporting the theses of ‘emergence’ and of ‘power-knowledge’56, respectively, 
stem from dissimilar traditions. Still, their mutual differences do not amount to incompatible 
                                                 
55 Alongside Foucault, Santos understands knowledge as intertwined with power, but, alongside 
postcolonial thought, he adopts a more structuralist view of knowledge-power regimes: Western (or 
Eurocentric) modern imaginaries have marginalized or suppressed other cultural models, effectively 
relegating them to a ‘space of non-existence’, and therethrough manage to legitimize and thus maintain 
their stance of alleged ontological superiority, giving rise to the ideologies of development and 
progress. Social justice can thus not be achieved – we might add: neither can ecological unsustainability 
be unmade – without “cognitive justice” (Santos, 2008) 
 
56 According to Foucault, reality is defined as the result of the balance of power amongst diverse 
“regimes of truth”, which are, in turn, sustained through discursive formations, i.e. discursive groupings 
that follow historically institutionalized sets of rules for discourse production (Keller, 2012). For 
example, a scientific discourse is manifest in texts, conferences, papers, talks, associations, and so on, 
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ontological or epistemological presuppositions, but rather to a matter of varying emphases, vantage 
points, and objects of study. Indeed, while power differentials leave their imprint in virtually any social 
fact, this is arguably less central an issue in European studies as it is in postcolonial societies. Moreover, 
unlike Eder’s main empirical endeavors, this doctoral thesis does not engage in socio-historical analysis 
of cultural change from a macro-perspective, but rather in ‘interactionist-dramaturgical’ analysis (J. C. 
Alexander, 2004; J. C. Alexander, Giesen, & Mast, 2006) at the meso-level. In other words, instead of 
looking at larger cultural change ex-post, I intend to research concrete discursive change as ex-ante 
indicators of unfolding cultural change. While in the former case the leverage of concrete social actors 
might be negligible, in the latter an a priori exclusion of power considerations seems unwarranted. 
This is to say that even if these two theoretical strands have developed autonomously from each other, 
this research endeavor may profit substantially from their pragmatic integration. In this regard, while 
acknowledging that discursive agents are no “masters of the discursive universe” but rather 
discursively (co-)constituted as well, it is equally clear that they by no means act naively, but rather 
as lively, interested producers of statements, as articulators with more or less strong resource and 
creativity potentials. The symbolic orders that are produced and transformed in this process constitute 
the aggregated effects of their actions; unambiguous temporary forms of dominance or hegemony are 
probably rare, but they are nonstandard configurations that should not be excluded from an empirical 
point of view (Keller, Schünemann, & Simons, forthcoming, p. 17) 
 
Since discourse, dramaturgy, and the agency-dimension therein are key in addressing our main research 
question, the following section seeks to build a theoretical bridge among these concepts, and integrate 
them with CLP theory, capitalizing on the discussions above. Analogously to what we did with CLP-
                                                 
which can all be studied as data. It emerged historically out of actions and interactions committed to 
“tell the empirical truth” about phenomena “in the world” – both in its form or formal appearance as 
well as in its contents: what could – and should – be told about these phenomena. Once 
institutionalized and given general legitimation, it pre-structures what could be said and done in this 
particular discourse arena. The Foucauldian concept of power-knowledge regimes usefully summarizes the 
idea that dominant institutions produce discourses that become commonly and uncritically accepted 
as ‘truths’ or ‘facts’. This form of power requires no coercion, as it is exercised merely through 
established socio-cultural practices – we might say: it is imprinted in the ‘deep structures’ of the socio-
cognitive world. As a result of this, Foucault’s conception of power/knowledge radically differs from 
the study of power in traditional conceptions, such as Marxist or Liberal ones, in that power relations 
are not considered mainly as relations between someone who possesses power and someone over 
whom this power is exercised. Although the aforementioned is apparent in a superficial analysis of 
power relations, a deeper, more sophisticated analysis would necessarily have to include subtler forms 
of power exercised not through agency, but through structures, in a dispersed, ubiquitous, way; 
whereby power is not only oppressive, but also constitutive (of subjectivities, practices, ‘realities’), as 
Butlers hetero-subjection theory, with which we engage in Chapter 2, clearly shows. 
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theory, the theoretical state of the art will be used as a point of departure, and will then be 
problematized in the face of the peculiarities emerging out of the current historical juncture as 
characterized by the all-disruptive presence of geostorical challenges and the derived transformation-
imperative. 
 
1.3. Discourse & Dramaturgy as heuristic framework for the study of collective learning 
processes towards a socio-ecological utopia 
 
This section offers an attempt at articulation of collective learning and discourse theory, under the 
premise that discourse change can be validly used as a heuristic tool for the study of emerging CLPs. 
It starts by explaining what is understood under the label ‘discourse’ in this dissertation, and why it 
matters for the study of CLPs, in particular for CLPs relevant to a prospective social-ecological 
transformation (or ‘transformative learning’). Following, two operational theoretical-methodological 
frameworks are introduced: First, the Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse (SKAD) 
(Keller, 2011) will serve for the interpretive content-analysis of the empirical case-studies in Part II. 
For the analysis of discourse performances or ‘stagings’, we resort to J.C. Alexander’s (2004) “Cultural 
Pragmatics” and its ‘dramaturgical model’. 
 
1.3.1. Discourse research: middle-range theory operationalizing collective learning 
 
According to Erik Olin Wright (2013), there are at least two interrelated arguments to account for 
discursively constructed alternative futures – which we can refer to as transformation discourses (TDs) or 
utopias57 (see Introductory chapter) – working as a precondition for collective learning and social 
change. First, the question of establishing a plausible and desirable destination of change arguably 
takes precedence over the question of the way of getting there. Why waste energy developing TDs 
before having proofed their achievability? The straightforward answer is that this is the only possible 
course of action, insofar fundamental social change is so complex and contingent that the question 
about the its achievability does simply not have an a priori answer. In addition, one could argue that, 
                                                 
57 Utopia is not synonymous with ‘unreachable’ in the context of this thesis, but rather with something 
that appears as unreachable. And by definition, according to our theoretical disquisitions above, 
anything which is not defined within the parameters of the prevailing symbolic order appears 
impossible. Hence, utopia is the necessary output of any collective learning process. 
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apart from providing direction, the development of credible and desirable alternative futures 
(“concrete” or “real utopias”) feeds back positively into their achievability. Indeed, credible visions 
can reasonably be assumed to have a greater mobilizing power than non-credible ones. Furthermore, 
the wider the diffusion of such plausible alternatives, the greater the cultural resonance for such ideas 
will be, and thus the greater the likelihood of the emergence of corresponding actions. These 
postulates refer to the social definition of the boundaries of the possible, which, as we saw, lies at the 
very heart of collective learning. Departing from the above assumptions, this dissertation proposes 
the study of the discursive construction of TDs or social-ecological “real utopias” as an unfolding 
transformative collective learning process. 
The notion of discourse is a structuring concept in the interpretative paradigm. As a first conceptual 
approximation, the notion of discourse can be loosely defined as “a common way of apprehending 
the world” (Dryzek, 1997, p. 9). A variety of scholars have aligned with and contributed to this 
theoretical strand. In the critical discourse-analytical tradition, the work of the Frankfurt school is 
prominent, as is that of Foucault, Laclau-Mouffe, and Fairclough. In the realm of sustainability 
discourses, Maarten Hajer and John Dryzek arguably stand out as the most influential scholars 
(Hannigan, 2006). These authors have all made singular contributions to the notion of discourse, 
placing diverse emphases on particular aspects of this complex phenomenon, yet their common-
ground understanding is that discourses are meaning-making activities that have incidence onto the 
definition of (certain parts of) reality, and thus contribute significantly to shaping social structures and 
processes (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). Hence “discourses do not map ‘the world out there’ but 
constitute reality in a specific way” (Keller, 2013, p. 71). Two key processes can be distinguished as 
constitutive parts of said meaning-making activities: processes of semantic signification (i.e. how meaning 
is formed), on the one hand, and processes of communication (i.e. how meaning is conveyed), on the 
other (Ramos Zincke, 2012). For shorthand, we refer to the first type of process in terms of discourse 
as representation (Chapter 3 and 5) and to the second in terms of discourse as practice or performance 
(dramaturgy) (Chapters 4 and 5). 
Complex issues normally generate a large variety of interpretations and prescriptive proposals (Dryzek, 
1997), and the issue of the global geostorical system-crisis and its possible solutions is no exception. 
Thus, this issue can be perceived as constituted by different discourses struggling to assign certain 
meanings to it. Such a complex configuration of competing discourses covering the same thematic 
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domain we will hereafter call discursive field58 (Dryzek, 1997; Hopwood et al., 2005; W. Sachs, 1997; 
Vanhulst & Beling, 2014a). 
Yet ‘discourse’ remains too broad a concept. Both in scholarly and social praxis, it has largely served 
as an umbrella term for conceptualizing debates or broader ideas and discussions at any societal level 
(Leipold, 2014). Hence, some conceptual clarification is required before an operationalization for 
empirical enquiry can be attempted. 
In correspondence with the dual register of discourse-as-representation and discourse-as-practice 
introduced above, discourse analysis59 can be conceived of in two broad ways: one which understands 
discourse as a semiotic system and thus focuses on language and rhetoric; and another one which 
understands discourse as social practice. Departing from the understanding that meaning is not an 
inherent attribute of linguistic propositions, but rather that such meaning becomes attached to their 
respective actualizations in the form of situated utterances, it becomes clear that variations in the use 
of language and semiotic systems by social agents can trigger changes in discourse with reality-
construction, relational, and normative effects60. 
Another relevant fault-line between discourse-analytical approaches distinguishes between discourses 
embedded in the logic of political conflict versus discourses embedded in the broader flow of socio-
cultural meaning-construction. While in the first category the instrumental use of argumentation in 
                                                 
58 The concept of discursive field is equivalent to what Norman Fairclough calls “order of discourse” 
(Fairclough, 1992), and to what Foucault termed “discursive formation”, yet the term ‘discursive field’ 
appears more straightforward to me, and is thus preferred. 
 
59 Discourse is treated in this dissertation as an analytical concept, that is, as an entity that the researcher 
projects onto the reality in order to create a framework for study. This means that the question of 
delimitation is determined strategically in relation to the research (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). 
60 This latter understanding of discourse overcomes a pre-Wittgensteinean conception of language as 
an axiomatic system of statements: Insofar discursive in nature, language is not a sable code, but rather 
an activity where signs play a vital role (i.e. a semiotic process, a variable relation between signifier and 
signified). This shifts the understanding of the semiotic system as structure towards its understanding as 
practical application: “discourse appears as speech, text, discussion, visual image, use of symbols, 
which have to be performed by actors following social instructions” (Keller, Schünemann, & Simons, 
forthcoming, p. 17). In other words, texts (and their constitutive elements, such as stories, frames, 
etc.) become an object, a ‘circulating reference’ (Latour), shedding light on consubstantial connections 
between the cognitive and other elements or fields making up social activity. An exemplary illustration 
for this is the opening quote of this dissertation by Milton Friedman, who surely had a completely 
different thing (most likely opposite!) in mind than what his words are intended to signify in the 
context of this research. 
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pursuit of short-term, concrete strategic goals comes to the fore (e.g. win a parliamentary majority), 
the second category comes closer to Eder’s analytical lens emphasizing long-term and self-
organization. Yet it is valid for both cases that social actors are continuously engaged in discursive 
struggles, in which each of them “try to secure support for their definition of reality” (Hajer, 1995, p. 
58). 
In order to ensure us picking the most suitable approach regarding the task at hand, the question is 
which logic better fits the situation under analysis. To be sure, the empirical debates under observation 
share many aspects of political conflict situations, hence the importance of argumentation. Yet on the 
other hand, their governing logic is not that of short-term politics, i.e. a logic of polarization dividing 
participants into supporters and challengers of a given person, policy proposal, etc. Furthermore, they 
largely take place outside and beyond the formal political system, mobilizing diverse sources of societal 
influence, in the terrain of what Ulrich Beck called subpolitics. Hence I argue that while the discursive 
dynamics of both the debates around GT and BV should be expected to be transversed by the logic 
of political conflict (especially the latter), they reach well beyond it, and should be rather conceived in 
terms of an interplay among “knowledge practices”61 (Haraway, 1991; Latour, 2008). This implies 
active agency and contention at the level of reality construction, whereby the strategic motivations of agents are 
to be regarded as embedded into a broader, more complex, dialectical process of meaning-making. 
The symbolic orders that are (re)produced or transformed in this process can be regarded as the 
emergent effect of their aggregated actions. 
The above considerations clearly point to a discourse-analytical approach away from the linguistic 
focus of structuralist conceptions of discourse (e.g. Laclau & Mouffe’s discourse theory) and the 
polarizing rationale of, say, Hajer’s argumentative approach to discourse, and closer to the Foucauldian 
line of discursive or knowledge-practices. By implication, the analytical lens should be enlarged to 
include the various material, practical, and ideational elements involved in the process of meaning-
making. The central point is that a discourse is not mainly explained by what it ‘says’, but by how it 
actually ‘works’ in social practice (Joan Beasley-Murray, in Beasley-Murray, 2013), – i.e. what non-
                                                 
61 While epistemologically kindred to the notion of discursive or ‘cognitive project’ introduced in 
Chapter 1, the concept of ‘knowledge practice’ places greater emphasis on the dimension of social 
practice in knowledge production, reproduction, and transformation. Knowledge practices are 
distinguishable from other social practices in that they “involve self-reflection, which productively 
reshapes the context of practices into the motive and engine of actions that do not simply repeat their 
contexts” (Santos, Nunes, & Meneses, 2007, p. 17). They can take the form of narratives, ideologies, 
theories, etc., as well as their creation, modification, and diverse enactments. 
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linguistic effects communication processes generate, and, in turn, how the latter are affected by the 
former. 
In this post-structuralist conception, discourses can thus be understood as attempts at ‘freezing’ 
meanings, or, more generally speaking, at fixating symbolic orders in time (Keller, 2012, p. 59), while 
discourse changes “contribute to the liquefaction and dissolution of the institutionalized 
interpretations and apparent unavailabilities” (Keller, 2012, p. 58). In other words, analyzing changes 
in these provisionally frozen symbolic orders through discourse research grants access to the 
observation of unfolding collective learning processes. At the same time, discourse analysis can be 
seen as inherently ‘critical’ in that it reveals how material discourses constitute power relations of 
various sorts. (Keller & Poferl, 2011) 
Now, how does the notion of discourse change reflect the disruptive character attributed above to 
collective learning? Innovation studies’ scholar Clayton Christensen (2013, cited in Altmann, 2015a, 
p. 163) draws a helpful distinction between ‘sustaining’ and ‘disruptive’ innovations which can be easily 
extended to discourse analysis. A ‘sustaining’ discursive change can be understood as any innovation 
in discourse (e.g. the introduction of a new concept) without a major epistemic break vis-à-vis the 
dominant discourse, while a disruptive discursive change poses novel contents, demands, or frames 
that deviate significantly from the latter. Hence, while ‘sustaining’ discourse innovations do not relate 
to collective learning, ‘disruptive’ ones do. By their very conceptualization, transformation discourses 
(TDs) match the latter type. 
The next section addresses the question of how to operationalize discourse research in accordance 
with the post-structuralist conception of discourse outlined above. The Sociology of Knowledge 
Approach to Discourse (SKAD) seems well suited to the task in terms of fitting the object of analysis. 
Indeed, SKAD is conceived as an analytical heuristics for the empirical study of discursive 
representations emerging from knowledge-practices62 and the “politics of knowledge”  (Keller et al., 
forthcoming). It therefore focuses on the use of signs (including language) as a social practice, and on 
the (re)production and transformation of symbolic orders. 
 
                                                 
62 The term ‘discursive practices’ is preferred to ‘knowledge practices’ in the SKAD framework, as it 
highlights the typical-like character of statement-production. This presupposes not only active shaping 
by social actors, but also their interpretative competence. 
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1.3.2. Operationalizing the study of discursive representation: Sociology of Knowledge Approach to 
Discourse (SKAD) 
 
The Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse (SKAD)63 offers an integrative and coherent 
methodological framework for discourse research alongside the epistemological and theoretical 
guidelines exposed above. As does CLP theory, it dwells on the Weberian hermeneutic and the 
German social-constructivist traditions (as represented by Berger & Luckmann), and on the 
(pragmatist) Symbolic Interactionist tradition (following George Herbert Mead), which account for 
the social constitution of significant symbols and competences of symbols’ utilization. It also 
integrates insights from the social phenomenology of Alfred Schütz, which sheds light onto the 
meaning-making process through the use of signs and symbols. As in the Habermasian tradition 
underpinning CLP theory, language and communicative processes take center stage, but the role of 
nonverbal practices in the constitution of a symbolic order is also interrogated. The main theoretical 
source of SKAD, however, – and the main complementary feature it offers in operationalizing CLP 
theory – is Foucauldian discourse theory, with its emphasis on institutionalized (and therefore 
structural rather than agential) forms of power. What results of the above is a balanced combination 
of Durkheimian social-institutional facticity and a Weberian interest in meaning-making agency, 
alongside a Maedian perspective of interactionist socialization processes and use of significant symbols 
(Keller, 2012, p. 56). 
Hence, in line with the research questions and the empirical research requirements, the SKAD 
framework allows for a focus on symbolic orderings and discursive agency, without losing sight of 
material settings and devices, as well as broader contextual factors. SKAD also proposes a clear 
analytical framework for the studying of the various cognitive devices shaping symbolic orderings such 
as frames, narratives and storylines, or phenomenal structures (see Chapter 3). While SKAD is 
especially tailored for the analysis of the ‘content-part of discourses’ (discourse as representation), it 
offers much less developed guidelines when it comes to collecting and analyzing data regarding the 
dimension of ‘discourse as practice’. However, it does offers articulation potential with other methods 
                                                 
63 SKAD was developed by Reiner Keller (Keller, 2006, 2008, 2012, 2013) more explicitly since the 
late 1990s. While it enjoys widespread recognition in the German academic scene, it remains largely 
unknown elsewhere (likely due mainly to linguistic barriers). Its utilization in this dissertation is also 
aimed at contributing to a wider dissemination of this analytical framework beyond the German-
speaking world. 
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in the interpretative tradition in sociology, such as the dramaturgical framework of J.C. Alexander 
applied here. 
 
SKAD structuring concepts 
 
This section summarizes the main theoretical concepts underpinning SKAD, following the 
descriptions provided by Reiner Keller and some of his collaborators. (Keller, 2012, 2013; Keller et 
al., forthcoming) 
SKAD builds upon the central Foucauldian insight that discourses can be systematically analyzed as 
more or less stable configurations of recurrent ‘statements’ (énoncés) that materialize in the form of a 
much larger number of ‘utterances’ (énonciations), i.e. concrete meaning-instantiations which can adopt 
diverse formats, be these verbal or non-verbal, written or non-written. While the total amount of 
utterances produced in any discursive field may be approximately infinite, the total number recurrent 
statements is principally finite (Foucault 1981: 115ff, cited in Keller et al., forthcoming, p. 18). 
Discourses can thus be systematically studied by retrieving the limited set of statements that constitute 
its ‘building blocks’. 
Yet even if discourses, as any other structure, tend to inertially reproduce themselves, each individual 
discursive event or utterance introduces some level of variation into this reproduction process, so that 
the structure of any given discourse is never actualized in a completely identical way, thus enabling 
discursive variation. Yet “discourse transformations can rarely be related to such an individual event. 
Rather, they originate out of the sum of variations, in a kind of switch from the quantitative to the 
qualitative effect” (Keller et al., forthcoming, p. 18). 
Hence discursive change implies more than mere actualization: indeed, it amounts to an altered 
meaning-structure, i.e. a change in structural patterns in communicative practice and related 
materialities. This requires a highly creative utilization of discursive materials at hand by social actors, 
which leads back to the classical question of agency vs. structure in social theory. Drawing on Giddens’ 
duality of structure, SKAD resolves the agency-structure tension by resorting to the explanation of a 
creative use of discursive patterns by social actors as instructions (rather than determinants). That is, social 
actors apply cognitive rules and resources available within their discursive context as tools for 
producing/articulating interpretations in their everyday praxis; such rules, however, do not drive social 
actors in a deterministic sense, but rather provide them with codes needed to intervene in the social 
51 
 
world. It is only if discourse research accounts for this agency of actors that it becomes helpful to 
understand how the more or less creative implementation of discursive practices happens, and 
therefore to understand discursive change (Keller et al., forthcoming, p. 18). 
Social actors relate to discourse in two possible ways: as statement producers (i.e. discursive agents) and 
as addressees of the practice of statement production (whom, following J. C. Alexander, we will call 
audiences). But actors also feature at the level of discourse as representation – which in the field of 
narrative analysis are often referred to as actants – depicting patterns of subjectivation or “subject-
positions” which are generated in discourses. (Keller et al., forthcoming, p. 18) 
Another key concept is that of dispositif, that is, a material ‘infrastructure’ bundling artifacts, practices, 
etc., that serves as the basis for discourse production. Of course, such infrastructures are also 
generated as an outcome of discursive practice, thus feeding back into the dialectic circle of discourse 
(re)production/transformation. 
The above proposed concepts address the dimension of discourses as social practice. In addition, 
SKAD offers a framework of sensitizing concepts64 designed to analyze discourses in their ideational 
dimension, distinguishing between interpretative schemes (also called ‘frames’), classification or 
categorization schemes, phenomenal (or problem) structures (Phänomenstrukturen), and narrative 
structures. 
The most important and overarching element in terms of discourse-structuring function are 
interpretative schemes or frames. A frame is the implicit ideational background or against which a 
particular topic is discussed, providing orientation for interpretative activity. Hence, climate change, 
for example, can be framed as an issue of geopolitical north-south confrontation, but also as an issue 
of national security. These two frames diverge in terms of their focus, but nonetheless share a common 
assumption, namely: that climate change is a matter to be addressed at the level of nation-states; an 
assumption which is, in turn, disputed by other frames highlighting the cross-boundary and cross-
sectoral transversality of the problem. Yet climate change may also be framed as a matter of private 
consumer behavior. These diverse frames lead to equally diverse understandings of the problem, 
therefore often also to divergent solution proposals. 
Similarly to what we discussed about discourses in general, frame analysis can view frames as 
“deliberative, utilitarian, and goal directed” attempts at orienting sense-making activities by specific 
agents (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 624), or rather as the emergent outcome of complex interactive 
                                                 
64 For detailed conceptualization, see Chapter 3, or Keller (2013) 
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meaning-making processes. While strategic framing is undoubtedly a widespread practice, as any 
marketing expert would know all too well, the understanding of frames in SKAD rather aligns with 
the second interpretation. Indeed, viewing frames only as a strategic tool tends to downplay the 
complexity of collective meaning-making and overstate the power of influence of individual agents on 
the process of establishing meaning. 
Narrative structures can, in turn, be defined as combinations of statements that are organized along a 
storyline or a plot, i.e. a set of statements which effectively tell a story alongside a temporal axis. 
Furthermore, narratives constitute the basic modus of ordering human experiences of the world in a 
meaningful way65 (Eder, 2006; Keller, 2008; Viehöver, 2006). Narratives are also the empirically most 
easily identifiable form that discourses take, and the easiest to link unambiguously to discursive agents. 
For this reason, narratives – or their shorthand form: storylines (Hajer, 2006) – constitute our central 
analytical concept in discourse research. 
The ‘theme’ of a discourse is constituted through a network of referential links among diverse elements 
or dimensions of this theme, which are interlinked in a specific form or phenomenal constellation 
(Keller, 2012, p. 87). Phenomenal structure, a notion draws on Karl Mannheim’s classical notion of 
Aspektstruktur, thus refers to the Gestalt of a phenomenon, that is, how it is constituted (in a given 
discourse at a particular moment in time) both in terms of its structuring dimensions and how these 
dimensions are fleshed-out with particular contents. 
Together, the above elements make up an interpretative repertoire that can be used as a toolbox by social 
actors in their individual sense-making activities, and in their meaning-making (inter)actions. Keller 
(2013, p. 73) defines interpretive repertoire as “a typified ensemble of statements related to a discourse 
which is more or less comprehensively actualized in individual utterances”. As a coherently interwoven 
set of elements, specific interpretive repertoires allow sense- and meaning-making activities by social 
actors; as a discursive construct, however, simultaneously they suggest certain pre-structured meanings: 
from a given discourse one can derive certain interpretations of the problem at hand and attached 
specific solutions, relevant actors positionings (villains, victims, heroes, etc.) and roles, and 
differentiated levels of responsibility or blame regarding the problems and solutions identified. 
                                                 
65 According to this anthropological assumption of a homo narrans, the strategic self-serving homo 
oeconomicus would be – its all-pervasiveness in the currently prevailing symbolic order notwithstanding 
– but the product of a particular (provisionally crystalized) narrative about the human condition. 
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Schünemann (2014) introduced another analytical category with the purpose of adapting SKAD to 
the polarizing logic of political conflict: the argument. The argument, as conceived here66, emanates 
from a particular discursive strand – for example the discourse about the ecology in a given society – 
and develops into strategic positionings to endorse particular policy proposals or political candidates. 
Complementing SKAD, which will inform particularly the analysis of discourse as representation, the 
following section introduces the dramaturgical model of J. C. Alexander (Cultural Pragmatics) as 
heuristics for the study of discourse as practice. A pragmatic combination of the two, together with 
collective learning as a macro-theoretical horizon, yields an integrated framework suited to the 
empirical study of the GT and BV case studies. 
 
1.3.3. The ‘walking-and-talking discourse’: dramaturgical analysis 
 
As anticipated above, while SKAD offers a detailed and solid framework for the analysis of discourse 
as representations (i.e. the ‘content part’ of discourses), it falls short of an equivalent level of ambition 
when it comes to systematizing the dimension of discourse as social practice. The same can be said of 
other critical discourse-analytical approaches. Even if they acknowledge the importance of the 
pragmatic dimension of discourse as a socio-cultural practice (e.g. Fairclough’s Critical Discourse 
Analysis), a refined and systematic prescription as to analytical procedures and tools are only provided 
for the analysis of discursive representation. Indeed, there seems to be a systematic bias towards 
linguistic (and, most often, written) textual forms in discourse research. This should hardly come as a 
surprise, since sociological approaches to discourse carry the baggage of their origin in linguistic 
analysis. To be sure, the complementary dimension of discourse as practice has gained traction 
through Foucault’s stitching together of knowledge and power structures in a single entity; yet 
Foucault himself did not develop a systematic heuristic framework for the analysis of discursive 
practices. In his expositions of SKAD, Keller acknowledges this and remits the reader to the methods 
and methodologies established in the broader context of the interpretative social sciences. 
 
                                                 
66 Here a terminological digression is in order to distinguish said conceptualization of the term 
‘argument’ vis-à-vis the meaning attributed to it in the Habermasian tradition. Indeed, rationalistic 
assumptions about the intrinsic quality of arguments (‘the better argument would prevail’) have no 
place in the above exposed conception of argumentation. 
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In this regard, recent scholarship has drawn attention to the role of the dramaturgical dynamics of social 
and political processes in discourse-production (J. C. Alexander, 2004, 2011; J. C. Alexander et al., 
2006; Hajer, 2005). Altmann (2015a) rightly suggests that the process between the introduction of 
novel discursive elements and the emergence of a discursive innovation remains largely black-boxed 
in discourse theory. The concept of ‘performance’ comes in handy to fill in this explanatory vacuum, 
and dramaturgical analysis as the method to study situated discourse-generative performances. 
 
Dramaturgical analysis thus emerges as an attempt at systematizing the study of the “walking-and-
talking-discourse” (Beasley-Murray, 2013), or else “texts in action” (Wagner-Pacifici 2000, cited in J. 
C. Alexander, 2004) as a typical dynamic of social interaction drawing on the language, symbols, and 
logic of theatre. Its sociological roots, in line with the theoretical approaches reviewed so far, lie with 
symbolic interactionism, in particular Erving Goffman’s The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life 
(Goffman, 1990)67, where key concepts and ideas from theatrical performance are first systematically 
adapted to the study of social interaction. The most relevant feature of a dramaturgical approach in 
terms of the research questions addressed here is the situational contingence68 of subjective ascriptions of 
meaning-offerings in discursive practice69, and – from a methodological vantage point – the 
systematization of such situation: in order to understand the pragmatic dimension of discursive practice, 
a careful analysis of the performance of such discourse is required (including various elements such 
as roles, audiences, on- and back-stage settings, etc.), thus Alexander (2004; 2006) referring to his 
approach as “Cultural Pragmatics”. 
 
                                                 
67 Goffman acknowledged the influence of Kenneth Burke’s analysis of policy processes in 
dramaturgical terms (Burke, 2009). It is also Burke rather than Goffman who informs, for example, 
M. Hajer’s work on dramaturgical analysis. 
 
68 The foregrounding of situational contingence immediately remits to Adele Clark’s (2005) theoretical 
and heuristic enterprise with situational analysis, conceived as a post-modernization of Strauss and 
Glasser’s Grounded Theory. While this is an epistemologically compatible perspective (also drawing 
on Foucauldian discourse theory and symbolic interactionism), Alexander’s dramaturgical approach 
offers more focused conceptual and theoretical elements for understanding discursive change, through 
notions such as performance, (re-)fusion, or cultural extension. 
 
69 Indeed, the discursive force of any knowledge claim is dependent upon the subjective ascription to 
the discourse that is performed within a particular socio-cultural setting. 
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Once social action is conceived of in dramaturgical terms, deliberate interventions can be easily 
conceptualized as mise-en-scène (Hajer, 2005). Dramaturgical analysis then enquires into the way its 
diverse elements (script, setting, staging, means of symbolic production, etc.) play out in the 
performance of the actors in front of their audiences70, a performance which is in turn enabled and/or 
constrained by multiple external forces (J. C. Alexander, 2011; J. C. Alexander et al., 2006; Hajer, 
2005). According to Hajer, dramaturgical approaches become indeed increasingly relevant at this 
particular historical conjuncture, insofar setting and staging have shifted from being regarded as 
contextual, assumed-to-be relatively stable variables bracketed as caeteris paribus in traditional 
(qualitative or quantitative) analytical models, to become key independent variables in processes 
developing in contexts of high turbulence (Dryzek, 2000; Hajer 2003, cited in Hajer, 2005). With the 
purpose of identifying discrete factors with greater explanatory weight, individual analysts have 
varyingly placed attention on particular elements of socio-political dramaturgies, alternatively 
emphasizing the staging process and the institutional setting (Hajer, 2005; Risse, 2005), the external 
constraints of the performance (J. C. Alexander, 2011), or else the combined effect of the various 
elements such as changing settings, framings, cultural background assumptions, the various dramatis 
personae in the play, and the actual staging of discourses (J. C. Alexander, 2004). By placing relatively 
greater emphasis on the complexity of the actual discourse-generative praxis; dramaturgical analysis 
would help us to “infer under what conditions a variety of people and voices emerge in the political 
discussions, how the variety of contributions can be related to one another in a meaningful way, and 
under what conditions such statements can be made with influence” on the actual political will 
formation (Hajer, 2005, pp. 630–631). 
 
Yet if the dramaturgical approach is to be helpful in explaining discursive change towards 
transformative collective learning, it requires articulating the micro-level type of dynamics – which is 
the usual stuff empirically examined through a dramaturgical lens – with developments at the meso-
                                                 
70 The analytical separation of ‘actors’ and ‘audiences’ may appear to collide with the Foucauldian 
understanding of discourse as both constituted by and constitutive of subjects (i.e. of discursive 
agents), risking to “overemphasize the strategic and tactical leverage of certain actors in political 
conflicts, effectively shrinking discourse research from high theoretical ambitions to something close 
to an analysis of successful (or failed) rhetoric”. (Keller et al., forthcoming). Yet the heuristic fixation 
of the roles of discoursing participants into actors and audiences does not amount to misrecognizing 
the discursively constituted character of both of them.  
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macro levels of society. Does the dramaturgical approach offer any help in advancing such theoretical 
articulation? J.C. Alexander (2013; 2004; 2006) has indeed attempted such an articulation effort, 
extending the dramaturgical approach beyond the well-established analysis of micro-level interactions 
to elaborate a full-fledged macro-sociological theory of social action as cultural performance71, thus 
merging material and ideal categories driving social evolution into a single theoretical framework. 
 
Dramaturgical fusion: the key role of agency in collective learning processes 
 
Alexander’s theory proves useful to explain how what we have called symbolic or cognitive projects 
(in dramaturgical jargon: the script) become successful at (provisionally) stabilizing meaning in 
collective interaction processes: the key explanatory concept is “fusion”. In line with Eder and the 
Foucauldian tradition, and, like them, rivaling with the rationalist tradition, Alexander (2004) contends 
that symbolic frames constitute the ultimate organizing principle of modern societies, as they did in 
traditional societies. From a functionalist vantage point, Alexander observes that reflexivity and 
negotiation in the modern world are no effective functional substitutes for the role of rituals affirming 
metaphysical and consensual beliefs in traditional cultures, “with the result that conflict, 
disappointment and feelings of bad faith are at least as common as integration, affirmation, and the 
energizing of the collective spirit” (Alexander 2004, p. 528). Instead, most vital social processes 
(including integrative processes) in complex societies are essentially symbolic (J. C. Alexander, 2004; 
Goffman, 1974), which means that the goal of modern social performances remains the same as the 
                                                 
71 Note that the concept of ‘performance’ can be attributed at least three different meanings: In the 
sense put forward by Alexander (2004), performance denotes any attempt to display social meaning 
for others in a situation of communicative interaction, by resorting to a set of dramaturgical resources 
that cannot be captured by the ‘content-part’ of the message alone. If such performance is perceived 
as fake –that is, as theatrical, in the pejorative sense- it will fail to persuade audiences. Contrasting with 
this purely analytical account of performance, the second meaning has a strong critical component to 
it, such that ‘performance’ comes to refer to simulative (inter)action or “hollow entertaining façadism”, 
which –while still would be successful in Alexander’s terms-, is deployed to close the gap between 
declarative commitments and effective action  (Blühdorn, 2007, p. 272). Third and lastly, 
‘performance’ in a more radical constructivist sense can denote the ‘creation’ of reality through 
contextualized interaction, yielding some observable output such as understandings of the problem at 
hand, knowledge, and new power relationships (Austin, 1962; Callon, 2007; Hajer, 2005; MacKenzie, 
Muniesa, & Siu, 2007). Unless indicated otherwise, in the framework of this dissertation, the term 
‘performance’ is utilized in the first of these senses. 
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ambition of rituals in traditional societies: The success or failure of a given performance – i.e. its 
capacity to psychologically engage audiences with the script and its characters, enabling subjective 
ascription to flows of cultural meaning generated ‘from the stage’ – is determined by the degree to 
which the diverse elements constitutive of a performance have been effectively ‘fused’ together in a 
seamless manner, exhibiting an apparent natural unity that evokes the cohesive effect of rituals in 
traditional societies. In complex, pluralist, and functionally differentiated societies characterized by 
fragmented and un-engaged audiences, however, the ritual-like effect of successful cultural 
performances tends to be short-lived and extremely contingent72. 
 
This ‘fusion’73 involves both ideational and material elements, thus allowing us to integrate together 
both dimensions of discourse research – representation and practice – into a single analytical 
framework which seeks to “model the relationship between collective representations, symbolic 
action, spatial and temporal materiality, political, economic, and hermeneutical power, contingent 
action, and audience response” (J. C. Alexander, 2005, p. 20). Based on Alexander’s model, in our 
empirical inquiry we assess the following dimensions of discursive performance as an interpretive 
                                                 
72 This line of argumentation emphasizing contingence and situational adequacy as key explanatory 
variables resonates with the approach of sociological pragmatism, as represented mainly by Luc 
Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot (1991, 1999; Thévenot, Blokker, & Brighenti, 2011), even though 
this approach privileges the dimension of discourse as representation. Indeed, pragmatic sociology 
evaluates argumentative claims according to their consistence with the diverse material and non-
material ‘markers’ defining the situation in relation to which the argument is played out. Unlike 
Alexander, however, the French authors come up with a taxonomy of possibilities for a ‘fused performance’, 
which they call “orders of worth” (grandeur). Each ordre de grandeur distinctively draws on one of the 
major political philosophies in Western political thought and praxis. If any particular script is to break 
through the indifference or resistance from its intended audiences, it need to adequately ‘fit’ one of 
these ordres de grandeur in consistence with the particular situation at hand (more about Pragmatic 
Sociology in the Excursus of Chapter 2). In contrast to the two French authors, Alexander and Hajer 
assess the success or failure of social performance not on the basis of rationalistic assumptions of 
argumentative fitting, but on the grounds of a much more contingent constellation of elements, whose 
combination would lead to an empirically observable success (‘fusion’), i.e. to achieving the subjective 
ascription of the intended audiences to the particular meaning conveyed in the performance of the 
script, thus establishing a discourse with that specific audience. 
 
73 Alexander’s concept of fusion exhibits strong semantic resemblances with Hartmut Rosa’s (H. Rosa, 
2016b) concept of resonance. While a promising exercise of conceptual exploration, their comparison 
falls beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
 
58 
 
device to understand factors of success or failure in the staging of GT and BV as situated 
transformation discourses: 
 
a. Match between (foreground) discourse and background cultural representations: this criterion tests the fit 
of a cognitive or discursive project against the established cultural model (i.e. ontological, 
epistemological, anthropological presuppositions, socially legitimized moral values and cues 
for appropriate behavior, identity boundaries, etc.). This match is covered by the 
aforementioned concept of cognitive plausibility of a discourse (Eder, 2006), as well as its 
compatibility with prevailing normative frameworks. 
 
b. Match between discourse and contingent situation (spatiotemporal embeddedness): assesses the 
resonance the discursive project finds in the spatiotemporally embedded staging (e.g. political 
climate, collective memory of significant events in the recent past, symbolic impact of 
contingent events, etc.) 
 
c. Enabling/ constraining role of social powers (symbolic production, distribution, hermeneutic), be it 
the power of critique and censorship, or shaping-power of public debate by economic 
interests, etc. 
 
d. Credibility and legitimacy of discursive agents: analyzes the trustworthiness (perceived authenticity) 
and perceived legitimacy of the spokesperson(s) or discourse-carriers, and the sources and 
degree of legitimacy, both of which enable the psychological identification of the audience 
with the discursive agent(s). 
 
e. Receptivity of discourse addressees: considers the cohesion or fragmentation of the intended 
audience around the discursive script, and the reasons thereof. 
 
This last dimension, as we will see, renders the inherent dilemma of trying to conceive of collective 
learning as a political project apparent. Indeed, the concept of ‘fusion’, so central to the dramaturgical 
explanation of performance-success, poses a significant challenge when considered from the 
theoretical perspective of collective learning: on the one hand, complexity, pluralism, and uncertainty 
were identified here as preconditions for the destabilization of prevailing symbolic orders and thus 
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also for social learning (Section 1.2.3, this chapter). Yet on the other hand, such conditions tend to 
produce the fragmentation of audiences alongside social and cultural fault lines (Alexander, 2004; Rosa 
2010), thus creating a structural barrier to reciprocal symbolic identification and communication, 
rendering the conditions of possibility for communicative interaction more unlikely to materialize. For 
this reason, discourses appealing to particularistic interests and identities are always more likely to find 
resonance in (and support from) their intended audiences. Such discursive dynamics, however, are ill-
equipped as pathways towards a whole-societal sustainability transformation. 
 
This socio-cultural segmentation need not be, however, a death-sentence for a successful performance 
of a transformative script: whether or not some shared cultural framework ‘really exists’ is not simply 
a factual issue; it is also a matter of interpretation. This is where agency comes to the foreground in our 
integrated theoretical framework of collective learning, discourse, and dramaturgy. 
Indeed, agency becomes the cornerstone of the theoretical puzzle of balancing discursive pluralization 
as precondition for collective learning, while at the same time bridging socially and culturally 
fragmented social groups to secure pragmatic discursive-dramaturgical articulation (i.e. fusion). This 
can be achieved by means of meaning-brokerage and translation (Santos, 2004), actively (re)framing 
collective representation schemes and assisting in sense-making, developing new visions, providing 
leadership, building trust, facilitating dialogue, empowering weaker parties, and mediating in conflicts 
(Davies & Kaufman, 2003; Lederach, 2003; Westley et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, this meaning-brokerage function of agency applies to both stages of the double 
movement implicit in collective learning processes identified earlier in this chapter: first, the 
deconstructive moment (“unbuild unsustainability”), where status-quo-challenging discursive forces 
will need to be rallied and status-quo-supporting ones be disarmed; and, second, the constructive 
moment (“build sustainability”), where the chaotic cultural and political imagination unleashed by the 
pluralization of discourse will require articulation into new fertile socio-ecological real utopias. Both 
meaning-brokerage efforts – one of deconstructive or disruptive imagination; and one of constructive 
creativity – are interrelated, necessary, and complementary efforts towards collective learning for a 
social-ecological transformation. 
 
With regard to this meaning-brokerage function, however, the question remains: how can a plethora 
of diverse yet fragmented actors in different societal levels and milieus be made to converge on plural 
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yet organic, long-term oriented, and effective discourse and transformative coalitions? This gives rise 
to our research question about the roles and practices of ‘transformative agents’, which constitutes 
our first theoretically informed object of observation in the empirical case-studies. 
 
Yet this is only the first question raised regarding a ‘transformative agency’. We have hitherto taken 
the spontaneous existence of such meaning-brokering ‘transformative agents’ for granted. Following, 
Chapter 2 argues, rather on the contrary, that the emergence of transformative agency is structurally 
impaired, and formulates theoretical hypotheses for the type of structural enablers that would, 
correspondingly, help lift those constraints. These hypotheses also serve, in turn, as guidelines for 
empirical observation in Part II of this dissertation. 
1.4. Chapter summary 
 
Let us wrap-up this theoretical enquiry by summarizing the complex set of ideas developed in this 
chapter: At the outset, we introduced a sociological theory of collective learning (CLP-theory) as a 
macro-theory dealing with changes in “deep (meaning-)structures” at socio-cognitive and cultural 
level. From an empirical perspective, the concept of collective learning opens new research avenues 
aiming to understand the processes of change (or lack thereof) of shared symbolic structures, allowing 
for the intermingling of cognitive and non-cognitive elements (affective, material, temporal 
dimensions, etc.) (Forchtner et. Al, 2018). The case was made for collective learning as a necessary 
(though not sufficient) condition for a social-ecological transformation (SET) at Polanyian scale of 
the (rapidly globalizing) cultural model of the West, which by worldwide scientific and political near-
consensus is imperative if a planetary ecological collapse is to be avoided. 
 
Collective learning results from a dialectical dynamic of emergence (self-organization) and deliberate 
meaning-making activities (‘cognitive projects’) by social agents, and can be operationalized in terms 
of discourse and discursive projects, which, for the case of discourses envisaging a social-ecological 
transition as a ‘real utopia’, we call transformation discourses (TDs). A theoretical dissection of 
collective learning allowed us to broadly define our conceptual foci of observation and analysis, by 
answering the questions of when and how learning comes about, who learns and what is learned: - It was established that learning comes about when the prevailing shared symbolic order is 
destabilized in the course of collective interaction. In terms of discourse, this translates into 
discursive pluralization as a precondition for learning. 
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 - The learning-subject was identified as more or less formal networks (possibly including 
individuals and organizations) which would eventually influence larger cultural change. - The object of learning is socio-cognitive meaning-structures, which would eventually result in 
transformed cultural structures. 
 
Section 2 of this chapter sought to build a theoretical articulation between the macro-theory of 
collective learning, on the one hand, and discourse as a middle-range theory that serves as heuristics 
for the empirical study of CLPs, on the other. Discourse was thus first ontologically and 
epistemologically delimited and its compatibility with CLP-theory tested. The post-structuralist 
understanding of discourse adopted here opens two dimensions for empirical observation: the 
ideational dimension (discourse as representation), which is operationalized through the Sociology of 
Knowledge Approach to Discourse (SKAD), and the performative or dramaturgical dimension 
(discourse as practice), operationalized through J.C. Alexander’s Cultural Pragmatics. In the 
performative dimension, the key question is raised of when contingent ‘cultural performances’ of 
discursive projects succeed in producing cultural-extension effects, that is, in provoking meaning-
shifts in situated contexts. The concept of fusion condenses the various types of material-ideational 
articulations that need to succeed if the discursive project is to find resonance with its intended 
audiences. 
This raises the first core question about agency in this dissertation: namely what the typical roles of 
agency are in building successful articulations between the discursive project and the various material-
practical dimensions of the contingent situation or context of discussion, and through which practices 
this is typically achieved. While at first sight achieving this fusion may appear as nothing more and 
nothing less than the pure art of politics, agents fostering ‘transformative learning’ face an even bigger 
challenge: how to balance the creative tension between de-fusing and fusing, that is, between ‘unbuilding 
unsustainability’ (i.e. breaking a hitherto successful or fused performance of the unsustainable way of 
life and model of development of the West) and ‘building sustainability’ (laying bridges for a new 
fusion around future-capable models of social organization and ways of life). 
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CHAPTER 2 
The predicament of transformative agency 
 
Futurzwei is a communication agency for a social movement that doesn’t yet know it is one 
Herald Welzer 
 
2.1. Introductory remarks 
 
Chapter 1 raised the question about the micro-foundations of collective learning processes at the 
meso- and macro- societal level, that is, the issue of agency as mediating such learning processes. This 
question is especially relevant in the case of sustainability-related learning: Indeed, given the likelihood 
of fundamental structural changes in interdependent socio-ecological systems, it seems reasonable to 
expect that current structural constraints will be loosened or changed over the coming decades, making 
more room for human agency so shape new structures in accordance to socially prevailing ideals or 
utopias (Raskin, 2008).  
As will be argued below, however, a ‘transformative agency’ cannot be taken for granted. This chapter 
therefore raises the fundamental question of the conditions of possibility for its emergence, inquiring 
into the social genesis and structural constraints for the emergence of agents capable of energizing the 
necessary transformations towards a society ‘capable of future’ (zukunftsfähige Gesellschaft).  In the 
second half of the chapter, I lay out theoretical questions derived from the above inquiry, which are 
aimed at orienting empirical observations, and hypotheses for overcoming (or at least mitigating) said 
structural constraints. An excursus at the end of the chapter winds up Part II of the dissertation by 
addressing the problem of the epistemic foundations for a critical theory of society in the context of 
the geostorical challenges of the Anthropocene, discussing implicit assumptions and epistemological 
choices underpinning this dissertation.  
 
2.2. The micro-foundations of learning: agency in theoretical approaches to social change 
 
For all relevant purposes, and respectively docking with the two theoretical strands mentioned in 
Chapter 1, agency-based theories of social change can be divided in two broad groups: those explaining 
change as a bottom-up process (‘from below’, i.e. through emergence when the change-impulse has 
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reached a ‘critical mass’) and those which see change as the result of top-down (by diffusion through 
power leverages), i.e. elite-driven processes74.  
Whichever the case, as shown when discussing the question of the subject of learning in Chapter 1, 
even a superficial empirical observation makes it clear soon that the transformation discourses (TDs) 
at stake here (GT and BV) do not reproduce through diffuse social interaction, i.e. without identifiable 
agent. Instead, they can be seen as veritable cognitive or symbolic projects which are vocally advocated 
for and embodied by specific (groups of) actors. A widespread yet ambiguous umbrella concept for 
these transformative niche-actors is that of “change agents”75. I prefer the more tailored yet still 
general term transformative agents to refer to agents pushing TDs through deeds or words. The particular 
quality of such actors has been interrogated in the area of socio-ecological transformation research: 
Concepts such as niche-agents (established by the Dutch ‘transition school’76); “germ cells”77; or else 
meaning-making elites (Stengel, 2011) – i.e. top-down or else ‘inside-outward’ agential dynamics (Adrian 
E. Beling & Vanhulst, 2016a)–, on the one hand, but also bottom-up, counter-systemic social 
movements (Escobar, 2012b, 2015), on the other, have been applied to describe the agents bringing 
about counter-systemic agency and collective learning processes aimed at “undoing unsustainability”. 
                                                 
74 With time, these two poles have come closer to each other, both incorporating elements of the 
other. For example, Field, Burton & Higley (Field & Higley, 1980) restated the classical elitist paradigm 
by Paretto, Mosca, and Michels, acknowledging that elites’ room for maneuver is always constrained 
by the general orientations prevailing in society. Elites are understood here as groups of persons who 
occupy strategic positions in public and private bureaucratic organizations (e.g. governments, parties, 
militaries, productive enterprises, trade unions, media, educational and religious organizations, 
organized protest groups, etc), through which they are able to affect political outcomes individually, 
regularly and significantly.  
75 Considering its origin in organizational change management and its discursive historical record, the 
concept of change agent has been criticized as having an inherent technologist and economistic bias; in 
other words, for its system-immanent character to the prevalent unsustainable socio-economic order. 
See Weber (2014). 
 
76 This scholarly stream, which actually consists of two related streams of ‘transition studies’ and 
‘transition management’, emerged in the Netherlands in the 1990s from a blend of academic traditions 
in innovation, history and technology, and has since found increasing acceptance in the policy sphere, 
especially of North-European countries. Yet at the same time it has met heavy critique from the 
academic sphere. See, inter alia, the work of Frank Geels, Jan Rotmans, and Derk Loorbach. For an 
assertive critique of the transition management perspective, see Shove and Walker (2007)  
 
77 Germ-cell activities are those activities that embody a potential response to deep-seated societal 
contradictions, and combine critical social and/or historical-material processes with values, 
dispositions, cognition and individual and collective agency capabilities to lead expansion, change and 
transformation (Lotz-Sisitka et al., 2015, p. 77)  
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To what extent the TDs at stake here are elite-driven or bottom-up processes is essentially an empirical 
question to be empirically resolved (see Chapter 6).  
Regardless of the above, however, any attempt at bridging the emergentist and the agency-based 
conceptions of collective learning (what we called ‘weighted emergentism’) confronts a fundamental 
question: where do these transformative agents come from? That is, how they are socially produced, and how 
do they manage to gain an ‘outsider’ perspective and effectively confront the prevailing symbolic order 
into which they were socialized themselves? This requires a theoretical explanation which has 
remained unaddressed in CLP theory: it is the question about the micro-foundation of such self-
organizing patterns, the question about the agency kicking-off collective learning processes; in this 
case, CLPs driven by social-ecological utopias. My theoretical interest is a double one: on the one 
hand, answering the above question by explaining the emergence of actually observable transformative 
agency (descriptive dimension). On the other, it should provide normative orientation as how to foster 
such transformative agency deliberately seeking to advance a social-ecological transformation (SET). 
This will hopefully contribute to increase the relevance of a sociological theory of collective learning 
for the scholarly agenda of Transformation and Transformative research. (Schneidewind, 2013b, 2015; 
WBGU, 2011)  
 
2.3. Sources and dilemmas of “transformative agency” 
 
For all their differences, the ‘emergentist’ collective-learning theory does share one critical assumption 
with agency-based theories of social change, namely: that collectively shared experiences of 
misrecognition, disadvantage, or disfranchisement within the prevailing social and cultural order lay at 
the root of socio-political and cultural change. Those disenchanted with the status quo then raise 
various normative and identity claims which provide the disruptive spark igniting processes of 
collective learning, potentially leading to social change (Eder, 1985; Pelfini, 2005). In the case of 
classical Marxist theory, the driver of change (via class-struggle) is material disfranchisement. In the 
case of post-materialistic theories of social change, such as recognition theory – particularly that of 
Axel Honneth, which is arguably the most elaborated theoretical framework in this tradition –, it is 
rather struggles for social recognition waged by particular social groups out of collectively shared 
experiences of disregard (Misachtung)78. These struggles, in turn, alter the shared horizon of collective 
                                                 
78 Recognition theory aims at subsuming the classical Marxist tradition, insofar material drivers are 
framed as a particular case of misrecognition, and thus class struggle as a particular case of recognition 
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meanings and of social expectations, giving rise to both moral sensibility (i.e. a shared 
phenomenological horizon) and a moral order (a shared normative horizon) (Honneth, 1992, 2007). 
Hence both recognition theory and collective learning theory depart from the premise that the 
grammar of social evolution is essentially symbolic79 and that the reproduction and transformation of 
boundaries of the shared phenomenological horizon (e.g. moral sensitivity, collective identity, 
fundamental assumptions about the world, etc.) – ideally mirrored in their corresponding material 
structures (e.g. in Western societies, respectively: Human Rights, nation-states, liberal philosophy, 
etc.)– is the historical backstage-constant in those processes of change, beyond the power-projects 
and power-leverages of particular agents. 
Since my theoretical interest is understanding how counter-systemic or transformative agency emerges 
from within the very same society it aims at changing, what matters here – the many differences 
between recognition and collective learning theories notwithstanding – are the problematic common 
assumptions of these two theories regarding the dimension of agency. Indeed: both theories rely on 
the notion of a (socially constructed) autonomous individual capable of identifying and effectively 
addressing the sources of oppression (which are always conceived of as being external to the subject). 
This key assumption, however, proves problematic when trying to explain agency in the context of a 
                                                 
struggle. Therefore, I will use recognition theory as analytical proxy to agency-based theories of change, 
in general. 
 
79 While Honneth’s theory focuses on the normative rather than on the narrative or symbolic order, as 
Eder does, Honneth (2007) does (unlike rationalists) raise the question of where normative claims 
come from, and his answer is that there is a shared phenomenological horizon of social expectations, 
i.e. a shared universe of meaning, which gives rise to actual normative claims. Normative claims 
presuppose a sense that one is entitled to certain forms of recognition. In my understanding, this 
constitutes the epistemological and theoretical docking point between the two theories, even if they 
divert in their respective foci and in their preferred explanatory mechanisms (i.e. recognition struggles 
in Honneth versus communicatively-mediated social self-reflectivity in CLP theory). There are, 
however, substantial differences between the two: At the most abstract level, while CLP theory is 
explicitly aimed at providing a theoretical basis for the critique of society, Honneth’s theory remains 
more ambiguous in its scope, in a blurry middle-ground between a critique of social injustice and a 
critique of social pathologies (Basaure, 2011; Adrian E. Beling, 2016). Another ground-level difference 
– and partly a consequence of this ambiguity – is that learning is largely conflated with change in 
Honneth’s theory, while Eder subscribes a more systemic view regarding how changes in socio-
cognitive and cultural patterns translate into changes in the material world. An exhaustive comparison 
between these theories, however, falls beyond the scope of this doctoral thesis, as it would not be 
informed by the research questions and objectives. 
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whole-societal transformation in response to geostorical challenges. The following paragraphs are 
devoted to exploring this problematic character. 
A first arguable assumption on the side of Honneth pertains the balance between agency and structure: 
Honneth’s over-determination of the individual subject as an agent of social change was already 
pointed out by Habermas. Indeed, for Habermas, the process is rather driven by the defensive 
mechanisms of the lifeworld (Lebenswelt) against the threat of colonization by the systemic logic of the 
bureaucratic and the economic spheres (Basaure, 2011). In other words, Habermas, once again, brings 
the self-organizing as opposed to the intended character of evolutionary processes to the foreground.  
But in addition to this problem of over-determination of an assumed-to-be-autonomous subject, the 
emergence of a transformative agency is further compromised by the problem of the heteronomous 
subject, which results from the circular dialectics of the subjection process, as theorized by Judith Butler: 
Indeed, if, following Foucault, power is understood not only as constraining the subject, but as formative 
of the subject, as well, then externally exerted power becomes the very condition of the subject’s social 
existence and provides both the trajectory of its desire and its capability of self-reflection (Butler, 
1997). Hence the double meaning of the term ‘subjection’: Indeed, ‘becoming a subject’ would 
simultaneously imply ‘becoming subject to’. A corollary of the above is that by attempting to fight the 
power which constrains but simultaneously constitutes them as subjects, social agents perform, in that 
very same act, an attack against their own social existence80. Acknowledging the thesis of hetero-
subjection makes our guiding question even more puzzling: Where are thus change agents fostering a 
whole-societal transformation towards sustainability expected to come from, if not the society into 
which they were born and socialized, and which they are now required to try and change beyond 
recognition?  
But even if we could successfully sort out the dilemma of the heteronomous subject, I argue that 
explaining agency confronting geostorical challenges requires factoring in another problem, which I 
have elsewhere called the missing subject (Adrian E. Beling, 2016). Indeed, the peculiar characteristics of 
the “perfect moral storm” (Gardiner, 2006) engendered by geostorical challenges give rise to a singular 
type of injustice, whose victims are inherently incapable of waging a struggle to reverse the condition 
                                                 
80 Economic historian Avner Offer (cited in Jackson, 2009a) provides an empirically-supported 
portrait of the contemporary subject as a conflicted individual torn apart by the tension between 
growing socio-ecological awareness, on the one hand, and the cultural pressure towards positional 
competition to “avoid shame” – i.e. to attain social recognition of one’s worth in society –, on the 
other. Stephan Lessenig (2014) and Herald Welzer (2011) have invoked kindred arguments in the 
context of the debate around social-ecological transformation in Germany. 
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of discrimination, exclusion, or subordination to which they are confined due to global environmental 
challenges. In the following, I will explore three different variants of the dilemma of the ‘missing 
subject’. 
The global scale and scope of geostorical challenges constitutes a first structural barrier to an effective 
defensive/vindicatory action on the side of stakeholders: because the main affected groups are the 
poor and disfranchised, they are incapable not only of opposing the great bureaucratic and economic 
forces of globally organized capitalism on equal footing, but also lack a suitable addressee for their 
claims: Indeed, the structures of the Westphalian world order are overwhelmed by the multiple 
transversality of global ecological challenges and systemic risks (Beck, 2008; Castells, 2008; Fraser, 
2007, 2011). In addition, the poor and disfranchised are ill-equipped for even recognizing the highly 
complex mechanisms – which are only knowledgeable through the often cryptic expert-language of 
science – through which these changes dramatically affect (or will affect) their daily lives (E. A. Rosa, 
Renn, & McCright, 2014; H. Rosa, 2003). I call this first type of deficit: the incapable agent. 
Secondly, I identify an absent agent, that is, culturally estranged or geographically de-localized ‘others’ 
affected by the consequences of, say, climate change, and thus with a stake in a social-ecological 
transformation (SET), but whose Missachtungen are culturally non-grievable (Butler, 2010) and 
politically unrepresented. In order to gain some level of cultural and political relevance, this structural 
disregard or Missachtung of victimized ‘others’  is dependent upon a double communicative mediation: 
first, as stated above, by science, without which the global ecological changes and their causal links 
with social arrangements remain completely veiled to human comprehension81; and, secondly, by the 
mass media, which create “simultaneity, shared involvement and shared suffering, and thereby creates 
the relevance for a global public” (Beck, 2010, p. 260). Hence, “the political explosiveness of global 
risks is largely a function of their (re-)presentation in the mass media”. Yet the media, just the same 
as the conflicted and incapable individual subject, fails to address the issue properly: As complex-
systems scholar James Dyke (2016) puts it in an article published by The Guardian: “We treat climate 
                                                 
81 This characterization is not exclusive to geostorical challenges, but to most “systemic risks” (Beck, 
1992), in general: Risk factors are interdependent, and the effects can lead a long chain 
interdependencies, without this being recognizable at first glance. Intuitively we associate causality 
with spatial or temporal proximity. This is no longer the case, however, in today's complex and 
interconnected risks – be it environmental ones or the great financial crises in recent decades. Because 
in such developments the link between cause and effect is not obvious, but is rather the outcome of 
many coupled intermediate steps, understanding and anticipating the risks in time becomes more 
difficult. (E. A. Rosa, Renn, & McCright, 2014) 
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change records as we treat new fashions, phones or films. But we seem unable to understand that we 
are driving such changes”. Both the vertical broadcasting media and the horizontal ‘social media’ suffer 
from the same disease: the ‘logic of news’, with its short-term focus and its fragmentary approach, is 
ill-suited to foster deliberation about indirect, complex, long-term systemic risk in the public sphere 
(more about this in Chapter 6).  
Furthermore, the public sphere itself would struggle to deal with this type of problems: downplaying 
Habermas’ optimism about the public sphere as a societal (self-)control mechanism capable of 
balancing out economic (and bureaucratic) power, Hartmut Rosa (2003, 2010) envisages said balance 
as increasingly unfavorable to the public sphere: the more complex and plural a given society grows, 
democratic decision-making becomes slower and less effective, as compared to autonomous, single-
bottom-line decision-making in the economic sphere82, which currently dictates the general pace of 
social evolution. Markets would therefore be in a position of structural advantage to keep gaining 
leverage as a societal control mechanism vis-à-vis the public sphere. In addition to the above, even if 
it were successful, current research in environmental sociology has raised serious doubts about the 
efficacy of this double-communicative mediation, as illustrated by the aforementioned ‘value-action 
gap’ (see Introductory chapter). 
The question posed by Ulrich Beck: “Why is there no storming of the Bastille because of the 
environmental destruction threatening mankind, why no Red October of ecology? (Beck, 2010, p. 
254); or else Bruno Latour: “where are the passions commensurate with the stakes?” (Latour, 2010, p. 
3), could find – in part, at least – their answer in this “virtually real” character of the subject and of 
the moral injury infringed by global environmental change. Summing up: in the case of global, systemic 
ecological risks, the Missachtung (of whatever type) is not perceived directly and without mediation, as 
agency-driven change theories assume to be the case; but, on the contrary, it is perceived in indirect, 
deferred, and mediated fashion, which can be expected to significantly weaken the capacity for 
transformative agency. 
Third and lastly, the current and potential effects of global ecological changes are so multifaceted, 
diffuse, and their attribution so problematic, that it is extremely difficult – if not impossible – to define 
the damage and identify its casualties with minimal required precision. Therefore, the resulting injuries 
                                                 
82 As will be shown in Chapter 3, Michel Bauwens addresses this problem and envisages a hopeful 
solution in the proliferation of decentralized, autarchic, and ad hoc distribution of decision-making 
power in social peer-to-peer functional relations (e.g. open-source projects) 
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are suffered by indeterminate subjects, a sort of "generalized other" (Mead), who, by virtue of its 
abstract and synthetic character, has no agency of its own. I will call this third type of deficit the 
indeterminate agent. Analogously, the inter-generational time-lag between the (invisible) generation of 
the causes and the (visible) manifestation of the consequences typical of geostorical challenges, such as 
anthropogenic climate change or threats to biosphere integrity, leads to the irony that the main victims 
of global ecological changes are generations just or yet to be born, who at present lack individual or 
collective entity to mobilize in defense of their legitimate interests, which are being violated by the 
actions of current generations. The Missachtung is thus ipso facto differed into the future at the time of 
being infringed, giving place to a delayed reaction which is inherently incapable of repairing the 
damage.  
Indeed, the transformative social struggle which should theoretically ensue from the quasi-certain 
prospect of a true planetary catastrophe under the current development path is crippled by a triple 
deficit of what could be called enactable agency, insofar, as said above, the main stakeholders or casualties 
are either absent, indeterminate, or else incapable of grasping the problem and/or coordinating an 
effective countervailing action. 
Now, the above problems – from the heteronomous conflicted subject to the missing subject resulting from 
the triple deficit of ‘enactable agency’ – should not prevent us from acknowledging geostorical challenges 
(understood as temporally and spatially diffuse byproducts of the aggregate actions of homo economicus) 
as effective triggers of collective learning processes towards sustainability: Indeed, there exists, de facto, 
a whole range of (attempts at) responding to this dilemma at various societal levels  – ranging from 
practical initiatives; social, intellectual, and political movements; and the ongoing (re)production of 
lifeworlds –, which a full-fledged theory of societal learning/change (such as CLP theory) should be 
able to theoretically account for. We have hitherto focused on the shortcomings of agency-based 
theories to deliver such account. In the following, I will attempt at outlining necessary adaptations to 
these theoretical perspectives in order to redress their explicative potential and bring out their 
relevance for understanding and fostering transformative agency and transformative learning. Given 
that our research focus is on agency, I will theoretically elaborate on possible solutions to agency-
related shortcomings under conditions of ‘conflicted agency’ and ‘deficit of enactable agency’. 
2.4. Redressing the dilemmas of transformative agency: Struggle for the recognition of an 
‘other’? 
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I would like to suggest that the paradoxes of conflicted agency (derived from heteronomous subjection) 
and of deficit of enactable agency (‘missing subject’) can, in principle, be largely circumvented through 
some form of deputy or subrogatory agency, through which individuals with effective agency-capacities 
“subrogate” the action of indeterminate, absent, or incapable agents in defense of their legitimate 
interests. This idea of subrogation of a diffuse interest by a representative or deputy agent is certainly 
not new, and even has some institutional and legal precedents: the class-action is a legal figure peculiar 
to the United States of America, which allows an individual or a small group to represent a particular 
‘class’ of stakeholders which is much larger in number. Similarly, the worldwide extended figure of the 
ombudsman – which is currently competent even in the defense of human rights – incarnates a form of 
subrogatory agency. The extension of this figure for the defense of future generations is actively 
promoted by civil society organizations, with the World Future Council as its most vocal advocate; and 
has known even a pioneering institutional implementation in Hungary under the guise of the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for the Future Generations83. Also at European and international level 
the implementation of a similar representation device is intensively debated (Szabó, 2013). In the field 
of social movements, traditional movements such as workers, peasants, ethnic and sexual minorities, 
party-political movements, etc. continue to operate on the basis of a classical conception of agency. 
But the complexities of the contemporary globalized world have led to the emergence of other 
movements which ‘represent’ the interests of broader social groups, even the rights of third-parties: 
the alter-globalization movement, the movement for the remission of sovereign debt of poor 
countries, environmental movements, in defense of democracy, against mass animal husbandry, etc. 
Moreover, climate change, which can be seen as paradigmatic in terms of subrogatory agency, has 
given rise to a global, heterogeneous and increasingly visible movement which stems from the fusion 
of ‘red’ and ‘green’ activism, now joined under the single banner of “climate justice” (Bond & Dorsey, 
2010).  
                                                 
83 The so-called “green ombudsman” had not only advisory attributions, but could also, for example, 
initiate actions in the constitutional court and intervene in judicial proceedings in defense of the 
interests of future generations. After a short-lived autonomous existence (2008-2011), the figure of 
the Parlamentary Commissioner for the Future Generations has been subsumed under the 
Commissioner for Fundamental Rights (see: http://jno.hu/en/) 
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This notably happens even in the absence84 of the theoretical preconditions envisaged by agency-based 
theories of change, i.e. material disfranchisement or other non-material forms of misrecognition. This 
demands the theoretical consideration of a functional substitute for these presupposed triggers of 
social struggle. To this purpose, insights from philosophical reflection about global change might 
provide some guidance. 
In general terms, it seems safe to assume that the most proximate substitute for a personally-felt ‘moral 
injury’ would be an injury inflicted to one’s community of reference, i.e. to those within one’s 
collectively established identitary boundaries. Hence, it is often argued, global ecological change can 
only be effectively dealt with from a cosmopolitan perspective85. Alongside this line of argumentation, 
notions of a species identity (Chakrabarty, 2009) or else a global community of fate (Beck, 2010; Held & 
Hervey, 2009) have been proposed as sine-qua-non bases for ethically-oriented action on global 
change. However, these notions, which are based on the idea of a global and intergenerational 
solidarity, arguably remain too abstract to account for the emergence of social mobilization. Yet this 
does not imply that such ideas cannot be traced back to more ‘grounded’ accounts of generalized 
solidarity by diverse authors. One such precedents is Sahlins’ concept of “generalized reciprocity” 
(1972, cited in Hénaff, 2010) – a form of diffuse solidarity with no expectation of a concrete quid-pro-
quo or even a particularized counterpart –, a concept which could be made extensive to the moral 
imperative of leaving future generations an inhabitable natural environment, just as we have inherited 
it from past generations. The resemblance is even closer with the concept of “mutuality” by Marcel 
Hénaff (2010), which he defines as a solidarity-network without defined borders, involving a "more 
uniform and continuous circulation, and therefore a temporal continuity" (Hénaff, 2010, p. 18) and 
                                                 
84 The uprising Degrowth movement in Western Europe (see Chapters 3 and 4) showcases this 
dramatically, where it is part of the relatively privileged well-educated, academic milieus who lead the 
protest against the ecologically plundering and socially polarizing effects of the global economy 
(Eversberg & Schmelzer, 2016) 
 
85 As a hermeneutic horizon, cosmopolitism has been understood as rivaling with the postcolonial 
“hermeneutics of suspicion”, which sees humanity as the product of complex power relations. I would 
like to argue, however, that this opposition between a ‘conciliatory humanism’ and a postcolonial 
hermeneutics is rather apparent: indeed, a politics based on the notion of a species identity is an 
eminently normative ideal, while postcolonial theories base their criticism on the description of an 
existing social order. The latter is in no way negated by the former: indeed, climate change will certainly 
reinforce existing inequalities, but simultaneously dilute them, insofar no lifeboats for the rich and 
powerful can keep them safe from the unforeseen consequences of our actions as a species 
(Chakrabarty 2009, Beck 2010). 
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implies a “multiplied symmetry”, a more homogeneous recognition among social actors. But probably 
the most suitable analogy can be established vis-à-vis Levinas’ “ethics of otherness”. Levinas 
emphasizes the responsibility beyond face-to-face relationships, i.e. a responsibility in the “third 
person” 86, that is, towards the neutral subject to which values, norms, and law refer, and who 
constitutes the foundation of ethics. The ‘egocentric societal model’ of the West is based on a self-
referential understanding of responsibility: individual freedom is exercised with the primary purpose 
of the expansion and happiness of the self, while the freedom of the other is respected only insofar 
such respect makes a Hobbesian peace possible (thus enabling a continued exercise of one’s own 
freedom), which leads to the creation of politics and the state. For Levinas, in turn, the existence of 
the state and of politics is not justified through the need to sustain a Hobbesian peace, but through 
the ethical imperative derived from the compassionate “heteronomous responsibility” for the welfare 
of the other (which for Levinas has an explicit connotation of social totality, a geographically and 
temporally omni-inclusive humanity). By lack of a concrete and tangible alter to interpellate ego, 
institutions guaranteeing the neutrality and universality of justice produce the necessary mediation “in 
the third person” between individual freedoms. In the same vein, Hans Jonas (1984) purports an 
“imperative of responsibility” for the ensuing global risk society – the imperative to act so that the 
effects of one’s action are compatible with the permanence of human life on Earth –, which expands 
Kantian-style responsibility to a new scale in space and time. Alasdair MacIntyre (2001) goes even 
farther to fundamentally challenge the anthropological model of the “independent practical reasoner” 
– a healthy, strong, autonomous, rational individual –, which he considers to be a biased and unrealistic 
premise of Western modern philosophy. Instead, he advocates the recognition of mutual 
interdependence (rather than independence) and – with Judith Butler (2010) – of our common 
precariousness or vulnerability as the normal condition of human existence. This exercise in recognition 
would be not only inescapable in accounting for the mutual imbrication of people in social life, but 
also for the mutual imbrication of social and ecological systems, which constitutes an essential (though 
modernly obscured) aspect of the human condition, i.e. of our identity as a species. 
The exercise in abstraction implied in the elaboration of a species-identity in the sense of Chakrabarty 
runs the risk, however, of crippling the recognizability of the singularity of subjects by withdrawing all 
                                                 
86 A concept which becomes prominent for Levinas in Autrement qu´être ou au-de là de léssence and 
onwards. (Burggraeve, 2009) 
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distinction markers. In order to resolve this tension, Chakrabarty maintains that global ecological 
challenges require thinking in a double register: indeed, global environmental change 
poses for us a question of a human collectivity, an us, pointing to a figure of the universal that escapes 
our capacity to experience the world. It is more like a universal that arises from a shared sense of a 
catastrophe. It calls for a global approach to politics without the myth of a global identity, for, unlike 
a Hegelian universal, it cannot subsume particularities. (Chakrabarty, 2009, p. 16) 
 
Arturo Escobar (2011, 2012, 2015) coined a concept to designate this double register: pluriverse; that 
is, in the more familiar words of the Zapatista-slogan, “a world where many worlds fit”; a world that 
offers multiple opportunities for identification and for recognition, while simultaneously building an 
overarching social bond that rests on the mutual interdependence and common vulnerability. 
Furthermore, a pluriversal society would fit the balance between pluralization and articulation required 
for collective learning to unfold, as argued in Chapter 1. 
Paradoxically, however, the very notion of precariousness or vulnerability that lies at the foundation 
of Chakrabarty’s concept of “species identity”, works, at the same time, as the structural constraint 
for the development of the latter: according to Butler (2010), given that our capacity to experience 
vulnerability depends itself on its own recognizability, the actual existence of such precariousness does 
not necessarily lead to a dynamics of mutuality, but can even lead, conversely, to an ontological 
segregation of lives which become expendable for the purpose of protecting those lives (or privileges) 
that do matter. This danger becomes all too evident in contemporary resource wars, dominant 
migration- and trade-policy worldwide, as well as, more recently, with the revival of extreme-right 
nationalism, notoriously in the global north.  
This operation of segregation, however, does not take place within the normative framework of society 
– the realm of Honneth’s struggle for recognition –, but rather in a realm of ‘non-existence’ that 
captures the residuum of such framework. This obscure realm of non-existence is where the 
indeterminate subject who falls victim to the consequences of global ecological changes is to be 
located; a subject whose loss is not experienced as such because its existence had never been 
recognized in the first place. Therefore, these are “non-grievable lives” (Butler, 2010). Nevertheless, 
Butler suggests that by reflecting upon the normative framework of society, it is possible to infer what 
that very framework excludes87; that is, we have the capacity of apprehending that which is non-
                                                 
87 This way of conceiving of the social world has its roots in Adorno’s (Adorno, 1983) “non-identical 
thinking”, which conceived of (an in principle totally determined) reality as containing elements which 
point beyond it, opening up the possibility for intellectually transcending the constraints of real society, 
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recognizable – not amenable to recognition–, and turn this apprehension into the basis for a critique 
of society: a society which disregards (missachtet) the (non-grievable) lives and the threatened welfare 
of future generations and of the poor and disfranchised of this world, who are and will remain the 
main victims of the global ecological crisis.  
Boaventura de Sousa Santos goes even farther, and proposes to develop a systematic “sociology of 
absences” that builds on this space of non-existence (Santos, 2004). This is not just a matter of social 
justice, Santos argues, but further serves the purpose of recovering valuable wasted social experience 
for collective learning purposes. Therefore, not only that which has been 
excluded/negated/marginalized is relevant (i.e. what is not), but also that which lurks in the realm of 
non-existence because it is not yet, because it is on the verge of coming into existence, and currently 
only inferable through clues that point towards such emergence. The restorative enterprise of the 
“sociology of absences” is thus to be complemented, Santos argues, with that of an anticipatory 
“sociology of emergences”88.  I would like to argue, in turn, that Butler’s and Santos’ reasoning comes 
very close to what CLP theory suggests is the modus operandi of collective learning processes: by 
apprehending and interactively reflecting upon that which is excluded from the prevailing symbolic 
order (i.e. the historically excluded and the emergent), the basis for social critique and the 
corresponding transformation of that symbolic order are laid. The ‘space of non-existence’ is absorbed 
by the ‘space of existence’ as a result of successful discursive projects shedding light on the blind spots 
of the old symbolic order, and, simultaneously, re-opening this symbolic order to alternative futures 
or utopias that had been confined to the space of non-existence as impossible or even unthinkable. 
Now what are the implications of the above in terms of the preconditions for the emergence of 
transformative agency? It seems clear from the above considerations that the assumption of a 
collectively shared experience of personal disregard or disfranchisement can be (however imperfectly) 
                                                 
and, therefore, for social learning. This thesis becomes even stronger with the pluralization of the 
world after the rise of the Global South (Rehbein, 2013) and the emergence of the pluralist theories 
of global modernity (see a.o. Arnason, 2003; Dirlik, 2007; Eisenstadt, 2000; García Canclini, 2004; 
Larraín, 2007; Therborn, 2003; Wagner, 2008, 2010): Indeed, if societies and their histories are 
fundamentally different from each other (unlike the assumed to be homogeneous empirical basis of 
classical social theory supposes), then the opportunities for ‘reality-transcending’-social learning are 
boosted ipso facto,: indeed, available to drawing upon there is now the whole experience of other 
societies at their diverse historical stages. 
 
88 For further elaboration of Santos’ ideas, see “Conceptual and epistemological considerations, at the 
end of the present chapter 
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subrogated by a collective process of reflection on and sensitization to the injustices and even on the 
pathologies of the prevailing socio-cultural order as a whole, by actively searching for what this order excludes, 
and rendering it visible and relevant, that is, by actively lending an ear to the excluded, the marginalized, the 
emerging, and giving them a voice, thus bringing them into the space of social existence, and 
multiplying opportunities for them gaining recognition, thus making their disfranchisement or 
Missachtung culturally grievable.  
By implication, this amounts to actively engaging in deliberate field-leveling interventions to facilitate 
the emergence and development of transformative agency. But what should such interventions 
concretely be aimed at? Let us attempt an answer by formulating our research problem in the terms 
of the predicament of transformative agency, as outlined above: 
 
Regarding the dilemma of the conflicted agent, the question arises: How can agents ‘break free’ from the 
constitutive bond that ties them, identity wise, to the world they are trying to change? 
 
And regarding the predicament of the missing agent and the need for an effectively enactable or 
subrogatory agency: 
- By which means can the disfranchised be empowered to have their voice represented in 
interactions shaping society? 
- How can the mediation process substituting for a directly experienced Missachtung be 
rendered more effective? How can the ‘invisible’ be rendered ‘visible’? That is, how can 
the space of social non-existence be absorbed into the space of existence? 
- How can generalized reciprocity be fostered? 
       
The above guiding questions will work as an observation device to be deployed in our empirical case-
studies, fleshing out our research questions about the structural enablers for the emergence of the 
transformative agency, and the roles and practices through which agents foster collective learning 
towards sustainability. 
 
2.5. Chapter summary 
 
The agential dimension remains obscured in existing accounts of collective learning in social theory. 
Yet the inherently destabilizing environment of risk society and, in particular, geostorical challenges can 
76 
 
be reasonably expected to play on the side of agency in the classical question about the balance 
between agency and structure. Hence, this dissertation focuses on the agency-dimension of collective 
learning, contributing to the theoretical development of the latter.  
The unprecedented prospect of a deliberately fostered whole-societal transformation towards 
sustainablity, however, puts both the emergentist CLP-theory and agency-based theories of social 
change to the test. Section 2 of this chapter explored the problematic aspects posed by ‘wicked issues’ 
such as climate change to the key assumption about the grammar of social change, namely: a 
collectively shared experience of Missachtung or disregard by disadvantaged groups to challenge 
prevalent social (symbolic) orders, thus propelling learning- and change-processes. Two main insights 
could be gained from this theoretical enquiry: if it is to account for a ‘transformative agency’, the 
classical understanding of agency in theories of social change needs to be revised, ad minimum, to 
address the parallel dilemmas of 1) the conflicted agent, resulting from the dynamics of hetero-subjection 
binding subjects’ identities to the very world they aim at changing; and 2) the missing agent, which results 
from a triple deficit of enactable agency, as stakeholders are often structurally weak or incapable due 
to their condition of marginality, politically unrepresented and culturally misrecognized in the relevant 
social and political arrangements of a globally interdependent yet territorially structured world (we 
called this deficit ‘absent agent’), or indeterminate/ unborn as a result of the diffuse and time-lagged 
impacts of global environmental change.   
A revised theoretical concept of (‘transformative’) agency would thus need to answer the following 
questions: how can the hetero-determination lock-in be overcome or at least significantly mitigated? 
How can the disfranchised be empowered to make their voice heard? Since in the cases of the 
indeterminate and the absent subjects a subrogation of agency is inescapable: how can a more effective 
mediation be built? How can generalized reciprocity/ mutuality be fostered for individuals and groups 
with effectively enactable agency to take ownership of the missing victims’ cause? These questions 
inferred from the structural deficits of conventional conceptions of agency to account for 
transformative forms of intervention will serve as points of reference or orientation for our empirical 
enquiry and later discussion. The empirical enquiry is expected to deliver insights into the 
characteristics of both actually existing transformative agency (descriptive dimension) and at idealized 
visions of it (normative dimension) drawn from the case studies. 
 
Table 1: Problematization of assumptions of agency-based social change theories in the Anthropocene 
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Heteronomous 
Subject  Conflicted 
Agent 
 
Common problem is the assumed self-determination of an (allegedly autonomous) subject. 
Butler opposes the thesis of the heteronomous subject (‘the enemy is not outside, but rather 
inside’) 
Missing Subject  
Deficit of Enactable 
Agency. 
 
Incapable subject: the most affected social group are the poor and disfranchised 
Absent subject. Representation and recognition opportunities lie with individuals/groups which 
only experience an “indirect” moral injury or material disfranchisement. Presents three 
problems: - Weak, double mediation: 1) cryptic language of science and complex interdependence 
renders causal chains hard to visualize 2) volubility of media communication (both 
horizontal and vertical mass media): “logic of news”;  - even if successful mediation likely ineffective (value-action gap) - inadequacy of the public sphere as political device: inefficiency of public deliberation 
as a mechanism to deal with complex problems in plural societies (H. Rosa) 
Indeterminate subject: the main stakeholder group are future generations. Problem of time- lag 
between the generation of causes and the full-fledged manifestation of consequences. In 
addition, the multi-faceted /diffuse character of the latter renders victims and concrete 
damages ‘invisible’, leading to a structural deficit of attribution and responsibility. 
Possible solutions 
   Subrogatory agency + empowerment. Pathways: 
- Mitigating/ circumventing identitary bond to prevalent socio-cultural matrix 
- Empowerment of disfranchised 
- improved mediation of social Missachtung resulting from civilizational/geostorical risk 
- fostering generalized reciprocity 
 
 
Excursus: Epistemological considerations for a critical theory of society in the Anthropocene 
 
The whole theoretical construct proposed above rests on the assumption that social learning is 
possible, that is, that it is possible to assess the positive or negative quality of social evolutionary 
trajectories, even in the absence of transcendentalist and naturalist assumptions about reason and 
evolution.  Yet how could anyone claim the capacity of observing society from the outside, so as to 
be in position to hold the very foundations of such society to critical scrutiny? Indeed, in the absence 
of transcendentalist presuppositions, this question is not satisfactorily resolved in the current state of 
the art in the philosophy of science, leading to a structural crisis of the epistemological enterprise as 
such89 (Haye Molina, 2007). As we have seen with Butler, Honneth, Eder, and Sousa Santos, however, 
                                                 
89 Indeed, epistemology – its ambition of being a meta-knowledge about knowledge notwithstanding 
– remains a form of knowledge (Greek: logos). And every knowledge, insofar communicatively 
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there exists a socially-immanent criterion for the critique of society: through a reflexive analysis of the 
prevailing normative order in any given society at any given point in time, it becomes possible to infer 
the space socially produced as non-existent (the space of absences and emergences), and utilize this 
exclusion as a basis for the critique of social injustice and of social pathologies.  
I would like to further argue that, in the geostorical context of the Anthropocene, the above immanent 
foundation for social critique can be reinforced by a socially-exogenous one, namely: the integrity of 
bio-physical life-support systems and natural resource-base on which the reproduction of human life 
on Earth critically depends, as measured by Earth-systemic megatrends. The historically 
unprecedented character of this event provides a solid foundation for the critique of a society insofar 
it can be safely assumed that any society would want to develop in a manner which is functional to its 
own reproduction capability. While this is still a quasi-normative assertion, it is certainly not one that 
is likely to be controversial. 
To be sure, however, our knowledge about Earth-systemic evolution remains communicatively 
mediated itself, and thus discursive in nature. This leads to reformulating the question which opened 
this excursus: Is it possible, in the context of geostorical challenges, to set a benchmark for social critique 
which transcends discourse, even if it remains discursively mediated?  
A first approximation to an answer comes from within the constructivist paradigm itself: the discursive 
character of any form of knowledge does not amount to an absolute relativism, but rather to a form of 
relationalism, which gives place to the social generation of alternative assumptions about the nature of 
the world, about the nature of man, and about the nature of the relationship between man and the 
world (J. Adams, 1995; Thompson, 1984). Such assumptions, as empirical research in pragmatic 
sociology and in the political culture approach in political science have shown (Boltanski & Chiapello, 
2005; Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991; Thompson, 1984; respectively), are limited in number: “there are 
only a few rationalizable ways of life, and […] each of them is underpinned by a distinctive socio-logic 
and buttressed by a distinctive idea of nature” (Thompson, 1984, p. 326). In other words, there are 
only so many worldviews – the ordres de grandeur or citès in Boltanski & Thevenot’s model – that are 
conceivable as part of an actually available historical repertoire of political philosophies, though 
nothing speaks against the possibility of it potentially (finitely) expanding in the future. The implication 
is that the question about which is the ‘right perspective’ on which to base political decision-making 
                                                 
mediated, is discursive in nature. And since a discourse is always contestable by another discourse, this 
leads to relativism and therefore to the negation of any universalistic (hence uncontestable) conception 
of ‘reality’. This premise is, of course, inherent to constructivist epistemologies. 
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(with the implied diagnoses and prescriptions) does not have a straightforward answer, yet in a context 
where the plurality of rationalities is limited, an answer should be possible, nonetheless. Indeed, 
according to Boltanski and Thévenot, invoking a particular rationality: political, techno-managerial, 
artistic, etc. – Enrique Leff (2004a) would add an ‘environmental rationality’ –, will be socially 
justifiable insofar it fits the particular situation to which it is being applied, as per the internal structural 
consistence of each system of political philosophy (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991). Scientifically, the 
most fruitful quest would be a genealogical one, that is, inquiring into the structural drivers of the 
social generation of the alternative sets of assumptions (i.e. to ask where the assumptions came from) 
(Thompson, 1984), and then test-proof their consistence with regard to the situation where they are 
being deployed, be it in a more cognitive fashion, as Boltanski and Thévenot suggest, or through a 
dramaturgical lens which includes a wider range of dimensions in the analysis of situations, as we 
advanced in Chapter 1.  
A second reaction to the above question resorts to de-constructing the constructivist enterprise in search for 
an answer: Bruno Latour convincingly argues that constructivist social science was born with the aim 
of emancipating the public from “prematurely naturalized objectified facts”. Yet as the case of climate 
denialism clearly illustrates, the constructivist ethos is now being instrumentalized and its 
emancipatory character subverted through a (pseudo-)scientific controversy artificially sustained to 
the benefit of vested interests seeking to maintain the status quo. Hence, Latour argues, 
the danger would no longer be coming from an excessive confidence in ideological arguments 
posturing as matters of fact—as we have learned to combat so efficiently in the past—but from an 
excessive distrust of good matters of fact disguised as bad ideological biases! While we spent years 
trying to detect the real prejudices hidden behind the appearance of objective statements, do we now 
have to reveal the real objective and incontrovertible facts hidden behind the illusion of prejudices? 
(Latour, 2004, p. 227) 
 
Along the lines of Latour’s ‘symmetric anthropology’, for a satisfactory engagement with geostorical 
challenges, the critical enterprise would thus need to emancipate from its obsession with ‘facts’, which 
keeps it running up a down escalator in its mission of unveiling pathological social configurations. 
This does not amount, Latour argues, to sidelining empiricism, but rather to redefining it away from 
a misleading focus on “matters of fact” towards a focus on “matters of concern” (Latour, 2004). In 
the same vein, Blühdorn (2007, p. 270) argues that the question of ‘empirical evidence’ is 
misconceived, because the whole point is to reach beyond established societal self-descriptions, whilst 
anything that is considered acceptable as empirical evidence would invariably just reproduce these 
societal self-descriptions. 
80 
 
Hence, while Blühdorn (similarly to Latour) rejects a naïve demonstrative empiricism that would “tie 
social theory into the system and into the role of a service provider”, he does advocate empirical 
plausibility as a validity criterion. Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2004, 2008) also turns his back to an 
outdated notion “empiricism” restricted to ‘fact’ and ‘evidence’, whose actual performative effect is 
keeping fundamental critique at bay. While the notion of ‘clue’, understood as something prefiguratively 
announcing what is yet to come into existence, is essential in diverse human practices of maximum 
rigor (such as medicine and criminal investigation), in the social sciences it has traditionally had no 
credibility at all (Santos, 2004, pp. 27–28). Santos’ aforementioned sociology of emergences (see section 2.4 
of this chapter) valorizes clues as indicative for the discussion about alternative futures. The potential 
evolution of observable clues into actual ‘facts’ is fraught with uncertainty, as a result of a double 
deficit: first, the conditions which would make the possible a fact are only partially known; and, second, 
such conditions themselves exist only partially. The clue can thus be regarded not as something 
inexistent, but as something whose existence has not yet fully manifested: as a 'not yet'. This ‘not yet’ 
is the key concept in sociology of emergences. Subjectively, the 'not yet' is anticipatory consciousness; 
objectively, it is actual capacity (potency, from the perspective of the agent), on the one hand, and 
concrete possibility (potential), on the other. The 'not yet' 
expresses what exists as mere tendency, a movement that is latent in the very process of manifesting 
itself. The Not Yet is the way in which the future is inscribed in the present. It is not an indeterminate 
or indefinite future, rather a concrete possibility and a capacity that neither exist in a vacuum, nor are 
completely predetermined. (Santos, 2004, p. 24) 
As heterodox as they may be, these theoretical proposals by Santos, Blühdorn and Latour are, 
however, anything but new: Indeed, Santos’ framework draws heavily on Ernst Bloch’s “The principle 
of Hope” (Bloch, 1995; Muraca, 2014). Bloch’s “not yet” has two dimensions: the “not yet conscious” 
(which belongs to the socio-cognitive realm) and the “not yet become” (material realm). For Bloch, 
social learning is driven by “concrete utopias”, which – as opposed to abstract utopias, which merely 
amount to wishful thinking – draw on existing potentials and tendencies toward alternative futures; i.e. 
they are anticipatory of the real-possible, as opposed to the compensatory character of abstract utopia90. 
Concrete utopias are therefore – as argued above alongside Olin Wright (see Chapter 1, section 1.3.1) 
– both prefiguring and performative. Yet Bloch makes clear that it takes more than naïve hope for 
                                                 
90 It is worth noticing that even the latter are appreciated positively by Bloch as a product –however 
fruitless- of the utopian impulse. Karl Manheim, in turn, criticized compensatory fantasies as 
ideological. 
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such anticipation to be fulfilled: what is required is what Bloch termed “militant optimism”, that is, 
the enactment of effective agency led by a transformative vision, what we have called transformative 
agency. 
At this point, it should be noted that the argument goes beyond the due consideration of 
epistemological assumptions and pertains the core business of the present research enterprise: Indeed, 
while collective learning theory has usually looked back into the past as its object of inquiry, what 
matters with regard to a social-ecological ‘Great Transformation’ is to understand and foster ongoing 
collective learning processes. To be sure, the past remains an indispensable source of knowledge and 
experience to illuminate our understanding of these processes, but can hardly account for the specifics 
of currently occurring learning processes. And the only way to study the latter, I would like to argue, 
is by resorting to the epistemological and methodological compromises above exposed, centered 
around the notion of actually existent anticipatory ‘clues’. This dissertation follows a middle-ground-
solution, focusing on discursive representations and their respective generative practices, i.e. actually 
existing ‘evidence’ of ongoing discourse pluralization, whose importance, however, resides in the fact 
that they are understood as clues pointing towards emerging collective learning processes with potential for a 
social-ecological transformation. 
Wrapping up the above considerations: For all the consensus there is on the need for radical social 
change towards an inclusive and sustainable model of development, there is a paradoxical resistance 
to letting go of traditional ‘certainties’ (also in the epistemological terrain), even if this resistance goes 
against the core business of the social sciences: Indeed, “[t]he exploration of real utopias is an integral 
part of a broad agenda of an emancipatory social science” (Wright, 2013, p. 3).  
Taking into account the available alternatives – a sustained status quo and the decades-long-dominant 
yet hitherto failed incremental-reformist strategy, versus a properly justified epistemological risk-
taking –, and following into the footsteps of the abovementioned scholars, this research is to be 
decidedly inscribed into the latter.  
This choice further mirrors the principle of post-normal science that – while striving for the best 
possible standard in both – the relevance of the question should take precedence over the accuracy of the answer 
(Gallopin, Funtowicz, O’Connor, & Ravetz, 2001; Santos, 2004), which means, in other words: 
relevant clues are preferable to superfluous facts. This view is equally embraced by emerging scholarly 
enterprises of transformation science and transformative science (Schneidewind, 2013a, 2013b, 2015; WBGU, 
2011) (see Chapter 3).  
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Great Transformation and Buen vivir 
as real-world collective learning experiments towards sustainability 
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CHAPTER 3 
The “Great Transformation” as a field of discursive representation 
 
“Vision is the most vital step in the policy process. If we don’t know where we want to go, 
it makes little difference that we make great progress. Yet vision is not only missing almost 
entirely from policy discussions; it is missing from our whole culture.” 
Donella H. Meadows 1996 
 
 
 
3.1. Introductory remarks. 
 
Chapter 2 defined discourse as a ‘cognitive project’, i.e. as an attempt to transform the socio-cognitive 
‘deep structures’ (symbolic order) in a certain direction. The domain of discussion we have termed the 
“Great Transformation debate” in Germany (GT debate for short) is the ideational locus where 
different partial discourses coalesce into an overarching discussion about whole-societal 
transformation. Precisely because of this complex, meta-like character–, the GT remains a diffuse and 
elusive field of discourse whose borders are inherently blurred. Therefore, a delimitation effort is 
required to mark the object of study off for observation and analytical purposes, as well as strengthen 
the validity of the analysis. 
The ideational reconstruction of the discursive field followed a three-stage process of: 
a. Initial outline of the discursive domain through early gained literature and field exploration for 
“empirical literacy” (Miles & Huberman, 1994) (including participant observation in 
conferences, workshops, etc., as well as exploratory expert interviews). 
b. Literature recompilation based on a combination of exploratory expert interviews, secondary 
literature (see below), and a snowballing process. This yielded a data corpus of 87 texts, 
consisting mainly of ‘grey literature’91 and dissemination literature, as well as application-
oriented scientific reports, which will hereafter be referred to as main data corpus (cf. Annex 1). 
This provided the database for the exploratory analysis of the field. 
                                                 
91 Conceptual digression: Grey literature is neither offered through commercial bookstores nor 
through academic journals, but is rather available directly from the publisher. E.g. publications by 
NGOs. 
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c. A sample of 14 representative texts (hereafter Sample 1, see Excursus in this chapter) drawn 
from the main data corpus, which provided the database for fine-tuned analysis. 
This chapter pursues a systematic reconstruction of the content of such discussion from an 
interpretative-analytical perspective, i.e. the GT discourse as representation. Chapter 4 then seeks to inquire 
into the discourse as practice, that is, into agent constellations, relations and processes, as well as into their 
situatedness and materiality. In so doing, it will bind together the findings of chapters 3 and 4. 
Regarding the secondary literature available, apart from a handful of overview studies of the field of 
sustainable development discourses in Germany (Adler & Schachtschneider, 2010; Jacob, Bär, & 
Graaf, 2015b; Mikfeld, 2012; Schriefl, 2008), to my knowledge there are have been few scholarly 
attempts so far to analyze the German GT debate as a situated discursive sub-field of the former with 
peculiar features and implications. Among these existing attempts are a series of texts by Ulrich Brand 
(Brand, 2012b, 2014c, 2014b, 2016a, 2016c, 2016b), the exploratory study conducted by Gerrit von 
Jorck (2013a unpublished), and a couple of  studies commissioned by the German Federal 
Environmental Office (UBA) and conducted by a research team at the TU Berlin (Jacob, Bär, & Graaf, 
2015a; Jacob et al., 2015b). In addition, Matthias Schmelzer’s (2015) structuring study of the growth-
critical discourse in Germany proved a useful analytical source for this chapter. All of the above seek 
to inquire into the diverse discursive representations of the GT, in order to bring out the cleavages 
and clarify the content and implications of the diverse conceptual drivers and normative visions and 
strategies featuring in the debate. The present chapter builds on these precedents, while completing, 
strengthening and updating these analysis and derived insights through a more comprehensive and 
systematic discourse analysis. In this sense, the intended contribution of this analysis to the state of 
the art in the knowledge about the GT discourse(s) constitutes a research goal in and of itself 
(cf.Introductory chapter). 
The chapter begins presenting the methodological proceedings for data collection and analysis. An 
initial exploratory analysis in Section 3.2 serves the purpose of identifying the key referential themes 
or issues (which I call the ‘axial themes’) in the GT debate. These axial themes appear in the debate 
combined in particular ways, which will be distilled from the texts in Sample 1. We call these 
representative combinations emerging from individual texts of the sample “GT-strategies”. These GT-
strategies provide for a first attempt at structuration of the GT-debate as a discursive field, as well as 
the basis for the study of narrative structures in the next step of analysis.  
Section 3.3 undertakes a fine-tuned analysis of the discursive field of the GT, following the 
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methodological orientations of the Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse (SKAD) (Keller, 
2011) introduced in Chapter 1. The SKAD framework involves inquiring into the content-structure 
or Gestalt of discourses; into the variegated identifiable narratives in the debate; as well as into the 
interpretative socio-cognitive templates or frames that can be therefrom derived. While the axial themes 
represent the building-blocks of the GT debate, GT-narratives (i.e. ideal-typical meaningful 
concatenations of axial themes) make up the main unit of analysis in our analysis of discourse. Frames, 
in turn, are the most condensed units of meaning transported via narratives, and provide an 
overarching (usually implicit) frame of reference for the discourse. A more detailed conceptualization 
of these analytical terms will be provided as appropriate. 
These sub-steps of fine-tuned analysis will then flow in into an integrated analysis of the GT discourse 
in Section 3.4. The chapter ends drawing insights about common, divisive, and potentially bridging 
elements in terms of the discourse-content for the analysis of the discourse-practice (the 
‘dramaturgical analysis’) in Chapter 4. As overlapping interpretative repertoire among discursive 
contestants in the GT debate, common elements set the boundaries of the GT debate vis-à-vis the 
broader sustainable development debate. Divisive elements, in turn, can be seen as a measure of 
pluralization in the debate. However, the focus of our interest is bridging elements, as, in terms of our 
research questions, they represent ideational-structural enablers of transformative agency at ideational 
level; that is, windows of opportunity for the transformation of meaning-structures, what we defined 
as collective learning. 
3.2. Exploratory Analysis: delimiting the GT as a field of discursive representation 
 
For the purpose of establishing an initial classification of the various contributions to the GT debate, 
I have used two guiding questions92: a) what are the axial themes around which the GT debate 
revolves? and b) In what combinations do these axial themes appear in the debate?. These questions 
were answered basing on a systematic analysis of the texts included in the main data corpus.  
 
3.2.1. Axial themes of the GT debate:  
 
                                                 
92 This exploratory design builds on the study by Gerrit von Jorck (2013a) 
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‘Axial themes’ is the term chosen in the framework of this analysis to represent the topoi or topical foci 
of the GT debate; that is, the main referential topics inductively obtained from the data through an 
iterative process of keywording, subsumption, and condensation (see methodological excursus at the 
end of this section for details). These topoi represent technical, cultural, and/or political leverage points 
that, from the perspective of the utterer, can or should be harnessed to unlock, trigger, foster, advance, 
or accelerate a ‘Great Transformation’. In other words, they are proposed as ‘building blocks’ which 
can be purposively and varyingly combined into a ‘transformation-roadmap’.  
The final result of the iteration-process featured the following eight axial themes, in decreasing order 
of prominence within the GT-debate (as measured by the number of appearances in the data corpus):  
- Cultural change: pertains the variable importance attributed to fundamental changes in cultural 
matrixes (moral values, aspirations, identity boundaries, sources of social recognition, beliefs 
or basic assumptions about the world) as drivers towards a transformation, and, more 
importantly, if these are to be regarded as an independent or as a dependent variable (e.g. of 
political impulses). The debate around consumerism is awarded special importance in the GT 
debate, and was therefore coded with an axial theme of its own. Distinguishable from cultural 
factors are particularly behaviorist strategies that seek to provoke change by means of 
exogenous stimuli. 
 
- Commons: This axial theme pits approaches emphasizing the social and ecological advantages 
of a cultural re-habilitation of use-value, re-communalization, and common property or use of 
material and immaterial goods (i.e. knowledge) versus approaches emphasizing the ‘tragedy of 
the commons’ (G. Hardin), i.e. the risk of overutilization of commonly owned resources. The 
socio-cultural effects of a solidarity-based versus a profit-based economy are also part of this 
strand of debate. 
 
- GDP growth: While the growth-debate is older than the GT debate, but has come to be framed 
as part of the latter. It covers discussions about the feasibility, desirability, and compatibility 
of a growth-oriented political economy vis-à-vis a GT. Central here is the issue of the technical 
and political possibility of decoupling economic growth from ecological degradation, as well as 
the observed persistent decoupling of economic growth from individual and collective 
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wellbeing in affluent societies. Because of the heavy technical-economic, political, cultural, and 
geopolitical implications, this is by far the most controversial and most politicized strand of 
discussion within the GT debate.  
 
- Re-localization/ regionalization: served to code discussions regarding the globalizing dynamics of 
late modern capitalism as a key driver of the global ecological crisis and possible ways to 
address it through a (partial) territorial re-embeddedness of economic relations. 
 
- Restructuration of work: most generally, this axial theme covers discussions about the re-
embeddedness of a ‘productivity’-centered economy into the dynamics of social ‘re-
productivity’. Addressed here are, in particular, the interrelated discussions on the ‘end of 
work’, cultural re-conceptualization of work, redistribution of gainful employment and 
reduction in working hours, etc. Being a transversal issue largely determinant of social 
allocation of time, economic resources, social recognition, socio-economic and gender-based 
power relations, etc., the restructuration of work is certain to be a central feature of a GT. 
 
- Redistribution: beyond considerations of social justice, redistribution (or else an altered primary 
distribution) is debated as a mechanism to roll-back positional consumption, as well as a 
compensatory or legitimizing mechanism to increase social acceptation of transformative 
measures. This argumentative strand stands in tension with post-materialist and growth-critical 
arguments, insofar a post-growth society implies a zero-sum game in distributive terms. In 
addition, the axial theme redistribution covers non-material aspects as well (redistribution of 
time, social recognition, cultural worth, etc.) 
 
- Democratization: while the central strand of discussion pertains alternatives to empower 
democratic participation of people in political debate and decision-making, including the 
representation of future generations, this axial theme also covers discussions about the 
democratization of knowledge, including the democratization of science, as well as  
 
- Sufficiency: introducing a conceptual differentiation (which is framed either in oppositional or 
in complementary terms) vis-à-vis efficiency- and consistency-strategies, sufficiency pertains 
the significance of a reduction in consumption – particularly in the areas of housing, 
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construction, mobility, and food, as well as intermediate goods (e.g. packaging), which account 
for the bulk of consumption-induced ecological and resource-impact. Cultural and political 
alternatives are assessed in one of the hottest topical foci in the GT debate.  
As should be apparent from the above, each of these axial themes gives rise to a sub-discourse within 
the GT debate, each with a specific phenomenal structure which will be dissected in-depth in Section 
3.3.1. But, as stands out from the outset, the centrality awarded, directly or indirectly, to cultural issues 
in the GT debate supports our assumption about the primacy of collective learning in unlocking 
entrenched unsustainability in the prevalent world- and social-order (cf. Introduction). 
Also noteworthy is the fact that – despite playing a prominent role in the GT debate – the axial themes 
dealing with fiscal-policy measures fostering an energy and technological revolution or market-
mechanisms were not selected as topics for detailed analysis. The reasons for this purposeful exclusion 
were two: First, their largely consensual (i.e. non-controversial) character; and, second, their system-
immanent character; that is, they do not add any value in terms of discursive diversity to the GT 
debate, which was established as one of our criteria of observation (Chapter 1). The exclusion of the 
mentioned axial themes from further analysis does not amount to the exclusion of discourses building 
on such axial themes from our defined discursive field. Indeed, while such axial themes lack interest 
as units of analysis, mainstream voices remain important not only empirically within the GT debate, 
but also to our analysis, insofar a contrasting reference for counter-hegemonic TDs.   
 
After distilling the axial themes of the GT debate, the exploratory analysis broadly modelled their 
various typical combinations (cf. Section 3.3.2), as they appear in exemplary transformative proposals 
or GT-strategies purposively sampled from the main data corpus.  
 
 
Excursus: Detailed methodological procedure 
 
How were the axial themes worked out from the literature sample?  
The first step was keywording the main data corpus of 87 texts on social-ecological transformation. 
Following, a subset of the most recurrent ones across the text-corpus – which can be safely assumed 
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to represent the main reference-topics of the GT debate – was aggregated into a more synthetic code-
list through an iterative process of equivalence-drawing, subsumption and condensation, allowing for 
greater conceptual parsimony and comprehensibility.  
The process of subsumption and condensation was based on two criteria: a) Keyword frequency in 
the corpus, and b) relevance within the GT debate, as per secondary literature and exploratory 
interviews. 
Keywords which featured in at least 30%93 of the texts in the corpus were considered relevant for the 
discourse as a whole, while others were understood to be part of a smaller sub-discourse without 
major relevance to the broader debate. By way of illustration, the sub-discourses around re-localization 
and subsistence / peasant agriculture overlap to a large extent, whereby ‘local sourcing’ stands out as 
the central theme; hence, they were merged together into a single axial theme named “local & 
regional”. Also, the sub-discourses around a re-politization of governance and the democratization of 
the economy were subsumed under the axial theme “democratization”, even if they address the issue 
of enlarged participation in a fairly different manner. Furthermore, the sub-discourse on the 
strengthening of convivial or community-values, structural de-acceleration of the peace of life, and 
the very trendy topic of “the good life” were all subsumed under the more general theme of “cultural 
change”.  
The end product of this process yielded the following eight axial themes: Cultural change (64 
repetitions); Commons (61); GDP growth (52); re-localization/ regionalization (48); restructuration of work (44); 
redistribution (44); democratization (32); and sufficiency (29). In turn, each of these axial themes gives rise to 
a sub-discourse in the GT debate, with a specific phenomenal structure (cf. section 3.3.1).  
The axial themes are clearly not on equal standing in terms of their level of abstraction, their span (e.g. 
‘restructuration of work’ is clearly narrower in span than ‘cultural change’), or their political 
implications. Furthermore, some of them could be framed as constitutive part of another (e.g. 
sufficiency-orientation as part of the more encompassing ‘cultural change’). Yet in this final list, the 
selection of axial themes has been condensed into the most abstract possible form without sacrificing 
                                                 
93 The cutting-point was established at 30% based on an abrupt discontinuity in the ranking of 
keyword-frequencies, from 29 utterances in position 10 (keyword: sufficiency, featuring in ca. 33% of 
the corpus), to 12 utterances in the next slot (keyword: alternative currencies, featuring in ca. 13% 
only).  
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the specificity of the discursive content of each theme. Resorting again to the above example, 
condensing sufficiency into the more general category of cultural change would have meant disregarding 
the particularities surfacing in the discussion around that particular referential topic of cultural change. In 
turn, cultural change served to capture other aspects of importance within the debate which are less 
developed in their particularities. 
 
The above axial themes were then applied as codes to a second corpus of 14 texts (Sample 1), which 
was chosen from within the broader corpus through theoretical sampling, and provides the basis for 
fine-tuned analysis (Section 3.3 of this chapter). As mentioned before, the texts in Sample 1 were 
selected to fairly represent the discursive diversity in the GT debate, i.e. containing the complete 
collection of relevant elements configuring the diverse discourses in the discursive field. The selection 
was done according to four criteria:  
First, the texts should present a full-fledged GT-strategy, i.e. a blueprint for a whole-societal 
transformation, rather than, say, at discrete economic sectors, as would be the case, for example, in 
the much-touted German Energy Transition (Energiewende).  
Second, the relevance of the particular texts within the debate (as a proxy for their structuring 
character), as assessed through the analysis of the pragmatic constitution of the GT-field of debate94.  
Third, it should combine a wide range of the axial themes identified, rather than merely a smaller sub-
set thereof.  
The fourth and last criterion refers to the constitution of the sample as a whole, and is aimed at 
guaranteeing that it is representative not only of the full-width of the discursive field (criterion of 
maximal contrasting), but of the subtler differences between proximate discursive takes, as well 
(criterion of minimal contrasting). The texts selected for Sample 1 were the following: 
1. The UNEP-strategy paper “Towards a Green Economy” (UNEP, 2012) as representative of 
the mainstream SD discourse in the context of the GT debate. 
2. The OECD-paper “Towards Green Growth” (OECD, 2011). As the official position paper 
                                                 
94 In terms of the chronological order of methodological proceedings, this analysis (presented in 
Chapter 4) was actually performed prior to the analysis of discourse as representation presented in the 
present chapter, thus yielding insights for the latter. 
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of the OECD member countries vis-à-vis the ‘multiple crisis’ it plays a significant role in the 
German transformation debate. 
3. Ralf Fücks’ “Intelligent Wachsen” (‘Grow smartly’) (Fücks, 2013), which represents the most 
explicit and deliberate engagement of eco-modernism with the sufficiency- and growth-critical 
discourses in Germany. 
4. The report “World in transition. A social contract for a Great Transformation” by the German 
Adisory Council on Global Change (WBGU, 2011), originally aimed at representing 
Germany’s official position in Rio+20. It found broad reception in Germany, and served as a 
key catalyzer of the GT debate in the German-speaking world up until the present day (cf. 
Chapter. 4). 
5. The ISM “Social-ecological societal restructuration” (Institut Solidarische Moderne, 2011), as 
joint position-paper of well-known representatives of traditionally considered to be left-of-
center political parties in Germany – Greens, Linke, and SPD; together with some influential 
NGOs. 
6. “Farewell to growth” (Latouche, 2009) by Serge Latouche, considered to be the father of the 
European Degrowth discourse (Décroissance). 
7. Alberto Acosta’s “Buen Vivir. Vom Recht auf ein Gutes Leben” (“about the right to a good life” 
2015a) brings in the Southern perspective of Buen Vivir, which has had noteworthy reception 
in the German GT debate. 
8. The book “Postwachstum. Krise, ökologische Grenzen und soziale Rechte” (“Post-growth, Crisis, 
ecological limits and social rights”) (Schmelzer & Passadakis, 2011) stands for the view of the 
anti-globalization network Attac, which played a pivotal role in bringing the growth-debate to 
Germany.95 
9. The book “Befreiung vom Überfluss” (“liberation from the superfluous”) by Niko Paech (2012) 
presents a classical strand of bottom-up, small-scale transitions at the communal level, yet 
framed in an unusual macro-perspective. 
10. Uwe Schneidewind & Angelika Zahrnt’s book “The politics of Sufficiency. Making it easier to 
live the good life” (2014) represents a ‘radical reformist’ perspective, and makes a pragmatic 
(and programmatic) case for sufficiency-oriented politics trumping the exclusive focus of the 
                                                 
95 For example, Attac organized the first Degrowth conference in Germany in 2011. Schmelzer was 
also part of the organization committee of the 4th international Degrowth conference in Leipzig and 
is a fellow of the DFG-financed Degrowth Research Group at Jena University. 
92 
 
mainstream on a techno-efficiency revolution as the high road towards a social-ecological 
transformation. 
11. Tim Jackson’s “Prosperity without growth” (2009a), a report produced for the Sustainable 
Development Commission of the British government (2000-2011) complements 
Schneidewind & Zahrnt’s meso-focus with a macro-perspective, and counts as the most 
representative text of the growth-critical discourse with a wider, international audience. 
12. Meinhard Miegel’s “Exit – Wohlstand ohne Wachstum (“Welfare without growth”) (2010) 
represents a neoliberal/conservative growth-critique, which is a singular feature of the GT-
debate in Germany (Schmelzer, 2015). 
13. The feminist strand of the GT debate, with its focus on social reproduction (as opposed to 
economic production), ir represented here by Adelheid Biesecker, Christa Wichterich, and Uta 
von Winterfeld (2012). 
14. Michael Bauwen’s essay “Blueprint for a P2P society” (Bauwens, 2012b) was selected, for 
reasons of comprehensiveness and conciseness, to represent the discursive strand setting on 
the technologically-activated potential of the so-called ‘digital commons’ for peer-to-peer 
networks of prosumers. Internationally, this discursive strand is represented by public figures 
such as Jeremy Rifkin (2014) and Paul Mason (2015). 
 
While not comparable with the other volumes listed above in terms of their broad reception, the last 
two texts were included in the sample with the purpose of offering a counterpoint vis-à-vis the former 
and expose the width of the discursive field (criterion of maximal contrasting). 
 
3.3. Fine-tuned analysis: reconstructing the interpretative repertoires in the GT debate 
 
Building on the exploratory analysis above, a second, fine-tuned analytical step will now be taken in 
order to pour the themes and GT-strategies identified into full-fledged discursive structures. The fine-
tuned analysis follows the methodological guidelines of the Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse 
(SKAD) (cf. Chapter 1) 
 
3.3.1. Phenomenal structures of the axial themes in the GT debate 
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The purpose of this section is to identify which particular categories or dimensions of the topic under 
consideration are being foregrounded (or even considered at all) in the discussion, and how this 
categorial scaffolding is fleshed-out; that is, how each of the dimensions of the phenomenon are 
problematized. This is what, following Keller (2011), I refer to as the analysis of the phenomenal structure 
of the debate. However, unlike Keller, who exemplarily analyzed the much narrower and focused 
discourse on garbage in a French-German comparative perspective, and came up with a synthetic 
overview of the phenomenal structure of the whole garbage-debate, in our case-study a 
straightforward unified analysis of the discursive field of the GT was not possible due to the sheer 
complexity of the field. Hence it was necessary to break down the analysis by single axial themes. In 
the final step of this analysis, however, a transversal appreciation of the phenomenal structure of the 
GT debate as a whole is attempted.  
 
The phenomenal structures of each axial theme were built by scrutinizing in detail how the latter are 
dealt with across the texts96 in Sample 1. For this purpose, the texts were thoroughly coded with the 
help of Atlas ti software for qualitative data analysis. Atlas ti then easily delivers a list of all coded texts 
excerpts or segments for each axial theme across the corpus, which is, in turn, second-level-coded 
with the categories inductively retrieved from a careful analysis of those excerpts. The first step allows 
to retrieve the relevant categories (say, for example, causal attribution, identity-markers, proposed course 
of action, etc.) for each axial theme, while the second allows to respectively flesh-out their specific 
contents. While the latter are expected to differ between competing discourses, the former may or may 
not differ. The final output of this phase of analysis is summarized below.  
Cultural change:  
 
Cultural change is mainly problematized in regard to the relationship between cultural and material 
transformation of Western-style society and economy. Positions are polarized between those who 
frame culture as the object of transformation and those who see this as a dangerous interference with 
individual freedoms. The former ones emphasize the social embeddedness of individual behavior and 
the socio-natural embeddedness of the economy, and therefore uphold political (i.e. collective) action 
as indispensable doorway towards a social-ecological transformation. For the latter, the transformation 
                                                 
96 Arguments raised by the texts in Sample 1 are complemented, when required, with supportive, 
opposing, or complementing arguments drawn from secondary literature. 
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should target exclusively production patterns and leave the rest to the individual choice of allegedly 
autonomous and rational subjects. The first strand of thought thus targets political values as an object 
of transformation, and thus emphasizes the importance of creating suitable framework-conditions for 
cultural change. The latter, in turn, rests on the assumption of an ongoing change of moral values and 
social and environmental consciousness, and therefore relies more on creating economic incentives 
and argumentative persuasion for socio-environmentally responsible behavior97.  
 
The rationale of the cultural change discourse goes as follows: The socio-cognitive and cultural 
infrastructures of Western-style societies are geared towards growth. Individual biographies are 
focused on constant improvement and development. Success is measured by the level of material 
welfare attained, whereby consumption is the locus where the former becomes visible (Welzer, 2011). 
A social-ecological transformation should therefore target not only technological and economic 
infrastructures, but also “mental” (i.e. socio-cognitive) ones. Core cultural pillars of contemporary 
Western(ized) societies should be revised, both political values (prosperity, freedom, individualism) 
and moral or esthetic ones (happiness, good life, success – also sufficiency, which has been framed 
negatively as curtailment and sacrifice instead of an expression of freedom). Even modernity should 
be redefined away from a narrow linear evolutionary understanding towards a pluralist one (Acosta, 
2015a). A philosophy of sufficiency and a non-materialistic vision of the good life would dissolve 
consumerism. Regulatory agents should create an infrastructure for cultural change via a “jaw-
strategy”: on the one hand, it should correct (or dismantle) the structure of perverse incentives for 
unsustainable and unproductive status competition (e.g. advertising, credit policy, etc.), as well as 
create new structures facilitating conviviality, participation, and social recognition. On the other hand, 
it should provide contrasting points of orientation to that of currently dominant culture via 
educational, time- and sufficiency-policies, as well as deliberately making room and facilitating cultural 
pluralism. In summary: The concept of cultural change covers the struggle between material-
structuralist and behaviorist approaches which seek to trigger changes by means of individualized 
moral appeals or economic incentives. 
 
                                                 
97 For a sound critique of this policy approach, see for example Shove (2010a) (cf. Introduction) or 
Kopatz (2016) 
95 
 
Commons:  
 
This axial theme covers the discussion around the commons, i.e. collective resources that are defined by 
their non-excludability98. This variably refers to the utilization or the property of common resources 
– be they factors of production or consumption goods. Another relevant distinction in the debate is 
that between material (e.g. land) and immaterial commons (knowledge). The central cleavage builds 
around positions which emphasize the danger of free-riding and over-utilization (tragedy of the 
commons99) in the absence of unambiguous private property rights (Hardin, 1968), on the one hand, 
and positions which advocate the communal utilization of collective resources denouncing 
dispossession (land-grabbing, IPR regimes) and externalization dynamics as a result of privatization 
and commodification. The resulting prescriptions are thus diametrically opposed to each other: the 
first approach prescribe exhaustive privatization through legal property rights to unambiguously 
determine responsibilities, while the second approach sees the root of social and ecological problems 
precisely in this all-encompassing privatization and commodification, and would thus rather 
recommend collective autonomy, cooperation and responsibility vis-à-vis common resources100. The 
de-commodification implied in the communalization of goods and services should serve also to 
guarantee universal access to life-critical provisions, thereby enhancing the actual freedom of the 
many, in that it facilitates subsistence, on the one hand, but also more relational lifestyles. The 
                                                 
98 The concept of commons differs from that of public goods mainly in that the latter have a discursive 
linkage to state-provision and/or management, while the former is normally connected with 
communal forms of social organization. 
 
99 This argument remains surprisingly popular despite ubiquitous evidence of the globally accelerating 
destruction of public natural resources such as mineral reservoirs or soil as a result of increasing 
commodification or privatization, which would rather suggest a ‘tragedy of externalization’ (Lessenich, 
2016). Worse even: not only is externalization affecting the remaining stocks of communalized 
ecosystems and resource-reservoirs, but the increasingly financialized logic of capital is externalizing 
the unbound of all its former constraints towards the physical world, regardless of property 
considerations, reflecting the fact that the fate of capital-owners is no longer tied to the long-term 
preservation of this physical resource-base, be the latter privately owned or not. 
 
100 For example, while private market economies have an inbuilt drive towards generating economies 
of scale (i.e. minimizing marginal cost through increasing production with a given endowment of 
factors of production), commoning enables lateral instead of vertical scales (so-called ‘economies of 
scope’) – i.e. maximizing productive synergies through sharing factors of production. Following this 
line of argumentation, the latter clearly have lower material throughput and socialized benefits. 
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commons approach is furthermore to be distinguished from market-based approaches to common 
utilization, such as the so-called ‘sharing economy’ (e.g. AirBNB, Uber, etc.)101, although both are 
often conflated in the debate. 
Three agential instances are problematized with regard to the commons (Bauwens, 2012b): Apart from 
the commoners themselves, which rely on a given infrastructure for cooperation, the state (or other 
intermediate institutions) have a decisive role in sustaining that infrastructure. Furthermore, by lack 
of a global sovereign power, the conservation of certain global commons (such as transnational 
ecosystems) relies upon the tutelage of the international community. Thirdly, a role is also ascribed to 
market relations in a re-commonalized world, insofar this would generate the economic resources 
needed to maintain the infrastructure. Yet economic agents would be bound to the commoners, who 
create the real use value; rather than the other way around.   
  
GDP growth:  
 
Beyond the by now commonplace (rhetorical) critique of GDP as a flawed indicator for measuring 
welfare (Jackson, 2009a, p. 34; UNEP, 2012, p. 21), this axial theme differentiates transformation 
strategies alongside the question about the significance of GDP-growth for a social-ecological 
transformation. It is by far the most controversial as well as the most complex among the axial themes 
of the GT debate, reason for which some extra-space will be given here to its analysis102. The critique 
revolves around two main axes: an ecological axis and a cultural axis, with plenty of factual contradictions 
and disputed normative signifiers between critics and advocates of the default growth-centered 
political economy, some of which will be scrutinized in the following paragraphs. Critical positions 
can be disaggregated in two groups, at least: a-growth (a political critique, i.e. the critique of the socio-
economic dependency from and the political growth-fixation) and degrowth (a technical critique of the 
                                                 
101 See for example WBGU (2011, p. 146). For an overview and assessment of the transformative 
potential of the sharing economy, see Juliet Schor’s (2014) essay for the Great Transition Initiative. 
 
102 The growth-debate cannot be summarized here without some loss of substance. However, good 
overview studies of the growth-critical discourse are available: For an overview of the international 
growth-debate, see, among others, Martínez-Alier (2014), Martínez-Alier et al. (2010), and Asara et al. 
(2015). For the German debate, see Woynowski et al. (2012) and especially Schmelzer (2015).  
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ecological and socio-economic dynamics of growth itself) 103, although degrowth is often used as an 
umbrella-term for all growth-critical positions104. Regarding the ecological axis, the central cleavage 
between growth-advocates and critics lies in their divergent prospective solutions to the “growth 
dilemma” (Jackson, 2009a, pp. 7; 11): for growth-critics, the structural dependence of the capitalist 
economies on growth faces governance-agents with a dilemma between short-term social and 
economic stability and long-term ecological (eventually also social and even economic) 
sustainability105, the only solution to which is re-structuring the fundamentals of the economy. ‘Pro-
growthers’, in turn, see economic growth not only as compatible with, but often even as a precondition 
for, a social-ecological transformation (Fücks, 2013, p. 162): indeed, only additional growth would 
deliver the level of welfare needed to address the multiple social and ecological crises (Fücks, 2013, p. 
74; Initiative Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft, 2012). To escape the “growth dilemma”, however, this 
additional growth need to be sustainable (“green”, “smart”, “better” or “qualitative” growth). This 
could be attained through decoupling economic value creation from increasing material throughput, 
which will hereinafter be referred to as the decoupling hypothesis. Paradoxically, while the lack of 
consensus about the compatibility between growth and sustainability is seen here as a hindrance to a 
successful sustainability transition (Fücks, 2013, p. 72), growth-critics, in turn, blame the “dogmatic 
status of growth” (Jackson, 2009a, p. 10; Miegel, 2010, p. 173), that makes the growth dilemma go 
unrecognized in mainstream policy and public debate (Jackson, 2009a, p. 102). Hence, for growth-
critics, recognizing this dilemma would be the point of departure towards a social-ecological 
transformation. While techno-efficiency has shown relative success in achieving “relative decoupling” 
(i.e. the reduction of material throughput per unit of GDP), it cannot deliver “absolute decoupling” 
between economic expansion and environmental degradation – except for a veritable miracle which 
                                                 
103 There is yet another strand advocating a steady-state economy (for an overview, see Daly, 2007), i.e. 
neither increasing nor decreasing the volume of economic output with respect to a stabilization level. 
Yet since they do not feature prominently in the German GT debate (thus neither do they in the 
selected literature), they will hereinafter not be considered separately for analytical purposes.  
 
104 Furthermore, over the time-frame of this study, Degrowth has progressively become an umbrella 
term articulating a heterogeneous array of intentional communities and social movements variably 
combining an ecological and a cultural critique of the globally dominant Western way of life (for an 
overview, see Konzeptwerk Neue Ökonomie e.V. & DFG-Kolleg Postwachstumsgesellschaften, 
2017). 
  
105 For a comprehensive description of the “growth dilemma”, see Jackson (2009a) 
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is currently nowhere in sight –, as per-unit efficiency gains are steadily over-compensated by the overall 
scale of economic production, a phenomenon known as rebound-effect or ‘Jevon’s paradox’106. In 
addition, the “angelized GDP” thesis (i.e. the idea that economic growth can be pursued dispensing 
with a corresponding growth in material throughput) has a flawed focus on production, rather than 
on consumption patterns, which continue to rely heavily on high street sales of material goods that 
need to be produced, transported, and purchased (Jackson, 2009a, p. 76; Paech, 2012, p. 9). As a result 
of these combined effects, sustainability would be incompatible with exponential growth. While 
degrowth-advocates of a pose a deliberately planned contraction in the size of economic output to 
avoid an unwanted recession (whereby authors varyingly disagree as to the geographical 
universalizability of prescriptions and the timing of the transition107), and emphasize the destructive 
                                                 
106 Originally theorized by British economist William S. Jevons in the 19th Century, rebound-effects are 
increasingly developing into a research-area in and of themselves (see, a.o. Santarius, 2012, 2014, 2015; 
Sorrell, 2007), and into an object of heated controversy. While it is clear that hitherto historical and 
empirical evidence sustain the rebound-effect rather than the decoupling-theory, the literature 
reviewed here shows contradictory statements as to the present developments in technological and 
resource-efficiency gains: Ralf Fücks, for instance, is convinced that absolute decoupling (i.e. the 
reduction in absolute levels of resource-throughput with continued GDP growth rates) is not only a 
realistic hope, but that it can already be observed in some sectors (Fücks, 2013, pp. 39, 169) and 
countries (Fücks, 2013, p. 168). Tim Jackson, in turn, argues that absolute decoupling is worldwide 
not even in sight (Jackson, 2009a, pp. 8, foreword). In some sectors, relative resource throughput is 
actually accelerating, rather than declining (Jackson, 2009a, p. 8). Furthermore, part of the hitherto 
actually observed relative decoupling (i.e. the reduction of material throughput per unit of production, 
as in UNEP, 2012, p. 15) vanishes when conjunctural economic variations and transboundary flows 
are factored into the equation (Jackson, 2009a, p. 76). In addition, not all sectors of the economy can 
be “greened”: according to Exner et al (2008), between a third to a half of global GDP is attributable 
to sectors that cannot be “greened”, and will thus need being phased out. Even if assuming it were 
achievable, however, absolute decoupling would not lead to sustainability, as it would unleash a 
process of “creative destruction”, whereby old productive infrastructure would have to be completely 
replaced, leaving idle waste-capital behind (Paech, 2012). How to make sense of such outright 
contradictions? In general, as per the literature reviewed, ‘pro-growthers’ tend to deploy partial and 
merely illustrative data in an impressionistic manner to sustain their more general arguments, while 
growth-critiques are founded on lasting mega-trends. Furthermore, pro-growthers consider 
improvements vis-à-vis the status quo as a measure of success, while growth-critics tend to use 
scientifically-informed stabilization targets as a benchmark. 
 
107 In this regard, while Jackson favors degrowth in the north with simultaneous continued growth in 
the south, Latouche poses that maintaining growth in poorer countries ignores the path-dependency 
of growth (if you build a growth society, it is very difficult to un-build at a later stage); and the plain 
insight that a convivial society can be fostered regardless of growth in general (maybe growing 
selectively the relevant sectors of industry and commerce) 
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ecological and socio-economic effects of an oversized, de-territorialized, and growth-addicted global 
economy, a-growthers focus on the perverse effects of the primacy of economic growth as 
superordinate policy-objective, while leaving the question of the contraction-imperative without an 
aprioristic answer – although overall GDP-contraction should be the likely result of a mix of selective 
de-growth (fossil-industries) and selective growth (green and service industries, and solidary-based 
economies) (Jackson, 2009a, p. 77). Growth critics further point out that jobless and low-growth is 
the consensual horizon for the future anyway, at least in early industrialized countries (Holzinger, 
2016; Institut Solidarische Moderne, 2011, p. 11), and that, far from the elusive promises of poverty 
eradication and universal prosperity of growth advocates108, the fulfillment of the promise of the 
growth-society would amount to threatening its very own survival (Miegel, 2010, pp. 100; 166). 
The cultural axis of the growth-debate adds further complexity to the discursive landscape. A 
contraction in GDP is framed distinctly – often even contradictorily – by diverse actors in the debate: 
advocates of a ‘green’ or ‘better’ growth see anything deviating from the accustomed path of continued 
growth as punishing asceticism and backwardness (the ‘back to the stone-age’ argument). Instead, 
growth-critics foreground the convergence of psychological, social and ecological benefits109 that 
                                                 
108 Indeed, the precarious and artificial character of current growth (Jackson, 2009a, p. 6; Miegel, 2010, 
p. 181) meaning that growth fails even in its own terms, in providing for social stability. Furthermore, 
recent research has shown that, at current trickle-down rates, and due to the size-multiplier and time 
required, solving the poverty issue through increasing GDP is nothing short of delusional (Woodward, 
2015). Historical evidence confirms this, as since the early 1980s growth has benefited exclusively the 
already well-off (Oxfam, 2016; Piketty, 2014)  
 
109 The‘Easterlin paradox’ (also known as “happiness-paradox or life-satisfaction paradox”) (Jackson, 
2009a, p. 34; Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014, p. 33) designates the decoupling of reported 
improvements in wellbeing from improvements in economic performance. While prosperity has 
undeniable material dimensions, it goes far beyond these to include social, psychological, (subjective 
wellbeing), moral, and spiritual/religious dimensions (49:39). In fact, material goods constitute a basis 
for individual welfare and social stability only in combination with the above stated non-material goods 
(Miegel, 2010, p. 236). The concept of prosperity itself requires deeper inquiry. Prosperity is not to be 
conflated with wellbeing or happiness; indeed: prosperity implies a balance between short-term arousal 
and long-term security. Furthermore, prosperity is inherently bounded concept: it is bounded by scale 
of global population and by ecological limits, and tied to intra- and inter-generational socio-moral 
dimensions (49:9; 49:47).  Hence, success needs to be redefined accordingly, structurally providing 
individuals with sustainable resources to “avoid shame” and gain social recognition (49:78; 64:19) 
without transgressing the abovementioned boundaries: borrowing Tim Kasser’s categorization, intrinsic 
values (i.e. self-acceptance, affiliation, a sense of belonging to the community) need to be reinforced as 
psychologically opposed to extrinsic values (popularity, image and financial success), as the former yield 
double or triple dividend as compared to more materialistic lifestyles (49:79). Lastly, material 
prosperity should not be conflated with economic growth. Indeed, growth is charged with having 
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would result from an emancipation of the ‘growth-dogma’ (Jackson, 2009a, p. 89; Schneidewind & 
Zahrnt, 2014, p. 127), purposively distancing themselves from negative visions of curtailment and 
sacrifice (e.g. Jackson, 2009a, p. 35). The sacrificial connotations of de-growth are common, however, 
in the moral-conservative growth-critical strand. For Meinhard Miegel, the inevitable economic 
contraction merely amounts to a collective awakening from the ecologically suicidal hubris of 
(tendentially globalizing) Western lifestyles.  
The growth-debate is home to a heated contest over the appropriation of positively-connoted 
signifiers such as modernity, freedom, prosperity/ progress or the good life: both growth-advocates and growth-
critics claim to be supporting these ideas and values through mutually contradictory prescriptions110. 
Consequently, they mutually accuse each other of dogmatism and of obstructive behavior (e.g. Fücks, 
2013, pp. 33, 36; Jackson, 2009a, p. 68; Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014, pp. 49, 150–151).   
The change agents envisaged by each strand vary correspondingly: Growth-advocates (and the 
conservative growth-critical strand) expect the sovereign state and their groupings in international 
fora, enlightened consumers, as well as socially and environmentally responsible business to advance 
the transition. Growth critics, in turn, seek to create virtuous circles between politics and civil society: 
between regulators and NGOs; with prosumers and alternative economic projects, such as Transition 
Towns, urban gardening, and open commons communities; or else with social movements (peasant, 
indigenous, Degrowth, commons), trade unions, alternative economic and subsistence undertakings. 
To be noted, however, is that, setting the issue of growth aside, prescriptions of both growth-critics 
and green Keynesians overlap to a large extent: massive public investment in eco-efficiency and 
renewable energies, redistribution, and regulation of financial markets are common demands 
(Schmelzer & Passadakis, 2011, p. 45). In the cultural front, however, even the basic diagnosis diverges 
between growth-advocates and detractors: whereas the latter blame materialism for destroying not 
                                                 
caused pauperization, deculturation (especially destruction of popular cultures), and de-politization. 
While the former is visible especially in the Global South, the two latter ubiquitously display the 
harmful effects of growth (Latouche, 2009, p. 29). 
 
110 By way of example, consider the framings of “right to sufficiency” by Uta von Winterfeld (2011) 
or the “iron cage of consumerism” (Jackson, 2009a) challenging the framing of a “right to 
consumption” (Fücks, 2013, p. 137) through factoring-in socially and ecologically damaging positional 
social pressures toward consumption: “nobody should be forced into wanting to have ever more” 
(Winterfeld, 2011). For an overview of the prescriptive views of the diverse growth-critical strands in 
Germany, see Schmelzer (2015) 
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only nature, but also for reducing society, cultures, and individual lives to an engine of consumption, 
the former acknowledge only environmental degradation as problematic.  
 
Local & regional (re-localization and regionalization):  
 
This axial theme covers a discursive strand in the transformation debate that bases on the assumption 
of economic globalization as a substantial causal factor of the multiple interlinked global crisis (Brand, 
Omann, et al., 2013; Demirović & Attac, 2011; Dörre, 2009). According to Latouche, re-localization 
is, together with cultural change and sufficiency, one of the three most strategic axial themes 
(Latouche, 2009, p. 44), because it affects the everyday lives and jobs of millions, and enables virtuous 
synergies among all axial themes (Latouche, 2009, p. 34). The discourse here sets on a regained sense 
of autonomy, in the sense of lesser dependence on long and distant supply chains, including the 
control of accumulation and local definition of consumption patterns as result of a participatory 
process (Acosta, 2015a, p. 148). Local needs must be satisfied with local production, financing, etc. 
insofar possible (subsidiarity principle) (Acosta, 2015a, p. 147 and ff.; Paech, 2012, p. 122), based on 
the concept of the bioregion: a “complex set of local territorial systems with a high capacity for an 
ecological self-sustainability” (Latouche, 2009, p. 44). Every region’s critical economic activity should 
be protected (Latouche, 2009, p. 47), thus encouraging local or regional development.  
In addition, local provisioning is seen as a way of strengthening of community resilience (as opposed 
to the proliferation of “zones of sacrifice” in globalized market societies) as an anchor for the good 
life (Jackson, 2009a, p. 35). Building a “network of virtuous and interdependent transversal relations”, 
with high-intensity democratic experimentalism, constitutes an effective barrier against neoliberalism 
and its crisis-proneness (Latouche, 2009, p. 47). This is particularly important for subsistence-critical 
economic activities (food, energy, then economy and financial resources – regional/ complementary 
currencies are often promoted in this discourse) for reasons of both supply-security and democratized 
access (Acosta, 2015a, p. 171; Biesecker et al., 2012, p. 154; Institut Solidarische Moderne, 2011, p. 16; 
Latouche, 2009, p. 49; Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014, p. 56; UNEP, 2012, p. 14). An example for of 
actually existing practices potentially underpinning this kind of developmental trajectory is perhaps 
most famously the Transition Towns movement, but also the “urban village”, or the “slow city” 
movements, the cooperatives’ movement, urban gardening, and street markets, food clusters and agro-
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parks, as well as the numerous 100%-renewable energy towns and communities in Germany and 
beyond serve to illustrate this type of development. 
 
Opponents to re-localization not only view it as a futile endeavor in an era of accelerating global 
interconnectedness, with hundreds of millions seeking to achieve the consumption status of global 
middle classes, sustained on the pillars of globalized job markets, mobility, and value chains (Fücks, 
2013, p. 149), but also as an obstacle in the way towards a form of cosmopolitan “global citizenship”. 
Against this, advocates stress that it is only capital and commodities that should be re-localized, while 
knowledge should be globalized (Bauwens, 2012b). Furthermore, only high-intensity local cells can 
deliver global democracy (Acosta, 2015a, p. 45). Politics and culture are to redefine the local as a 
primary drive in individual and collective life. With regard to technology – and the encouragement of 
global transfer of useful, clean technologies notwithstanding – locally developed and/or tailored, 
simple, “convivial” technology allows for regaining control and reducing individual and social stress 
(Acosta, 2015a, p. 152; Adloff, 2014; H. Rosa, 2010). 
 
Restructuration of work 
 
In the framework of this discussion, a reorganization of both waged- and non-waged labor in modern 
societies is deemed a key instrument for a GT, with an emphasis on reducing overall working time as 
a way of reducing unemployment in a post-growth world, and liberating time for other activities. In 
the wording of Hannah Arendt, liberated time111 (which is excluded from the economic sphere) would 
allow not  only for  the  two repressed components  of the  vita activa – the work of the artist  or  
artisan  and  political  activity –  to  be  restored  the  same  dignity  as  gainful labor,  but also for the  
vita contemplativa  to  be  rehabilitated (Latouche, 2009, p. 86), with the corresponding revaluation of 
non-materialistic values, such as conviviality and spirituality. 
At the same time, work-reduction would allow for a more balanced ratio between so-called productive 
(which create economic exchange-value) and reproductive activities (non-remunerative ‘care work’ yields 
                                                 
111 Following Thierry Paquot  (2007), Latouche (Latouche, 2009, pp. 41, 85) speaks of liberated time as 
opposed to free time seeking to emphasize the subversive, anti-systemic character of the former. While 
in a market society free time, defined as a “left-over” from work and other obligations, and is destined 
to passive consumption from the health and leisure industries, liberated time is rather devoted to 
engaging creatively in shaping one’s own existence.  
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a major part of social value creation, which, however, does not figure at all in GDP data)(Schmelzer 
& Passadakis, 2011, p. 89; Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014, p. 108). This would diminish the overall 
dependence on monetary income (Paech, 2012, p. 120).  
Variants of the work-shortening argument can be grouped in two main strands: those advocating for 
a shorter working life (reduction of retirement age), on the one hand, and those seeking to redistribute 
work within the scope of working life (reduction of weekly working hours, sabbaticals, etc.). To yield 
transformative effects, the reorganization of work should further encompass the following 
dimensions: a) a rebalancing between factors of production away from the productivity of capital and 
labor towards productivity of resources; b) a revised international division of labor (with focus on re-
localization of essential economic activities) to halt the exploitation of the South; c) the creation of 
green jobs in new sectors and activities (i.e. changing the content of work) (Acosta, 2015a, p. 155; 
Latouche, 2009, p. 84); and d) the dismantling of ecologically and socially damaging economic 
sectors/activities, the scope of which would have to be subject to political deliberation, and goes hand 
in hand with a major cultural shift (e.g. major  cutbacks  in  advertising, tourism, transport,  the car 
industry, agribusiness, biotechnologies, etc.). The first three of the above would have the net effect of 
increasing labor demand, while the last would reduce it.  
A redistribution of available work would thus be required, with the likely neat effect of reduced 
quantity of waged labor (Acosta, 2015a, p. 155; Institut Solidarische Moderne, 2011, p. 13; Latouche, 
2009, p. 79). This argumentative strand outrightly challenges the ‘back-to-full-employment’ narrative 
of green economy or green growth advocates (Fücks, 2013, p. 51). Conservatives envision a lesser role 
of the state in financing both the rent system or a capital-intensive economic transformation, and 
therefore argue for a work-life that is longer – making labor available to compensate for lower capital-
intensity – yet less intensive, thus allowing for the re-constitution of strong family and communal 
solidarity-bonds. (Miegel, 2010, p. 226/7) 
A holistic labor policy supporting care and family work, voluntary civic engagement, and new forms 
of self-provisioning (Schmelzer & Passadakis, 2011, pp. 80/1-89; Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014, p. 
123) would offer potentially powerful synergies with other policy fields across the scope of the GT- 
axial themes: sufficiency policies; education policy; social security to make subsistence less dependent 
on work (e.g. universal basic income or UBI) (Jackson, 2009a, pp. 81; 91; Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 
2014, p. 124); appropriate consumer and health policies, e.g. support for less speed in everyday life, 
promoting longer product life (Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014, pp. 30; 53), redistribution to reduce 
unproductive (and unsustainable) status competition in consumption; and cultural change steering 
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away from our “obsession with work” and productivism (Latouche, 2009, p. 40) and allowing for 
some degree of “re-enchantment of the world” (Latouche, 2009, p. 85).  
 
Redistribution:  
 
The axial theme redistribution presents a complex phenomenal structure: it is problematized varyingly 
either as a justice-wreaking device evening the injustices caused by an ensuing ‘Great transformation’ 
(or by the contemporary economic system which it seeks to overcome), or else as a powerful driver 
of the transformation itself, by virtue of its effects on social status competition. While for the former 
redistribution constitutes a matter of justice and/or a precondition for the social acceptability of a 
social-ecological transformation (legitimacy), for the latter the impact of redistribution helps the 
transformation become effectual (efficacy).  
The argument of a ‘transformative redistribution’ largely takes root in the assumption that increased 
material equality constitutes a precondition for a reduction in the consumption of positional goods 
and services112 (Jackson, 2009a; Latouche, 2009; Røpke, 2012; Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014). 
Positional consumption adds little to overall happiness (resembling a welfare zero-sum game) but 
contributes significantly to unsustainable resource throughput (ecological negative-sum game). 
Redistribution is thus key to dismantling perverse incentive for positional competition and the logic 
of consumerism (Jackson, 2009a, p. 73), with the corresponding growth-inhibiting and 
environmentally friendly effects.  
 
Opponents claim that distribution issues are a source of social conflict and instability, so they should 
be sidelined as much as possible by clinging on to growth (Fücks, 2013, pp. 50; 121). Furthermore, 
conservative discourse opposes a moral sense of asceticism and solidarity as a remedy to consumerism, 
rather than redistribution, which is seen as “anti-natural” (Miegel, 2010, p. 37). Furthermore, in lieu of 
redistributive policy, direct compensatory financial transfers can provide both for “greening the 
economy” and for alleviating social stress derived thereof (OECD, 2011; UNEP, 2012; WBGU, 2011).  
                                                 
112 As recent research has persuasively shown, the importance of income in welfare plays out in relative, 
positional terms vis-à-vis peer groups (Jackson, 2009a, p. 39; Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014, p. 28), 
although some have given more importance to consumption styles associated with higher income 
groups thatn to income itself (Delhey, Schneickert, & Steckermeier, 2017) 
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Redistribution is varyingly framed as an issue of reallocation of wealth and resources between north 
and south (key here is the discussion around the ‘ecological debt’113), between the public and the 
private domain, and between capital-driven ‘productive’ and socio-ecological ‘reproductive’ activities. 
Instruments include a rights-based (global) resource-allocation (WBGU, 2011, p. 17), fiscal policy 
(Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014, p. 47) – tax on consumption, maximum wealth and income limits 
(Acosta, 2015a, p. 152; Paech, 2012, p. 139; Schmelzer & Passadakis, 2011, p. 84), etc. –, a solidarity-
based citizen insurance to decouple social security from salaries (Institut Solidarische Moderne, 2011, 
p. 14; Schmelzer & Passadakis, 2011, p. 85); or at least a minimum insurance against poverty (Institut 
Solidarische Moderne, 2011, p. 28), etc. The idea of a universal basic income114 (Blaschke, 2012) is also 
progressively gaining strength in the debate around redistribution. A universal basic income would 
address the crisis of reproductive work through financially securing care work, instead of 
commodifying it. (Biesecker et al., 2012, p. 19) 
 
The discussion around redistribution also includes other elements beyond wealth and income, such as 
the allocation of available work across the workforce and among sectors (Acosta, 2015a, p. 155; 
Jackson, 2009a, p. 80), agricultural land, habitable space (Schmelzer & Passadakis, 2011, p. 70), non-
renewable natural resources (Latouche, 2009, p. 29; WBGU, 2011, p. 20), and immaterial ones such 
as time and social recognition (Acosta, 2015a, p. 155; Paech, 2012, p. 56).  
The distribution problem becomes more acute in a sustainable society, where constantly raising 
material increases cannot be taken for granted (Scherhorn, 2012, p. 91 ff.; Schmelzer & Passadakis, 
                                                 
113 The concept of “ecological debt” has come to signify the environmental liability of the Global 
North for their (historical) exploitation and appropriation of natural resources and pollution in the 
Global South, although it has also been used with reference to intergenerational justice (e.g. Kibert, 
Thiele, Peterson, & Monroe, 2010). The term was coined by environmental organizations from the 
Global South since the mid-1990s; academic research on “ecological debt” and “ecologically unequal 
exchange” came later (for an overview see Rice, 2007; J. T. Roberts & Parks, 2009). The ‘ecological 
debt’ stands in tension with the argument about funding and technology transfer for the ‘less 
developed’ countries to mitigate and adapt to environmental change: it’s not so much about giving more 
as about taking less from them (Latouche, 2009, p. 37). 
 
114 The discussion around a Universal or Unconditional Basic Income (UBI) is one of the policy-foci in the 
GT debate and beyond. A universal basic income is defined as an income guaranteeing the livelihood 
and societal participation, which is received without any type of return or any conditionalities or 
eligibility requisites. A variant could be a UBI tied to common good utilizations (Paech, 2012, p. 139). 
For an overview of this discussion see http://basicincome-europe.org/ubie/ 
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2011, p. 84). However, there is a meta-question to fair redistribution: does that which is to be 
distributed have a fair origin, in the first place? (Paech, 2012, p. 23). Implicit in this meta-question is 
the fact that social standards for material welfare have risen disproportionately and are ecologically 
unsustainable. Indeed, the redistribution argument stands in ambivalent tension with the idea that the 
social appreciation of material welfare needs to decrease for evolutionary trajectories to stay within 
the ecological carrying capacity of the earth. A cultural change is thus required to redefine said 
standards. Moreover, a relatively equal income distribution seems to be a precondition for successful 
restructuration of the labor market (Jackson, 2009a, p. 81), which in turn is the most consensual 
measure to combat unemployment in a non-growing economy (p. 80). Redistribution is a prerequisite 
for guaranteeing rights such as existential security, participation in social life, shelter, health, education, 
and appropriate and meaningful paid work (Institut Solidarische Moderne, 2011, p. 15). Redistribution 
thus seems a key lever in the pursuit of a serene, convivial, and sustainable society (Latouche, 2009, p. 
33), provided that interdependent linkages with other axial themes are properly acknowledged. 
 
Democratization:  
 
The axial theme democratization refers to the discussion about new forms of democratic steering of 
societal trajectories. In order to counter the historical post-democratic shift from a political regulating-
state to a post-political ‘competitor state’ engaged in a regulatory race-to-the-bottom to attract capital 
in the global investment market (Crouch, 2004)115, this sub-discourse presents high-intensity (re-
)democratization as a remedy.  
 
Circumventing the short-termism and lock-ins of representative democracy (Germany. Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2013, p. 481), requires a particular type of democratization, namely one which gives more 
                                                 
115 Close variants on the thesis of post-democracy have been developed by Jaques Rancière (1999) and 
Sheldon Wolin (2008). Also Ingolfur Blühdorn (2007) conceives of the present situation in terms of 
post-democracy, though he conceptualizes it somewhat differently: the liberal consumer democracies 
of the West have lost their emancipatory character to a reactionary defense of acquired consumer-
privileges, resulting in ‘simulative democracies’ incapable of delivering ecologically sustainable socio-
economic arrangements, and unlikely to sustain themselves in the longer run. In Blühdorn’s view, the 
only hope for democracy – as well as for ecological viability of modern societies – would be a radical 
transformation of the imaginaries of emancipatory politics away from the quest for ever increasing 
material abundance. 
107 
 
power to the citizens than to the state, or at least empowers both simultaneously (WBGU, 2011, p. 
19; Wright, 2013). This reaches well beyond the incrementalistic mainstream policy-principles of 
participation, transparency, and accountability towards e.g. open agenda-setting processes (OECD, 
2011, p. 17), participatory budgeting, and limiting lobbyism (Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014, p. 83). 
Democratization demands are directed also at international institutions. Furthermore, failure-friendly 
experimentalism is portrayed as a key feature of democratization. Claus Leggewie, for example, 
advocates new deliberative methods such as “future councils” to represent future generations at 
various decision-making scales and spheres (Nanz & Leggewie, 2016). Optimistic voices stress the fact 
that post-materialistic values and pro-environment attitudes are widely supported by the population, 
not only in early industrialized countries, but also by opinion leaders in emerging ones (WBGU, 2011, 
p. 7).  
 
But the most peculiar strand of the democratization discourse in the framework of the GT debate 
refers to the democratization of the economy. This could be achieved, for example, through stakeholder and 
workers’ (TUs) involvement in business decision-making (e.g. economic, social, and environmental 
councils from CSOs spanning from the micro- to the macro-level) (Institut Solidarische Moderne, 
2011, pp. 16; 21), especially in key sectors like finance/banking and energy production. Bolder 
visionary proposals envisage an already ensuing reorganization of relations of 
production/consumption through peer-to-peer or open source communities, which opens up space 
for experimental combinations of democratic, hierarchical, and polyarchic (i.e. peer governance) forms 
of operational and political organization (Bauwens, 2012b, pp. 2–3).  
 
Beyond political and economic democratization, this axial concept also subsumes discussions around 
a democratization of culture, understood as the de-colonialization of cultural imaginaries and ‘cognitive 
justice’ among diverse forms of knowledge (Acosta, 2015a, pp. 149–151; Santos, 2008). A distinct  yet 
connected branch of this argumentative strand is the discussion about an intensified participation of 
civil society in the politics of science (Latouche, 2009, p. 71; Schneidewind, 2013a; WBGU, 2011, p. 
21), a debate going back to diagnoses of structural risk of late modern societies (Beck, 1992) and post-
normal science (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1991, 1993; Gallopin et al., 2001), re-labeled for mainstreaming 
as transformation science and transformative science (Schneidewind, 2013b; WBGU, 2011, p. 21). Proposals 
here include, for example, a moratorium on techno-scientific innovation to democratically assess and 
re-orient efforts (Latouche, 2009, p. 71) 
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The relationship between democracy and the sustainability-transformation are more complex than 
that, however. Skeptics argue that sustainability (or social justice, for that matter) are not a likely result 
of spontaneous, free individual behavior in the framework of current liberal consumer-democracies. 
They put forward structural problems such as the territorial biases in the governance of trans-
boundary issues (Institut Solidarische Moderne, 2011, p. 16), the relative slowness of democratic 
decision-making (as compared not only to single bottom-line, economic decision-making, but also to 
meritocratic, ad hoc, and distributed methods)(Bauwens, 2012b, pp. 2–3), the “tyranny of majorities”, 
and the problem of “myopic choice” (Avner Offer, cited in Jackson, 2009a), which would lead to 
short-term bias at the expense of one’s own long-term interests. One might add, though not explicitly 
mentioned, the bias towards ‘feasibility’ in contemporary political culture: idealism is culturally 
devaluated; instead, action, pragmatism, achievability, demonstrability have set through as the 
validation proof for the worth of ideas, actions, and persons. This leads to a paradox of inverse 
proportionality between efficacy and control, on the one hand, and scope of impact, on the other: the 
more effective an intervention, the more irrelevant it is in terms of advancing a whole-societal 
transformation, but the higher it will be prioritized in a political culture that privileges ‘achievability’ 
over ‘impact’. Against these arguments, democratization advocates stress that the empowering local 
deliberative communities with greatest possible autonomy (conceived not as microcosm, but as a 
connected interdependent network) would facilitate democratizing the economy, strengthen 
integration and solidarity (Jackson, 2009a, p. 91; Latouche, 2009, p. 50); and would smoothen the path 
towards a convivial culture which is more ready to endorse strong sustainability measures (Latouche, 
2009, p. 56). A high-energy democracy would lead to institutive activity with the power to transform, 
which puts the social imaginary into action and supersedes (a locked-into the status quo) traditional 
party-politics as a transformative agent (pp. 65-67). 
 
Agents to enact high-intensity democratization are the reformed state – a “proactive” (WBGU, 2011, 
p. 19), an “enabling” or “partner” state (Bauwens, 2012b, p. 7), with enlarged citizen participation –, 
civil society (key for legitimation), science, and committed forces in the economy. A spearhead 
function is attributed variably to either utopia-capable groups in societal niches forming a civic 
‘coalition of the willing’ – indigenous movements, rural and urban communities (e.g. transition towns) 
– (Acosta, 2015a, p. 165), or else to individuals in their role as citizens and consumers (Fücks, 2013, 
p. 160), networked thanks to the internet (p. 298). 
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Sufficiency: 
 
The axial theme sufficiency covers the diverse considerations regarding the significance of a reduction 
in levels of material consumption. The sectors of food, construction, housing, and mobility are 
responsible for 60 to 70 percent of consumption-originated ecological pressure (Stengel, 2011, p. 289). 
By problematizing the ‘demand-side’ of the prevailing socio-economic system, the concept of 
“sufficiency” seeks to complement (and simultaneously to challenge the totalitarian aspirations of) the 
dominant concepts of “efficiency” and (to a lesser degree) “consistency”, which focus exclusively on 
the ‘supply-side’ (i.e. production patterns). The concept of ‘sufficiency’ was introduced in the 1990s 
by Wolfgang Sachs (1994), who summarized it in four pillars: less speed, less distance, less material 
encumbrance, and less dependence on markets and commerce in life. Key to a sufficiency strategy are 
thus re-localization (Latouche, 2009, p. 69), decommodification, de-acceleration, and a cultural change 
placing greater social appreciation on immaterial values. 
The debate is framed as a struggle for the appropriation of meaning of key liberal values, mainly 
freedom116. While sufficiency-advocates highlight the consumption patterns of early industrialized 
countries as the main cause of the global ecological crisis, sufficiency-critics warn of the danger of a 
“tyranny of virtue” in the name of the ecology, i.e. an unwarranted intrusion of regulative powers into 
the right to free choice of the individual (Fücks, 2013, pp. 46; 118; 150). For sufficiency critics, “not 
the transformation of men is the business of ecological politics, but the transformation of the industrial 
society” (Fücks, 2013, p. 46). Sufficiency-advocates reply that focusing solely on the supply-side of the 
economy without transforming demand-patterns creates a structural incentive towards externalization 
(Lessenich, 2016), giving way to “imperial ways of life” (Brand & Wissen, 2011) which depend on the 
plundering of nature and labor in the global south for their own reproduction. (Acosta, 2015a, p. 81; 
Institut Solidarische Moderne, 2011, p. 14; Paech, 2012, p. 11; Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014, p. 125; 
Stengel, 2011)  
Alongside this legitimacy question, the question is raised of whether sufficiency politics would be fit 
for the purpose of achieving a sustainable society, in the first place. An established argument portrays 
                                                 
116 Cf. Section 3.3.3 on GT framings for extensive treatment. 
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sufficiency as requiring a deep cultural change as precondition, which would take longer than we can 
afford in the face of the ecological crisis. Others argue, in diametrical opposition, that sufficiency 
strategies are the most effective and time-efficient way of obtaining substantial reduction in levels of 
consumption (demand-side). Indeed, while efficiency and consistency117 strategies (supply-side) are also 
regarded as necessary, they are entirely dependent on technological innovation, which is largely 
unplannable, and require time-consuming development of physical and market infrastructures. 
Furthermore, by and of themselves, efficiency strategies may lead away from rather than toward 
sustainability, mainly due to so-called “rebound-effects” (Jackson, 2009a, pp. 62; 76; Schneidewind & 
Zahrnt, 2014, pp. 18–20). Sufficiency strategies, in turn, do not generate rebound-effects. 
Furthermore, the needed reduction of 80% in material throughput can be achieved by massive cuts in 
positional consumption, which doesn’t add to welfare (Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014, p. 15), and 
'intermediate consumption’, including wasteful disposable consumption (in a broader sense, also 
transport, energy, packaging, advertising). According to Hulot (2006, p. 237, cited in Latouche, 2009, 
p. 38), eighty percent of goods traded on the market are used only once, and then go straight  into  the  
dustbin.  
Yet even if sufficiency is about reducing consumption, its framing as a matter of resigned deprivation 
is attributable to an unfortunate bias in public and scientific communication, “portraying sufficiency 
as a burden and excess as a virtue”  (Miegel, 2010, p. 14): indeed, research in happiness and subjective 
wellbeing has consistently shown that, far from feeling deprived, ‘simplifiers’ are actually happier 
(Jackson, 2009a, p. 89; Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014, p. 16). Hence, sufficiency does not mean only 
less (stuff); it also means more (freedom, happiness, time, longer product duration, etc.) (Jackson 2009, 
                                                 
117 Consistency is a generic term for the more widely diffused “circular economy”, i.e. the substitution 
of the linear system of extraction-production-consumption-disposal by a circular one, where the 
output of one process always becomes the input for another one. While such an approach obviously 
constitutes an adequate solution to local ecological systems, it appears problematic as a global 
approach as a result of at least the following reasons: a) it focuses exclusively on the supply side of the 
economy, ignoring the demand-side; b) it does not raise the question of which level of biosphere 
deterioration is admissible before the circular dynamics is established (i.e. it ignores the fact that 
current global throughput is already ca. 50% above the ecological carrying capacity of the Earth, and 
up to 600% above in trend-setting countries such as the USA); c) it does not raise the question of 
what counts as ‘resouce’: do bees or coral reefs (both critical to ecosystems of potentially global 
impact) count, for example?; and d) does not raise the question of how the necessary changes are to 
be politically implemented: democratically or autocratically; in centralized or decentralized fashion; 
following an egalitarian or a polarized pattern; etc. 
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88; Paech 2012, 128;130). Going for sufficiency does not imply going ‘against modernity’, as often 
portrayed by ecological modernizers (Fücks, 2013, pp. 36; 52); rather the contrary: it amounts to 
enlightened liberalism and future optimism: “A society seeking the proper balance between too much 
and too little, between acceleration and deceleration, market and self-provisioning, the global and the 
local, is more colorful and requires much more imagination than one that follows only the linear 
compulsion of escalation” (Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014, p. 145). Furthermore, it would allow people 
to re-gain some degree of control over their own life (Acosta, 2015a, p. 36). While ecological 
modernizers admit frugal lifestyles as a matter of individual lifestyle choice (Fücks, 2013, p. 118), 
sufficiency is typically framed as a matter of structural ways of life. The relationality and relativeness of 
needs vis-à-vis social milieus and standards is emphasized (Schmelzer & Passadakis, 2011, p. 53; 
Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014, p. 27), so that the right to meaningful social participation of any given 
individual is contingent upon societal parameters. Sufficiency thus requires the institutionalization of 
collective choice (Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014, p. 157). In this vein, Uta von Winterfeld (Winterfeld, 
2011, p. 64 ff.) criticizes current homogenizing pressures towards economization and consumerism: 
the alleged freedom behind the “right to consume” is deconstructed by opposition to the “right to 
sufficiency” – i.e. the right no to be “forced into wanting to have ever more”.  
 
What can we learn from the analysis of phenomenal structures of the axial themes in the GT debate?   
 
Even this very condensed description of the phenomenal structure of each of the axial themes above 
conveys an idea of the bewildering complexity of the discursive field of the GT. This should not come 
as a surprise, given that we are dealing with a meta-discursive arena, as was anticipated at the beginning 
of this chapter. Yet the ultimate purpose of this analysis remains distilling some cross-cutting insights 
into the GT debate as a whole: In the end, our goal is understanding how the sub-discourses around 
each axial theme coalesce, with their tensions and affinities, into a macro-picture of whole-societal 
change in the dominant (westernized) model of modern society. The juxtaposition of the phenomenal-
structures of each axial theme or sub-discourse should allow for the identification of transversal 
categories and topics of dispute, on the basis of which an outline of the overarching problem-structure 
of the GT debate has been attempted.  
Table 2 below offers such patchwork-like overview of the phenomenal structure of the broader GT 
debate, based on the three analytical categories mentioned at the beginning of this chapter (uniting, 
divisive, and bridging elements). 
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Table 2: Summary of categorial and content-dimensions of the GT debate as per analysis of phenomenal structures 
AXIAL 
THEME 
CATEGORIAL 
STRUCTURE 
CONTENT STRUCTURE 
UNITES DIVIDES BRIDGES 
cultral change 
As object or 
outcome of 
transformation  
contest on how best to 
achieve a 'green culture' 
- culture ('Mental infrastructures') as 
object of transformation? 
- building of emancipatory framework-
conditions (constructivist) vs attack on 
individual freedoms (autonomist) 
cultural embeddedness 
constraining individual  
 Commons 
- utilization vs 
property 
- factors of 
production or 
consumption goods 
- material (land) vs 
immaterial 
(knowledge) 
Contest over better way 
of protecting rapidly 
depleting common pool 
of resources 
 
Shared utilization of 
consumption goods 
widely accepted (e.g. the 
‘sharing economy’) 
- Ownership of material or immaterial 
goods (esp. factors of production) 
disputed: 'Tragedy of the commons' vs 
disposession & externalization argument 
(land-grabbing) 
 
- Mere resource-protection debate vs a 
broader debate about impacts on the 
social bond 
Changing energy-
communications matrix 
enabling shift in power 
relations to re-embed 
markets into societal 
relations 
GDP growth 
- technical-economic 
axis 
- cultural axis 
- ecological axis 
- BAU is not an option 
- contest over the 
definition of positively 
connoted signifiers such 
as modernity, freedom, 
prosperity/ progress or 
the good life  
- Growth compatible with (precondition 
for) sustainability vs. growth dilemma 
(i.e. stability vs. sustainability) 
- ‘Decoupling hypothesis’ possible 
(already happening) vs decoupling 
impossible / extremely unlikely 
- growth itself as problem (degrowth) vs 
growth-dependency as problem (a-
growth) 
- Degrowth everywhere vs degrowth in 
affluent countries 
- Degrowth as punishing asceticism and 
backwardness vs degrowth as liberation 
and good life 
- short-term green growth 
invested in creating 
preconditions for 
overcoming growth-
dependency 
- Common demands: 
massive public investment 
in eco-efficiency and 
renewable energies, 
redistribution, and 
regulation of financial 
markets  
local & regional 
cultural dimension 
security dimenson 
ecological dimension 
strengthened relationality 
and solidarity bonds 
- autonomy, high-energy democracy, and 
resilience (subsistence-critical economic 
activities) vs localization as a futile 
endeavor in a globalized world and an 
obstacle in the building of a 'global 
citizenship'. 
capital and (subsistence-
critical) commodities to be 
localized, while knowledge 
/ clean (insofar possible 
convivial) technologies 
should be globalized 
work 
restructuration 
- division of labor 
btw. 
a) waged- and non-
waged labor 
b) productive and 
reproductive work 
c) international 
 
- content of work 
(e.g. 'green jobs') 
- structural 
unemployment to grow 
in future (Industry 4.0) 
- green jobs replacing 
brown jobs 
- major part of social 
value creation not 
accounted for in 
'productive' sectors 
- generalized productivity imperative vs. 
shift focus from productivity of labor 
and capital to productivity of resources 
- revised (international, inter-gender, 
waged- and non-waged) division of labor 
vs mere revision of content of work (e.g. 
green jobs) 
- redistribution of available work vs 
"back to full employment" 
- working life reduction vs working life 
expansion (to compensate for the lesser 
intensity of capital) 
- holistic labor policy (supporting care, 
self-provisioning, and civic engagement) 
vs compensatory transfer to 
disadvantaged 
 working week reduction 
to combat unemployment 
and allow for care work 
and socio-political 
engagement 
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redistribution 
- redistribution of 
what? 
A) wealth and 
income 
B) available work 
C) Land (inhabit and 
work) 
D) non-renewable 
resources 
E) intangibles (time, 
soc. recognition) 
- purpose of 
redistribution 
- ecological 
equilibrium point for 
redistribution 
- redistribution btw.: 
a) north and south 
(e.g. ecological debt) 
b) public-private 
domain 
c) capital and 
(re)productive 
activities  
greening' the economy 
requires a certain level of 
redistribution (from 
brown to green and 
reproductive sectors) 
- Continued growth (mechanism for 
social stability, source of revenues for 
transformation, etc.) vs (or precondition 
for) redistribution 
- Redistribution as instrument for 
transformation (trumping positional 
consumption, increasing social 
harmony,etc.) vs redistribution as 
compensatory cash transfer to 'losers' 
from the transformation 
- redistribution as source of social 
instability vs. inequality as source of 
social instability 
- redistribution (policy-level) vs 
asceticism and solidarity (moral appeal) 
as a remedy to consumerism 
UBI decoupling social 
security from income, 
power leverage between 
employers and job-seekers, 
spares resources through 
downsizing bureaucratic 
state 
democratization 
- Empowered 
subject: citizens or 
state? 
- democratization of 
what: 
a) political life 
b) economy 
c) culture (de-
colonialization of 
imaginaries) 
d) science 
Experimentalism (e.g. 
future councils, 
international democracy, 
etc.) 
- Political democracy: Enlarged 
participation vs. high-intensity 
democracy 
- political democracy (limit lobbyism, 
participatory budgeting) vs economic 
democracy (worker and stakeholder 
involvement in business decision-
making) 
- democratization as plain goal vs 
experimental combinations of 
democratic, hierarchical, and polyarchic 
(i.e. peer governance) forms of 
operational and political organization to 
solve problems of territorial bias, 
'tyrannies of the majorities', 'myopic 
choice' (short-term bias), and structural 
incapability for expanded deliberation 
(scale, slowness, etc.) 
- improving institutions vs expanding 
institutive power of the social imaginary 
- initiative by individuals (consumers, 
citizens) or niche groups vs. institutional 
speerheading 
proactive', 'enabling' or 
'partner' state correcting 
legitimation deficits 
simultaneously 
empowering communities 
(strenghtening integration, 
solidarity, conviviality) 
sufficiency 
- desirability : 
curtailment/ 
sacrifice vs 
liberation/ positive 
discrimination 
-feasibility 
- Freedom 
- Efficiency (with 
provisions for rebound-
effects) 
- consistency  
- "making it easier to live the good life" 
vs "tyranny of virtue"  
- object of transformation: supply-side 
(production patterns) vs demand-side 
(consumption patterns) 
- "right to development" (normative) vs 
"imperial ways of life" / 
"externalization-societies" (descriptive) 
- fesasibility: "no time to wait for cultural 
change" vs. sufficiency as fast-track to 
sustainability 
- material werlfare argument vs. welfare-
neutral cuts in intermediate and 
positional consumption 
- freedom 
- justice: "Right to 
sufficiency" 
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- deprivation (less stuff) vs gain 
(freedom, happiness, time, product 
duration) 
- "enemies of modernity" vs enlightened 
liberalism and future optimism 
 
What transversal insights into the structure of the GT discursive field can be gained from this mosaic? 
Looking at the column ‘categories in the discussion’, a prima facie realization is that diverse dimensions 
are often overlooked and rendered invisible behind a common header: democratization stands for both 
incrementally improved ‘participation’, ‘transparency’, and ‘accountability’ in existing formal 
institutions of representative (post)democracy, on the one hand, and for radical economic (i.e. 
stakeholder- and worker-involvement) and cultural democratization (‘cognitive justice’ or 
‘decolonization of the imaginary’), on the other. Hence the object of democratization (institutional 
politics, communal life, economy, culture) becomes blurry, but so does the subject to be empowered 
for democratizing purposes (state, organized civil society, citizen constituencies?) (Wright, 2013). Also, 
the need for a profound cultural change is widely acknowledged, but while some regard culture as the 
direct target of collectively defined transformative interventions, others frame cultural change as the 
byproduct of shifting trends in consumer-preferences and socially and ecologically responsible 
business-policies. Cultural change as object and cultural change as outcome thus become confused. 
Similarly, the sub-discourse around commons (discussion property vs. utilization of diverse possible 
material or immaterial goods) and work re-structuration (around the social and economic significance and 
division of labor), are often conflated with the ‘sharing economy’ (i.e. the private provisioning of 
shareable utilization services, be it cars, housing, etc.) and a better remuneration of workers in the 
care-service market, respectively. Even redistribution (with varying references to object, beneficiaries, 
purpose) is invoked with dissimilar and sometimes narratively antagonistic tenets (e.g. consider the 
arguments of redistribution as lever for vs redistribution as buffer of the transformation). By implication, 
democratization, cultural change, commons, work restructuration, and redistribution, can be 
understood as “floating signifiers” (Laclau, 2001), which, by virtue of what Foucault would call their 
“tactical polyvalence”, can be seen as conceptual touching stones providing ground for “discursive 
affinities”118 (Hajer, 2006). That is, meaning-construction around these axial themes will likely remain 
                                                 
118 While this blurry discursive character of the axial themes mentioned can be partly attributed to their 
synthetic character as endogenously constructed categories for the purpose of this study (to be 
remembered, the axial theme ‘labels’ emerged from a process of subsumption and synthesis – see 
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ambiguous and thus turn them into good rendezvous-points for contesting discourses by providing 
an ideational platform for dialogue yet deflecting open confrontation.  
On the other hand, and although similar categorial complexity can be observed for the axial theme 
local & regional (security/autonomy dimension, cultural dimension, ecological dimension), the 
referential bearings here leave less room for ambiguity. Same is valid for the more linear, rugged, and 
intertwined debate about both the feasibility and desirability of GDP-growth and sufficiency. As a result, 
these three axial themes can be said to constitute the ‘thematic hotspots’ of the GT debate, where 
subtler discursive affinities are likely to play lesser of a role than bold (and more explicit) argumentative 
struggle. 
Beyond the analysis of categorial structures, Table 2 – in triangulation with insights from state of the 
art literature, and the detailed analysis of coded text-excerpts – also suggests cross-cutting 
commonalities, cleavages, and potential bridges in the contents of the GT debate as a whole. In some 
cases, the identification of cleavages, commonalities, or bridges proceeds almost directly, as they are 
made explicit in the data. In most cases, however, a stronger interpretative mediation is needed, due 
to the already mentioned lack of explicit and thorough mutual engagement among participants in the 
GT debate with each other´s arguments (Diefenbacher et al., 2014, p. 36; von Jorck, 2013a). This 
interpretative process should thus be regarded, first and foremost, as a moment of generation of 
categories and hypothesis to be ratified through the ensuing results of narrative and frame analysis, 
rather than as conclusive findings from the analysis of phenomenal structures. 
As should be expected, commonalities across a discursive field transversed by fundamental 
contestations are in short supply and rather vague in their definition. Nevertheless, beyond 
commonplace consensual formulas such as ‘sustainable development’ or ‘intergenerational justice’, 
two shared assumptions with substantial implications for the definition of the scale, scope, and quality 
of a ‘Great transformation’ could be identified: 
First, the prospect of a ‘Great Transformation’ is framed either as an evolutionary inevitability (even 
as already unfolding) or as a desirable political goal, and thus to be deliberately fostered, or at least 
accompanied, by political, social, and economic governance-agents. Ultimately, the ecological systemic 
boundaries or “planetary boundaries” (Rockström et al., 2009; Steffen et al., 2015), if anything else, 
will force the transformation upon the social world. In other words, a policy of incremental changes 
                                                 
section 2.1 – which is ‘reversed’ in the analysis of phenomenal structures), it is equally true that the 
subsumption and labeling process drew largely on empirically utilized language, which validates their 
interpretation as floating signifiers. 
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to the status quo is actively produced as a non-available discursive option. This readiness to accept 
radical changes should not come as a surprise, Alex Demirovic (2012) argues, insofar the inherent 
logic of modern capitalist societies is a fundamentally transformative one. The decisive question of 
the GT debate is thus one about if there will be a transformation, but what transformation it will be: 
in other words, what type of transformation will allow to minimize its negative impacts and seize its 
positive effects for the general population? Is it a continuation of the dominant logic of profit-making, 
capital accumulation, and the concomitant expansion of the economy; or does this logic need to be 
superseded by a rivaling logic of social organization? And our analysis shows – in line with Ulrich 
Brand’s (2014b) – that it is precisely the problematization of this logic which characterizes the GT 
debate, as opposed to the mainstream sustainable development discourse.  
 
Drawing on Gramsci, Brand argues that for such contention leading to a shift in social and political 
hegemony, however, it requires a correlation with the development of the material base. And this is 
where the second cross-cutting shared assumption comes in: Socio-technical developments (Big Data, 
Artificial Intelligence, IoT technologies) have the potential to trigger a fundamental shift in the 
production systems of modern societies. Be it the ‘Industry 4.0’ discourse on the “smart factory”, with 
its disruptive consequences for employment119, or the co-evolutionist yet emancipatory P2P-
discourse, a radical re-structuration (read: shrinking) of the labor market is viewed as inevitable, and, 
with it, a major re-structuration of the fundamental pillars of social organization. This creates an 
unprecedented basis for consensus across the discursive spectrum (which, to become effective, would 
still require active brokerage) around proportionally radical measures to ‘combat unemployment’ and 
securing minimum livable income, such as a Universal Basic Income, work reduction, substantially 
enlarged self-provision capabilities (through strengthened solidarity bonds, ranging from personal 
family/clan relations to impersonal P2P-networks, with more or less systematic assistance on the part 
of the state), etc. Worthwhile observing is that, regardless of the intentions or the forces setting these 
processes in motion, these perspectives of structural-material change open-up a historical window of 
opportunity for emancipatory GT-discourses, making them appear plausible, and thus strengthening 
                                                 
119 "Industry 4.0" refers to the current trend towards further automation in industrial manufacturing. 
The label ‘Industry 4.0’ had its origin in a project of the German Ministry for Education and Research 
(BMBF), which seeks to foster these developments in manufacturing technologies. See: 
https://www.bmbf.de/de/zukunftsprojekt-industrie-4-0-848.html 
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their performative power as “real utopias” (cf. Section 1.2 in Chapter 1). Sticking to the prior example, 
the scale-efficiencies of vertically integrated capitalist enterprises and ensuing technological 
developments (such as 3-D printing) have created the socio-technical preconditions for the 
development of open-source, P2P value-creation, which – while  resonating with well-established 
cultural values such as autonomy, entrepreneurship, meritocracy – would yield radically distributed 
and democratized access goods and services at affordable cost (Rifkin, 2014). 
 
Secondly, with regard to disputes, the field-wide analysis of the GT-debate’ phenomenal structure also 
sheds interesting insights. Central cleavages across the GT debate are, on the one hand, technical matters 
with disputed assessments (particularly, the possibility of decoupling pollution and resource-throughput 
through technological advancements and efficiency-gains, which we termed decoupling hypothesis), and, 
on the other, disputed signifiers (what accounts for modern? What is prosperity? What is freedom? What 
is happiness?) and value-attributions (sufficiency as curtailment vs. sufficiency as freedom; freedom as 
unfettered consumerism vs. freedom from the “fatigue and clutter” of consumerist culture, etc.). Not 
surprisingly, disputed signifiers and value-attributions – but incidentally also disputed technical matters 
– revolve mainly around two of the thematic hotspots identified in the categorial analysis: GDP growth 
and sufficiency. 
 
Thus far, from the analysis of phenomenal structures alone, we have identified areas which, at least in 
part, explain which meaning-structures served as catalyzers for the GT debate: democratization, 
cultural change, and, to a lesser extent, redistribution served as umbrella concepts or floating signifiers 
for discussants to coalesce, regardless of the fact that, on closer inspection, they would often (dis)agree 
or maybe even just talk past each other. Also, the common perception of inevitability of a major social 
transformation and a sense of a historical opportunity-window presented by socio-economic and/or 
socio-technical developments lie at the common base, so that a ‘new social contract’ (cf. WBGU) can 
and must be drawn.  
Thirdly and lastly, and departing from the cleavages identified above, what kind of meaning-brokerage 
can be observed at action; and what brokerage would be needed to make further progress down the 
transformative road? Drawing on the above identified types of cleavages – technical issues, disputed 
signifiers and controversial value-attributions –, bridging articulations result (or cold be potentially be 
built) through: 
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- disputing univocal appropriations of widely accepted or positively connotated signifiers 
(freedom, happiness, prosperity, modernity) by breaking chains of equivalence (e.g. prosperity 
equal economic growth equal material welfare equal subjective wellbeing / happiness) (Reißig, 
2014, p. 72) 
- factoring-in commonly ignored implications or feedback loops (e.g. Miegel’s diagnosis “we are 
living beyond our means” is challenged and complexified by Stephen Lessenig’s argument that 
“we are living beyond the means of others”) 
- Articulating complementarities to challenge the polarizing edge of divisive arguments; e.g. 
sufficiency-policies as a complement (rather than an alternative) to efficiency- and consistency-
oriented ones; short-term with long-term measures, such as green growth in the short and 
structural redesign away from growth in the longer run, etc. 
- translating more sophisticated theories of the social (accounting for dialectical relationalities, 
systemic interdependencies, cultural and power-structural embeddedness, etc.) into concrete 
transformative interventions which seem promising in political and cultural terms (e.g. UBI, 
work-restructuration) (Kopatz, 2016; Shove, 2010a) 
 
The lessons gained through the analysis of phenomenal structures are insightful towards an 
understanding of the emergence, current development of the GT debate, as well as for future 
transformative learning-prospects. Yet these building-blocks are not discursively articulated in a 
vacuum, but rather as part of narrative structures that function as container through which discourses 
(and all their constitutive elements) are transported in meaning-making processes. The following 
section is devoted to the reconstruction of such structures, that will grant access to the ‘big picture’ of 
the diversity of narratives at play in the GT debate.      
 
3.3.2. Narrative analysis of the GT discourses 
 
Although vague and fragmentary narrative contours of GT discourses became apparent already 
through the analysis of phenomenal structures, this section seeks to ratify and build on those 
preliminary insights to deliver a full-fledged narrative analysis of the GT field of discourse. This 
analysis unfolds in three sequential steps: the first step aims at providing a synthetic yet systematic 
proto-narrative articulation of the axial themes of the GT debate, based on the sampled strategy-
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papers (Sample 1). The resulting ‘proto-narrative alignments’ serve as an indicator of the likely 
narrative affinity among the diverse GT-strategies and their respective proponents. The second step 
uses these provisional categorization (filtered through the criteria of minimal and maximal contrasting) 
to analyze the narratives contained in Sample 1 through the Actantial Model by Julien Greimas. The 
third and last step builds on the Greimas-analysis to infer, outline, and analyze stylized or ideal-typical 
storylines narratively structuring the GT debate. These stylized narratives or storylines will thereafter 
become our main unit of analysis for the remaining of the chapter.  
 
Comparison of representative GT strategies:  
 
Based on the primary data (Sample 1), as well as insights from existing literature, the hypothesis of 
departure in our narrative analysis is that the German GT debate constitutes a heterogeneous and 
fragmentary field, where participants often do not engage thoroughly with each other´s arguments, 
thereby rendering the structuring of the field (i.e. the identification of commonalities, differences, and 
contradictions) a difficult task (Diefenbacher et al., 2014, p. 36).  
A preliminary effort at such structuration will be undertaken by way of analyzing the strategy papers 
sampled for fine analysis (Sample 1), which are representative of comprehensive GT strategies in the sense 
that they meaningfully combine diverse axial themes into a storyline of how a GT is (or should be 
made) to unfold. The structuration will ensue by means of a systematic comparison of the relative 
positioning of each author towards each of the axial themes: advocative, declining, or neutral. Such 
structuration would allow for the building of broad ‘narrative alignments’, which will, in turn, serve as 
a basis for an integral narrative analysis.  
However, a number of problems and limitations soon become apparent in such analysis. The first 
problem is that, in some cases, unambiguous positioning cannot be identified from the primary data. 
In cases of ambiguity, positioning has been inferred from (properly referenced) secondary literature, 
whenever possible. In the cases where secondary literature did not shed any new light on the matter, 
a neutral position has been accorded to the particular strategy vis-à-vis the axial theme under 
consideration.  
A second problem emerges when a given axial theme receives only limited or conditioned support: 
redistribution, for example, is often supported only insofar it is combined with an actively fostered 
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cultural change towards sufficiency-oriented ways of life, a reform of the work-regime liberating time 
for non-productivist and non-consumerist activities, or even a promotion of modern subsistence-
economies. (Latouche, 2009) 
This comparative analysis of the sampled transformation strategies for each axial theme yielded the 
graph shown in Figure 1, where 1 stands for a positive position towards a given axial theme in the 
strategy under consideration, 0 for a neutral one, and -1 for a declining position. 
 
Figure 1: Selected GT Strategies in comparative perspective 
 
From Figure 1, two broad patterns of alignment can be easily identified on simple visual inspection: 
OECD, UNEP, and Fücks, on the one hand, and the rest of the texts, on the other – with the 
exception of Miegel and Bauwens, which follow a clearly different pattern from both the mentioned 
alignments. 
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The texts in the second alignment broadly advocate the following axial themes in common: an actively 
fostered cultural change, a relative de-commodification and re-commonalization of social and economic life 
(except for the WBGU, which remains committed to the idea of strong property rights as a grounding 
for transformation); a dismantling of the growth-dependency of modern capitalist economies, a fundamental 
re-structuration and re-balancing of gainful and non-gainful work, a systematic redistributive intervention to 
unbuild structural inequalities (primarily, but not only, in material resources), political and economic 
democratization (with a skeptic reservation about the transformative potential of ‘consumerist 
democracies’ on the part of Niko Paech and Tim Jackson), and sufficiency as a political project.  
But it is here where the above announced limitations of such rudimentary structuration become 
apparent: As the analysis of phenomenal structures in the previous section revealed, there is significant 
internal complexity and heterogeneity to each of the axial themes. Furthermore, while broadly 
outlining discursive positions, these sets of distinctly articulated axial themes do not provide sufficient 
information for the purpose of reconstructing the respective narrative structures in which they are 
embedded: a proper analysis of the plot and its elements (the characters, the point of departure or the 
vision pursued by each narrative) is thus complementarily required.  
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 Actantial Model analysis (Greimas) of GT-narratives 
 
The Actantial Model, developed by A.J. Greimas, breaks a narrative plot down into six facets or actants: 
(1) The subject (for example, to use the wording of our own analytical categories: the change agents) is 
the agential driver towards (2) an object or goal (the vision of the future), with the aid of a (3) helper 
(instrumental means or favorable circumstances). The (4) sender is what instigates the action (the 
epochal diagnosis), while the (5) receiver is what benefits from it (called here: beneficiaries). Lastly, (6) 
an opponent (obstacles, anti-subject) seeks to hinder the action. Since a relatively detailed description of 
how transformative actions are to be carried out plays a central role for the purpose of our analysis, 
the category of (7) basic strategy (plot key markers) will be added to the original Greimas-scheme.  
The purpose of this stage of analysis is to reconstruct the basic narratives at play in the GT debate, 
basing on the broad alignments hypothesized above. The Actantial-analysis (synthesized in Table 3) 
confirmed that for the three GT-strategies originally grouped under the header ‘Alignment 1’ in Figure 
1 (hereafter Green Economy, and identifiable with green color in tables and figures), differences are 
negligible in terms of their respective narrative structures. Similarly, the two stand-alone strategies – 
Miegel’s Conservative Contraction (identifiable with yellow color) and Bauwens’ P2P society (blue color) – 
were found to indeed be clearly distinguishable from the rest in narrative terms. The GT strategies 
grouped under the header ‘Alignment 2’ (hereafter Green Society120, identifiable with reddish colors), 
however, showed greater complexity and heterogeneity in their respective narrative attributions of 
meaning. This resulted in 5 sub-groups (cf. Table 3): New Social Contract, Solidarity-based Modernity, 
Sufficiency-oriented Liberalism, (Re)productivism, and Post-Development, which, in turn, coalesce varyingly 
according to various criteria and degrees of overlapping. These sub-groupings eventually proved 
relevant as a referential source for inquiring into finer discursive articulations (cf. Section 3.4 on 
Integral Analysis), but the structuring units for subsequent analysis will remain the four basic narrative 
alignments identified in Figure 1, which constitute also the main headers of Table 3 
                                                 
120 The concept of “Green Society” as opposed to that of a “Green Economy” was borrowed from 
Diefenbacher et al. (2014) 
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Table 3: Synthetic view of Greimas analysis of GT narratives 
 
GREEN ECONOMY 
(Alignment 1) 
GREEN SOCIETY (Alignment 2) 
CONSERVATIVE 
CONTRACTION 
P2P 
   Unbundling 1 Unbundling 2 
 NEW SOCIAL 
CONTRACT 
SOLIDARITY-BASED 
MODERNITY 
SUFFICIENCY-ORIENTED 
REFORMISM 
(RE)PRODUCTIVISM POST-DEVELOPMENT 
Narrator(s) OECD, UNEP, Fücks WBGU ISM Jackson, Schneidewind & 
Zahnrt 
von Winterfeld, Wichterich, 
& Biesecker 
Paech, Latouche, Acosta Miegel Bauwens 
Diagnosis 
(roots of 
crisis) 
Capital allocation failure 
/ unsuitable regulation.  
unsustainable 
production and 
consumption 
patterns.  
“Imperial modes of 
living” (Brand & Wissen)  
disproportionate/ obsessive 
political pursuit of growth. 
fixation with foreign supply, 
consumerism, capitalist 
accumulation, separation of 
so-called productive and 
re-productive work 
Productivist obsession. 
Separation of so-called 
productive and re-
productive work 
Inherent expansionism and 
wealth-concentration of 
capitalist development  
Society and the state 
‘live beyond their (social 
and natural) means’. End 
of growth is not a 
political goal, but a fact 
commanding societal 
adaptation 
artificial scarcity creation 
through commodification 
underpinning capitalist 
accumulation as source of 
social and ecological crises.  
Goal transformation of 
production patterns 
(marginally only 
consumption) 
Wholesale societal 
and economic 
transformation of a 
Polanyian scale 
(including forms of 
political organization 
and cultural values) 
(materially) 
universalizable ways of 
life (i.e. relative equality 
+ sustainability), better 
balance of diverse 
dimensions of life 
a resilient socio-economic 
order with a non-
materialistic view of 
prosperity and  
multiplicity of lifestyles co-
existing in global 
responsibility 
Care society: “re-
foundation of the 
economy”: politically driven 
ecological and social re-
embeddedness of markets 
a resilient socio-economic 
order with a non-
materialistic view of 
prosperity and  
multiplicity of lifestyles co-
existing in global 
responsibility 
Roll-back of consumerist 
culture and overcoming 
state obsession with 
(paid) jobs and growth.  
Fostered emergence of 
commons-based economy as 
new mode of valuation (i.e. re-
embeddedness of market 
dynamics).and of a glocalist 
cosmopolitan society based on 
collaboratively generated open 
knowledge 
Basic 
strategy 
Transformation through 
continued growth, 
technological and 
efficiency improvements 
(decoupling), and global 
trade for diffusion. 
Transformation = 
shifting from 
expansion to balance 
through 1) 
technological 
innovation, and 2) an 
actively fostered 
cultural change; with 
the state as 
catalyzer. 
Post-growth 
transformation financed 
via short-term green 
growth. Transformation 
of social (systemic 
material inequality + 
power) and socio-natural 
relations through 
expended 
(economic)democracy  
Post-growth society 
through cultural and 
material infrastructure 
supporting sufficiency-
based lifestyles, and better 
integration of diverse 
dimensions of life (the 
“good life” concept) 
Deliberately fostered roll-
back from consumerist 
culture. “right to 
sufficiency”. Balanced and 
holistic labor-redistribution 
and recognition policy, 
covering all forms of work 
(paid and unpaid) as the 
cornerstone for 
transformative cultural 
change 
Open up the political 
imagination beyond 
economicist, 
developmentalist, and 
progressive totalitarianism; 
Post-growth society as an 
altogether different form of 
socio-economic organization 
(e.g. re-localized modern 
subsistence economies),  
Restoration of traditional 
cultural values (e.g. 
family) and 
administration of scarcity. 
Emphasis on constraint 
and resignation. 
P2P capable of globalizing the 
dynamics of a small tribe: ICT, 
network, and 3D printing 
revolutions (e.g. open source 
ecology) enable simultaneous 
localization-globalization 
through a mode of production 
based on voluntary free 
association and horizontality, 
creating an exponential rise in 
the creation of user value by 
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“prosumers” (productive 
publics). 
Means - (Growth-financed) 
green infrastructure 
- transparent and 
predictable regulatory 
framework for private 
investment (price, tax, 
and competition 
policy, including 
strong IPRs) 
- technological 
development allowing 
for efficiency gains 
and decoupling 
- leap-frogging through 
global trade 
- Compensatory 
transfer payments for 
disadvantaged 
- Cultural 
diversification 
broadening options 
- Repolitization 
(“new social 
contract) of the 
cultural model of 
the West 
- Scientific and 
political consensus 
on climate change 
providing leverage 
- technological 
development, 
- planned leap-
frogging 
- sustainable 
agriculture 
- drastic mobility 
reduction 
- Compensatory 
transfer payments 
for disadvantaged 
- Redistribution via 
financial transaction 
tax (Tobin tax) and 
carbon taxes; 
- Democratization of the 
economy incl. energy 
production. 
- Work reduction as 
precondition for 
cultural shift towards 
post-materialistic 
lifestyles with 
increased participation 
in politics 
- Green stimulus in the 
short-term + Macro-
economic re- redesign 
away from structural 
dependence on growth 
for the medium/ long 
term 
- Steered cultural 
transition: affirmative 
action in favor of 
sufficient lifestyles. 
- Sufficiency provides fast-
track to sustainability (no 
need for complex market 
and logistic 
infrastructures) 
- Meaningful resource and 
environmental limits on 
economic activity 
- Redistribution (material 
and immaterial: time, 
power, status, work, etc.) 
- Internationally: 
‘contraction & 
convergence’ 
- Material redistribution  
- Enlargeing welfare-state 
(including UBI) 
- greening industry 
- decentralization of key 
subsistence activities 
(agriculture & energy) 
- Re-localization of value 
chains. 
- Stete-fostered 
commoning & convivial 
practices 
- Damming privatization 
Re-politization and 
democracy: participative, 
discursively balanced, and 
cooperative processes 
Money reform (incl. 
regional currencies) to 
work as medium of 
exchange 
 
- Cultural (e.g. celebrative 
rather than utilitarian 
ethos), social and 
institutional innovations 
(e.g. time banks, “rights of 
nature”, plurinational 
states) 
- Infrastructure for 
subsistence- and 
(bio)regional economies  
- Redistribution of: working 
time (also work less: ‘time 
wealth’), money, soil 
- Dismantling of 
infrastructure of consumer 
societies: credit 
advertising, and planned 
obsolescence, and 
fostering production of 
“relational goods” 
(friendship, 
neighbourliness, etc.) 
- Foster new forms of 
growth-neutral income 
generation (e.g. 
extending but de-
intensifying work-life) 
- Cultural revalorization 
of care work and family 
- Replacement of a 
deficient welfare state 
by a social state 
securing minimum 
living wages 
- More functions to be 
taken over by civic 
engagement and 
solidarity networks 
- Reform of the 
educational system 
away from market-
orientation 
- Redistribution via 
financial and ecological 
taxes 
- combination of global open-
design communities (i.e. 
knowledge commoning) and 
re-localized (self-)production 
in micro-factories. 
- economic arrangements 
minimizing the common cost 
of shared factors of 
production (called 
“economies of scope”) 
- Market-activity carried out by 
ethical companies tied to the 
ethical values of the 
commoners and their 
support of the respective 
commons (infrastructure of 
cooperation) 
- Reform of the state towards 
a ‘partner-state’ (a network 
of democratically-run for-
benefit institutions which 
protect the common good 
on a territorial scale) 
guaranteeing the 
infrastructure of cooperation 
at macro-level 
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Change 
agents 
- UNEP / Fücks: 
Keynesian state as 
investor and regulator, 
orienting private 
investment; or  
- OECD: Green 
markets 
cosmopolitan civil 
society (incl.religious 
actors), niche-
agents’/ networks (a 
global citizen’s 
movement). testing 
and advancing 
innovations 
A strong Keynesian 
welfare state re-
balancing societal 
relations (material and 
immaterial power and 
resources) 
The state as macro-
designer of a resilient 
economy; and cultural 
change agent (“orientative 
politics”) 
State shaping the 
conditions for a balanced 
discursive interaction about 
the quality and quantity of 
growth and welfare 
(gestaltender Staat) 
Pioneers: prosumers, 
intentional communities 
operating from the “margins” 
of the system, (alternative 
collective life-forms and 
collaborative-communal 
economies, such as 
Transition Towns) 
- enlightened consumers 
and politicians 
- entrepreneurial 
individuals 
Peer-to-peer networks of 
prosumers 
Helper NGOs; ICT-networked 
and ‘informed’ citizens 
- an empowered 
“enabling state” 
with enlarged 
citizen participation  
- science, 
- committed forces in 
the economy. 
Pro-active citizens in a 
high-intensity democracy 
(also economic) 
- politicians and civil 
society: young and 
predominantly urban 
milieus,  
- “Intentional 
communities”, 
- enlightened citizen/ 
consumer” 
Pro-active citizens in a 
high-intensity democracy 
(also economic) 
The State as instance of 
institutionalization 
- family bonds and 
solidarity-networks. 
- Historical evolutionary 
trend away from 
materialism 
- ethical companies 
supporting the infrastructure 
of cooperation 
- “partner state” sustaining 
and empowering the P2P 
society at the macro-level 
(creating the right 
environment and support 
infrastructure) 
Obstacles / 
opponents 
- Brown economy and 
its vested interests 
(veto players) 
- advocates of sufficient 
lifestyles and growth-
critics (Fücks) 
- Brown economy 
and its vested 
interests (veto 
players) 
- path-dependencies 
in the current 
socio-economic 
order 
- Technocratic global 
governance 
- global financial system 
- state-indebtedness 
- “Growth-dilemma” 
- Dominant structures and 
values in society (e.g. 
positional competition) 
- The economists 
stalemating debate and 
their and their “growth-
fixes” (green growth, 
inclusive growth, etc.) 
- ‘’artificial division btw. 
‘productive’ and 
‘reproductive’ activities 
- Productivist obsession 
- all forms of imperialism 
(ecological, gender, 
geographical) 
- “Growth-dilemma” 
- dogmatic status of growth 
and development 
speculative finance 
trade unions (with their 
constant demand for rise 
in salary), materialistic 
unidimensionality and 
commodification of 
lifeworlds. Scientific 
communication taxing 
sufficiency as a burden 
- IPR regimes preventing 
knowledge accessibility; 
- capitalist capture of value 
created in mutualized 
platforms. 
Beneficiaries Urban residents 
Unemployed getting 
“green jobs” 
Poor of the world 
Urban residents 
Unemployed getting 
“green jobs” 
Poor of the world 
the poor and 
disfranchised, the future 
generations 
humanity (present and 
future generations), both at 
collective and individual 
level (more happiness, less 
anxiety) 
current (especially women) 
and future generations 
Present and future 
generations,marginalized 
socio-economic and cultural 
groups, particularly in the 
Global South 
Individuals and families 
of the current and of 
future generations. 
Present and future 
generations, starting with 
prosumers and commoners 
worldwide 
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Drawing on the Greimas-analysis summarized in Table 3, the following section seeks to build on the 
four narrative alignments identified above to reconstruct typified, condensed narrative models at play 
in the GT debate, which, for shorthand reference and analytical differentiation purposes, I will call 
storylines.121 
 
Storylines: typified condensed narratives in the GT debate 
 
This section thus seeks to identify storylines as ideal-typical, condensed narrative structures at play in 
the GT debate. To add generalizability to these typified narratives beyond the sampled database of 
GT strategies (Sample 1), their key statements were brought into dialogue, when relevant, with 
secondary literature, purposefully seeking to reach beyond the data sample used for our analysis. 
These narrative ideal-types or storylines also have instrumental value for furthering the discourse 
analysis: insofar the discursive elements interwoven in these storylines partially overlap or converge, a 
basis for (potential) discourse coalitions can be established. Furthermore, amongst the discursive 
elements distinguished in our analysis, narratives/ storylines are the ‘most empirical’ entity: indeed, 
narratives are more or less consistent units of meaning which can be retrieved through observation 
followed by a simple analysis such as the Greimas-model applied here, while phenomenal structures 
and frames are inherently analytical constructs. Consequently, narratives are also the discursive 
element which can more easily be correlated with particular discursive agents. Therefore, narratives 
will be the focal point of the integral analysis of GT discourses (Section 3.4).  
 
                                                 
121  This convenience-utilization of the term narrative largely coincides with Maarten Hajer’s definition 
of storylines as a “narratives on social reality through which elements from many different domains 
are combined and that provide actors with a set of symbolic references that suggest a common 
understanding” (Hajer, 1995, p. 62), and which serve as a practical and as a political device as the 
cornerstone for the building of discourse coalitions, and thus as “prime vehicles of change” (p. 63). 
However, Hajer’s conceptualization of storylines relies heavily on his concept of ‘discursive affinities’ 
(see final section of frame analysis in this chapter for a detailed conceptualization), which emphasizes 
extra-cognitive dimensions as the “essential discursive cement that creates communicative networks 
among actors with different or at best overlapping perceptions and understandings”. The storylines 
in our analytical construct, in turn, are still relatively compact and coherent, logically fitting 
constructions. 
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Figure 2. Storyline 1: Green economy (GE): sustainable development as usual  
 
This storyline seeks to distil a common narrative from the GT strategies grouped under the header of 
‘Alignment 1’. As should be clear to the reader by now, the Green Economy narrative follows the 
tread of the Brundtland-version of the sustainable development discourse and its theoretical 
expression: ecological modernization. Hence, the GE storyline should not be regarded as a GT-
narrative stricto sensu. However, it is empirically part of the GT debate, and remains an important 
contrasting reference in our analysis. 
The basic plot goes as follows: Despite the global mainstreaming of the sustainable development 
discourse since the 1990s, progress towards sustainability has been limited. The reason is a continued 
failure of capital-allocation, due to both the veto powers of outdated brown-industry players and 
insufficient political will (or capacity) to set the right regulatory environment, fiscal incentives, and 
infrastructures.  Towards the end of the first decade of the 21st century, the aggravating ecological 
crisis converged with a global financial and socio-economic crisis. This convergence set the push 
needed to give the transition to a green economy momentum (DIAGNOSIS). The green economy 
will usher a new cycle of modernization yielding a triple-win situation for ‘the economy’, ‘society’, and 
the ‘environment’ (conceived as three autonomous yet interlinked spheres) through green industrial 
processes, green mobility, green consumer products, green jobs, and green business opportunities for 
a continued cycle of capital accumulation. Object of the transformation is the transformation of 
production patterns (marginally also consumption and disposal) yielding the triple-win of economic, 
social, and environmental gains (GOAL). 
The main engine driving change is an (allegedly self-generated) cultural change, as reflected in 
individual consumer choices. Yet there is no case for an ecological (or cultural) critique of 
consumerism. The currently prevalent socio-economic system based on economic expansion and 
material development is not only compatible, but a precondition for a sustainability transformation: 
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only additional (qualitatively ‘smart’, ‘green’, ‘sustainable’) growth will generate the resources needed 
for large-scale infrastructure investment required. Further commodification of nature and the creation 
of adequately functioning pollutants-markets and strong property rights, in general, are promoted to 
counteract ‘tragedy of the commons’-type of situations (STRATEGY). Prospects of steered cultural 
change are looked at with suspicion, as they could open the door to a ‘tyranny of virtue’ (i.e. ideological 
indoctrination) imposed by a paternalistic state. As a consequence, advocates of sufficient lifestyles 
and growth critics are either produced as non-existent in the Green Economy narrative (Aguilar, Fiuza, 
Glozman, Grondona, & Pryluka, 2015), or else they appear as anti-heroes, posing a ‘dangerous 
distraction’ that could hinder the transformation. The priority of economic growth is unquestionable 
for southern countries, leading to the current stalemate in multilateral climate negotiations and to the 
loss of investor confidence (OBSTACLES). The solution offered to the ecological predicament is thus 
a “flight forward” strategy through regulation and the right incentive-systems (STRATEGY). The 
main agents of the green transformation are – in addition to the enlightened, sovereign consumer – 
either the state (Green Keynesianism) or green markets (AGENTS). In the state-driven variant, the 
state is given a central role as an economic player, in addition to demarcating the economic playing 
field and correcting market failures. Emphasis placed on large-scale public investments in 
infrastructure (‘Green New Deal’), resulting in a ‘green social-market-economy’. In the market-driven 
variant, emphasis is placed on the diffusion of green technology through global trade, enabling ‘leap-
frogging’ by those lagging behind in the development ladder. Trans-national corporations (TNCs) are 
thus portrayed as the main players in their role of technological spearheads. The State has a role as 
essential infrastructure provider and guarantor of transparent and predictable regulatory framework 
for private investment (price, tax, and competition policy, including strong intellectual property rights 
(IPRs). The state should also put compensation mechanisms in place (via transfer-payments) for the 
losers of the transformation.  
BENEFICIARIES in the GE-storyline are the working force of the green-industry branches spreading 
across the whole economy, the substantially enlarged global consumer class increasingly populating 
the world’s cities, and, therethrough, humanity at large. Socio-ecological problems are attributed a 
"given" character as issued by "mankind", and conflict is neutralized and replaced by ‘consensual 
solutions’ (win-win). Core problems (e.g. the globalization of Western modern lifestyles) are in the 
best case recognized as such, but not treated analytically – i.e. what their dynamics are and how to 
address them, as done for example by Rilling (2014). 
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Figure 3. Storyline 2: Green society (GS): emancipatory cultural and ecological critique 
 
The emancipatory narrative of a Green Society (GS) synthesizes the shared storyline of the GT-strategies 
grouped under the header ‘alignment 2’. As was shown, this group is much more heterogeneous than 
that of ‘alignment 1’. Despite their internal diversity, however, there is a strong common plot to the 
narratives in this group, as well: What I called the Green society narrative is the melting pot for a 
fundamental ecological and cultural critique of the expansive, Western-style modernity hailed in the 
Green Economy narrative. Indeed, while the latter sets on hegemonic signifier-signified relationships (i.e. 
provisionally frozen meaning-attributions in mainstream culture), the former seeks to fight a battle for 
the appropriation of meaning of positively connoted signifiers, such as modernity, prosperity, 
freedom, or happiness that we recognized in the analysis of phenomenal structures. In addition to this 
cultural battle, the Green Society narratives also tell a story about the technical incompatibility of a 
growth-dependent economy with ecological sustainability122 (Asara et al., 2015). Common to most of 
the GS-narratives is the critique of economic growth as inherently incompatible with a finite planet 
(de-growth), or else of the growth-imperative, i.e. the structural dependence of modern societies on 
economic growth (a-growth). Some would approve of a short-term continuation of growth as a 
precondition to transform the energy-matrix and drastically rise resource-productivity (Institut 
Solidarische Moderne, 2011). Yet unlike the conservative contraction narrative (storyline 3), in the Green 
Society, the growth-critique is coupled with socially progressive critiques, such as the separation 
between the spheres of ‘production’ and ‘reproduction’ (Biesecker et al., 2012), the critique of 
development as ideology (known in academic literature as postdevelopment – cf. Introductory chapter), 
or the critique of capitalism (Brand, 2016a; Institut Solidarische Moderne, 2011). 
                                                 
122 For a detailed discussion of the growth-critique, see the phenomenal structure analysis of the axial 
theme GDP growth in this chapter.  
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The crisis is thus understood here as much broader in scope than is the case in the Green Economy 
narrative, comprising Western-style modern societies as a systemic whole, with an emphasis on their 
ecologically and socially unsustainable (and exploitative) production-consumption matrix. The 
emphases change regarding the exploited subject – nature, the global south, reproductive (mainly 
female) work – yet they are acknowledged to have a common root in the capitalist accumulation 
imperative. Therefore, the problem is much more than an implementation-deficit of the Brundtland-
formula: the problem lies with the very pillar of Western-style modern societies as currently organized. 
Hence, the ‘Great transformation’ implies not only the economic system, but also social organization 
and cultural patterns. (Euro-Atlantic) modernity must be re-conceptualized, and future-optimism is a 
“militant optimism” (Bloch, 1995) actively fostering such redefinition (DIAGNOSIS). Liberal cultural 
values and institutions are not outrightly rejected, but rather subject to a profound re-signification 
effort: ‘negative’ freedom (from external constraints) needs to be de-emphasized in favor of ‘positive’ 
freedom (for the achievement of individual and collective purposes) (Gould, 2008); autonomy needs 
to be re-conceptualized from independence towards interdependence (MacIntyre, 2001); the concept of 
rationality needs to be extended from that of a Cartesian instrumental rationality as ultimate 
benchmark to that of a complex, plural rationality (Leff, 2004a; Santos, 2008) – including the 
democratization of science (Beck, 1992; Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993; Schneidewind, 2013b; WBGU, 
2011). By way of synthesis, perhaps, one could say that universality needs to be re-conceptualized 
towards a non-totalizing, kaleidoscopic pluriverse (Escobar, 2011; Rehbein, 2013).   
The vision of a Green Society is that of a resilient socio-economic order providing capabilities for 
individual and collective human flourishing within ecological limits, a “solidarity-based modernity” 
(Institut Solidarische Moderne, 2011) with a post-materialistic view of prosperity (GOAL). Emphasis 
is placed on qualitatively different dimensions of a good life and emancipatory character of sufficiency-
based lifestyles as a collective endeavor. The lifestyle-question is not limited to more ecological 
sustainability, but to a better integration of diverse dimensions of life (the “good life” concept). The 
goal of a green society is thus one of re-balancing the excesses and deconstructing the biases implicit 
in an ideal of modernity which follows a linear compulsion towards unlimited expansion: modernity 
is also about reflexively and autonomously choosing – as socially embedded individuals – the right 
societal path towards a good life for all, which can be summarized as ‘the right measure for time, 
space, property, and the market’, which, following Wolfgang Sachs (1994), would translate into “less 
speed, less distance, less stuff, and less market”, but, at the same time, more freedom, more 
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relationality and conviviality, more time-prosperity123 (Zeitwohlstand), more individual and communal 
autonomy and control over one’s own life. In short: in the Green Society, the good life amounts to 
“living better while consuming less and working less” (Latouche, 2009, p. 9), allowing for more 
resonance experiences (H. Rosa, 2016b) or a certain degree of “re-enchantment of the world” as a 
precondition for a ‘Great Transformation’ (Latouche, 2009, p. 85). 
 
Achieving this vision implies balancing current forces of acceleration, globalization, consumerism, and 
commodification/marketization through deliberate investment and promotion of cultural and 
material infrastructure towards sufficiency (STRATGY & OPPORTUNITIES). Such balancing can 
be achieved only through a holistic policy-outlook. Schneidewind & Zahrnt (2014) punctuated this 
holistic transformation as a combination of framing, orienting, shaping, and enabling: framing deals with 
“changes to the institutional framework around our economic activity, from a new measure for 
prosperity and changes to ownership and competition regimes to policies for greater social justice” (p. 
111). Ultimately, what is required is a macro-economic re-design away from the structural dependence 
on economic growth to merely sustain functional societies, with fundamental restructuration especially 
of the realms of labor and finance. Meaningful resource and environmental limits on economic activity 
are also indispensable (Jackson, 2009a). Orienting refers to the realm of symbolic politics, which needs 
to foster less speed, less distance, less property and less market. To this goal, time policies (working-
time, leisure time, durability of products, etc.) are seen as key. The other two are very pragmatic: shaping 
means implementing measures needed to bring about such a re-orientation in specific policy fields, 
such as housing, mobility and food (taking advantage of existing structures and policies); and enabling 
implies building capacity and resources for sufficiency through health, consumer, work or education 
policy, areas which today are still dominated by the dogma of economic growth, and so they are often 
focused on the creation of jobs and of more consumption. In the WBGU’s (2011, p. 9) vision, 
fundamental changes can be achieved by following a ‘jaw strategy’ which combines a “polycentric 
policy-strategy” – i.e. numerous convergent small, ‘easy’ measures leading through emergence to a 
‘social tipping point’ decreasing social resistance to the transformation (which differs from 
                                                 
123 Under the heading of time-prosperity (Zeitwohlstand), the use of time in market societies is 
problematized as a form of alienation of individual life, as in Arendt’s and Latouche’s aforementioned 
opposition between ‘free’ and ‘liberated’ time, whereby the latter is that time which is spent in non-
marketized activities (Latouche, 2009, p. 85) 
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incremental, short-term crisis management) –, and a “focused strategy”: few, high-impact, ‘difficult’ 
measures with wide-reaching, cross-cutting effect. 
The view regarding the AGENTS of the transformation correlates with the varying conceptualization 
of the perceived capacity for effective implementation of the regulatory authority. Post-developmentalists 
and the feminist reproductive critique (cf. Table 3) see the state as an expression of the prevailing balance 
of societal forces, and thus its regulatory independence and capacity for transformative change as 
inherently compromised. Yet all sub-narratives stress the potential role of government in actively and 
systematically fostering cultural change, thus creating conditions of possibility for effective 
intervention, in the first place. But is not only the agency of an empowered “enabling state” or 
gestaltender Staat (Biesecker & Hofmeister, 2014, p. 154; Biesecker et al., 2012, p. 35) as macro-designer 
of a resilient economy and a cultural change agent that is relevant to the transformation: emphasis is 
varyingly placed also on a cosmopolitan civil society (including religious actors), ‘change agents’ in 
niches (e.g. intentional communities) and their networks to test and advance innovations (WBGU, 
2011, p. 6), a transformative science (Schneidewind, 2013b; WBGU, 2011, p. 22), committed forces 
in the economy (WBGU, 2011, p. 8), enlightened citizens – usually young and predominantly urban 
milieus (Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014, p. 138) –, seeking to combine own lifestyle change with 
engagement in fostering structural socio-political change. 
OBSTACLES to the transformation are rather portrayed here as systemic in nature: be it the logic of 
the capitalist system, the structural-technical path-dependencies (e.g. transport or energy-production 
infrastructure, but also state-indebtedness and structurally entrenched power relations in society) and 
cultural inertias – e.g. the ‘growth mentality’ (Welzer, 2011), the cult of material success, the “iron cage 
of consumerism” (in particular positional competition, worsened by inequality) (Jackson, 2009a, p. 
39), the artificial division between so-called ‘productive’ and ‘reproductive’ activities, and, more 
generally, the ethos of usefulness (Aguilar et al., 2015) – that block transformative progress. The growth-
dependent economic system poses a particularly wicked challenge combining the two types of lock-
in: the structural-technical “growth-dilemma” (Jackson, 2009a, pp. 7, 11) – i.e. growth is ecologically 
unsustainable, but the absence of growth leads to instability – is aggravated by the fact that it goes 
unrecognized in mainstream policy or in public debate (p. 102) due to the “dogmatic status of growth” 
(p. 10). In addition to these structural causes, of course, is the taken-for-granted resistance of veto-
players protecting their vested interests in the status quo, and certain discursive hegemonies 
(particularly, the discourse of economics), which stalemates debate and innovation (Schneidewind & 
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Zahrnt, 2014, pp. 150–151) and keeps delaying the confrontation of the inevitable through “growth-
fix”-discourses (green growth, inclusive growth, etc. (p. 49) 
BENEFICIARIES in this narrative are more concretely identified as in the Green Economy: material 
sufficiency, more happiness, and less anxiety await both present and future generations, including 
marginalized socio-economic and cultural groups (women, indigenous people, etc.), particularly in the 
Global South. 
Within the broader narrative outlined above, and following the classifications in Table 3 (by colors), 
three sub-groupings are worth distinguishing: the first stresses consumption and production patterns 
towards dematerialized value and sufficiency (under the header new social contract), the second adds a 
critique of the inbuilt unsustainable character of an economy that is structurally dependent on 
exponential growth (header sufficiency-oriented liberalism), and the third stresses the problematic character 
of power dynamics and structural inequalities in society and articulates an open critique of capitalism 
(headers solidarity-based modernity, (re)productivism, post-development). While the narratives of a solidarity-based 
modernity and (re)productivism do not explicitly stress the growth-dependence of the economy as the 
ultimate source of the multiple crisis, as sufficiency-oriented liberalism and post-development do, their 
argumentative structure is certainly compatible with the growth critique. Despite the commonalities 
outlined above, the new social contract, which advocates cultural change, sufficiency, and democratization 
but remains silent about growth and the need to re-localize economic value chains, while also favoring 
a more sophisticated proprietary regime and leaving the dominance of the market logic unquestioned 
(W. Sachs, 2013) instead of a re-commonalization and de-commodification of socio-economic life, is the 
clear outlier of the ‘alignment 2’ group, and should be understood as a midway between the green 
economy and green society storylines.  
 
Figure 4. Storyline 3: Moral-conservative economic contraction (CC) 
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The plot of the Conservative Contraction storyline (CC) shares a similar point of departure to the Green 
Society: both combine a fundamental ecological critique and a radical cultural critique targeting the 
growth-obsession of a consumption-driven global economy. Their respective prescriptions, however, 
considerably differ from each other. The framing also changes: The conservative narrative sees 
modernity as such as having crashed against its own barriers, as both citizens and the state “live beyond 
their means”. The expansionist and materialist obsession destroying nature and the social bond.The 
illusory character of the artificial “paradise of abundance” that the lifestyle of the global consumer 
class lives in was revealed by the latest economic crisis, yet this remains unacknowledged in 
mainstream social and political discourse (DIAGNOSIS).  
The society envisioned here (GOAL) is a frugal and resigned one, resting on the moral argument of 
sacrifice: we are living beyond our means, and it’s time to pay the bill. The end of growth is not framed 
as a political goal, but as a fact to which societies need to adapt (Miegel, 2010, p. 163). Given this 
context, the object of politics is a fair administration of scarcity. 
The OBSTACLES toward this frugal society are multiple: path-dependencies in certain economic 
sectors, institutions and structures, in particular those of the Welfare state – the ‘growth trap’ already 
invoked in the GS-storyline –, debt, moral corruption. At the cultural level, materialism and the 
commodification of lifeworlds (Miegel, 2010, pp. 181, 238). Beyond a GDP per capita of US$ 20.000, 
subjective wellbeing does not increase in advanced countries (Miegel, 2010, p. 32 for Schneidewind & 
Zahrnt, it is after 10.000 Euros/ p. 35); after this threshold, material possessions (and the system 
which produces them) do not free people, but rather enslave them, as can be observed in the case of 
early industrialized countries today (p. 158).  
Yet a historical window of OPPORTUNITY opens up as materialism progressively loses stance as a 
source of meaning for life (p. 166). Welfare and growth are decoupled, which means that the only 
remaining anchor for the growth imperative is jobs (pp. 33-34). But continued growth is a delusional 
promise: even today’s growth is precarious and artificial in character (p. 181; coinciding with Jackson, 
p. 6). Hence, growth fails even in its own terms, in providing for social stability.  
The conservative STRATEGY for society to cope with the end of growth is multiplying and scaling-
up the promotion of cultural and material initiatives fostering a roll-back of materialism. The focus 
should be set on “unproductive” policy-areas, pointing at the restoration of traditional values such as 
friendship, respect, and solidarity. In addition, a radical contraction of the state apparatus and of the 
economy is required: Both neoliberal deregulation and progressive redistribution fuel the growth-
dependency. What is needed for society to cope with this downscaling are new forms of income 
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generation that are independent from growth: independent, entrepreneurial work paving the way for 
self-reliance. Retirement age should be raised to alleviate fiscal pressure. The internalization of 
ecological damages of capital-intensive production through taxation should make labor regain 
competitiveness vis-à-vis automatization (Miegel, 2010, p. 181 ff.). More work will be required, as 
material compensation and state-benefits will decrease (Miegel, 2010, p. 192 ff.). Solidarity-networks 
and a solidarity-culture will surface as a reaction to the retreat of the welfare state (Miegel, 2010, pp. 
205–208), in the form of e.g. enlarged families. This will, in turn, raise birth rates, helping to keep 
immigration at bay.  
The privileged AGENTS in realizing the conservative transformation are enlightened persons in 
politics, citizens and consumers that understand the ‘adaptation imperative’. Politicians will lead the 
political framework-reforms, but the key agency is that of entrepreneurial, self-procuring individuals 
showcasing that the dependence on state-provision is reminiscent from other times that in an 
overweighed world just puts an extra-burden on society and nature. 
Figure 5. Storyline 4: Glocal commons-collaborative economy or P2P society (P2P) 
 
The P2P-storyline sees the multiple crisis as the logical result of a continued process of artificial 
scarcity-creation through the historical processes of enclosure of the commons and ever-expanding 
commodification of all spheres of life, and of the corresponding process of externalization. Both are 
rooted in the logic of privatization and capital accumulation: private gain can only be continuedly 
maximized at the expense of others and of nature (DIAGNOSIS).  
The vision opposed here to this dystopia (GOAL) is a commons-based collaborative economy, which 
– as a result of historical windows of opportunity opened by socio-technical co-evolution – has led to 
the emergence of a new mode of production, one that is capable of globalizing the communitarian 
dynamics of traditional tribal forms: peer-to-peer (P2P) (Bauwens, 2012b, p. 3). This new mode of 
production is defined by an ethos of free association and horizontality: peer production is currently 
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most visible in the free software industry, and incipiently in the open hardware realm (e.g. open source 
ecology). Today, this mode of production exists only in a proto-version, which is entirely 
interdependent with the system of capital. But the social reproduction of commons and the 
commoners could potentially grow independent from the accumulation cycle of capital, and generate 
its own cycle of value creation. For P2P becoming anti-systemic (de facto “eclipsing” capitalism – to 
borrow Jeremy Rifkin’s expression), it would need to create an exponential rise in the creation of user 
value by productive publics, or “prosumers” (or “produsers”), which would trump the logic of 
scarcity-creation and expansion on which capital accumulation rests. 
  
The historical window of opportunity (STRATEGY/ OPPORTUNITY) for this is provided by 
technological development: A quantum-leap in late-modern development trajectory is to be expected 
(in fact, is already underway) due to a fundamental change of the communications-energy matrix 
(Rifkin, 2014): in the first and second industrial revolutions, energy and communications required 
centralization and vertical integration to rise labor productivity and resource-efficiency (‘economies of 
scale’). The upcoming third revolution infrastructure is the so-called Internet of Things (IoT): an 
integrated network of decentralized communications, energy production, and micro-factories using 
3D-printing technology. This development creates the structural conditions of possibility for the 
materialization of M.K. Gahndi’s vision of swaraj.  Given the environmental impact and rising costs 
of global economies of scale, alternative economic arrangements minimizing the common cost of 
shared factors of production (called “economies of scope” or “lateral scale”) make increasing 
economic, social and environmental sense.  
What is hitherto standing in the way toward a P2P society (OBSTACLES) is the institutionalized 
privatization of knowledge by capitalist interests (IPR regimes) and the capitalist capture of social 
collaborative value-creation through marketization (e.g. the so-called “sharing-economy”: car-sharing 
companies, AirBNB, etc.). But since communications/energy matrixes determine the way power is 
organized and distributed in any civilization (Rifkin, 2014, p. 106), political confrontation is secondary 
to the co-evolutionist force of socio-technical systems. 
AGENTS, in this storyline, are seen as emerging outcomes of the co- evolutionary dynamics of social 
and technical development. This does not amount to saying that agency has no role to play in realizing 
the co-evolutionary process: prosumers forming both global open-design communities (i.e. knowledge 
commoners) and re-localized micro-factories form, of course, the cornerstone of a P2P society. Yet 
market value would still be needed to help sustain the infrastructure of cooperation upon which the 
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creation of the commons rests (servers, micro-factories, etc.). This would be derived from the activity 
of ethical companies whose existence is tied to their alignment with the ethical values of the 
commoners and their support of the respective commons. At the macro-level, the P2P society is 
sustained and empowered by a Partner state (orig. theorized by Cosma Orsi), i.e. a state form that 
enables and empowers the social creation of value by its citizens (as opposed to private or state-public 
provision), creating the right environment and support infrastructure so that citizens can peer produce 
value from which the whole society benefits (Bauwens, 2012a, p. 6) (BENEFICIARIES).  
 
What can we learn from the narrative analysis? 
 
This concluding part of section 3.3.2 seeks to revisit and assess the findings of phenomenal structure 
analysis from the perspective of their narrative embeddedness, including how the axial themes of the 
GT debate are bound into the distinct ideal-typical storylines.  
First, regarding the DIAGNOSIS, different depth-layers in the understanding of the ‘multiple crisis’ 
can be narratively assigned to our typified storylines. The background question is: How systemic is the 
crisis? Is it a crisis of the fossil-based economy? Is it a crisis of the hyper-financialized, neoliberal mode 
of capitalist regulation? (Green economy storyline). Is it a crisis of capitalism as such (or of industrialism)? 
(P2P society and part of the Green Society narratives: ‘solidarity-based modernity’ and ‘sufficiency-
oriented liberalism’). Is it a crisis of a certain understanding of modernity (i.e. a civilizational crisis)? 
(in a broad structural sense: Green Society ‘post-developmental’ and ‘reproductivist’ narratives; in a 
moral-cultural sense: Conservative Contraction).  
With respect to the GOAL or VISION for a GT, most narratives in the GT debate do problematize 
the dominant logic of profit-making, capital accumulation, and economic expansion, with the 
exception of the Green Economy storyline (and, to an extent, the GS-sub-narrative of the ‘new social 
contract’). In so doing, positively connoted signifiers in the dominant culture (modernity, prosperity, 
freedom) are disputed, especially between the GE and GS narratives, as are definitions of success and 
happiness. The precise content of these disputes will be analyzed in detail in section 3.3.3 on frames, 
but a straightforward distinction can be made between the dominant expansionist, materialist, 
business-as-usual definitions of these concepts in the Green Economy and the defensive arguments 
of the Green Society narratives, seeking to expand the scope of meaning to re-claim these positive 
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values, also if accorded to alternative forms of economic and social organization based on sufficiency, 
social rather than economic value creation, and ‘ecological caps’. 
Regarding the STRATEGIES and OPPORTUNITIES, I will refer to the narrative embeddedness of 
three issues raised as an outcome of phenomenal structure analysis: 1) the narrative ascription of 
meaning and narrative articulation of axial themes; 2) the issue of disputed technical matters 
(particularly the decoupling hypothesis)124, and 3) the historical window of opportunity for a 
transformation opened-up by alterations in the material foundation of societies.    
First, regarding the narrative meaning-attributions, the watershed-themes125 structuring the debate – 
i.e. GDP growth, sufficiency, and re-localization – can now be narratively matched with our ideal-
typical storylines: The Green Economy on one side, all GS-narratives and Conservative Contraction on the 
opposite one, whereby both sides argue not only in opposition to each other, but also on different 
grounds. The discursive battlefield spans across from the technical field (with the decoupling hypothesis 
as key question126) to the cultural field (i.e. to the question about the ‘growth mentality’, the ‘growth 
dogma’, or ‘technological messianism’). The sufficiency-issue, in turn, is firmly anchored in the cultural 
realm in the conservative narrative (CC), while in GS its political and material implications are 
foregrounded. Sufficiency usually goes hand in hand with a re-localization of economic value-chains 
(first and foremost of subsistence-critical activities). GS stresses also the re-localization of political as 
well as of cultural life, allowing for greater community-resilience, a social re-embeddedness of the 
economy, reduction of trade-related pollution, and the repair of the social bond through 
communitarian solidarity. Any significant re-localization (in particular of economic value-chains) is, in 
turn, explicitly ridiculed by the evolutionist globalization discourse of the Green Economy. 
A special provision should be made for the P2P storyline, which, despite aligning with the epochal 
diagnosis of GS and CC and, and rejecting consumerism and economic expansionism, as the latter do, 
envisions a hybrid future: a “post-scarcity world” in which P2P production will do away with growth 
pressures and consumerism. This is, however, not the same prescription of a (state-guaranteed) 
                                                 
124 Another technical issue with a high toll on the feasibility of a ‘Great Transformation’ that is 
discussed in the literature (e.g. by Tim Jackson) is the dysfunctionality of the current global system of 
money supply (so-called ‘fiat-money’) and the need to subject it to public control. While I acknowledge 
the enormous importance of such issue, it will not be further specifically discussed here, as this was 
not found to be one of the axial themes dominating the GT-debate (as, in my view, it should), but it 
will be implicitly included through the generic category of ‘disputed assessments around technical 
matters’.       
125 See point “what can we learn from phenomenal structure analysis” in section 3.1 
126 See footnote 108 on rebound-effects in Section 3.3.1 
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protected space for the flourishing of social creativity, political engagement, and care promoted by the 
GS; though the end result would be much alike. Hence, P2P narratively ‘circumvents’ the difficult 
challenge proposed by GS, but gets to the same place. Confrontation, however, cannot be entirely 
avoided: strong property rights (in particular, IPRs, where the bulk of the profit of capital comes from 
in the global economy) amount to a foundational stone for the Green economy storyline, and to a 
fundamental obstacle for P2P society. The axial theme Commons thus emerges as another clear-cut 
watershed, as soon as the ‘sharing economy’ is framed as bypassing the principles of private property 
(here, particularly, intellectual property) and profit-maximizing markets. 
As for the remaining axial themes, which we characterized as potential floating signifiers, can also be 
ascribed to the typified storylines with particular meanings. Cultural change is not a central concern for 
the Green Economy, although seemingly naturalist post-materialist shifts in consumer preferences 
and ‘environment-friendly’ social practices (recycling, riding a bicycle, etc.) are welcome and portrayed 
as a sign of improved ‘environmental consciousness’. Efforts are directed at closing the ‘value-action 
gap’ that prevents such progress in environmental consciousness translate into corresponding 
behaviors by the mainstream populations. CC and GS, in turn, see cultural change as a cornerstone of 
transformative social change. Yet while the former relies on moral appeals for frugality in the name 
of ecological realism, the latter sees the creation of an infrastructure for cultural change as precondition 
for culturally embedded individuals to be in position of producing and reproducing ecologically and 
socially sustainable practices. Underlying these differing prescriptions are equally differing theories of 
the social and of social change (Shove, 2010a): whereas  GE and CC emphasize that ‘we make society’, 
GS insists on the complement that ‘society makes us’. These differing understandings of the social 
explain the competing claims of sufficiency as a political project versus sufficiency as an individual 
lifestyle-choice.  In P2P, the socio-technical co-evolutionary dialectic is the constitutive narrative logic: 
the emergence of a glocal collaborative commons-based economy and the “eclipse of capitalism” will 
not be the result of a political revolution, but rather of the (strategically supported) social 
metabolization of technological developments.  
Competing theories of the social also partially explain the differing accounts of the axial theme 
democratization: while enlarged citizen participation together with increased accountability and 
transparency of elected political representatives and their administrative officers define the agenda of 
the GE, GS stresses the importance of power structures: the state is not a neutral actors who can be 
safely assumed to work in favor of the ‘common good’, but rather reflects the social balance of power. 
Therefore, the state’s legitimation-drive towards democratization of public life should be geared 
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towards unraveling power entrenchments through democratizing not only the state, but fundamentally 
also society, the economy, and culture. A fundamental re-politization of life is thus advocated, which, 
by implication, also means involving a wider range of ‘transformation-agents’ beyond the usual scope 
of politicians, bureaucrats, and large business and NGOs. CC sees not the danger of the state being 
co-opted by dominant social and economic powers, but rather degenerated through the institutional 
stiffening of historically sedimented social demands that are now outdated (such as an ‘early’ 
retirement age which did not further evolve to match growing life expectancy). Democratization 
would further reinforce the perpetuation of unjustified public welfare benefits. But also in the GS 
camp there are skeptics of democratization: While strongly sympathetic of cultural diversification 
making room for alternatives and a plural economy, there is a strand within the GS which sees a 
strongly established correspondence between material prosperity and the political imaginary of 
emancipation. For this reason, straightforward promotion of citizen involvement is unlikely to yield 
‘ecologically right’ outcomes, which would necessarily involve taming the materialistic hubris 
(Blühdorn, 2007; Jackson, 2009a; Paech, 2012). For its part, P2P circumvents most these issues: the 
collaborative commons-economy balances individualist entrepreneurial and meritocratic values ruling 
P2P networks with open-access, socially distributed (i.e. democratized) benefits.    
Similarly, redistribution is problematized diversely along the fault-line of the abovementioned theories 
of social change: In P2P redistribution is an unmediated byproduct of the shift in production systems, 
and thus not problematized as a transformation-driver. For the GE and CC, redistribution as such is 
seen as undesirable, politically impossible, or even unnatural, although compensatory transfer-
payments to secure social support for unpopular policy measures or disruptive business practices are 
supported. For the GS, redistribution is not only an issue of justice, but a key lever for the 
transformation, insofar greater material equality would remove social and psychological pressures 
underpinning positional consumption. 
An important feature of the GT-debate, as we had concluded from the analysis of phenomenal 
structures, is the meaning-disputes around cross-cutting, positively connoted signifiers such as 
modernity, prosperity, freedom, happiness, success, the good life. These reference frames and their 
narrative embeddedness will be dealt with in detail in section 3.3.3 on Frame analysis 
With regard to windows of OPPORTUNITY, phenomenal structure analysis had revealed a common 
assumption of potentially disruptive socio-technical developments (big data, AI, IoT technologies and 
their diverse forms of social metabolization) that would lead to a radical re-structuration (and likely a 
shrinking) of the labor market, in particular, and of the social and economic significance of waged-
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labor, in general. We can now distinguish narrative articulations from this common assumption: Green 
Economy representatives cling to established cultural and economic material and meaning-structures. 
Structural unemployment resulting from the fading brown-economy is assumed to be 
(over)compensated by brand new ‘green jobs’. Even if not explicitly problematized in our samples of 
the GE-narrative, the projected loss of jobs due to the automation wave of ‘Industry 4.0’, potentially 
creates room for coalescence around forms of securing means of subsistence with visions and 
proposals from other narratives.  Universal Basic Income, for example, is a policy-idea enjoying 
widespread and increasing acceptance by both advocates of fiscal austerity, who see in this the 
opportunity for substantially shrinking the bureaucracy of the welfare state, and by progressives, who 
emphasize the transformative ripple-effects of a basic subsistence-insurance in almost all areas of 
social life (waged-labor, reproductive activities, political activation, etc.). Similarly, work reduction is 
generally favored by all GS-narratives. Bounded cooperation-space exists also with CC: Indeed, even 
if CC seeks to extend rather than reduce working-life to disburden the state from retirement pension-
payments, it favors flexible and less intensive working-time policy to allow for care and self-
development. Of course, CC would not rely on state-mediated social solidarity to secure subsistence, 
but rather on clan-solidarity around enlarged families. P2P again deviates the most from the narrative 
pattern, as the social and economic conception and significance of work is fundamentally altered 
correspondingly with the shift in modes of production. Solidarity-networks here are organic to P2P-
design communities and micro-factories. 
   
From the analysis of AGENTS of change, three distinct (usually also framed as competing) patterns 
for the governance of the transformation are discernable alongside narrative fault-lines: GE favors a 
techno-managerial view (top-down), where identifiable transformation-agents are the state as investor 
and regulator, the markets as resource-allocation mechanism, and enlightened consumers creating 
market-signals for investors to make ecological and socially right choices. Insofar the main driver of 
the transformation is moral, the conservative narrative (CC) personalizes transformative agency even 
more, be it in the political, the economic, or the social sphere. The GS-narratives oppose to these a 
re-politicized ‘design of the future’: dominant market-oriented technological development and 
management, as well as cultural preferences, embody the very power relations that need to be 
challenged if political decisions are to pursue the common good of present and future generations. 
The P2P-storyline sees steering as decentralized and collective, but also as largely a-political, insofar 
bounded (if not determined) by the co-evolution of socio-technical systems. 
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OPPONENTS or OBSTACLES are narratively constructed either as contingent and personalized – 
e.g. vested interests (all narratives), specific social groups (e.g. for GE, the ‘enemies of modernity’; for 
GS, ‘the (neoclassical) economists’; for CC, the trade unions, etc.) –, or as structural: socio-economic 
and cultural path- dependencies, such as consumerism (GS and CC), welfare state structures (CC), 
intellectual property regimes and the logic of capital accumulation (P2P and GS). Worth noticing, all 
of our typified storylines acknowledge structural lock-ins in some of the institutions and processes of 
society, except for the GE, who sees the veto-power of brown economy representatives as by and 
large the only obstacle in the way to a sustainable future. Indeed, the GE sees the only one of the four 
storylines that sees the future as an extrapolation of the present in terms of the basic structures of 
society. 
Lastly, regarding the BENEFICIARIES, a dual categorization is also possible: under the sociologically 
empty signifier of ‘humanity’, deployed in both the GE and CC narratives, responsibilities are 
blanketed (CC) and benefits are assumed to automatically ‘trickle down’ (GE): what is good for (green) 
industry and for the global consumer class is good for humanity. In the GS-storyline, in turn, 
responsibilities are highlighted and framed in structural terms. A concept that would fairly dispute the 
‘humanist’ approach of CC and GE is the already mentioned “imperial ways of life” (imperiale 
Lebensweise) (Brand & Wissen, 2011, 2017), which highlights the inherent non-generalizability of 
modern Western lifestyles, as their sustainment is a function of the exploitation of man and nature. 
GS thus speaks to particularized beneficiaries: marginalized social groups in the global south, women, 
care-workers, precarious waged-workers, the anxious and footloose liberal professional, the youth 
whose future has been severely compromised, etc; while GE largely conflates the global consumer 
class with humanity, and recognizes only an inter-generational tension. The conflict setting can be 
thus framed as one pitting the global middle classes against the global marginalized (W. Sachs, 2014).  
 
3.3.3. Frame analysis: the implicit world(s) in GT discourses 
 
In the methodological scheme of the Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourses (SKAD), the 
analysis of socio-cognitive frames, also called interpretative templates or patterns (Deutungsmuster) 
constitutes a third complementary level of access to the study of the content-related structuring of 
discourses, together with the analysis of phenomenal and narrative structures. 
In Chapter 1 we defined frames as interpretative templates available in social knowledge-stocks that 
can be drawn upon (therethrough being actualized) in collective or individual meaning-making 
143 
 
processes (Keller, 2011, p. 108). The analysis of frames is a way of tapping into the world of socio-
cognitive presuppositions, i.e. the cognitive rules governing social interaction, what we referred to in 
Chapter 1 as the “symbolic order”.  
While narratives belong to the normative world, frames inhabit the pre-normative world, the world of 
socio-cognitive presuppositions. In other words, a frame is the ideational background reference-
context of a given topic, or the more or less explicit overarching theme (with its corresponding, 
provisionally fixed meaning-structure, which varies with spatial-temporal coordinates) in reference to 
which a particular topic is being discussed. The overarching theme in a discussion is the category 
around everything else can be meaningfully ordered: it is the reference-phenomenon of a discourse, 
i.e. what the discourse is about. Insofar, frames are the most significant unit of meaning transported by 
a discourse (Keller, 2011; Keller et al., forthcoming, p. 19).  
As we saw in Chapter 1, framing can also be understood as a strategic activity, i.e. the deliberate use of 
argumentative tools to influence meaning-making activities in line with certain pre-constituted 
purposes. The aim of frame analysis here (and in SKAD, which draws on the German traditions of 
Deutungsmusteranalyse), however, is rather to retrieve socially typified (i.e. conventionalized) meaning of 
the overarching theme of a discourse, which allows for understanding about the way in which the 
world is symbolically ordered in a given discourse – i.e. the structure of cultural assumptions operating 
in the background –, regardless of the strategic intentions of discursive agents.  
In the case-study at hand, the more explicit frames appear evident as derived directly from the analysis 
of narratives – e.g. the alternative ways of framing ‘steering modes’, as a political or rather a techno-
managerial business, can be directly derived from the diverse storylines. But there are deeper, more 
implicit interpretative schemes that cannot be immediately retrieved from the narrative accounts. Both 
are necessary for an adequate understanding of the alternative discursive orderings of the world at play 
in the GT debate. 
In the absence of ‘objective’ methods for deriving frames from the data, frame analysis is the most 
artisanal and interpretative phase of the discourse analysis. To constrain the researcher’s subjectivity 
and attain ‘social objectivization’ of the frame-reconstruction process (Keller 2011, p. 109), this task 
was carried out in a small, ad hoc group of 3 previously instructed persons with “empirical literacy” in 
the GT debate.  
The method followed to perform the frame-analysis started with a sequential analysis of GT-strategy 
summaries, crossing them with the results of the analysis of phenomenal of structures for each axial 
theme, to iteratively come up with the frames that best accounted for the interpretation of each 
144 
 
strategy. A purposeful device to derive frames was looking for the main, overarching cleavages explicit 
or implicit in and across said strategies. All emerging hypotheses were discussed by checking them 
against the coded data. The best suited interpretation prevailed (often subsuming some of the 
interpretations discarded in the process). The final systematization of these collectively filtered 
interpretations was a solo work of the author of this dissertation.  
Outcome of the group-process 
 
The group-work produced insights about the frames implicit in the GT discourses which can be 
grouped in three main categories: 
A. Understanding of ‘modernity’  
This first category synthesizes alternative conceptions of the world in terms of ontological, 
anthropological, and epistemological assumptions; as well as moral and political-philosophical 
assumptions and normative preferences, all of which were subsumed as descriptors under a ‘meta-
frame’ in the GT-debate: it is ultimately about the meaning of “modernity” and what the transformation 
would imply for it. Modernity is not conceived of, in this regard, as a historical period, but as a 
particular pattern of social organization dominant in contemporary societies. Three basic variants were 
identified - expansive modernity, balancing/ reductive modernity, and plural modernities - to which implicit or 
explicit reference has already been made in previous steps of analysis. By implication, the widespread 
idea of ‘modernity’ as a synonym of contemporaneity, Occidentalism, or a determined set of 
institutional or philosophical features (democracy, market economies, science as superior form of 
knowledge, etc.) is challenged in the GT debate, echoing longstanding academic debates on 
modernity127. This should not come as a surprise: indeed, a rigid and static understanding of 
                                                 
127 Indeed, our categorization here follows established archetypes in the sociological literature. While 
the expansive modernity follows the descriptive patterns of the classical theories of modernity (as 
reflected, for example, in Rostow’s stages of economic development), the balancing/reductive 
modernity corresponds to U. Beck’s ‘reflexive modernity’, which sets to reformulate the classical 
model in the face of self-engendered systemic or civilizational risks (Beck, 1992), also represented in 
the GT debate by Herald Welzer, who advocates a “reductive modernity” as opposite to the dominant 
understanding of modernity as “expansive” (Welzer & Sommer, 2014). Yet from the perspective of 
the pluralist theories of modernity, which, in the historical framework of contemporary globalization, 
envisage diverse possible global “trajectories of modernity”, both the expansive and the reductive/ 
balancing models of modernity can be framed as deriving from the same ‘Eurocentric matrix’ of 
thought, which has long colonized our understanding of modernity. “Eurocentrism” is a neologism 
that refers to assumptions that identify the European historical course and social structural patterns 
as a universal model (Wallerstein, 2004). Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2008, 2009) has typified 
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modernity would be at odds with the complex and dynamic evolution of socio-cultural systems. Yet 
those critically questioning dominant understandings of (an expansive) modernity will typically be 
labeled ‘anti-moderns’ (e.g. Fücks, 2013, p. 36 referring to growth-critics). 
 
Here, the three understandings of modernity will be characterized as they come about across the GT 
debate, through the specification of the descriptive categories identified through the collective-
interpretative work, which drew on the analysis of phenomenal structures in the GT debate. This is 
synthesized in Table 4 below. 
‘Modernity’ is variably framed either in naturalistic, expansive terms (a frame shared by conservatives 
advocating a ‘roll-back’ of modernity), or else in constructivist, balancing terms. Constructivist framings 
include a reflexive (yet rather monolithic, in cultural terms) understanding of modernity, and a 
kaleidoscopic understanding of ‘modernities’ as plural ontology integrating diverse cultural matrixes.  
The frame ‘expansive modernity’ sees the world as a functionalist articulation of ontologically 
independent spheres (economy, society, environment) that need to be brought into harmony though 
‘smart’, ‘triple-win’ solutions. It depicts homo economicus as most accurate anthropological model and 
stresses a “negative freedom” from external constraints to individual choice (Gould, 2008) (which rests 
on an allegedly endogenous, pre-given structure of views and preferences). In accordance with this 
anthropological model, it prescribes utilitarian (and hence managerial) governance frameworks to deal 
with the multiple crisis, including “economizing the ecology” as a way of “ecologizing the economy” 
(Mol, 1997). Rationality is understood as a monolithic, positivistic Cartesian benchmark to assess the 
validity of any knowledge. Systemic or civilizational risk is dealt with through an axiomatic ‘faith in 
progress’ and indefinitely continuing economic growth or capital accumulation and (capital-intensive) 
technological development is taken for granted (Huesemann & Huesemann, 2011). Modern 
civilization is ‘too big to fail’ (Stengel, 2011), positive thinking is ‘in’(Kallis, 2017) and, in some places, 
such as the USA, optimism regarding the ‘American way of life’ is a matter of patriotism (Weizsäcker, 
Hargroves, Smith, Desha, & Stasinopoulos, 2009).The ecological overshoot of current development 
trajectories is depicted as a technical ‘problem’, solvable through technical efficiency and consistency 
strategies that will make it possible to decouple continued economic expansion from the degradation 
                                                 
Eurocentrism through a series of particular ‘monocultures’ (universalistic ontology and epistemology, 
a lineal understanding of time and progress, economicism, etc.), as opposed to an “ecology of 
knowledges”. The term ‘plural modernities’ connotes the multiplicity and plurality of societal models 
that are part, in this plurality, of the modern world.  
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of natural resources and life-support systems. Property and economic structures rely on 
commodification and public investment for rising productivity and the creation of exchange value. 
Non-naturalistic and non-evolutionistic understandings of modernity are divided here into two ideal-
types, on the basis of how strong a role the cultural element plays in them. Both the ‘balancing 
modernity’ or ‘reductive modernity’ (H. Welzer) and the ‘plural modernities’ see the economy as 
embedded into society, and both into nature, which sets both conditions of possibility and limits to 
socio-economic development. Both uphold the anthropological view of a homo solidaris: building on 
the insights from empirical economics, psychology, neurology and the new and interdisciplinary field 
of happiness research, empathy and cooperation are as much a defining trait of human nature as 
individualistic utility-maximization and competition (Rifkin, 2009; Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014, p. 
66). Pluralistic framings will further emphasize celebrative, symbolic, transcendent elements as a 
driving force in human existence (Estermann, 1998; Schneidewind, Santarius, & Humburg, 2013), 
questioning the ethos of usefulness (Aguilar et al., 2015) and foregrounding ideas such as time-prosperity 
(Zeitwohlstand). Correspondingly, non-expansionist framings of modernity would rather prescribe 
relational political steering or co-evolutionary governance emphasizing socio-technical and cultural 
embeddedness. Freedom is framed as “positive freedom” for the collective development of human 
potential (Gould, 2008). The “freedom to consume” in externalization societies (Lessenich, 2016) 
upholding imperial (Brand & Wissen, 2017) subsidized (Miegel, 2010) modes of living comes at the 
expense of expropriating others – the global south, women, indigenous peoples, future generations – 
of their own freedom.  Rationality is understood as socio-culturally embedded, and knowledge is 
validated through constructivist epistemologies ranging from trans-disciplinarity and citizen 
participation in academic knowledge-production to the increasing the social and political relevance of 
multiple forms of knowledge; replacing the ‘monoculture’ of scientific knowledge with an “ecology of 
knowledges” (Santos, 2008). Indeed: in a context of generalized vulnerability and high uncertainty, 
science becomes “more and more necessary but less and less sufficient for a socially binding definition 
of truth” (Beck, 1992, p. 156).  
This argument bases on both considerations of justice (‘cognitive justice’) and of the strength/ 
resilience of decentralized complex systems (“no one is as smart as everyone”), which makes a 
pragmatic case, particularly in the face of systemic or civilizational risk, opening up a “space for the 
inventiveness and creativity of the imagination, which has been blocked by economicist, 
developmentalist, and progressive totalitarianism” (Latouche, 2009, p. 9). 
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 Table 4: Meaning structure of alternative understandings of modernity as meta-frame in the GT debate 
  Plural Modernity Reductive Modernity Expansive Modernity 
O
nt
olo
gic
al 
as
su
mp
tio
ns
 Nature/society Social-ecological embeddedness 
Social-ecological 
embeddedness 
Three pillars of 
sustainability 
Ecological 
limits 
“Enjoyable limits” Planetary boundaries as 
bottomline 
Planetary boundaries 
orientation 
A
nt
hr
op
olo
gic
al 
as
su
mp
tio
ns
 
Human nature Homo solidaris / Homo celebrans 
Homo solidaris Homo economicus 
Freedom / 
autonomy 
Freedom ‘for’ (positive) 
Individual 
interdependence / 
economic autonomy 
Freedom ‘for’ (positive) 
Individual interdependence / 
economic autonomy 
Freedom ‘from’ 
(negative) 
Individual autonomy / 
economic 
interdependence 
E
pis
tem
olo
gic
al 
as
su
mp
tio
ns
 Rationality Multiple rationalities Embedded rationality Cartesian rationality 
Knowledge 
Diversification of 
knowledges 
(constructivism) 
Transdisciplinarity & 
democratization of science 
(constructivism) 
Scientific knowledge 
(positivism) 
M
ora
l &
 p
oli
tic
al 
va
lue
s a
nd
 a
ssu
mp
tio
ns
 
 
Risk 
Risk-loosening / 
diversification 
Resilience 
Risk avoidance:  
Rebound-Effect 
Faith in ‚progress‘: 
decoupling hypothesis 
Governance Political Political / co-evolutionary Techno-managerial 
Technology 
Technology skepticism 
Convivial technologies 
Technology skepticism 
 
Technological optimism  
Development 
Postdevelopment Development in the South Development in North 
and South 
Sustainability 
strategies 
Sufficiency / good life sufficiency Efficiency/ consistency 
Property Commons Public goods/ Commons Private Goods/ public goods 
Economy 
Reproduction Reproduction Production 
 
 
Growth-orientation and capital accumulation are seen as a historically contingent form of socio-
economic organization, and therefore - particularly when factoring in ecological constraints - as 
necessarily finite. Furthermore, the current pursuit of exploitative and destructive economic growth 
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constitutes a flagrant means-ends inversion (Stengel, 2011, p. 350). The unquestioned faith in 
technological development is viewed as a dogmatic belief, and a largely unsubstantiated one in the face 
of unfulfilled eco-modernist promises of decoupling. Sufficiency-orientation thus becomes a political 
and cultural imperative if an ecological Armageddon is to be averted and the integrity of the social 
bond preserved/restored. The implications of sufficiency may imply pursing short-term recovery 
growth in the south and degrowth in the north, following a ‘contraction and convergence’-type of 
geo-economic arrangement (Global Commons Institute, 1996), or giving up on the ideology of 
development altogether and seek for new models of collective human realization (Gudynas & Acosta, 
2011b; Wolfgang. Sachs, 2010).  Self-made and/or self-controllable ‘convival technologies’ (Adloff & 
Leggewie, 2014; Illich, 1973) are welcome as easing the path towards a modern form of subsistence. 
Property-regimes are loosened and private property largely substituted by public goods and re-
commonalization. The economy is redefined to cater for a healthy reproduction of society and nature 
(Biesecker & Hofmeister, 2014).  
 
B. Understanding of ‘reality’ 
 
Besides the competing understandings of modernity, another pervasive cleavage in the GT debate 
pertains the ontological status of reality: according to Foucault, reality is defined as the result of the 
balance of power amongst diverse “regimes of truth”, which are, in turn, sustained through discursive 
formations, i.e. discursive groupings that follow historically institutionalized sets of rules for discourse 
production (Keller, 2012). A clear distinction can be drawn here between two discursive formations I 
will call ‘pragmatic-realists’ and ‘eco-realists’. For the system-conservative postures, ‘reality’ – as defined by 
the current socio-cultural and political status quo. Progress towards socio-ecological goals are 
correspondingly measured against the benchmark of the current situation. Eco-realists, in turn, would 
measure success against the benchmark of scientifically-supported ecological imperatives. 
While conceptions of hard ecological limits strongly influenced discourses in the 1970s, the pragmatist 
approach has characterized the most influential voices in Western sustainability debate since the 1980s 
(Gómez-Baggethun & Naredo, 2015). Pivotal in the rise of environmental pragmatism as a dominant 
frame was the Brundtland-Report of 1987. Aguilar et al.’s (2015) analysis of the rhetorical resources 
of the Brundtland report unveils the mechanisms of discursive closure operating at the foundations 
of the eco-modernist worldview underpinning the ‘sustainable development consensus’. Such closure 
is largely attained through rhetorically tools configuring a matrix of cognitive ‘evidences’ whose 
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performative effect is to close down alternative understandings of key structuring concepts in the 
discursive domain. The most recurrent linguistic dispositif of the Brundtland-authors to this effect is 
the introduction of ‘preconstituted’ statements; conceptual constructs that are treated as ‘objects’ 
whose unicity and stability is not articulated within the text’s argument, but rather appears as given 
beforehand, with a reality-constitutive effect: ‘development’, ‘poverty’, ‘ecological problems’, etc. thus 
come already gift-wrapped into the discourse. This elicits an ideological effect, insofar they reclaim 
acknowledgement as if they were transparent, self-evident phenomena, thereby “annihilating other 
temporalities, other memoirs, other contributions to the construction of inter-human relationships 
and of other forms of relating to time and space” (Aguilar et al., 2015, p. 105). Poverty is not only 
naturalized, but also blamed as a source of pollution, thus effectively sidelining conceptions which had 
until then blamed opulence for the same problem. Discursive diversity is demonized as a divisive form 
of ‘politics of suspicion’. Instead, there stands the “world-community” heroically confronting the 
challenges facing ‚humanity’, an undifferentiated ‘we’  featuring only one tension or antagonism: that 
between present and future generations (Brand, 2014d, p. 255). The ontological elimination of 
alternatives reported by Alguilar et al. powerfully stretches into the Green Economy documents in 
our sample, particularly those by the OECD and UNEP, who deliberately produce alternative political 
views as non-existent. This is rendered particularly visible when contrasted with the competing 
narratives in the rest of the documents in Sample 1. Even Fücks – while fully aligned with UNEP and 
OECD GE narrative – feels compelled to make his critique of growth critics an integral and explicit 
part of his argument, thereby lending them ontological entity.   
At the opposite corner of pragmatics stand ‘eco-realists’, who derive their sense of reality not from 
the prevailing socio-cultural, economic, and political configurations, but from the knowledge of bio-
physical system-boundaries for the reproduction of life on the planet. Changing society accordingly 
thus becomes not a ‘political project’, but a factual imperative commanding adaptation (Miegel, 2010, 
p. 163). So while eco-realists may see themselves as ‘pioneers of the a new system’, or ‘concrete-utopists’ 
(Bloch, 1995; Wright, 2013), pragmatic realists rather see them as a “drop of water on a hot stone”. 
Decisive is not whether ecological constraints are acknowledged or not, but what defines the scope of 
possibility (i.e. what is deemed ‘realistic’ or feasible) for the ‘steering of social evolution’: For pragmatists, 
the challenge of sustainability may well be historically unprecedented, but modern civilization is ‘too 
big to fail’, and has proven its adaptability and capacity to re-invent itself time and again. The future 
becomes determined by the past and present. Eco-realists, in turn, tend to emphasize the radical 
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novelty of current historical challenges and the experimentalist path into the future, which is portrayed 
as a terra incognita, rather than an extrapolation of the present and past into the future128.  
 
C. Understanding of ‘the good life’: Normative assessment of the respective understandings of 
modernity and reality 
A shared worldview (i.e. a common understanding of modernity or of reality) does not necessarily 
imply a shared normative assessment of the world. Miegel (2010, p. 14), for example, blamed scientists 
for conveyed their findings with a negative connotation, “portraying sufficiency as a burden and excess 
as a virtue”. Indeed, the storyline of conservative contraction understands modernity as expansive, yet 
argues for ‘muzzling’ it based on ecological concerns. At the same time, it welcomes the opportunity 
the exhaustion of currently hegemonic wasteful (progressive critics would add: exploitative) ways of 
life presents for a society-wide restoration of traditional values such as a stronger family-bonds and 
clan-solidarity. However, insofar the conservative argument grows out of the push of moral duty 
rather than out of the pull of historical promise, the case can be made that green (or eco-)modernists 
and conservatives share both a common understanding of modernity and of the good life, though not 
the same parameters for defining ‘realism’. Unsurprisingly then, does Fücks lament the “pessimism of 
growth-critics”, from whom one would get the sense that “Europe has left her greatest times behind” 
(2013, p. 29). Yet emancipatory critics of growth and consumerism have a much more cheerful image 
of themselves: instead of the ‘freedom to consume’, they yearn for the ‘right to sufficiency’, and decry 
the world’s “fatigue with the clutter and waste” of hegemonic Western lifestyles as the burden. Hence, 
they see no contradiction in the idea of “enjoyable limits”, and see a hopeful path forward – especially 
for the excluded and the victims of “imperial ways of life” of the global consumer class – in “a sort of 
synthesis of traditions that have been lost and a modernity to which they have been denied access” 
(Latouche, 2009, p. 62). The same prescriptions for or visions of the future are seen as optimistic, 
desirable, a worth-striving-for utopia by the one camp; and as dystopian, pessimistic, and undesirable 
by the other. This evidence allows to conclude that, while the Conservative Contraction (CC) and the 
emancipatory Green Society (GS) storylines uphold different ideals of the good life (which find some 
overlap in their convergent emphasis on material frugality and greater social importance awarded to 
                                                 
128 Critical voices in the 1970s debate on limits to growth rejected mechanistic extrapolations of the 
present into the future as “anti-scientific”, as they disregarded “possible qualitative changes in the 
global context, as well as potentially revolutionary changes in production patterns to meet social needs 
and in the technologies to achieve such changes (Varsavsky, 1974, p. 36) 
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Tim Krasner’s “intrinsic values”), they share a notion of ‘realism’ as defined by an ecological bottom-
line. 
Noteworthy is also the asymmetry observable in the ascriptions of meaning to the respective 
counterpart in the dispute: while conservationist discourses centered on the preservation of ‘pristine’ 
natural landscapes, for example, have indeed historically often exhibited an anti-modernist rhetoric, 
sufficiency-based conceptions of the good life in the GT debate (as per the discursive samples 
analyzed) tend to emphasize a natural synergy or complementarity with  efficiency- and consistency-
based strategies and technological progress (Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014, p. 20). Indeed, sufficiency 
is even predicated as a precondition for the modernist values of efficiency: without a sufficiency-
orientation, efficiency gains are lost to consumerism (Acosta, 2015a, pp. 150–155). In his 
comprehensive volume about sufficiency, Oliver Stengel (2011, pp. 348–349) showcases the fallacy of 
opposing modernization and sufficiency through the example of the popular TV show Star Trek: a 
futuristic vision combining sufficient ways of life with high technological development. Eco-
modernist GE-advocates, on the other hand, tend to frame sufficiency and efficiency as mutually 
exclusive political options (Fücks, 2013, p. 154).   
 
Frames per storylines: what can be learned from frame-analysis?  
 
This section aims at matching the interpretative schemes presented above with the four storylines 
synthesized in Section 3.3.2, which make up our central unit of discourse analysis. Figure 6 below help 
categorize the four typified storylines in terms of the frames they transport. The differing conceptions 
of reality and of modernity – with their respectively implied (though often unarticulated) ontological, 
epistemological, anthropological, and moral and political assumptions – make up a first double-axis, 
which is descriptive. The second axis is a normative one: as we saw, these alternative conceptions of the 
world can be framed in a positive or in a negative light, according to narratively explicit or implicit 
conceptions of the good life.  
 
Figure 6: Categorization of the four typified narratives in terms of their framing-structure.  
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Figure 6 gives direct visual access to how the four storylines play out in terms of (non-)allegiances 
with one another, and in which regard. In terms of shared frames and value-attributions, GE and GS 
have little in common, except that both portray their respective visions as something worth striving 
for; that is: as pathways toward a good life. P2P joins into this optimism, while its co-evolutional view 
of history bridges both antagonistically defined understandings of reality: a non-expansive modernity, 
based on localized modern subsistence-production and global knowledge production, is seen as 
achievable (even as already underway) from a pragmatic viewpoint. Conservatives in the GT debate share 
the expansionist understanding of modernity of their liberal counterparts advocating a Green 
Economy, and the implicit utilitarian and individualistic assumptions. Yet in light of the impending 
global ecological catastrophe, they envision not hopeful but dire consequences as a result of this 
cultural setting, and in consequence advocate a ‘damming of modernity’ through wholesale cultural 
change, a withdrawal of welfare state provisions in favor of a retreat into the security of small-world 
solidarity networks, a greater responsibility and inventiveness o individuals to take care of themselves 
and of their kindred ones. Like other influential conservative frames in the contemporary world 
(‘TINA/ there is no alternative’, ‘austerity’ politics, etc.), the CC-narrative is not driven by the hope 
of a promise, but by fear (H. Rosa, 2010): the fear of socio-ecological demise if things do not change 
fundamentally. Interestingly thus, as a consequence, while CC largely shares the same interpretative 
templates with GE, at the same time they partly feather the nest of sufficiency-advocates and growth-
critics in the GS-camp, with whom they share the bottomline-conception of ecological boundaries as 
defining reality, although the dark, dystopian, resigned note of CC does not resonate with the spirit of 
‘enjoyable limits’ (Schneidewind et al., 2013) of GS.  
The P2P-storyline, in turn, rather shares the emancipatory worldview of the Green Society, but argues 
from a materialistic-dialectical perspective rather than in a rights-based, normative, political language. 
A contest over the definition of reality (and therefore, over the scope of the possible) thus becomes 
unnecessary, because developments extrapolated from the present into the future are convergent with 
the normative pathways one could back-cast from science-based ecological imperatives and social 
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utopias. Like GS-advocates, P2P enthusiasts see modernity as a socio-technical and cultural 
configuration that can (and will) evolve beyond its expansionist phase towards one of balance between 
global and local, between market and self-provision, between material and immaterial forms of wealth. 
Emancipatory agency is still required to reaffirm and further develop that pathway, but the capitalist 
society is taking care of this herself, unaware that it is undermining its own systemic foundations, or 
else uncappable – maybe also unwilling, insofar the decisions of individual investors and consumers 
are not driven by systemic motives - of stopping it, engaging in a suicidal competition in productivity-
enhancing technological development that is, paradoxically, threatening the logic of private property 
itself, in a sort of ironic inversion of the “tragedy of the commons”. A relational and embedded 
understanding of individuals is thus a key means towards a ‘Great Transformation’ (as stressed in GS), 
as well as an outcome of it (as stressed in P2P). 
For all their differences, GE and GS do share a luminous view of the future - provided their respective 
prescriptions are followed -, as is also the case with P2P. A glim shadow is projected only from the 
side of CC, which, no matter what, foresees a future of diminished capabilities for ‘humanity’, because 
of the chastity belt it has earned through its historical excesses.   
In conclusion: While the Green Economy (GE) and the Green Society (GS) narratives are rather 
irreconcilable in terms of their diametrically opposing deeply entrenched discourse-structuring 
assumptions regarding the conceptualization of modernity and their perception of reality, the storylines 
of Conservative Contraction (CC) and P2P Society lay bridges between some of these opposing assumptions 
among the two major contenders: P2P is pragmatic like GE – it’s view of a transformation departs 
from what is, not what should be – yet challenges its expansive view of modernity, where it rather aligns 
with GS: current socio-technical developments set guardrails that will lead historical trajectories 
towards post-mass-production industrialism and post-capitalism. Unlike GS, however, this is not a 
matter of overthrowing an all-mighty economic system by harnessing social and political forces against 
it, but rather of picking the right ‘historical wave’ to ride. CC, in turn, shares a common worldview 
with GE in terms of anthropological, ontological, and epistemological, and political-philosophical 
assumptions, but aligns with GS in the need to fundamentally shift the evolutionary course of Western 
modern societies in the face of the current systemic overshot planetary boundaries. Finally, GE, GS, 
and P2P offer the pull of the promise of an optimistic vision of the future, while CC bases its discursive 
force on the push of a menace. Figure 7 below summarizes this visually. 
 
Figure 7: GT-frames and brokering narratives 
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3.4. Integral Analysis: Structuring the discursive field of the GT debate 
 
Revisiting the goals proposed at the beginning of this chapter, we sought to answer the central 
question about in what ways ideational elements can enable transformative agency to drive a GT 
forward. To answer this question, this chapter engaged in two main tasks: a) identifying and structuring 
the ideational (i.e. discursive-representational) components of the GT debate (key themes, narratives, 
frames), and b) assessing their actual and potential articulations alongside a triadic model pinpointing 
unitive, divisive, and bridging elements, whereby the latter present themselves as ideational enablers 
for agency to draw on for advancing transformative learning. 
 
While the concluding section for each of the sub-steps of analysis already advanced the task of 
factoring upcoming findings into an evolving picture, this last section of the chapter seeks to draw 
overarching conclusions, integrating all of the sub-steps into a final picture of what, in Chapter 1, 
following Keller, we called interpretive repertoire of the GT-field of discourse. 
 
3.4.1. Analysis of shared interpretive repertoires 
 
Through a summary-juxtaposition of the sub-steps of discursive analysis, Table 5 below provides the 
input for their interpretative triangulation towards an integral analysis of the GT-discursive field: 
   
Table 5: Summary view of sub-steps of fine-tuned analysis of the GT Debate per storyline 
 
 Narrative markers Rhetorical 
markers 
Phenomenal-structural markers Frames 
GREEN 
ECONOMY 
Cause: capital misallocation ‘market (and state) 
failure’ 
- Addresses only supply-side of the 
economy 
Realist-pragmatic 
(utopian) 
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(GE) Goal: Green Economy 
(resource-light, de-
carbonized, steadily 
expansive) 
‘Green Konradtiev’ - growth as technical imperative, 
culturally consubstantial, and 
ecologically compatible 
- Commodification of material and 
immaterial (IPRs) resources 
- Cultural change not object but 
outcome of the transformation 
- (re-)localization culturally undesirable 
(contra cosmopolitanism) and 
unrealistic. Methodological nationalism 
& international competition. 
- Back-to-full-employment and labor-
productivity increase through structural 
boost of ‘green jobs’ 
- Compensatory redistribution to 
‘losers’ of transformation 
- Improved political (representative) 
democracy through enlarged 
participation 
 
 
 
 
Expansive modernity 
(utilitarian homo 
economicus, 
individualistic negative 
freedom, three pillars 
of sustainability) 
 
Strategy:  growth, Green 
tech, Green regulation & 
infrastructure 
“off towards new 
shores” 
“flight forward” 
Agents: green (Keynesian) 
state; 
Green business & 
enlightened consumers 
‘Green New Deal’ 
‘buy to save the 
world’ 
 
Anti-subjects: sufficiency-
advocates, growth-critics 
“dangerous 
distraction” 
“ideological 
groundless 
revolutionaries” 
“drop of water on a 
hot stone” 
“modern-day 
luddites” 
“enemies of 
modernity” 
 “tyranny of virtue” 
Obstacles: Brown-economy 
veto-players 
‘brown lobby’; 
‘climate skepticism’ 
Beneficiaries: “humanity”, 
‘developing’ countries, urban 
dwellers, green industry 
workers 
 
“right to 
development” 
“right to 
consumption”  
GREEN SOCIETY 
(GS) 
Cause: Multiple  interlinked 
crisis/ civilizational crisis 
“living beyond the 
means of others” 
- Emphasis on demand-side of the 
economy: sufficiency desirable, feasible 
(advantageous),   
- Growth as technical imperative, but 
cultural and ecological problem 
- Degrowth vs a-growth 
- Growth withdrawal as a northern or 
global program 
Eco-realist (utopian) 
 
Balancing (reductive) 
modernity /plural 
modernities 
(relational homo solidaris, 
economy ecologically 
and social embedded, 
positive freedom) 
Goal: Green Society (“right 
measure for time, space, 
property, and market”) 
“enjoyable limits” 
Strategy: Macro-economic 
and institutional re-design 
away from growth-
imperative (framing), 
orienting towards sufficiency, 
and shaping concrete options 
“meaking it easier 
to live the good life” 
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Agents: ‘Enabling state’ 
nurturing change agents/ 
pioneers in civil society & 
science 
 
 
“seeds of the 
transformation” 
“militant optimism” 
- (Partial) decommodification of 
material and immaterial resources 
- collective-political cultural change as 
object and outcome of the 
transformation of material structures 
- Bio-regionalism: (re-)localization (at 
least of subsistence-critical activities) 
desirable/ vital for cultural (preserve 
ecology of cultures), ecological (reduce 
pollution from trade), and subsistence-
security reasons 
- Redistribution of available paid-work: 
holistic labor policy (supporting care, 
self-provisioning, and civic 
engagement), balance productive and 
reproductive work 
- Transformative material 
redistribution as a remedy to 
consumerism (trumping positional 
consumption, increasing social 
harmony, etc.). Also of land, non-
renewable resources, intangibles (time, 
soc. Recognition). Redistribution btw.: 
a) north and south (e.g. ecological 
debt) 
b) public-private domain 
c) capital and (re)productive activities  
- High-intensity democracy in political, 
economic, cultural life; and in science. 
 
 
Obstacles: socio-economic & 
cultural path-dependencies 
(+ green economy 
advocates) 
 
“delusion of growth” 
(Wachstumswahn) 
“rebound effect” 
“myth of 
decoupling” 
“myopic choice” 
Beneficiaries: Present & 
future generations 
Urban and rural residents 
Exploited of the world 
(south, nature, women) 
 
“Right to 
sufficiency” (v. 
Winterfeld) 
“tyranny of 
majorities” 
CONSERVATIVE 
CONTRACTION 
(CC) 
Cause: Consumerism and 
State expenditure 
“Living beyond our 
means” 
- Emphasizes the supply-side of the 
economy 
- Growth ecologically incompatible 
overdetermining other dimensions. 
- Individual moral and cultural change 
as central object of transformation: 
asceticism and clan-solidarity (moral 
appeal) as a remedy to consumerism 
- (re-)localization as ecological 
imperative 
- Work-life split between gainful 
employment, self-employment, 
subsistence, and care. 
Eco-realist (dystopian) 
 
‘Dammed’ modernity 
(roll-back) 
(homo economicus + clan-
solidarity, ecological 
hetero-determination, 
economy ecologically 
and social embedded) 
 
Goal: Roll-back 
consumerism and economic 
expansionism 
“fair administration 
of scarcity” 
Strategy: Retreat of the state 
and strengthening of 
communal and family-bonds 
and traditional cultural 
values. Self-reliance / 
asceticism 
 
Agents: Entrepreneurial and 
enlightened consumers and 
politicians 
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Obstacles: Welfare-state 
inertias, trade unions, 
consumer culture, financial 
speculation 
“artificial paradise 
of abundance” 
 
Beneficiaries: Humanity, 
future generations 
 
P2P SOCIETY 
(P2P) 
Cause: Artificial scarcity 
creation & externalization 
through capitalist 
commodification 
 - Dissolves the boundary btw supply 
and demand: prosumer economy   
- Growth rendered irrelevant ( a-
growth) 
- Decommodification of material and 
immaterial resources (starting with 
knowledge) 
- Culture changes in co-evolutionary 
fashion with socio-technical systems 
- Glocalism: globalization of design 
with (re-)localization of 
(micro)factories 
- experimental combinations of 
democratic, hierarchical, and polyarchic 
(i.e. peer governance) forms of 
operational and political organization 
 
Pragmatic-realist 
(utopian) 
 
Reductive/ plural 
modernities 
 
(relational homo solidaris, 
economy embedded in 
socio-technical 
infrastructures,  
positive freedom) 
 
Goal: Glocal P2P-
collaborative and commons-
based society 
“collaborative age” 
“eclipse of 
capitalism” 
Strategy: IoT infrastructure, 
P2P value-creation, 
‘economies of scope’. market 
embedded in the 
collaborative commons 
 
Agents: P2P networks of 
prosumers -entrepreneurs 
Partner state 
 
Obstacles: IPR regimes / 
capitalist capture of 
collaborative value-creation 
 
Beneficiaries: “Humanity” 
Present and future 
generations  
Commoners & prosumers 
 
 
Phenomenal structure analysis gave us insights into the structure of sub-discourses around axial 
themes within the GT-debate. Central categories and cleavages within and across the sub-discourses 
were identified, including which axial themes – through their very phenomenal constitution – 
constitute a ‘watershed’ in the GT debate (GDP growth, sufficiency, re-localization), and which can 
serve as ‘floating signifiers’ (democratization, cultural change, restructuration of work, etc.). Also, 
broad arenas of convergence across the debate were identified, helping establish the bottom-line in 
the GT discussion as distinct from that of mainstream sustainable development. 
Narrative analysis organized the discursive elements identified above in typified, coherent storylines 
(GE, GS, CC, and P2P), each with their own account of causes of the multiple crisis, vision of and 
strategies for the transformation, contextual windows of opportunity identified, envisaged change 
agents, obstacles and beneficiaries. Furthermore, since narratives/storylines are the main discursive 
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vehicle for meaning-making and meaning-transportation, and since they can be empirically linked 
more directly to discursive agents, they were deemed our main structuring-unit of discursive analysis.  
Frame analysis revealed fundamental divisions and bridges among the typified storylines regarding 
their respective conceptions of modernity (with corresponding ontological, anthropological, 
epistemological, and causal assumptions; as well as in moral and political-philosophical assumptions), 
in conceptions of reality (political-pragmatic vs. eco-realists, including controversial technical matters), and 
in disputed conceptions of the good life (normative values and preferences). 
These three sub-steps of analysis provided us with diverse analytical tools to try and understand the 
main cleavages in the GT debate, and how they have been or could be bridged. Tensions and affinities 
are observable in diverse of these discursive elements distilled through fine-tuned analysis, which we 
will seek to visualize more clearly through recapitulation and articulation of the partial findings.  
What unites 
 
Consensual discursive markers in the GT debate are, on the ecological front: the ubiquitous language of 
crisis, the reinsertion of the 1970s concept of ecological limits into the discursive landscape (now re-
packaged as ‘planetary boundaries’, and the corresponding emphases on systemic interdependencies 
and dynamics), as well as the radically altered biophysical state of the Earth (Anthropocene). On the 
socio-cultural front: the importance of a systemic outlook, social innovation, multi-level spatiality and 
temporalities, and going beyond incrementalism in approaching social change. Furthermore, the 
concept of Anthropocene implies the likelihood of sudden and abrupt alterations in the dynamics of 
the Earth-system that cannot be foreseen or dealt with effectively by human agents –, and that this 
radical uncertainty must be taken into account in sustainability governance129. This level of discursive consensus 
is epitomized by the WBGU-report “Social contract for a Great Transformation”. 
With regard to the big open question of ‘what transformation?’, our analysis of phenomenal structures 
revealed that the discursive connotation of a ‘Great Transformation’ in the German debate – to a large 
extent – is one of re-politization of the dominant socio-economic and cultural matrix of the West (the object of 
re-politization varies from neoliberal capitalism to industrialism and the philosophical foundations of 
the modern project), particularly with regard to a redefinition of the society-environment equation, in 
a way that harmonizes (global) ecological interdependences and socio-historical diversity. 
                                                 
129 Workshop lecture by Bruno Latour: http://bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/downloads/00-
BREAKTHROUGH-06-15_0.pdf; accessed 2. June 2017 
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Furthermore, the debate is transversed by a sense of historical window of opportunity presented by 
forthcoming (or already unfolding) socio-technical (Big Data, Artificial Intelligence, Smart Factory, 
Internet of Things) developments with a disruptive effect on the material base of Western-style social 
organization, in particular the modern capitalist institution of waged labor. 
These findings summarize the discursive repertoire which agents can resort to, for example, when 
consensus needs to be reaffirmed, incompatibilities need to be pointed out, or systemic implications 
problematized. This common ground also serves as resonance board for more nuanced discursive 
affinities to progressively expand the discursive space of debate, making it possible to address topics 
which would have been unavailable otherwise. So, for example, the consensual ecological argument 
of ‘living beyond our means’ can be expanded into the social justice argument of ‘living beyond the 
means of others’. (Lessenich, 2016) 
What divides 
 
The three sub-steps of our analysis delivered distinct insights into the cleavages in the GT debate, 
which can be combined for a kaleidoscopic access to the whole field of discourse. 
  
The analysis of phenomenal structures revealed that not all of the axial themes of the GT debate are 
equally controversial (better: not all prompt the type of controversy that goes virtually unmitigated). 
The starkest cleavages are built around three axial themes: the discussions around GDP growth as goal 
of the political economy; around sufficiency as a possible substitute for this orientation of the political 
economy, and re-localization as reconstruction of the socio-territorial embeddedness of the economy. 
These three axial themes can be regarded as clear watersheds in the GT debate. Phenomenal structure 
analysis further showed that the meaning-structure of the axial themes commons, cultural change, 
democratization, and redistribution are relatively more elastic (‘floating signifiers’), and allow for narrative 
variations. Lastly, and while still controversial in terms of the ‘how’ question, the axial theme work-
restructuration offers the most promising platform for a fertile engagement of all parties in the 
discussion. Hardly a surprise, then, that it is in this sub-discourse were policy-proposals are incipiently 
emerging; examples are proposals around a substantial reduction in working hours, an unconditional 
subsistence-insurance (Universal Basic Income), or else an enlargement of self-provision capabilities 
through the building up or strengthening of social and economic infrastructures fostering solidarity 
and collaborative production. 
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Phenomenal structure analysis and frame analysis combined produced a comprehensive yet synthetic 
picture of the types of cleavages traversing the debate across the axial themes:  
 
1) Disputed signifiers, where cleavages can be structured around the axis of diverse understandings 
of modernity – expansive, reductive/balancing, and plural. Each of these implies different and 
often contrasting assumptions about the world: ontological (the nature/society equation and 
the status of ‘ecological limits’); epistemological (the conception of reason, positivist vs. 
constructivist epistemologies, and the status of scientific knowledge vis-à-vis other forms of 
knowledge); anthropological (homo economicus vs. anthropologies emphasizing empathy, 
solidarity, and the celebrative aspect of life); moral and political (status of property, 
management of risk, style of governance, ideological elaborations of the idea of development, 
etc.). 
 
2) Discrepant notions of reality or realism (i.e. what is considered feasible), pitting eco-realists 
against pragmatic realists: while the former departs from ecological boundaries as bottom-line 
for the design of social-transformative interventions, the latter depart from the status quo as 
boundary of the possible. This cleavage is rooted, among other things, in controversial assessment 
of technical matters, particularly the possibility of decoupling continued economic growth from the 
degradation of ecosystems and the unsustainable exploitation of non-renewable natural 
resources (decoupling hypothesis), and other issues such as the resilience or adaptability of 
current macro-economic structures, including a monetary system based on fiat-money 
(Ludewig, 2017; Peukert, 2017; Richters & Siemoneit, 2017). 
 
3) Discrepant conceptions of the good life, and hence contrasting value-attributions to the same object 
of discussion (e.g. sufficiency as curtailment vs. sufficiency as freedom) 
 
 
The cleavages identified above are interwoven with diversely combined and emphasized axial themes 
in narrative structures, which we disclosed through the model of Actantial analysis (Greimas). The 
reconstructed narratives were further condensed into ideal-typical structures which, for shorthand, we 
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called storylines: Green Economy (GE), Green Society (GS), Conservative Contraction (CC), and P2P-
society (P2P). Cleavages here were reconstructed alongside the following set of narrative categories: 
 
Diagnosis: the four storylines present diverse diagnoses regarding the span and scope of the multiple 
crisis. The key divisive question is whether we are facing a crisis of the current functioning of 
established social structures of Euro-Atlantic modernity (neoliberal mode of regulation) (GE), or 
rather a crisis of the structures themselves. Euro-Atlantic modernity is variably problematized by the 
three latter storylines in terms of its accumulation regime (capitalism) (most of GS, except the new 
social contract strand130, P2P); its (re)production-system (industrialism and the concomitant crisis of 
socio-natural reproduction) (most of GS, except the new social contract and solidarity-based modernity 
strands), or its cultural matrix (individualism, utilitarianism, anthropocentrism, patriarchy, etc.) (partly 
CC, all of GS)  
 
Goal/ vision: Corresponding to the diverse diagnoses, the key cleavage here is about the logic of the 
‘Great Transformation’: is the utilitarian, expansionist logic of the dominant vision of an ‘expansive 
modernity’ to be fundamentally challenged (GS, P2P), tamed (CC), or rather harnessed toward the 
goal of a transformation (GE)?  
 
Opportunities/ strategies: According to the diagnoses and visions, the axial themes are variably combined 
and assessed, outlining a course of action. As we learned from phenomenal structure analysis, there is 
a widely-shared assessment of an inevitable fundamental alteration in the material base of society 
across the discursive field, yet disputed assessment of technical matters (decoupling hypothesis) and 
envisaged trends (industry 4.0 versus Third Industrial Revolution of P2P) give place to 
correspondingly diverse prescriptions. In a nutshell, GE seeks to correct capital misallocations 
through state-investment, regulation and appropriate incentive-settings to private economic actors; 
while GS sees the need to create infrastructures facilitating the mainstreaming of cultural preferences 
towards sufficiency-based ideals of the good life. CC hopes to mainstream sufficiency through moral 
appeals to self-restraint, and P2P envisages a technologically enabled shift in the communications- and 
energy-matrix away from the social order emerged as a result of the first and second industrial 
                                                 
130 A comparison of the various strands within the GS narrative can be found in Table 3, section 3.3.2 
of this chapter 
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revolutions, to one characterized by P2P collaborative production and horizontal rather than vertical 
integration of economic activity.  
 
Agency: political (GS) versus techno-managerial steering (GE, CC) of a transformation as central 
cleavage. The co-evolutionary narrative of P2P society clearly emerges as mediating between the two. 
 
Opponents: Two broad answers are observable to the question of what/ who is hindering transformative 
progress:  one blames the vested interests in the status quo, building an ‘us against them’ narrative (be 
it ‘the people’ or any specific social group against the ‘evil elites’, as in the most combative strands of 
GS; or ‘humanity’, as an undifferentiated subject, against the impersonal forces of the status quo, as 
in GE or CC); the other frames obstacles as structural (economic path-dependencies, cultural inertias, 
socio-economic inequality structures) (P2P and most of GS). Here solutions are correspondingly de-
personalized and indirect: structural transformations are pre-condition for effective policy-
interventions or individual lifestyle-choices to become available in the first place. 
   
Beneficiaries: Here also two broad narrative constructions of who is to benefit from the transformation 
are observed: one portrays a sociologically empty blanket-concept of ‘humanity’ as beneficiary, thus 
rendering any conflict-lines invisible and assuming that ‘we are all on the same boat’, and therefore 
‘we are all pushing in the same direction’ (GE, CC). The other narrative challenges this hypothesis of 
automatic convergence, acknowledging the structural divisions emerging from the analytically stronger 
concept of ‘imperial ways of life’ pitting the global consumer class against the exploited workers, 
peasants, and indigenous groups in the global south. The inherent non-generalizability of the ‘imperial 
way of life’ implies that, if unchallenged, the human species as a whole is set on a course towards self-
damnation.  
 
At the basis of diverse assessment (regarding causes of the crisis, agency, opponents) and prescriptions 
are discrepant theories of social change. GE and CC adhere to the basic tenets of behaviorist and 
rational-choice economic theories (‘we make society’), while GS and P2P draw on structural-
constructivist and practice-based accounts of social change (‘society makes us’) (Shove, 2010a).   
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What bridges 
 
Understanding actual and potential bridging elements in the GT debate is the key to understanding its 
emergence in the German sub-political sphere at the dawn of the 2010s, as well as promising avenues 
for transformative collective learning. Because of their more direct connection to agency, we seek to 
structure our findings about meaning-bridging elements as a function of our typified narratives or 
storylines. The question we seek to answer here is “which narratives offer bridging elements for which type of 
cleavages?”  
A general insight into this question was anticipated in our conclusion to frame analysis: While GE 
conveys a pragmatist-realistic frame combined with an expansive understanding of modernity, and is 
thus diametrically opposed to GS, which rests on eco-realist and alternative-modernity frames, P2P 
and CC mediate between the two by recombining the framings: P2P combines pragmatism with an 
alternative understanding of modernity; while CC, in turn, combines eco-realism and the mainstream 
expansive conception of modernity. Hence, at this level of basic assumptions about the world, the P2P 
and CC storylines can actually bridge incompatible meaning structures between GS and GE. 
Yet beyond this rather abstract insight – if the guiding question posed above is to generate answers 
with real interpretative power – it needs to generate insights into which particular aspects in each typified 
narrative allows to bridge which types of cleavages in the debate. Bridging-elements articulate cleaving-
elements alongside the categories identified during the sub-steps of our fine-tuned analysis: a) disputed 
assumptions and values implicit in clashing conceptions of modernity, b) disputed assessment of 
technical matters, c) opposing governance styles; as well as d) different conceptions of reality 
traversing all these categories. As determined above, most of these cleavages cluster around (or else 
relate to) the axial themes GDP growth, sufficiency, and (re)localization. 
The eco-modernist Green Economy being the dominant narrative both in the German and in the 
international sustainable development debate (cf. introductory chapter), our main interest is showing 
how meaning-articulations (and potential fertilizations) are established – or could be established, 
depending on how discursive agents make use of the opportunities allowed by meaning-structures – 
with the two contending narratives of Green Society and Conservative Contraction. The P2P-society narrative, 
in turn, has not appeared in our analysis as an antagonistic one; probably due to its lack of anchorage 
in the field of political discourse and to the ‘detachment’ conveyed by its co-evolutionary plot. It rather 
appears as a neat bridge-builder by presenting a pragmatic prospect of radical change in the material 
foundations of the current social order.   
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I will use a metaphorical visual representation of docking puzzle pieces to display the various elements 
performing a bridging-function among contending socio-political narratives. In so doing, I will 
simultaneously seek to reconnect the level of general conclusions with the level of data. Puzzle pieces 
symbolize the ‘elastic’ nature of meaning: indeed, the plug of one piece stretches into the socket of 
the other, thereby blurring the assumed-to-be-straight, linear boundary between meanings. In his 
seminal work about political utopias, The Principle of Hope (1995), Ernst Bloch uses the concept of 
“surplus of meaning” (Deutungsüberschuss) to explain how meaning can be freed from tight discursive 
grips by tapping into a ‘reserve’ that any unit of meaning contains in a given discursive context. This 
“surplus meaning” thus creates re-combination and re-signification potentials that can be drawn upon 
by discursive agents in meaning-making activities. Figure 8 shows some exemplary discursive elements 
by means of which GS (in reddish color) bridges – or could be strategically harnessed to bridge – the 
contending narratives of GE (green) and CC (yellow). The first three rows refer to cleavages around 
cultural values and the remaining ones cover differing notions of reality and technical controversies. 
The dichotomy between a supreme freedom understood as dis-embeddedness from any type of 
external constraint (GE) and a 
heteronomy derived from conditions of 
global ecological emergency (CC) are 
articulated in GS through the idea of 
interdependence, and a positive 
reframing of freedom (‘freedom for’ 
instead of ‘freedom from’). 
Floating signifiers associated with 
modernity such as ‘progress’ or 
‘prosperity’ are deployed in GS to 
challenge the dichotomy expansion vs. 
contraction emerging from a linear 
understanding of modernity shared by 
GE and CC: prosperity is conceivable 
without economic growth; and ecological 
or social limits to runaway economic 
expansion need not be experienced as a 
castrating or diminishing corset, as the 
Figure 8: Meanings in GS bridging GE and CC 
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conservative view portrays it, but can be a liberating and harmonizing path towards human realization. 
Ecological demands and social demands (consumers, workers) played against each other (CC) vs 
ecological and social demands portrayed as compatible – even synergetic with the right technical 
management strategy. GS expands the emancipatory claims of GE to marginalized social groups 
(reproductive workers, exploited south, future generations), yet recognizes the need for a steered 
cultural change challenging materialistic expansionist notions of the good life to bring eco- and social 
into compatibility. Similarly, conflictive views of (green) growth seen as compatible with (precondition 
for) sustainability and growth seen as fundamentally incompatible with sustainability can find a fertile 
articulation in the acknowledgement of the ‘growth dilemma’, i.e. the acknowledgement of the growth 
imperative in a growth-based economy with the simultaneous problematization of such economy, that 
nonsensically turns growth from an instrument for the 
achievement of social wellbeing into an 
end in itself, locking the world into an 
unsustainable path. This dilemma can be 
addressed through a deliberately planned 
degrowth program enabling adaptation 
without sacrificing the worst well-off in 
the population, including the use the 
steering-power of cultural agents for both 
deconstructing the illusion that currently 
preferred modes of consumption can be 
made compatible with ecological integrity, 
and for conveying the message that there 
are other ways to a plentiful life.  
 
Figure 9, in turn, shows cleavages 
between GE and GS, featuring opposing 
governance styles and socio-economic 
priorities: the former is framed as a 
cleavage between a techno-managerial 
and market-based coordination (problem-
solving), and a political coordination 
Figure 9: Meanings in P2P bridging GE and 
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(problem-framing). The second one is a cleavage between economic rights and freedoms versus social 
rights and freedoms, and their corresponding prescriptions.  
 
P2P bridges these cleavages by assuming that a fundamental shift in productive infrastructure will 
radically alter both supply and demand patterns. An emerging ‘third industrial-revolution’ 
infrastructure based on the IoT (Rifkin, 2014) would allow to transcend scarcity-based conceptions of 
efficiency and sufficiency through integrating the consumption and production spheres and reducing 
market mediation to its minimum. Furthermore, this would ipso facto rule out the rebound-effect and 
allow for the combination of the advantages of hierarchic, polyarchic, and democratic steering 
mechanisms, while staying clear of their respective disadvantages. 
 
But as our third sample Figure 10 shows, 
cleavages between GE and GS can also be 
mediated by elements from GS itself, in 
particular, by its sufficiency-oriented liberal 
strand (cf. Table 3 in section 3.2.2). This 
particular strand within the GS narrative 
deliberately seeks to build up a 
constructive critique of the hegemonic 
Green Economy discourse: on the one 
hand, it seeks to deconstruct its 
unquestioned assumptions and illuminate 
its blind spots, but, at the same time, to 
show how the baby of the GE-narrative 
does not need to be thrown out with the bathwater (Adrian E. Beling et al., 2018). It does so by 
harnessing the ‘surplus of meaning’ of liberal values as mainstream discourse about modernity131 
(Muraca, 2014; Schmelzer, 2015). The examples in Figure 10 address strong clashes in both narratives 
regarding transformative agents, causes of the crisis (diagnosis), controversial prescriptions, and their 
systemic implications: the cleavage between the ideas of a neutral state vs. a co-opted state (could be 
                                                 
131 The surplus of meaning in ‘modernity’ arises out of the ambiguity of its defining discursive markers. 
See Castoriadis’ reflections about the “imaginary significations of modernity” (1990), and also P. 
Wagner’s “interpretative approach” to modernity (2008). 
Figure 10: GS sufficiency-oriented liberal strand bridging GE 
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generalized to governance agents) finds a fertile articulation in the idea of a state embedded in social 
relations, as it is framed in the critical theories of politics. The competing diagnoses of ‘capital 
misallocation’ (quantitative problem, solvable through regulation) vs. the ‘inherent nature of capitalist 
accumulation’ (qualitative issue) as source of the multiple crisis can be bridged through the concept 
of structural path-dependencies or inertias to be unbuilt through an infrastructure facilitating 
materially sufficient lifestyles; and the rivaling prescriptions of further commodification (‘put a price 
tag’, particularly strong IPRs) vs. decommodification/commons can be reconciled through cultural 
and political debate regarding the “right measure for property and the market”.  Even the often framed 
as competing approaches of reform vs. transformation have a fertile cross-pollination in the idea of 
‘non-reformist reforms' / reforms with an 
inbuilt ‘transformative trojan horse’. 
The last figure in the series (Figure 11) 
portrays CC as bridge between GE and 
GS, breaking down our findings from 
frame analysis into empirically anchored 
meaning-units: the moralist approach of 
conservatives stays relatively close to the 
approach of the enlightened consumer of 
GE, insofar both rely on individual choice 
as the driver of social change. Yet the 
conservative morale has here a materially 
lighter lifestyle as its object, which brings it closer to the GS emphasis on sufficiency, though differing 
with it in the political-structural steering towards it. Similarly, the ‘back-to-full-employment’ argument 
of GE is confronted with a work reduction argument from GS. As mentioned before, work reduction 
is progressively gaining support across the political spectrum as a means to create employment 
opportunities for more people in the face of the persistence of and the anticipated rise in structural 
unemployment resulting from the new wave of industrial automatization (industry 4.0). The emphasis 
in a GS narrative, however, is on the redefinition of power relations between employers and 
employees, and on the increased political and cultural engagement made possible by the freed time of 
former full-time workers. This is at odds with the entrenched meritocratic ethos of the liberal political 
discourse nurturing GE. CC introduces a security argument on the need to extend and strengthen 
family-relationship in the face of shrinking state provisions, which plays into the hands of GS-
Figure 11: Meanings in CC bridging GE and GS 
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advocates. Compensation for less intensive working weeks comes in the form of a longer aggregate 
working life. Similarly, instead of consumption-fueling compensatory transfer payments for the 
disadvantaged of the green transformation, CC aligns with GS to advocate for a revival of solidarity 
bonds. However, while the former restricts solidarity to family or clan-relationships, GS sees the need 
for a politically organized infrastructure enabling wider social solidarity networks.  
 
3.5. Conclusions of the chapter 
 
Drawing on the discursive variability featured in the German GT debate, this chapter has sought to 
analytically lay down ideational “docking points for the politization of an alleged lack of alternatives” 
(U. Brand) that continues to discursively lock the mainstream sustainability debate into empirically ill-
founded premises such as ‘consensual’ stakeholder dialogue, enlightened consumerism, elusive win-
win market solutions, or technological ‘fixes’. Transformative agency can draw on these ideational-
structural windows of opportunity to deploy its creative potential and thereby ‘push’ collective learning 
processes towards a social-ecological transformation. In Chapter 4, these ideational structures are 
brought into dialectical interplay with situational and material ones, yielding a more ‘grounded’ picture 
of enablers and constraints that transformative agents encounter.  
In order to illuminate the agency dimension and possible discourse coalitions in advancing collective 
learning, let us summarize the ideational docking points potentially bridging the diverse discursive 
strands:  
The Conservative Contraction storyline (CC) introduces an eco-realist perspective into the mainstream 
worldview of an expansive modernity, with whom it largely shares ontological, anthropological and 
epistemological assumptions, but opposes some of its core moral and political values and related 
prescriptions. With the GS, in turn, it shares some of the prescriptions and general orientations in 
terms of cultural renewal toward de-materialization and the need to mainstream solidarity in social 
life, though drawing on precautionary arguments rather than on (and often clashing with) 
emancipatory ones. CC also agrees with GS in disputes around controversial technical assessments 
regarding the possibility of coming up with a techno-fix to the ecological predicament.  
The Green Society storyline (GS) deconstructs and therethrough de-naturalizes false absolutes of the 
dominant discourse around modernity embodied in both GE and CC, and challenges both their 
prescriptions. Yet in so doing, GS combines and reconciles opposing elements from the expansive 
hubris of GE and the ascetic ethos of CC, giving way to what could be called an emancipatory vision 
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of social and ecological re-embeddedness of the economy, that is: the joyful, forward-looking 
acceptance of ecological and social constraints to the currently dominant mode of socio-economic 
organization; not as an encroaching corset, as the conservative view portrays it, but as a liberating and 
balancing path towards human realization. Furthermore, within the relatively heterogeneous GS 
narrative, the sufficiency-oriented liberal strand creates bridges between the widely perceived-as-too-radical 
tenets of other GS strands (postdevelopmentalists, eco-feminists, and capitalism-critics), and the 
cultural values of mainstream sustainable development (GE), harnessing the ‘surplus meaning’ of 
dominant discourse about modernity. While ecologically uncompromising and socially emancipatory, 
this approach remains institutionally conservative, as it seeks to transform existing structures that are 
essential to a liberal world-order, rather than dispensing with them altogether (Schmelzer, 2014). 
Ecologically radical liberal sufficiency-advocates thus provide multiple docking points with established 
institutional structures and with widespread cultural values, though largely redesigning material and 
institutional structures and redefining values by tapping into their ‘surplus meaning’. Yet this growth-
critical, liberal strand also creates bridges in the opposite direction, thus also meeting key demands 
from the more radical discourses in the GS-spectrum. It helps bridging the cleavages autonomy vs. 
eco-heteronomy (through the concept of re-embeddedness); freedom vs. critique of consumerism 
(e.g. through ‘right to sufficiency’), the decoupling controversy (even if the decoupling hypothesis 
were technically feasible, the good life necessitates ‘market-freed’ spaces). The one remaining 
unmitigated tension is between political versus techno-managerial steering. But this is where the P2P-
narrative provides bridging elements.  
The P2P-soctiety storyline (P2P) envisages an already unfolding co-evolutionary diversification of 
modern trajectory towards an economy and society based on ‘modern subsistence’. Rather than 
proposing a utopia to be conquered by means of political struggle or by techno-managerial governance 
alone, it makes the pragmatic case of a change in the fundamental material conditions enabling large-
scale societal change in late-modern societies. The P2P-Society (P2P) narrative develops the most 
distinctive plot out of the four typical storylines, insofar it reclaims a descriptive language and therefore 
remains relatively more detached from normative antagonisms. Moreover, P2P narrative avoids many 
of the divisive issues (e.g. growth) by implicitly making them irrelevant. P2P further harnesses the 
hype of technology-centered discourses by awarding the technologically driven shift in socio-technical 
infrastructures center-stage. Even the idea of an ‘eclipse of capitalism’ (Rifkin) sounds harmless when 
compared with inflammatory anti-capitalist rhetoric of the traditional left, yet to identical avail as the 
latter. It shares the eco-social emancipatory concerns of the GS-narrative (though with a lesser 
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emphasis on formal recognition of rights and lesser reliance on state-provision), and the self-
sufficiency drive of the CC-narrative (yet a socially-embedded rather than an individualistic version of 
it), highlighting individual commitment and meritocratic peer-control and supervision. These changes, 
however, require adequate infrastructures as a precondition, which arise in a co-evolutionary fashion, 
meaning that their emergence depends on socio-political and material-technological developments 
shaping each other in the ‘right way’. 
One of the main discursive loci of discursive articulation where the above narratives encounter each 
other – and where the identified synergies can be brought into play – are intervention proposals (mainly 
but not solely state-policies). Let us summarize here some areas of intervention which, based on our 
own analysis and on that of our sampled authors’, hold potential for the above synergies to unfold:  
- Massive public investment in eco-efficiency and renewable energies, redistribution, and 
regulation of financial markets are common demands across the discourse: As mentioned 
before, setting the key issue of growth aside, there is still significant overlap in short-term 
prescriptions of both growth-critics and green Keynesians (Schmelzer & Passadakis, 2011, p. 
45). 
- Short-term green growth, as long as it is invested in creating preconditions for overcoming 
growth-dependency in the longer run. 
- A holistic labor-policy supporting care and family work, voluntary civic engagement, and new 
forms of self-provisioning (Schmelzer & Passadakis, 2011, pp. 80/1-89; Schneidewind & 
Zahrnt, 2014, p. 123) – which would find unprecedented legitimacy in the face of the envisaged 
drastically shrinking global labor market would offer potentially powerful synergies with other 
policy fields across the scope of the GT-axial themes (sufficiency policies; education policy; 
universal basic income decoupling subsistence security from work, redistribution to reduce 
unproductive status competition in consumption, re-localization, etc.) 
- Mainstreaming of the transversal field of time-policy as “political field of the future” 
(Garhammer 1999; Weichert 2011, cited in Reisch & Bietz, 2014, p. 34); e.g. support for less 
speed in everyday life, promoting longer product life (Reisch & Bietz, 2014; Schneidewind & 
Zahrnt, 2014, pp. 30; 53)  
- Deliberate steering away from our “obsession with work” (Latouche, 2009, p. 40)  
Furthermore, interventions alongside ‘unproductive’ policy-areas would be a rendezvous-point for 
moral conservatives, socio-technical co-evolutionary pragmatic-realists, and emancipatory realist-
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utopians: Indeed, rolling-back materialist obsession and consumerism as threats to the social bond, 
mainstreaming the idea of indefinite growth as incompatible with ecological sustainability are shared 
goals. A normative point of convergence could be thus be found around programs providing personal 
resources/ infrastructure for “making the good life easier” (Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014), i.e. 
fostering health, leisure, education, social relations of friendship and respect, etc., restoring a balanced 
relationship between material and non-material aspects of life. 
As stated above, the identification of ideational building-blocks and meaning-bridges served the 
purpose of understanding possible articulations and positive feedback loops reinforcing the dynamics 
of the GT debate at a structural level, regardless of the strategic intentions of the discursive agents 
involved. The variegated interpretative repertoire reconstructed in this chapter, as well as the multiple 
bridging and docking opportunities, and the ‘bounded’ elasticity of meaning structures implying 
discursively laden yet still flexible signifiers (‘surplus meaning’) allow for cross-fertilizing engagement 
amongst discursive agents; that is: they offer structural discursive preconditions for transformative 
learning. Indeed, such ‘ideational infrastructure’ creates multiple opportunities for building plural yet 
strong “transformative identities”, loosening the pressure for identification with mainstream cultural 
values (what in Chapter 1 we termed the dilemma of the “conflicted” or “hetero-determined” subject). 
At the same time, a main marker of this form of “transformative identity” is the subrogation of the 
agency of more or less ‘generalized others’, ranging from the very abstract concepts of ‘nature’ or Gaia 
(as subject) and ‘humanity’ to the more concrete ‘exploited of the South’, women, etc.   
At the level of agency, however, these structural configurations can be understood as windows of 
opportunity to foster new articulations, alliances, and promissory interventions (surely also to prevent 
them). This dimension of agency takes center stage in our analysis in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The “Great Transformation” as a field of discursive practice 
 
 
Prosperity without growth is no longer a utopian dream. It is a financial and ecological necessity.  
Tim Jackson, 2009 
 
4.1. Introductory remarks 
 
Complementing the interpretative analysis of discursive content in Chapter 3, this chapter seeks to 
inquire into the discourse as practice132, that is, into the way discourse actually works in terms of mobilizing 
material and situational elements to produce material, psychological, and cultural-extension effects (J. 
C. Alexander, 2004; Beasley-Murray, 2013; Keller, 2011), based on the premise that the performativity 
of a discourse is not to be retrieved from what a discourse ‘says’, but from the ideational and material 
effects it actually produces. This chapter thus deals with the Great Transformation as a “walking and 
talking discourse” (Beasley-Murray, 2013), or, recalling Eder’s metaphor in Chapter 1, it reunites the 
social ‘brain’, where discursive performances play out, with the social ‘mind’ where ideational 
repertoires are located. 
The first part of the chapter (section 4.2) presents a detailed reconstruction of the GT field of debate 
in its pragmatic-material and diachronic dimensions: events, processes, agents, material dispositifs 
(publications, funding schemes, etc.), and agent practices. This was done through theoretically 
sampling literature reporting about the GT as discursive process (rather than about its contents) 
sourced from a triangulation of exploratory interviews, empirical knowledge of the field, and a 
snowballing, and subjecting these texts (hereafter Sample 2, see Annex 2 and 3) to two successive 
coding rounds with Atlas Ti, combining a start-list of codes with codes generated inductively from the 
first coding round, and the interpretive linkage of the resulting code list to yield a timeline and map of 
the GT debate133, which was then translated into narrative form.  
                                                 
132 Relevant here is an analytic distinction between practice-as-performance (as enacted in a given 
spatiotemporal context); and practice-as-entity (the emergent outcome of such performances) (Schatzki, 
1996). The object of this chapter fits the first conceptualization of social practice. 
133 Since these data only cover the GT debate development until 2015, updates to 2017 were added 
when relevant based on secondary literature. 
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This served as a basis for the ‘dramaturgical’ analysis to build on, in the second part of the chapter 
(section 4.3), which binds together the (provisionally and relatively static) ideational perspective of 
Chapter 3 and the (dynamic) practical-material developments reconstructed in the first part of the 
present chapter, within the boundaries of analysis set by our research questions.   
 
4.2. Pragmatic contextualization and reconstruction of the GT field of debate 
 
The “all-pervasiveness of the language of crisis” (Escobar, 2013), which spread over to the Global 
North ignited by the shock of the economic crisis in 2007-2008, constitutes the unmistakable 
backdrop against which the GT debate unfolds, coupled with the crisis of multilateralism in climate 
policy (which became evident at the latest after the failure of UNFCCC COP15 in Copenhagen, in 
2009) and with the newly reinvigorated debate on welfare models, quality of life indicators, and good 
life134. (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2013a; Rätz, 2012; Reisch & Bietz, 2014; Sandel, 2013; Schneidewind 
& Zahrnt, 2013) 
The epochal diagnosis formulated within the GT debate, however, places these conjunctural triggers 
as contingent consequence of a deeper ‘systemic’ or  multiple interlinked crisis  (Brand, 2016b; Demirović 
& Attac, 2011; Dörre, 2009; Narberhaus & Sheppard, 2015). As we saw in Chapter 3, most of the 
ideational repertoire at play in the GT debate – with exception of the P2P narrative, with its strong 
technological driver characteristic of the contemporary ‘digital modernity’ – can hardly be regarded as 
historically novel135, but rather largely re-creates the international discursive atmosphere of the early 
                                                 
 
134 The first publication of the World Happiness Report by the Sustainable Development Solutions 
Network (SDSN) in 2012, for example, is a reflection of growing debates on well-being, happiness, 
meaningful welfare indicators and good life at the international level (UN, OECD, as well as countries 
such as France and the USA), and serves to establish these themes globally as a political issue (Reisch 
& Bietz, 2014, pp. 15, 17). As a sub-field in discussions on welfare and the good life, time prosperity 
(Zeitwohlstand) emerges in empirical studies as a relevant factor for quality of life in northern contexts, 
leading to the emergence a time-politics and activism (e.g. slow cities) (p. 36-37). On focus are time-
regimes as a political variable for social transformation, influencing debates around care, working time, 
etc. Also in academic life the topic of time is increasingly relevant. E.g. Hartmut Rosa’s work on 
‘acceleration’ (H. Rosa, 2005, 2010). Being a discrete aspect of a larger debate, however, debates on 
time-alienation and time-prosperity will not be further considered in my analysis here. 
 
135 For a systematic historical analysis of the cyclical recurrence of the critique of industrialism since 
the 19th Century, see Rolf Sieferle’s 1985 book: Fortschrittsfeinde? Opposition gegen Technik und Industrie 
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1970s, characterized by an approach to sustainability as coupled with equality, cooperation, and 
frugality, among other societal goals (Asara et al., 2015; Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2007; Dryzek, 1997; 
Hopwood et al., 2005; W. Sachs, 1999; Sneddon, Howarth, & Norgaard, 2006). Coinciding with the 
rise of the Washington Consensus in the 1980s, this interest for critical engagements with economic 
growth and development paradigms faded during the last two decades of the twentieth century, but 
revived with the turn of the new one (Kallis et al. 2014). This section sets out to reconstruct the 
context and dynamics that enabled or fostered such revival at a site where it developed into a 
particularly vibrant debate: Germany.  
At the turn of the first decade of the century, the idea of a social-ecological transformation or Great 
Transformation emerged as an umbrella concept seeking to integrate these discussions into a systemic 
social-ecological picture, and generated a momentous and extensive debate spanning across social 
fields and institutions in Germany (Brand, 2012a, 2016c; Brand, Pühl, & Thimmel, 2013; Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2013; Diefenbacher et al., 2014; Homer-Dixon, 2009; Leggewie & Welzer, 2010; W. Sachs, 
2013; Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft, 2011; von Jorck, 2013b; WBGU, 2011).  
The debate first took off in the expert domain, with a decisive impulse being provided by two major 
events at the interface between the spheres of politics and science: one of them was the publication 
of the 2011 flagship report “World in transition: A social Contract for the Great Transformation” by 
the German Advisory Council on Global Change (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat Globaler Umweltveränderungen, 
short WBGU) (cf. Chapter 3), an official consulting body of the federal government. This report was 
meant as the German contribution to the Rio+20 Earth Summit, but ended up having far greater 
impact at home than it did internationally. Indeed, there is broad consensus in acknowledging this 
WBGU-report as a catalyzing event that boosted momentum for a wider socio-political GT debate 
(Brand, 2014d; W. Sachs, 2013; von Jorck, 2013b), firmly anchoring the topic in diverse agendas and 
setting the tone of the discussion: the debate on sustainable development is to evolve towards a 
discourse on a more fundamental and all-encompassing socio-ecological transformation (Reißig, 
2014). A wide range of publications on the topic followed in the coming years. (Brand, Pühl, et al., 
2013) 
                                                 
von der Romantik bis zur Gegenwart, as well as his historical background input (2010) to the 2011 WBGU 
flagship report.  
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The second catalyzing platform was the 2010-2013 debate held by a national-level parliamentary 
Enquete Commission136 “Growth, welfare, quality of life”  – shortened Enquete-WWL by its German 
acronym (Brand, 2014b). In the above described context of continued business-as-usual, politization 
of inequality, growing civilizational risk with the worsening ecological trends, and an international 
debate on alternative welfare-models, debates at the Enquete-WWL pitted the opposition parties137, 
who had originally summoned the Enquete with the purpose of sketching out possible solutions to 
the multiple-interlinked crisis (Brand, Pühl, et al., 2013; Deutscher Bundestag, 2013; von Jorck, 2013b), 
against the coalition of ruling parties, who, in turn, shifted the emphasis toward discussing the validity 
of GDP as an indicator of human development and subjective life satisfaction (Deutscher Bundestag, 
2010), following into the steps of similar efforts in other countries138.  
 
Following this double impulse, the GT debate spread wide open, overflowing the expert domain and 
connecting with debates and struggles in multiple spheres. Hence there arises the need to explore 
                                                 
136 Enquete-commissions (from the French enquête: ‘inquiry’) are inter-fractional working groups set 
up by the German Bundestag or by a Bundesland parliament to address long-term issues involving 
diverse juridical, economic, social, or ethical aspects. The Enquete-commissions should reach a 
consensual position on these questions. The objective is to arrive at a solution that would be supported 
by a majority of the population, even by those who do not feel represented by the ruling coalition.  
137 At the time, the opposition block was formed by the Social Democrats (SPD), the German Greens 
(Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen), and the democratic socialist party (Die Linke), while the government coalition 
was formed by the sister parties of the Christian Democrats (CDU and CSU), and the liberals (FDP). 
By the end of 2013, FDP had lost its congressional representation, and SPD formed a ‘Great Coalition’ 
with CDU/CSU, changing the board of political allegiances and therefore also the prevalent discourse, 
particularly within SPD.   
 
138 The debate on GDP is acknowledged by the WBGU as an indicator of changing values (WBGU, 
2011, p. 74). A discussion which, initially, was led in society’s ‘ecological niches’ has become a matter 
of concern for governments and the EU Commission: since 2007, various initiatives for measuring 
national welfare and social progress have been pioneered by the United Nations, the OECD (Istanbul 
World Forum ‘Measuring and Fostering the Progress of Societies’), the European Community 
(Beyond GDP) and Eurostat, and, most recently, by the French (Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi-Commission on 
the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress) (J. Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi, 2009) 
and by the UK governments (Jackson, 2009a). The debate on alternatives to GDP as an indicator is 
hardly a recent one, however: Since the 1970s, and the Club of Rome’s study on ‘The Limits to 
Growth’ (D. H. Meadows, Meadows, Randers, & Behrens, 1972), there has been continued scientific 
and political discussions on how to adequately measure welfare, human development, social progress 
and natural environmental changes. 
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developments in diverse arenas that constitute breeding grounds for the GT’s discursive production, 
as well as how (and in how far) they relate to each other. For example, the scientific sphere intersects 
with politics in the form of think tanks with a policy-consulting function, and sometimes also with 
civil society organizations in experimental spaces seeking a “democratization of science” (Beck, 1992; 
Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1991; Gallopin et al., 2001), or merging with grassroots activism, as in the 
Degrowth movement (see Excursus at the end of this section). Although the latter develops largely in 
parallel to mainstream politics, growth-critical approaches are incipiently finding resonance, as we will 
see, within political debates in the larger public sphere. Meanwhile, special interest groups such as 
trade unions (TUs), employers’ unions, or business chambers develop their own visions and proposals 
for a GT, with TUs, especially, exhibiting surprising crossovers and overlapping with unlikely partners.  
Given that the focus of this research is on agency, these arenas of discursive production were 
constructed analytically as agent-centered categories. Five broad agent-arenas have been identified 
inductively from the data: 1) the sphere of long-term politics and the sustainable development policy-
domain; 2) the arena of institutionalized civil society organizations (with environmental, 
developmental, and religious NGOs and think tanks with a public-interest agenda playing a central 
role); 3) the spheres of social movement organizations (SMOs), grassroots’ initiatives and niches of 
alternative practice; 4) the sphere of special interest groups, which gathers, for example, trade-union 
and business actors, as well as think tanks with a particularistic agenda; and, lastly, 5) the sphere of 
science and politics of science. The concrete sites or loci where these debates unfold range from 
physical (conferences, fora, institutionalized political debates) to virtual discussion platforms – the 
latter seemingly becoming more prominent the lesser formalized the group-arrangements are. The 
media through which debates unfold range from live discussion to print media –mainly dissemination 
and so-called ‘grey’ literature, application-oriented research, and also through academic publications 
and, occasionally, certain mass media.  
 
Let us now zoom into contextual developments within particular arenas of discourse production, in 
order to get a grasp of situational, material, and agential elements at play, as well as how the diverse 
arenas interact (or not) with each other. These dimensions are then systematically analyzed in the 
second part of this chapter (Section 4.3) through the lens of dramaturgical analysis. 
Political and SD policy- sphere 
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In international policy arena, macro-narratives of transition flourished in the years following 
immediately after the financial meltdown of 2008, partly drawing on conceptual and theoretical 
developments in sustainability-related sciences, such as the Dutch school of Transition Research, 
albeit with a heavily technocratic and sub-systemic approach139. First, the different versions of a Green 
New Deal appeared with the common aim of guaranteeing both a quick recovery of the economy and 
taking advantage of the historical momentum to push for a larger transformation of the economy 
towards green energy and technologies. These policy frameworks and packages were thus framed as 
win–win type of solutions (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2008; UN DESA, 2009; UNEP/PNUMA, 2009). 
Later, in the wake of the Rio+20 Conference in 2012, the idea of a ‘Green New Deal’ was superseded 
by broader narratives such as ‘Green growth’ (OECD, 2011) and the ‘Green Economy’ (UNEP, 2012) 
(cf. Chapter 3). Though increasingly popular in civil society circles, more radical proposals such as the 
‘Great Transition’ (New Economics Foundation, 2009; Raskin, 2008; Smart CSOs Initiative, 2011) 
addressing a broader scope of problems and raising foundational questions about issues such as 
economic growth, the environmentally and socially destructive character of (neoliberal) globalization, 
and the regulative role of markets, found less reception in political agendas140. Hence the adoption of 
the term ‘transformation’ in this sphere did not alter the discursive balance in the field of SD, but 
rather had, by and large, mere rhetorical impact.141 
In Germany, however, the idea of a ‘Great Transformation’ or ‘social-ecological transformation’, as 
conveyed in the reports of the already mentioned German Advisory Council on Global Change 
                                                 
139 Transition research theories work under the assumption that changes in one societal sub-system 
would trigger changes in other sub-systems, and thus, as a consequence, of the system as a whole 
(Grin et al. 2010, p. 4, cited in Diefenbacher et al., 2014) 
 
140 Some of their insights, however, have permeated policy processes, both at the local and at the 
international level. In the framework of the Sustainable Development Goals 2015-process (SDGs), 
for example, views highlighting inequality as a barrier to global prosperity in harmony with nature, and 
acknowledging that “it was a mistake to make economic growth the decisive criterion for successfully 
combating poverty and pursuing sustainable development” had made their way into first-round drafts; 
yet eventually the recommendations of the international experts put forward “a strategy of cosmetic 
corrections of course to the present resource-intensive economic model rather than a radical departure 
from the growth-dogma and a turn towards the concept of the global common good” (Schilder, 2013, 
p. 22). 
 
141 For a critical inquiry into the swift career of “transformation” as a concept in German development 
and environmental discussions, see (Brand, 2016c); into its technocratic appropriations at the global 
level (Stirling, 2015) 
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(WBGU, 2011, 2014, 2016), triggered a wider and deeper socio-political  – or, with Ulrich Beck: sub-
political – debate. In the wake of the momentum created by the convergence of the discussion strands 
unleashed by the Enquete WWL and the 2011 WBGU report, Germany’s political parties –and the 
internationally active foundations they support142– readily developed their respective interpretative 
and normative stances towards the multiple crisis and its possible solutions. The most proactive stance 
was clearly taken by the opposition parties, both ad intra the Enquete WWL discussions as well as in 
the public sphere, which clearly suggests that the debate on a social-ecological transformation was – 
at least in its beginnings – politically promoted by the opposition as a potentially unifying concept 
(Brand, Pühl, et al., 2013). A formal conceptual definition by the opposition parties was laid down in 
a special amendment (Sondervotum) to the final report of the Enquete WWL:  
The concept of socio-ecological transformation covers all those strategies which rely on a 
conscious socio-political design to address the multiple crisis rather than relying first and 
foremost on the capitalist (global) market that allegedly responds to ecological problems by 
means of technology and scarcity signals. As indicated in the adjective “socio-ecological”, 
fundamental transformations are required in the economy and in society, as well as in their 
relation to geological and biophysical life-support systems (Deutscher Bundestag, 2013, p. 484) 
The first party to individually voice an official position paper were the Greens (Bündnis 90/Die 
Grünen, 2011), which  reframed their earlier Green New Deal143 proposal (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 
2008) as a comprehensive policy-package for a social-ecological transformation. As compared to the 
2008 version, whose main focus was the regulation of the financial sector, this new proposal was not 
only meant to provide immediate and decisive response to the economic crisis, but simultaneously 
goes beyond the short-term juncture and pave the way towards a low-carbon society through an 
                                                 
 
142 Each of the traditional political parties in Germany has a like-minded foundation which receives 
support from tax-revenues according to the congressional representation of each force, and function 
as think tanks, disseminators, and civil society-branches of the respective party, not only in Germany, 
but worldwide, with national or regional branches. The ones playing a more important role in the GT 
debate are the Heinrich-Böll Foundation, which is close to the German Greens, and the Rosa-
Luxemburg Foundation (Die Linke), and, to a lesser degree, the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation (SPD).  
 
 
143 The original “Green New Deal” by the German Green Party had been issued as a conjunctural 
response to the 2008 economic crisis, in consonance other proposals of the kind world-wide. The 
label “Green New Deal” is in obvious reference to U.S. President Roosevelt’s successful Keynesian 
policy intervention lifting his country out of the Great Depression back in the 1930s. 
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integrated policy-framework based on three pillars: the regulation of the financial system, a social 
pillar, and, lastly, a “social-ecological restructuration” (ökologisch-sozialer Umbau). 
The Social-Democratic Party (SPD) also released in 2011 their framework program “New progress 
and more democracy”. Hereby the SPD goes on to address a critique toward the “old conception of 
progress”, departing from the observation that such ‘progress’ is no longer translating into welfare for 
the population (SPD Sozial Demokratische Partei, 2011, p. 3). A new model of progress is thus 
proposed, one which is based on stronger democratic engagement of the citizenry and is embedded 
in social and ecological boundaries (SPD Sozial Demokratische Partei, 2011, p. 7). In addition, that 
same year, the SPD convened the Fortschrittsforum (“Progress-Forum”), a two-year dialogue process 
among 100 experts around the question about the meaning of the good life from a future-oriented 
perspective, which developed on a parallel track to the work of the Enquete WWL, and published its 
results in the spring of 2013 (Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2013a)144. A distinctive topical contribution 
from this forum to the GT debate was the question of the status and characteristics of work –both 
gainful productive employment as well as reproductive, unpaid ‘care’-work– in current and in a future 
sustainable society (Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2013b) 
Taking the care-perspective heads-on, feminist intellectuals also joined the debate with a critical 
appreciation of the Enquete WWL report (Biesecker et al., 2012) (cf. Chapter 3) and various spin-off 
contributions (a.o. Biesecker & Hofmeister, 2014; Muraca, 2014; Winterfeld, 2011). From a feminist 
perspective, the global social-ecological crisis can be reframed as a crisis of socio-natural reproduction 
with a large gender-component145. The Enquete WWL approach of ‘finding the right indicators’ largely 
                                                 
144 Inputs from the SPD-environment came mainly in the form of byproducts of the 
Fortschrittsprogramm and the Fortschrittsforum: the documents So wollen wir leben! Ideen und 
Handlungsempfehlungen aus dem Fortschrittsforum („This is how we want to live! Ideas and 
recommendations from the progress-forum) (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2013a); and Wie wollen wir leben 
und arbeiten? („How we want to live and work?) (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2013b) summarize the visions 
on the good life and the good work discussed in these for a. 
 
145 The “crisis of (re)production” is the basic conceptual and theoretical axis of the feminist 
contribution to the GT debate. It adds a layer of complexity to the understanding of the multiple 
crisis. Basic tenets are, on the one hand, that a capitalist economy not only externalizes operative costs 
through exploiting the environment and the workforce, but also by drawing on non-market-based 
(re)productive activities that are, in turn, a condition of possibility for its very existence. The 
incorporation of women into the labor market has only led to a „double burden“ that is dealt with 
locally through transnational care-supply chains, adding yet another level of precariousness to the 
working class through the establishment of a new “double-earner household” model (see Biesecker & 
Hofmeister, 2014). 
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misses the point: exclusions and externalizations discussed in the GT debate cannot be solved by 
simple measures of inclusion, appreciation, or internalization, as any single one-point measure (same 
as any single indicator) necessarily miss critical interconnectedness of the various issues at stake in the 
multiple crisis. A social-ecological transformation away from profit- and growth-driven political 
imperatives would thus be the only consistent pathway out of the crisis. 
In the same line, the democratic socialist party Die Linke presented its “Plan B: Red project for the 
social-ecological restructuration”146 in 2012 (Fraktion Die Linke im Deutschen Bundestag, 2012). In the 
circle of influence of the Rosa-Luxemburg-Foundation –the foundation supported by Die Linke- 
transformation strategies are discussed from a capitalism-critical standpoint (Brangsch & et al., 2012; 
Dellheim & Krause, 2008). The focus of this discourse lies with the democratization of society and of 
the economy, emphasizing the ‘how’ of the transition, which is framed around three main concepts: 
climate justice; just transition; and Degrowth (Kaufmann & Müller, 2009, p. 193). In addition, the 
social-ecological transformation is framed as a transition towards a ‘Green Socialism’ (Adler & 
Schachtschneider, 2010; Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, 2012). 
The political discourse around a GT continued developing over the following years, as witnessed by 
key publications influencing the debate from the respective party-positions: anthologies such as 
Futuring: Perspectives of a transformation within capitalism and beyond  (Brie, 2014) develop the capitalist- and 
growth-critical argument akin to Die Linke and the Rosa-Luxemburg Foundation; while the Green 
Party and the Heinrich-Böll Foundation developed their discourse around the axes of a Green Market 
Economy and ‘smart growth’ (Andreae, 2012; Fücks, 2013), which resonates internationally with the 
discourses of Green Growth (OECD) and the Green Economy (UNEP), both of which have had 
significant impact on the German debate. In particular, the book Intelligent Wachsen: die Grüne Revolution 
(“Growing smartly: the green revolution”) by Ralf Fücks (2013) speaks out in favor of the continued 
pursuit of economic growth, albeit a selective one (cf. Chapter 3). The more ‘radical’ faction147 of the 
                                                 
 
146 In German “Plan B: das rote Projekt für den sozial-ökologischen Umbau“. The debate on an alternative to 
the Green New Deal had been developing already by 2009 under the label social-ecological transformation 
(see for example Wolf, 2009). “Plan B”, which in 2016 started a 2.0 project-phase, stands out as 
arguably the most elaborated policy-program for a SET at the party-level in the German political 
sphere. 
 
147 It should be noted that the German Greens, both at party-level and at the Heinrich-Böll 
Foundation, are divided into two strands representing intermediate positions alongside the black-red 
continuum, with those leaning more toward the status quo (the so-called ‘Realos’) being dominant at 
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Heinrich-Böll Foundation, however, aligns itself with the discursive strands of the center-left of the 
political spectrum, calling for fundamental societal transformation and for overcoming the growth 
imperative. (Unmüßig, Sachs, & Fatheuer, 2012) 
In June 2013, the Enquete WWL issued their final report. Despite the fact that the supposed mission 
of this Enquete commission was interrogating the problematic relationship between economic growth 
and welfare/quality of life (Reuter, 2013), a fracture between the ruling coalition and the opposition 
along the topical lines of the “status of growth in economy and society”148 signed debates throughout, 
and becomes apparent in the final report. Delegates and experts from the ruling coalition of Christian-
Democrats (CDU/CSU) and liberals (FDP) further relied on a growth-based definition of welfare 
(e.g. Paqué, 2010) and on a continuation of the political-economic model of strengthening national 
international competitiveness as precondition (Reuter, 2013), whereas the opposition (social-
democrats/SPD, Greens, and the Die Linke) emphasized the need for a social-ecological 
transformation of a Polanyian scale as a precondition to achieve sustainable welfare for all within 
ecological limits (see for example Deutscher Bundestag, 2013, p. 128). Yet also within the ruling 
coalition a fracture became exposed: neoclassical-neoliberals, ‘business as usual’ advocates showed 
divergences with part of the conservative factions149 in the ruling coalition who acknowledge the 
interlinked and multidimensional character of the crisis and the need for fundamental transformations. 
(Brand, Pühl, et al., 2013) 
                                                 
present. The Green New Deal can therefore be assumed to represent more faithfully the position and 
worldview of this strand, while the more radical Greens (‘Fundis’) embody a discourse critical of eco-
modernist positions (see for example Unmüßig, Sachs, & Fatheuer, 2012). For background 
information on the cleavage between the more radical faction (known as “Fundis”) and the ‘realists’ 
(“Realos”) within the German Greens see: https://www.gruene.de/partei/30-gruene-jahre-30-
gruene-geschichten/30-gruene-jahre-8-realos-und-fundis.html 
 
148 See report of Project Group 1 “Status of Growth in Economy and Society” and related Sondervoten 
of the opposition, as well as Working Group 4 on “sustainability-oriented regulatory policy”, 
particularly on the decoupling of growth, welfare, and resource consumption. 
149 With his widely disseminated book “Exit. Welfare without growth” (Miegel 2010), and an active 
engagement through public writing and interviews, as well as through his think-thank Denkwerk 
Zukunft, Meinhard Miegel, CDU/CSU expert consultant to the Enquete WWL, rises as main 
representative of a conservative, anti-growth transformation discourse. 
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Despite the above fractures, significant acknowledgements regarding hot topics were also achieved 
across the party-spectrum. These include convergent assessment about the difficulty of overcoming 
rebound-effects150 in efficiency-based approaches to environmental policy (Project-group 3) or about 
some implications of downward trends in growth-rates, as well as constructive debates on feminist 
contributions to an extended conception of work, or else on the critique of extractivism and resource-
intensive lifestyles. In regard to the topic “consumption”, the final report of Project Group 5 explicitly 
states that techno-fixes will not suffice and need to be complemented through behavioral change, 
sufficiency-approaches and civil society innovations (Kuhnhenn, 2013). Among the opposition parties 
there was further agreement on following points: a) GDP no being an adequate measure for welfare 
nor a suitable objective for contemporary economy; b) the multiple-interlinked crisis can only be 
addressed through a GT beyond growth and market-regulation; c) need to decouple the concept of 
welfare from resource-consumption. (Brand, Pühl, et al., 2013) 
Although the Enquete WWL was widely regarded as a political failure, it did arguably boost the 
momentum for a larger debate around a social-ecological transformation. Furthermore, it also 
introduced a dialogue around the good life in German politics. In December 2013, the SPD allied with 
CDU/CSU forming a ‘Great Coalition’. Themes like welfare, life satisfaction and good life beyond 
economic performance are acknowledged in the in the new government strategy Gut Leben in 
Deutschland (“Good Living in Germany”), which was agreed upon in the coalition contract (Reisch & 
Bietz, 2014, p. 16). This led to a first attempt at a Zukunftsdialog “gut leben in Deutschland” (‘futuring- 
dialogue’ on the good life in Germany), which was largely regarded as a failure and re-edited in 2015. 
However, the opposition parties having taken up the banner of the ‘Great Transformation’ as their 
own at the Enquete- WWL, it should come as no surprise that CDU/CSU and FDP are hardly 
involved in this debate, at least at party-wide level. This became evident with the widely promoted 
Zukunftscharta consultation and resulting document (BMZ Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche 
Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, 2014), an initiative by the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (BMZ) under CSU Minister Gerd Müller, which was conceived of as Germany’s official 
input to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). The Zukunftscharta barely refers to the GT 
debate, although some of its points can be arguably traced back to GT-language. The merger of the 
‘transformation’ and ‘green economy’ rhetoric is also evident at policy-processes related to the 2015-
                                                 
150 For a broader address of the issue of rebound-effects or Jevon’s paradox, see Chapter 3, Section 
XX 
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established Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations151. The subsequent fading 
of the GT debate in the formal political scene was inversely proportional to its up-taking in other 
spheres of socio-political debate, which will be reviewed in the following sections. 
More promising than this declarative instances, however, are a handful of policy initiatives, which were 
mentioned in Chapter 3: drawing on the debate around welfare and the feminist-inspired care-crisis 
or “crisis of reproduction”, reduced working-time (Arbeitsverkürzung), and a Universal Basic Income 
(UBI), and, more generally, the rise of a politics of time in Germany (Reisch & Bietz, 2014) are arenas 
and initiatives with socio-ecological transformative potential insofar they deal with balancing of gainful 
employment versus unpaid care-work, working time versus civic engagement or family-time, material 
welfare versus qualitative welfare with a stronger appreciation of so-called ‘time-prosperity’ 
(Zeitwohlstand), and with a re-balancing of gender-specific roles, among other tensions inbuilt into 
Western modern lifestyles, mainly in affluent societies. Also the policy-package in Plan B (now in its 
version 2.0) from Die Linke is worth mentioning, including proposals for free public transport in cities, 
energy democracy, re-localized circular economies, and strengthened popular participation in politics 
and the economy. 
Especially significant mentioning, in this context, is the public and political momentum of an iconic 
national utopia with arguably ambivalent effects vis-à-vis the GT debate: The German Energiewende 
(i.e. the nation-wide ‘Energy Transition’ to renewables). The Energiewende initiative is older and has 
different sources than the GT debate: its origins can be traced back to the context of the anti-nuclear 
movements in the early 1980s with a leading blueprinting-role of the Öko-Institut, but it was only the 
accident in the Japanese nuclear power plant of Fukushima in 2011 that prompted the ruling coalition 
under the leadership of Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel to give an official seal of approval to the 
initiative, which aims at completely phasing out nuclear power plants by 2022. That Energiewende 
provides a favorable back wind of “utopian realism” to the GT debate is arguably beyond question. 
Furthermore, it may serve as a concrete project with catalyzing potential for “transformative agents” 
to coalesce around, thus building a basis for deeper and more comprehensive cooperation and 
discursive coalition (Reißig, 2014); particularly when, together with the current Chinese 5-year plan, it 
                                                 
151 E.g. the Bonn Conference on Global Transformation in May 2015 was intended to kick-start a bi-yearly 
conference series designed as milestones alongside the SDGs implementation process. This 
conference was co-organized by the state of Nordreihn-Westfalen and by GIZ, the largest German 
development agency (Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) & Landesregierung 
Nordreihn-Westfalen, 2015). 
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is the only encompassing initiative of transition toward low-carbon energy systems worldwide 
(Germanwatch, 2012, p. 8). Yet, on the other hand, the Energiewende does not address, per se, any of 
the critiques towards economic growth (in particular, the rebound effects) and towards the crisis-
prone character of the capitalist mode of accumulation that are characteristic of most GT-narratives, 
as we saw in Chapter 3. Social justice-dimensions are given marginal consideration (Kopatz, 2013), 
even less so the arguably greatest transformative potential of the Energiewende: the decentralized 
‘prosumption’ of energy (Rifkin, 2014). Whether it will become a catalyst and docking slot for the GT 
debate into the mainstream policy- and political spheres, or rather dilute into a ‘green growth’ 
approach leaning toward the status quo remains to be seen. 
Civil society:  
 
Three particular developments at the interface of institutionalized CSOs and grassroots movement 
and SMOs are worth mentioning as creating momentum for the GT debate in Germany: First, Ulrich 
Brand identifies the grassroots mobilization against the G8 summit in Heiligendamm (2007) as prelude 
to a strong re-politization momentum, serving as a bridge between ‘old’ and ‘new’ generations of 
radical activists, plus left parties and part of tradeunionism. Secondly, the five McPlanet.com 
congresses held alternatively in Berlin and Hamburg between 2003 and 2012 showcase the merger of 
globalization critique and socio-ecological themes (Brand, 2014a). McPlanet.com was organized jointly 
by alter-globalist, environmental, development, and religious NGOs and SMOs, including Attac,  Brot 
für die Welt (Bread for the World), BUND (the biggest German environmental NGO), the protestant 
development service EED, Greenpeace, and the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation. Thirdly, the COP 15 to 
the UNFCC in Copenhagen (2009) can be seen as another catalyzing moment in civil society circles 
creating momentum for the GT debate. This was when trade unions presented themselves at the 
international level as standard-bearers of a “just transition”, thereby expressing the will of and 
demanding getting involved in the design process of a societal transition (Brand, 2014d, p. 252). In 
Germany, it led to the globalization-critical left decidedly taking ownership of the ecological crisis 
(Brand, 2014a). 
Meanwhile, initiatives and niches of alternative practice152 have begun to cluster, organize and become 
politically active, spreading internationally and becoming a global source of discourse production 
                                                 
152 Alternative practices include citizen initiatives experimenting with new lifestyles for self-production 
(prosumers), shared utilization (commonists), reparation (the ‘Repair Revolution’), and long-lived 
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about a social-ecological transformation (von Jorck, 2014, p. 26). The most prominent example of 
niche experiments with community-based responses to the great challenges of the Anthropocene is 
probably the Transition Towns Network153, with more than 1000 initiatives registered in over 40 
countries by 2013. 
Significant developments with relevance to the GT debate also took place at the interface of civil 
society and science. Here the most significant development of the last 10 years in Europe has arguably 
been the rise of the Décroissance or Degrowth movement, as the most important impulse revitalizing 
the debate on ecological and social limits to economic expansion. Degrowth became ‘‘both a banner 
associated with social and environmental movements and an emergent concept in academic and 
intellectual circles, [which] are interdependent and affect each other’’ (Martinez Alier et al. 2010, cited 
in Asara et al., 2015, p. 3). Because of its standalone entity and its catalyzing force within the GT 
debate, the Degrowth movement will be addressed separately in an Excursus at the end of section 4.2.  
 
The following sub-sections will describe developments and agents in the sphere of CS in more detail, 
focusing on the most momentous timeframe of the GT debate, starting 2010. 
Grassroots movements, environmental, developmental and religious NGOs, associations & think tanks 
Docking with the above described debate at the level of political parties and their foundations in the 
wake of the Enquete-WWL and the 2011 WBGU report, a multitude of think-tanks154, social 
movement organizations (SMOs) such as the alterglobalization-forerunner Attac, and Development 
& Environment NGOs – BUND, Misereor, Bread for the World, among many others – stepped in 
early co-shaping the GT debate with own elaborations and proposals, often in cooperation with 
political foundations and think tanks. Here again the critique of the dominant economic model and 
world-order plays a central role, with a particular focus on the economic growth-fixation of politics, 
                                                 
design; urban-gardening; etc. See Escobar (2013) for an illustrative survey of transition initiatives 
worldwide. 
 
153 Initiated in 2005 by British permaculture educator Rob Hopkins, Transition Towns is a model of 
community-organization that has been linking disperse initiatives, seeking to build locally rooted yet 
networked structures of resilience in the face of the energy climate, economic, and food crisis. See: 
https://transitionnetwork.org/about-the-movement/what-is-transition/history/ 
 
154 The Institut Solidarische Moderne (ISM) (Institut Solidarische Moderne, 2011), Denkwerk 
Demokratie (Mikfeld, 2012), Denkwerk Zukunft (Denkwerk Zufunft, 2008, n.d.; Zimmer, 2013), and 
the Foundation Mercator count amongst the most influential 
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as can be concluded from publications such as Ausgewachsen! (“Outgrown!”) (Rätz, 2012) or 
Postwachstum (“Post-growth”)(Schmelzer & Passadakis, 2011); as well as in conferences and congresses, 
such as the 2011 Attac-congress Jenseits des Wachstums155 (‘Beyond growth’), which had broad resonance 
in national mass media and played a decisive role in establishing the degrowth debate in Germany 
(Brand, 2014a). This congress was co-organized with the Friedrich Ebert, Heinrich-Böll, Rosa 
Luxemburg, and Otto Brenner foundations, as well as organizations from the media: the newspaper 
Taz die Tageszeitung and the well-established monthly magazine of political analysis Blätter für deutsche 
und internationale Politik.156 
Particularly noteworthy is also the widespread study by the Wuppertal Institute, BUND, and Bread 
for the World: Zukunftfähiges Deutschland157 (Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, Brot für 
die Welt, & Wuppertal Instituts für Klima, Umwelt, Energie, 2008). This study updates the 
homonymous and highly influential 1996 Report (Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, 
Misereor, & Wuppertal-Institut für Klima, 1996): while the original report was concerned with 
discussing the prospects for sustainable development on the basis of the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, 
this new document takes issue with what it deems the flawed responses of German official politics to 
the emerging economic crisis, advocating for a fundamental re-thinking of socio-economic structures 
and patterns in Germany from a global perspective (Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland 
et al., 2008). Furthermore, the 2009 version makes the growth critique more central than the 1996 
version, which had merely argued for the need to look beyond economic growth without deeming it 
outrightly incompatible with ecological limits. Problematized are also the primacy of markets over the 
political, the current division of labor (both nationally and internationally), the importance of the 
commons and the regional economies; and the effects of global trade expansionism, as well as the 
current distribution of benefits in global value chains. 
                                                 
155 Jenseits: des Wachstums. Ökologische Gerechtigkeit. Soziale Rechte. Gutes Leben (“Beyond growth: Ecological 
justice. Social rights. Good life”) 
 
156 These two media organizations proved of particular importance in spreading, amplifying, and 
providing a critical platform for the debates on GT. See for example in Blätter issues 05/2008 
(“Klimakrise”) and 12/2011 (“Wie das Wachstum in die Köpfe kam”), both by H. Welzer; or else issue 
10/2014, with an article by Jürgen Trittin on the Coalition for a GT and its challenges. 
 
157 Zukunftfähiges Deutschland in einer globalisierten Welt. Ein Anstoß zur gesellschaftlichen Debatte („Sustainable 
Germany in a globalized world. An impulse for social debate”) 
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The role of religious communities, movements and organizations in building a transformation 
discourse emphasizing climate protection and social and environmental justice which closely aligns 
with the corresponding global movements158 is highlighted by diverse observers of the GT debate (a.o. 
Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014; WBGU, 2014). By way of illustration, the three-year project 
“Weltgemeinwohl: Development in the service of the global welfare“ (2012-2015) by Misereor and the 
Institut für Gesellschaftspolitik in Munich (Misereor & IHS, 2013), follows in the steps of Zukunftfähiges 
Deutschland, but is more global in scope and more intercultural in its tone, explicitly bringing in a global 
South and a religious-motivated perspective to the analysis of the orientations of German politics, 
economy, and society. A second interesting example, because of the unusual cooperation between 
trade-unionism, religious and environmental organizations it featured (Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014, 
p. 144), is the “Transformation Congress” (Transformationskongress), which was held in June 2012 in 
Berlin under the motto “Acting sustainably. Redesigning the economy. Strengthening democracy”, 
with nearly 900 attendees. This congress was organized by the German Association of Trade Unions 
(Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund / DGB), Bread for the World with two academic organizations 
representing the German Protestant church159, and the German Circle for the Protection of Nature 
(Deutscher Naturschutzring / DNR), together with nine project-partners, including other Protestant 
religious organizations, BUND, Misereor, and Friends of the Earth Germany, and other 14 
supporters, among which the Wuppertal Institute. Likewise, discursive development within religious 
groups and organizations reflect a growing concern with the multiple crisis and the need for a 
fundamental transformation of society. The most notable event is arguably the rise to prominence of 
the 2013-elected Pope Francis in the global SD debate. After the publication of his ground-breaking 
Encyclical Laudato Si’ in 2015, the so-called ‘green Pope’ Francis was widely acclaimed as an ally by 
activist groups in the GT debate, particularly as the transformative counterpoint to the much more 
conventional outlook of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which were agreed upon 
that same year.  In the same vein, the thematic foci of the latest Protestant Synods in Germany 
(Evangelischer Kirchentag)160 were largely tailored to discursive atmosphere of the GT debate: For 
                                                 
158 For an overview of the international Environmental Justice and Climate Justice movements, see 
Martinez-Alier (2014)  
159 Research campus of the evangelical student community (Forschungsstäatte der Evangelischen 
Studiengemeinschaft /FEST) and the Social Science Institute (SI) of the EKD. 
 
160 Larger public fora with a futuring-agenda (e.g. Kirchentag, Katholikentag – Kirchentag every two 
years with somewhat 100 thousand visitors) (Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014, p. 142). 
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example, the 2008 Kirchentag’s main theme was ‘Changing Climate – Changing Waters – Changing 
Lives’. In 2013, the slogan was “As much as you need”, which resonates with the debate over the non-
material dimensions of the Good Life in society at large; and the 2014 synod carried the title ‘World 
Food Security and Sustainable Agriculture’. (WBGU, 2014, p. 89)  
The above drivers are complemented with a more cultural type of activism, which places lesser 
emphasis on structural conditions and more on the inspirational potential of real-lived examples of 
alternative, sustainable forms of engaging with the world. Exemplary of this kind of engagement is 
“Futureperfect”, a joint project of Herald Welzer’s Foundation Futur Zwei and the well-known 
Goethe-Institute. Its goal is the widespread diffusion of ‘transformation narratives’ underpinning real-
life stories of a different way of living and organizing economies along the lines of sufficiency and 
Degrowth through mainstream media, thus reaching well beyond the “usual suspects” and avoiding 
the circular logic of “preaching to the already converted”161. 
Approaches like the ones described above clearly deviate from the usual fragmented, short-term, and 
pragmatic approaches of mainstream activism and philanthropy, reason for which while many 
advocate for the emergence of a “new activism” or “systemic activism” (Narberhaus, 2013; Raskin, 
2010; WBGU, 2014); some would argue that we are in fact witnessing such emergence162. Showcasing 
examples for emergent “systemic movements” in the global North are the Commons movement, the 
Degrowth movement, the Solidarity-Economy movement163, the P2P movement, or else the 
intersectional feminist movement (Narberhaus & Sheppard, 2015). At the level of institutionalized 
NGO-activism, a systemic outlook was also adopted at the NGO International Conference “Dialogue 
on Transformation” organized jointly by the development NGO Germanwatch and US-partner IATP 
in November 2012, in Bonn. The conference was conceived as a national and international dialogue- 
and strategy-building process, as a starting point to overcome geographical and thematic borders in 
                                                 
161 http://www.goethe.de/ins/cz/prj/fup/ueb/deindex.htm 
 
162 See for example. http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/aug/24/protest-
movement-failings-i-dont-believe-in-it-anymore?CMP 
 
163 At the congress “Solidarity Economy” (Solikon) in September 2015 in Berlin, which was the biggest 
grassroots event since the Leipzig Degrowth conference in 2014, with 1000 participants representing 
ca. 25 international social movements, the idea of ‘convergence’ of the distinct social struggles was 
also the key concept around which discussions on ‘common welfare economics’ (Gemeinwohlökonomie). 
Commons, fair trade, Transition Towns and feminist perspectives were conducted. This shows a 
growing awareness and interest at the grassroots level to think in terms of a ‘systemic actvism’. 
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order to discuss a fundamental shift of the global society – a Great Transformation (Germanwatch, 
2012). On a day-to-day level, notorious innovations include the rapid spread of ‘social learning labs’ 
as a novel institutional arrangement better suited for coping with complex challenges (Hassan, 2014). 
A case in point is the Smart CSOs Lab, which offers an interaction- and learning-platform for activists 
and researchers aimed at developing strategies for ‘systemic change’ through the self-transformation 
of civil society organizations (short: CSOs). The Smart CSOs Lab engages ‘change agents’ from both 
small and large organizations, as well as from organizational networks in the development and 
sustainability sectors, such as CONCORD, the European NGO Confederation for Relief and 
Development, and CIDSE, an international alliance of 17 Catholic development agencies. 
The above examples are, of course, purposefully chosen to shed light on the agents, arenas, events, 
and processes that showcase discursive shifts and learning-platforms advocating a social-ecological 
transformation. This does not amount to saying that ‘transformative learning’ is widespread among 
civil society agents in Germany or beyond: Indeed, evidence to the contrary can be observed unfolding 
in parallel: self-preservation drives and a bias towards issue-silos, short-term pragmatism, and 
advocacy of shallow ‘achievable’ policy-goals are still prevalent among CSOs, due to reasons ranging 
from a pragmatic outlook to pressures on the side of funders (Narberhaus & Sheppard, 2015). In 
addition, a continued disconnection from their grassroots base raises the question of whose interests 
NGOs are actually representing (Felder & et. al, 2012, p. 3; Germanwatch, 2012, p. 13). But social 
movements are not to be regarded as emancipatory per se, either; in fact, the recent widespread 
emergence of so-called “crisis movements” and demonstrations (della Porta, 2013) or else anti-
immigration or islamophobic movements that have spread across the global North over the timespan 
of this research project attest to the increasingly reactionary character of large parts of the grassroot 
base when the certainties of a fading (but still taken for granted) world commence to shake.  
Special interest groups 
In the widespread discourse about ‘stakeholder dialogue’ all stakeholders are assumed somehow ‘equal’ 
in both their aim (‘we are all on the same boat’) and their power when it comes to deliberative 
interaction. Instead, a primary analytical distinction is made here between civil society organizations 
which (can claim to) stand for the defense of the general interest or common good, on the one hand, 
and those which explicitly pursue a particularistic interest – which they are required to frame their 
arguments in terms of the contribution they represent to the general interest when participating in 
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discussions of societal relevance –, such as workers’ and employers’ associations, business chambers, 
etc.  
In the case of business actors, and despite their central role in ‘locking-in unsustainability’ – more 
controversially, also in potentially unlocking it – an organic discussion around their role in (debates 
around) a “Great Transformation” is in its early infancy. The Institute of Ecological Economics 
(IÖW), however, produced two insightful studies on the topic of businesses that are not dependent 
on growth. The first one, in 2013, showcased and reflected on the experience of successful growth-
independent companies; and a follow-up 2015 study found that one third of the polled small-and-
medium enterprises did not see the need for economic growth at all (Scholl & Mewes, 2015). The 
emergence of new business models based on longer product life, barter, repairing, sharing and other 
forms of collaborative economic activity is indeed widely regarded as a marker of future trends: The 
foresight study by the German Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) regarding societal 
changes identified barter culture, ‘do-it-yourself’, a rediscovery of the commons, and consumption-
slowdown, as well as redefined notions of social welfare and growth, to become defining societal 
trends towards 2030 (Zweck & al., 2015) 
 
Noteworthy is the fact that a significant part of the unionized working class have engaged in the debate 
around the social-ecological transformation, including VER.DI (representing the service sector), IG 
Metall (steel industry), and IG BCE (chemical, mining, and energy industries) (IG Metall & IG BCE, 
2011; Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft, 2011), as well as their umbrella organization DGB 
(Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund). Singularly interesting, in this regard, is the crossover-paper “Social-
ecological restructuration as a project of trade unions and social movements”164 (Felder & et. al, 2012) 
issued jointly by Attac, VER.DI, and Greenpeace. This alliance is interesting insofar it challenges the 
widespread view that there exists a necessary conflict of interests between trade unions and 
environmental groups in the face of the social-ecological crisis; although –to be sure– here the social 
perspective takes precedence here over the ecological one (von Jorck, 2013a).  
The reaction from the side of the employers came through the Initiative Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft 
(INSM/ Initiative New Social Market Economy), a liberal advocacy think-tank founded in 2000 by 
the employers’ association Gesamtmetall (Schroeder & Wessels, 2010), which outlined six 
                                                 
164 Sozial-ökologischer Umbau als Projekt von Gewerkschaften und sozialen Bewegungen 
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transformation strategies, all of them oriented toward ‚sustainable growth’ (Initiative Neue Soziale 
Marktwirtschaft, 2012). This strand of argumentation resonates closely with the eco-modernist strand 
within the Green Party and the Heinrich Böll Foundation (Andreae, 2012; Fücks, 2013), and 
internationally with the discourses of Green Growth (OECD) and the Green Economy (UNEP). 
Political initiatives have also been kick-started from this agent-arena, in collaboration with other civil 
society partners: the initiative “Arbeitsverkürzung jetzt!“ (“Shortened working-time –now!”)165, pushed 
by the Arbeitsgruppe Alternative Wirtschaftspolitik –a think tank reuniting intellectuals and tradeunionists, 
with an explicit socio-critical profile–, Attac Germany, the Rosa-Luxemburg Foundation, and 
VER.DI, raising interest also from religious organizations (e.g. the catholic workers’ movement / 
KAB), and environmental organizations (e.g. BUND). The initiative explicitly draws on capitalist- and 
growth-critical views, and invokes arguments from the storyline of the multiple crisis –from the need 
to further social integration and gender equality to time-political and ecological objectives– in order 
to justify their proposals. One widely discussed policy-proposal is “Kurze Vollzeit für alle” ("shortened 
full-time jobs for everyone”), which seeks to legally reduce the current 40-hour to a 30-hour working 
week while maintaining full salaries. This initiative is set to consider interdependencies between 
growth, jobs, happiness and sustainability (Reisch & Bietz, 2014), and enjoys widespread support from 
the population and even among conservative politicians, in view of glim prospects of sustaining high 
rates of economic growth in the future, on the one hand, and the likely drastic and structural shrinking 
of the job market as a result of ‘smart factories’ and the rise of artificial intelligence (AI), as we saw in 
Chapter 3. Other policy proposals such as a raise in the legal minimum wage and an unconditional 
universal basic income (UBI) are often debated in combination with worktime reduction. 
Intellectual sphere and politics of science:  
 
Special consideration is owed to the role of the scientific sphere in both fueling the GT debate and 
lending it visibility, through both substantial input and advocacy. As was the case with civil society 
actors, in some academic and intellectual circles the GT debate existed before its mainstreaming in 
2010. (i.a. Adler & Schachtschneider, 2010; Homer-Dixon, 2009; Leggewie & Welzer, 2010). 
Furthermore, intellectuals have been pivotal and standard-bearers in bringing the GT debate to the 
wider socio-political stage and promoting “transformative literacy” (Schneidewind, 2013a).  
                                                 
165 The initiative started as a result of the conference „Wege zur Überwindung der Massenarbeitslosigkeit. 
Arbeitsverkürzung auf die Tagesornung?!“ (Hannover, 30.6-01.7 2011). For more information on the 
initiative see www.arbeitszeitverckuerzung-jetzt.de 
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Transformation emerged as a focal point of research and policy-consultancy in diverse scholarly 
spheres. Apart from relatively well-established academic milieus such as time-research, consumer-
research, happiness-research, “well-being”-research, and environmental research, which were already 
mentioned, it is the emerging, inter- and trans-disciplinary fields of Transformation Research, 
Transition Research & Management, and Sustainability Science or Earth System Science that are at 
forefront of the debate on a social-ecological transformation within the sphere of science. The 
development of a social-ecological research agenda and infrastructure is part of a broad discourse 
about the transformation of the science-system itself, dating back at least to the turn of the century 
(Ecornet, 2012; WBGU, 2014, p. 104), the debate heating up particularly from the early 2010s in both 
the natural and the social sciences166, with the emergence or upscaling of international and inter-
disciplinary research organizations and programs on ‘transformation’. Paradoxically, given the socio-
structural roots of the phenomenon of global environmental change, the social sciences –setting aside 
Environmental Economics (an application of neoclassical economic analysis) and critical 
interdisciplinary endeavors such as Political Ecology and Ecological Economics– have been 
latecomers to the sustainable development debate (Beck, 2010; Biermann, 2010; Chakrabarty, 2009; 
Latour, 2010; Szerszynski & Urry, 2010). Recently, however, signs of stronger involvement of the 
social sciences in global sustainability research have appeared alongside the axes of transition theories 
(Geels, 2002; Geels & Schot, 2007; Grin, Rotmans, & Schot, 2010), Earth System governance (e.g. 
Biermann, 2011b; Biermann et al., 2012; Calame, 2012), and more recently the transdisciplinary agenda 
of transformation research (Gell-Mann, 2010; Hackmann & Moser, 2013c; Hackmann & St. Claire, 2012; 
Westley, 2014) and –particularly in Germany- transformative science167 (Grunwald, 2015; Schneidewind, 
2013a, 2013b; WBGU, 2011), which can be characterized as a transdisciplinary (encompassing both 
the natural and the human sciences) and participatory trend in the politics of science towards a more 
direct implication of scholarly work in fostering a social-ecological transformation. This double 
program of ‘transformation research’ and ‘transformative science’ can be understood as a 
                                                 
166 For a good overview, see (O’Brien, 2012). 
 
167 The transformative science agenda thus takes up the tread developed earlier under the label of 
postnormal science (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1991, 1993; Gallopin, Funtowicz, O’Connor, & Ravetz, 2001; 
Ravetz, 2006), and is characterized by its explicit, normative commitment to performatively 
influencing transition processes. 
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radicalization of the transdisciplinary field of social-ecological research (sozial-ökologische Forschung/ 
SÖF168), closely binding descriptive, normative, and intervention processes together, yielding new 
insights for both science and social praxis. While research constellations spanning across disciplines 
and science sectors continue to face big substantial and institutional obstacles (Ecornet, 2012), this 
approach is subject of a vivid debate169 and has had incipient but notorious impact in scholarly 
research, funding, and institutional development programs.  At the international level, a noteworthy 
case in point is the launching of “Future Earth” initiative by UNESCO, the United Nations University 
(UNU), the International Social Science Council (ISSC), and the International Council for Science 
(ICSU). While the field of sustainability research is still heavily dominated by the natural sciences 
(Biermann, 2010), Future Earth grants a more significant role to interdisciplinary research with the 
social sciences170 as its predecessor, the Earth System Science Partnership (Hackmann, 2014). In 
                                                 
168 The Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) –drawing on a framework-concept 
developed within an initiative of Ökoforum, an association of non-university, non-for-profit research 
institutes led by the Institut für Sozial-Ökologische Forschung (ISOE) in cooperation with BMBF (Ecornet, 
2012, p. 5)– had already institutionalized such a shift in research-focus: within the framework program 
“Research for sustainable development” (FONA), the scientific field of “social-ecological research“ 
(Sozial-ökologische Forschung/ SÖF) has been established as a priority area since 2000, and has helped 
develop a field hitherto dominated by the natural and technological sciences into a more 
transdisciplinary one. In 2012 a conference aimed at the further development of this focal point SÖF 
took place, the output of which was the Memorandum "Verstehen  - Bewerten- gestalten. Transdisziplinäres 
Wissen für eine nachhaltige Gesellschaft" (BMBF, 2012), which committed over 1000 scientists who signed 
the memorandum to ensuring that the socio-ecological research in the coming years is consistently 
deepened and widened –content-wise, organizationally and institutionally–, and was handed over to 
the Ministry of Education and Research in the autumn of 2012. This effort can be assimilated to akin 
international processes in the politics of science, such as those reflected in the publications Grand 
Challenges of Global Sustainability Research by the International Council for Science (ICSU, 2010), and the 
Transformative Cornerstones framework by the International Social Science Council (ISSC) (Hackmann & 
St. Claire, 2012). Both publications outline the key contributions the social sciences can and should 
make to global environmental change research. 
 
169 See for example the discussion between the president of the German Research Foundation (Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschft/ DFG), Peter Strohschneider, and Armin Grunwald, professor at the Karslruher 
Institute for Technology/ KIT (Grunwald, 2015) 
 
170 The 2016 appointment of former ISSC Director Heide Hackmann as ICSU Director – the first 
time ever a social scientist presides over the International Council for Science –, can be seen as 
indicative of this trend. Key publications opening up space for the social sciences in this field are the 
“Transformative cornerstones of social science research on Global Change” (Hackmann & St. Claire, 
2012); and the World Social Science Report 2013: “Social sciences in a changing global environment” 
(Hackmann & Moser, 2013a) 
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Germany, examples are well-funded research and facilities, such as DFG-funded research group on 
post-growth societies at the University of Jena (Forschungskolleg “Postwachstumsgesellschaften”) or the 
“Research group on transformation” at the Norbert Elias Center (NEC), Flensburg University 
(Forschungskolleg zu Transformation). A more historical orientation is in focus at the Centre for 
transformation research at the Univeristy of Magdeburg; while the TransZent Centre is the first cross-
institutional research facility run jointly by the University of Wuppertal and the Wuppertal Institute 
for Climate, Environment, and Energy. Other material examples of this trend include the newly 
launched PhD-funding programs on “The Great Transformation” by the Heinrich-Böll and the Rosa-
Luxemburg foundations; or else the Program “Transformateure” (i.e. “transformation agents”) at the 
Evangelische Akademie Tutzing, in Bavaria.   
 
As pioneers of social-ecological research in Germany, non-university, non-profit research 
organizations with a critical tradition heavily influenced this development since the 1980s, taking up 
social-ecological questions, as well as normative questions of societal transformation, and elaborating 
innovative trans-disciplinary approaches to deal with them (Ecornet, 2012). Several of these 
organizations and their representatives count amongst the most vocal and influential voices within the 
GT debate171, and have already been mentioned: Most prominent is probably the Wuppertal Institute, 
one of the best-known climate and environmental research organizations in Europe, which has 
historically shifted from a discursive focus on efficiency –which became particularly prominent through 
the influence of its founder Ernst U. von Weizsäcker– to an emphasis on sufficiency, under the influence 
from Wolfgang Sachs (who is actually credited with coining the term172) and its current president, Uwe 
Schneidewind, who is also a vocal growth-critic. Other agents in the debate are the Institut für ökologische 
Wirtschaftsforschung (iöw) (Institute for Ecological Economics Research), the Öko-Institut e.V, or the 
Institut für sozial-ökologische Forschung (ISOE), to name but a few, most of which networked in 
the NaWis-Runde and Ecornet173.  
                                                 
171 The Wuppertal Institute, for example, has an own publication series which carries the title “Impulse 
zur WachstumsWende” (“Impulses towards a growth transition”) 
 
172 The concepts of efficiency, sufficiency, and consistency were developed as three possible ways to 
new conceptions of welfare by the “working group on new welfare models” of the Wuppertal Institute 
in the 1990s (Biesecker, Wichterich, & von Winterfeld, 2012, p. 24) 
 
173 Ecornet (Ecological Research Network) is the network of non-university, non-for-profit 
environmental and sustainability research institutes in Germany. The common goal of the Ecornet-
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A noteworthy materialization of the discourse on transformative science is the project 
Zivilgesellschaftliche Platform Forschungswende174 (‘civil society platform for a research transition’) towards a 
societal transformation to sustainability, which was set up by the Association of German Scientists 
(Vereinigung Deutscher Wissenschaftler/VDW) as a dialogue-forum for environmental (BUND, NABU, 
DNR175), developmental, and other organizations to discuss together with scientists what orientation 
public research should adopt for the coming decades. This opening-up of the agenda-setting politics 
of science to CSOs is expected to foster a re-orientation from a current dominance of market-value 
creation and technological solutions towards a stronger emphasis on common welfare and planetary 
limits (Ober, 2013; Vereinigung Deutscher Wissenschaftler/ VDW, 2012). The platform received 
financial support from the Ministry of the Environment (BMUB) and the German Environmental 
Office (UBA) (2012-2014).  
Last but not least, the critical edge of the GT debate feeds on the rehabilitation of the critique of 
capitalism to the social sciences in the wake of the Great Recession, seemingly freeing them at last 
from the spell of Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis (Dörre, Lessenich, & Rosa, 2009; Streeck, 2013; 
Urhammer & Røpke, 2013). The most visible and unambiguous indicator of this trend is probably the 
much touted Picketty-debate, based on Harvard University Press’ bestselling book ever (Piketty, 2014), 
                                                 
Institutes is to provide the scientific foundations for societal transformations to sustainability. The 
eight Ecornet-members –the Ecologic Institut, Institut für Energie- und Umweltforschung 
Heidelberg (ifeu), Institut für ökologische Wirtschaftsforschung (IÖW), Institut für sozial-ökologische 
Forschung (ISOE), Institut für Zukunftsstudien und Technologiebewertung (IZT), Öko-Institut e.V., 
Unabhängiges Institut für Umweltfragen (UfU) und das Wuppertal Institut für Klima, Umwelt, 
Energie– are devoted mainly to applied transdisciplinary research on ways towards a post-fossil and 
post-nuclear society. In addition, some of them are acknowledged as some of the most influential 
think tanks in climate-political matters in all of Europe (see for example: 
http://wupperinst.org/info/details/wi/a/s/ad/2234). The NaWis network (Verband für Nachhaltige 
Wissenschaft), in turn, has a mixed membership of universities and non-university research facilities –
Leuphana University of Lüneburg, the University of Kassel; the Institute for Advanced Sustainability 
Studies in Potsdam (IASS); and the Wuppertal Institute–, and pursues the goal of promoting 
transdisciplinary sustainability science in the university-system and beyond.  
 
174 For an in-depth insight into the topic Forschungswende and the initiative, see the special issue Nr. 
140/2015 of the Politische Ökologie magazine: Forschungswende. Wissen schaffen für die Große Transformation 
(“Research Transition: creating knowledge for the Great Transformation”)  
 
175 NABU stands for „Nature and Biodiversity conservation Union” (Deutscher Naturschutzbund), while 
DNR is the umbrella organization for German eco-conservationist organizations (Deutscher Naturschutz 
Ring) 
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which went viral both in academic and political discussion fora, bringing the discussion about the 
necessary link between inequality and capitalism to the foreground, even if the premises of this debate 
are mired in fairly orthodox economic assumptions. The growing legion of capitalism-critical 
intellectuals and media-communicators notably include referents beyond the pool of the ‘usual 
suspects’: the Head of Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Wolfgang Streeck, for example, 
views the end of capitalism as a near inevitability (2013, 2014); the (2014 deceased) co-editor of the 
newspaper Frankfurter Allegemeine, Frank Schirrmacher (2010); or else Meinhard Miegel, founder of the 
conservative think tank Denkwerk Zukunft, yet, as we have seen, a strong advocate of economic 
downscaling (Miegel, 2010, 2012). Also worth mentioning is the rediscovery of the work of Karl 
Polanyi (Block, 2014; Fraser, 2011, 2013; Hann & Hart, 2009; Prudham, 2013; Smith, 2013; Somers 
& Block, 2014; Walker, 2013). Indeed, “Polanyi has gained belated recognition around the world as 
one of the most important thinkers of the twentieth century. He is regularly invoked by both scholars 
and activists who challenge unfettered free-market globalization, and his writings are increasingly part 
of the core canon for sociologists, political scientists, historians, and heterodox economists” (Somers 
& Block, 2014).  
The growing normative implication of academic scholars in the perspective of a social-ecological 
transformation, as well as the revival of the 1970s critical stances, is exemplarily illustrated by the 2013 
publication of the “Convivialist Manifesto. A declaration of interdependence”. This initiative of a 
group of French intellectuals aligning with a tradition of thought dating back to Ivan Illich (1973), 
brought together around 40 prominent intellectuals, mainly from the social sciences and the 
humanities – amongst whom Alain Caillé (the convener), Patrik Viveret, Serge Latouche, Eva Illouz, 
Chantal Mouffe, Edgar Morin, Eve Chiapello, and Yann Moulier-Boutang – to agree on the 
fundamental guidelines for a new form of social organization that would comply with social and 
ecological imperatives threatening the very survival of humankind. The manifesto unleashed a public 
debate in France, and was translated into German in 2014 (Adloff & Leggewie, 2014), where it soon 
streamed into ongoing debate around a GT.176   
Last but not least, also coming from the intellectual scene, but this time rather from milieus with social, 
political, and ecological concerns within the ICT-branch. Drawing on widespread digital developments 
such as the open-software and the open-source movements, socio-technical entrepreneurs have 
                                                 
176 For broadened background information and relevant sources and links, see 
http://www.diekonvivialisten.de/ 
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started experimenting with the collaborative commons taking advantage of – and at the same time 
further developing – an incipient Internet of Things (IoT) technology and infrastructure. The Open 
Source Ecology movement177 is a pioneering initiative that is in the process of developing a self-sufficient 
and self-replicative set of modular, low-cost, user-friendly industrial machines with the capacity of 
building and sustaining a small, ecologically sustainable society with modern comforts. Authors such 
as Michel Bauwens and his P2P-Foundation or Jeremy Rifkin (2014) see in these developments the 
potential for a full-fledged social-ecological ‘Great Transformation’ to a post-capitalist glocal economy 
unfolding not by means of cultural and political struggle (alone), but through socio-technical co-
evolution. While undoubtfully less radical in its conclusions, the aforementioned BMBF-foresight 
study (Zweck & al., 2015) supports the idea of a more central place for the ‘collaborative commons’ 
in modern societies by mid-century. 
 
Excursus: the Degrowth Debate 
 
The critique of economic growth – which can be found under diverse labels such as postgrowth 
(Postwachstum); growth contraction (Schrumpfung); growth transition (Wachstumswende); or degrowth 
(‘Entwachstum’) – is older and developed independently from the GT debate, yet eventually it came to 
be conducted under the header of transformation (Brand, 2016b; Latouche, 2015; Martínez-Alier, 
Pascual, Vivien, & Zaccai, 2010; Muraca, 2013; Paech, 2012). Indeed, while originally placed at the 
junction of ecological and cultural critiques to economic growth and development in the 1970s, its 
contemporary form has evolved to encompass also concerns about democracy, social justice, meaning 
of life and wellbeing (Asara et al., 2015; D’Alisa, Demaria, & Kallis, 2014; Demaria, Schneider, 
Sekulova, & Martinez-Alier, 2013). 
Over the last 10 years it spread from France over Spain and Italy –its ascendency spurred by 
development-critical discourses in L. America and Africa – to reach the Anglo-Saxon world, and later 
also Germany. Leading figures in the intellectual sphere are Serge Latouche (France), Joan Martinez-
Alier (Spain), and Tim Jackson (UK). Early inputs to the German discourse on Degrowth where the 
essay-collections “Ausgewachsen!” (Rätz, 2012), “Postwachstumsgesellschaft” (Seidl & Zahrnt, 2010) and 
“Wirtschaft ohne Wachstum?!” (Woynowski, 2012), as well as Latouche’s (2009) “Farewell to Growth” 
                                                 
177 Retrieved from http://opensourceecology.org/gvcs/ on 27.08.2017 
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and Tim Jackson’s “Prosperity without growth” (2009a, German translation published 2011). Other 
widely disseminated texts are Befreiung vom Überfluss” (2012) by Niko Paech; Schneidewind & Zahrnt’s 
“Damit gutes Leben einfacher wird”  (2013, published 2014 in English under the title “The politics of 
sufficiency: making it easier to live the good life”); and Herald Welzer’s “Thinking by yourself: an 
instruction for resistance” (2014), and, in co-authorship with Bernd Sommer, “Transformation design. Ways 
into a future-capable society” (2014), which introduces the concept of a “reductive modernity”. The 
international success of the Degrowth-dictionary “Degrowth: a vocabulary for a new era” (D’Alisa et 
al., 2014) is indicative of the resonance this discourse is finding in diverse social contexts around the 
world. The common assessment of all this literature is that the growth-dependency of contemporary 
economies is at the root of the multiple crisis. The historical struggles of the workers movement led 
to a strong politization of growth- and distributive questions, overshadowing other problematic issues 
such as gender justice, environmental pollution, and the consequences of the growth- or export-
orientation and their international (imperialistic) preconditions; i.e. that people and nature are 
exploited in other countries and therethrough contribute to the richness of wealthy countries via 
international trade (Brand, 2014b; Haberl, Fischer-Kowalski, Krausmann, Martinez-Alier, & 
Winiwarter, 2011; Hornborg, 1998). Indeed, due to largely unchangeable social and ecological 
constraints, current Western-middle class lifestyle patterns are naturally non-universalizable and thus 
per se exclusive and parasitic (Brand & Wissen, 2011). Hence a fundamental change towards ways of 
life based on ideals of sufficiency is required to unlock the pathway to a post-growth society. The 
question remains how this can be done in a historical context where the “American Way of Life” has 
virtually been elevated to the category of a basic right, which is pursued by those in the Global South 
and tightly hold on to by those in the Global North. The degrowth-movement creates the space for 
social debate to even make imagining alternatives to this world-order possible, in the first place. 
(Brand, 2014b) 
This discussion on welfare and growth is conducted in diverse live-fora, as well as increasingly in 
networks and in virtual platforms such as Netzwerk Wachstumswende, the German Degrowth Website, or the 
network Konzeptwerk Neue Ökonomie178. In addition, the degrowth-perspective is increasingly being 
adopted by a great variety of social movements and by niches of alternative economic practice, 
suggesting that degrowth is becoming a catalyzer for a grassroots-based transformation discourse 
(Konzeptwerk Neue Ökonomie e.V. & DFG-Kolleg Postwachstumsgesellschaften, 2017). Degrowth 
                                                 
178 https://wachstumswende.de/ ; http://blog.postwachstum.de/; www.degrowth.de 
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established itself as an international movement with the first International Colloquium on Sustainable 
Degrowth in Lyon (2003), which gathered hundreds of participants from France, Switzerland and Italy 
(D’Alisa et al. 2014), inaugurating a series of biyearly conferences. The 2014 International Degrowth 
Conference in Leipzig was considered the most significant grassroots-political event of the year, with 
over 3000 attendees (Brand, 2014a) and is indicative of the momentum of the Degrowth movement 
enjoys in Germany and Europe. Another massive grassroots initiative merging a degrowth outlook 
with climate concerns is Ende Gelände179. Summoned by anti-nuclear and anti-fossil activist groups with 
the support of various NGOs and political organizations under the slogan ‘system change, not climate 
change’, Ende Gelände relies on mass-mobilizations occupying open pit coal mines as a way to 
symbolically ‘take climate negotiations into their own hands’ through civil disobedience, with 
significant impact in the public sphere. Other widespread protest movements include those against 
large infrastructure projects, movements for food sovereignty and energy democracy, as well as for 
the “right to the city”.(Eversberg & Schmelzer, 2016, p. 6). In societal niches, an outburst of creativity 
in non-capitalist grassroots’ economic practices including eco-communities, cooperatives, ethical 
banks, urban gardens, time banks and community currencies contribute to secure the basic needs of 
people relying on new processes of commoning with low material throughput (Asara et al., 2015). The 
discourse on social-ecological transformation acknowledges this diversity, and offers a rendezvous 
point to advance conversations and synergies toward whole-societal change (Brand, 2016a).  
Even at the level of everyday social practices significant (if not systemic) changes can be observed: an 
increasing number of young people in Western Europe consciously renounce to eating meat; the vision 
of ‘car-free cities’ is spreading – even in major cities like Vienna over fifty percent of households do 
not own a car any longer–; and the relationship and division of labor between the formal economy 
and other forms of production, subsistence, and well-being are changing. (Brand, 2016a) 
Furthermore, the growth-critique incipiently attracts the interest –or else provokes the reaction– of 
governments and state agencies, probably (in part at least) out of resignation due to bad prospects for 
sustaining high growth rates (Misereor & IHS, 2013, p. 13): in 2008 the Austrian Federal Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management (short “Life Ministry”) launched the 
initiative “growth in transition” (‘Wachstum im Wandel’), which is conducted jointly with 20 partner 
organizations – ministries, regional governments, interest groups, private business companies, 
universities and civil society organizations – with the goal of  promoting a multistakeholder-dialogue 
                                                 
179 Further information under: https://www.ende-gelaende.org 
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on what type of growth is ecologically and socially sustainable, with the aim of increasing the resilience 
of the economic system. In this framework, three international conferences were held in Vienna in 
2010, 2012, and 2016, and has published a study synthesizing existing growth-critical transformation 
literature worldwide (Holzinger, 2016). 
The Degrowth discussion spans across the political-ideological spectrum (Eversberg & Schmelzer, 
2016; Schmelzer, 2015). Growth critique has known both support and attacks from the political right 
as well as the political left180. Left-oriented groups and parties, trade unions, and part of the media 
more open to question own traditional frameworks. Even if Degrowth can be safely framed as a radical 
and predominantly anti-capitalistic intellectual and social current, growth-critical positions have 
expanded in the last years from the margins to the center of many left-oriented groups and even 
beyond the left, at least in Germany. This should not be regarded as paradoxical, however: after all –
even if usually embedded in emancipatory agendas– Degrowth has no emancipatory content per se, 
as Miegel´s conservative plea for Degrowth illustrates. 
 
Synthesis: The discursive process of the GT 
 
Our review of the pragmatic-material dimension of the diverse discursive arenas in the GT debate can 
be synthesized by schematizing the discursive process as a whole in diachronic perspective. 
The two-decades-long post-Brundtland phase in the field of global social-ecological debates (roughly 
between the landmark events of Rio 1992 and Rio+20) is characterized by the SD consensus (in line 
with the “end of history” hypothesis dominating the cultural imaginary in those years), with serious 
discursive contestation sidelined and confined to the margins; that is, as we described it in Chapter 2, 
to the space of societal non-existence. The ‘cultural mood’ in this period is characterized by the 
institutionalist “logic of appropriateness” and consensus-optimism in governance spheres, and by an 
either optimistic or else a resigned pragmatism in other social spheres, including activist and academic 
ones. The central arena of (rather technocratic) SD deliberations during this phase is the policy-sphere. 
As of 2007-2009, the upsurge of public awareness about global climate change, the beginning of the 
Great Recession, and increasing resistance in the face of the increasingly apparent paralysis of 
                                                 
180 Could degrowth have the opposite performativity to that claimed by its advocates, and eventually 
stabilize the status quo by persuading people that a good life can be achieved with less material 
encumbrance, even under conditions of structural economic recession? 
(Eversberg & Schmelzer, 2016, p. 11)  
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multilateral cooperation, give way to a phase we could denominate of ‘incubation’, where cultural and 
political contestation starts reclaiming their space from conformity and from dry technocratic 
governance arrangements. The central arena shifts from the policy- to the (sub)political sphere, 
including the international level. An array of ideas and proposals inspired in the spirit of the great 
cultural contestations of the 1960s and 1970s surface again into the (sub)public sphere(s), as well as 
concepts from the radical ecological critique: Convivialism, Eco-socialism, Post-development, 
Sufficiency, and Degrowth – on the one hand – and Anthropocene, planetary boundaries, and Great 
Acceleration, on the other, count among the revivals in academic and political debates. Historically 
more novel inputs are the feminist discourse on care and (re)production, as well as the collaborative 
commons or P2P. Political deliberation at the time revolves around ideas such as Just transition (TUs) 
and the “Green New Deal”. 
But the GT debate did not pick up momentum until the WBGU 2011 report came out and the 
parliamentary Enquete-WWL (2010-2013) provided the proper institutional platform for discussion.  
We saw that the GT was adopted as a banner by the political opposition in the final report of the 
Enquete, taking distance from the discursive closure of the ruling coalition and their advisory experts. 
Hence, in stark contrast to the Brundtland consensus in Rio 1992 (and to the BV debate to be analyzed 
in Chapter 5), the emergence of the GT debate did not occur by consensus, but rather by dissension or 
discursive dislocation. In Chapter 3 we distinguished three main discursive strands contending in the 
(sub)political arena: The Green Economy (UNEP, OECD, Fücks, etc.), which seeks to repackaging 
of the Brundtland consensus with marginal influences from progressive social-ecological discourses; 
the Green Society, which combines the cultural critique and security discourses of the 1970s (‘Limits 
to growth’) with the re-emerging vision of the good life as political project. Finally, a conservative 
growth-critique emphasizes the security dimension and the need for a moral-cultural transformation, 
and indicates a line of fracture within conservative political elites. 
From 2014 onwards, the political momentum progressively evaporates, but not the debate in sub-
political, academic, scientific, and activist spheres. We observe a process of dialectical and progressive 
discursive assemblage, cross-fertilization, or integration, as visible in the profusion of transversal 
interaction and collaboration platforms (cross-organizational, cross-disciplinary, cross-institutional, 
including TUs, religion, NGOs, grassroots, science). The attempt at renewed consensus- 
‘performances’ (Paris 2015, SDGs) did not have the appeasing effect of Brundtland, but rather fueled 
the ‘cultural mood’ of contestation in the GT field of discussion. The full-fledged arrival of a “digital 
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modernity” and its disruptive foreseeable consequences open up additional room for transformative 
debates. Figure 12 below summarizes the above. 
 
 
 
Figure 12: The GT as a discursive process 
 
 
4.3. Dramaturgical analysis of the GT debate 
 
Given that our research-goal is understanding the (agential) dynamics behind the emergence of 
meaning-transformations, the remaining of this chapter is aimed at identifying the diverse pragmatic 
dimensions of a “successful discursive performance”. In the terms of Alexander’s (2004) synthetic 
theory introduced in Chapter 1, this amounts to identifying the diverse fusions (cf. Section 1.3.3, 
Chapter 1) that are required for a discourse to produce cultural-extension effects and psychological 
identification on the part of the audiences to which the discourse-performance is targeted. The 
required fusion dialectically integrates ‘hard’ material factors (organizational, political constraints and 
opportunities, resources, political and economic power) that would be important for political 
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opportunity- and resource mobilization theories, as well as ‘soft’ cultural ones at play in the 
spatiotemporal situation at hand (e.g. background cultural markers, hermeneutic powers, etc.). 
Furthermore, contingent elements regarding the agents and their interaction in the particular situation 
at hand are taken into account, as well.  
 
According to Alexander, a successful ‘fusion’ of the above dimensions is the precondition for creating 
and sustaining collective belief, as the inescapable precondition for the success of any collective 
project. From a normative point of view in democratic societies, however, this fusion-effect of 
performances should always be unmasked (to use a dramaturgical metaphor) through rational 
deliberation. Yet embracing rationality as a norm does not imply seeing social action as rational in an 
empirical way. Critical efforts to question a “discourse performance” are usually accompanied by 
creative efforts to mount a “counter-performance” in turn (J. C. Alexander, 2004, p. 568). The GT 
debate exemplarily allows to observe both movements of deconstruction and reconstruction (or ‘de-
fusion’ and ‘re-fusion’) implied in transformative learning (cf. Chapter 1). We thus introduce this 
distinction also in our empirical analysis, under the rubrics of disruptors (‘undoing unsustainability’) and 
generators (‘doing sustainability’), respectively. Both movements are to be regarded as enablers of 
transformative learning processes, in the sense of our research question. 
These mutually opposing movements will be analyzed considering the diverse aspects of a discourse 
performance, following Alexander’s (2004) analytical categorization: 1) the matching of (foreground) 
discourse and cultural (background) representations; 2) the matching of the discourse with the 
contingent spatiotemporal and situational context of instantiation; 3) the enabling and constraining 
role of social powers of symbolic production, distribution, and interpretation; 4) the credibility/ 
legitimacy of the discourse performance (i.e. matching of the discourse with the performing actor); 
and 5) the reception by the discourse addressees (i.e. the matching between discourse and its various 
audiences).  Furthermore, this stage of analysis seeks to gain transversal insights to the various 
discursive arenas analyzed in the first part of this chapter, so that the categories just outlined will be 
applied across the agent-centered categories in Section 4.2. The ultimate goal of the chapter is 
systematizing discursive enablers (both ‘disruptors’ and ‘generators’) and the relevant practices and roles 
of agents in the GT debate derivable therefrom. To be noted, it is not implied that the relevant factors 
identified as advancing fusion in each dimension have or are been intendedly deployed to that avail by 
self-aware transformative agents in the GT debate, although it is suggested that they potentially could 
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be strategically harnessed for the purpose of deliberately advancing the emergence of transformative 
learning processes.   
 
The method applied for this dramaturgical analysis was a triangulation of the reconstruction of the 
GT-pragmatics in the first part of this chapter, the findings of Chapter 3 on the ideational dimensions 
of the GT discourse, and secondary literature, all structured through Alexander’s heuristic framework.  
 
Match between (foreground) discourse and background cultural representations:  
 
Recalling the notions introduced in Chapter 1, this criterion tests the fit of a cognitive or discursive 
project against the established cultural model, including tacit assumptions about the world 
(ontological, epistemological, anthropological, etc.), socially legitimized moral values, etc. With this 
first test, we seek to assess the cognitive plausibility of the discursive project at hand (Eder, 2006). To 
that purpose, this section builds on the insights gained in Chapter 3, yet gearing them toward the 
articulation of discourses as “cognitive projects” and their broader cultural context.  
 
The indicator that a discursive project was successfully ‘fused’ with the prevalent cultural 
representations is that the discourse seems truthful and produces cultural extension effects – required 
is also, as we will see below, that the discursive ‘script’ gets through to the audience, which would 
make it seem real and produce psychological identification (J. C. Alexander, 2004, p. 555). A 
precondition for this, of course, is that the audience is familiarized with the codes (categories, frames) 
deployed. In a complex social order, such familiarity is always a matter of degree, and the script (i.e. a 
particular instantiation of a given discourse) is always an “action-oriented subset of background 
understandings” (p. 550).  
 
This presents a particularly heavy challenge in the case of a whole-societal transformation discourse, 
as it risks crippling the recognizability of the codes used in the discourse. While in its wholeness and 
specificity, the GT is arguably too complex and too abstract a discourse for the larger public sphere 
to pick it up (see section on ‘Obstacles’ below), we have seen in the first half of this chapter that some 
key elements of a whole-societal transformational perspective are de facto shaking deeply entrenched 
cultural pillars in the Western(-like) world, be it through lived experience, through contradictions 
becoming increasingly apparent at a more abstract level, or by the weight of evidence in terms of the 
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most revered form of knowing in the modern world: science. Moreover, non-modern yet culturally 
deeply ingrained imaginaries, such as romantic or religious ones, also add to the progressively 
upbuilding picture of a doomed conventional modern worldview by awakening nostalgias and 
questioning of industrialist postulates. (W. Sachs, 2014)  
Yet characteristic of the GT debate is also that agents do not attempt a wholesale critique of 
modernity, but rather draw on the ‘surplus meaning’ of positively connoted modern signifiers to 
expand significations towards new ways of understanding modern life beyond business-as-usual 
imaginaries and practices. In Hartmut Rosa’s terms, the GT combines critique (e.g. the ‘missile word’ 
degrowth) with promise (‘the good life’). In their performative function, the ‘pull’ force of the concrete 
utopia is synergic with the ‘push’ of the ‘realistic dystopia’ of anthropogenic global environmental 
change. 
Let us first address disrupting factors of the unsustainable status quo: At a general level, the “promise 
of modernity” has been diagnosed as loosing attractivity (H. Rosa, 2003, 2010), insofar an increasing 
number of people, also in the affluent countries, experiences it ever less as an emancipatory vehicle to 
freedom and a brighter future, and increasingly as a straight-jacket. There is a widespread feeling of 
alienation, whereby individuals are compelled to run ever faster as on a slippery slope, i.e. not to 
progress, but just to maintain their position in society. In particular, the simultaneity of the deadlock 
in multilateral climate cooperation and the public outrage over ‘too big to fail’-business companies 
and their massive taxpayer-financed out-bailing implied an upfront attack on deeply held beliefs and 
values (market-efficiency, responsibility, meritocracy, equality, justice, etc.). In addition, the plausible 
prospect of major socio-technical disruptions, be it a (potentially) emancipatory one (e.g. Rifkin’s 
‘Third Industrial Revolution’) or a gloomy one (Industry 4.0 and massive structural unemployment) 
lays fertile ground for discourses of systemic breakdown or multiple-interlinked crisis to flourish.  
Additional support for these views comes from new theoretical-conceptual developments in the 
scientific sphere: Anthropocene, Earth-system or ‘planetary boundaries’ and the implied discursive 
centrality of global systemic interdependence, tipping points, discontinuous and abrupt change, the 
evidence of rebound-effects, among others, as well as the hitherto failed promise of techno-fixes and 
persistent paradoxes (e.g. Jevon’s paradox, Easterlin-paradox) has damaged the modern 
“Promethean” imaginary of control (Dryzek, 1997); and precautionary discourses are on the rise 
(Dryzek, Goodin, Tucker, & Reber, 2008). Moreover, the above scientifically backed concepts 
challenge the classical modern dualist ontology splitting society and nature apart: social and ecological 
issues are now reframed as two sides of the same coin (Manuel- Navarrete & Buzinde, 2010). 
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The merger of existential environmental threats with the frustration of half a century of the unfulfilled 
promise of ‘global development’ has given rise to critical ways of looking at global relations, and 
economic globalization is being questioned as a “false necessity” (Unger, 2004). Unlike earlier 
geopolitical and geo-economic theories (decolonial, dependency theory, World-Systems analysis), 
however, the concept of imperial ways of life (Brand & Wissen, 2011, 2017) scrutinizes structural relations 
of domination of a cultural, rather than merely of a material nature, complementing and extending the 
critiques of the global Environmental and Climate Justice movements (Bond & Dorsey, 2010; 
Martinez-Alier, Temper, Del Bene, & Scheidel, 2016). Not only socio- and eco-, but also north and 
south are incipiently being perceived as two sides of the same coin in this global multidimensionally 
interdependent world of the 21st century. 
But the most serious blow to the unsustainable status quo is arguably delivered by the Degrowth 
critique, because growth-logic is so deeply embedded in the contemporary mindset (Welzer, 2011). 
From Chapter 3 we know that GDP growth, sufficiency, re-localization are the watershed-issues in 
the GT debate. Yet the evidence of historically unprecedented inequality rates at the global level 
(Oxfam, 2016) as inherent to the dynamics of capitalism (Piketty, 2014), contrasted against the 
relatively successful experience of more equal societies (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010), and the difficulty 
or impossibility of decoupling economic expansion from its ecological impacts (Santarius, 2014, 2015; 
Sorrell, 2007), coupled with the anyway glim prospects for sustaining future growth rates at high levels, 
opens a fracture in the hitherto undisputed growth-narrative (Santarius, 2012).  
The growth-critical perspective seeks the upfront deconstruction of the ‘triumphant narrative’ of 
capitalism, industrialism, and modernity, and Degrowth is meant as a “missile word” (Demaria et al., 
2013; Kallis, 2017) to debunk these narratives. While politically less promising, and even if the term 
‘degrowth’ should disappear in the future, the problematique it unveils will not, and contributes decidedly 
to undermining the prevailing symbolic order. Positive ‘generative’ fusions might be more successfully 
attempted by some of the concepts below.  
Having reviewed factors disrupting the status quo, let us turn to the discursive ‘generators’ fusing 
around a promising, credible vision of sustainable future.  
 
The ideational articulations and docking-opportunities described at depth in Chapter 3 exemplarily 
show how to connect the GT script with the background cultural representations of modern societies 
by selectively drawing on culturally established ecological and socially progressive values. 
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In normative terms, the GT debate purports the script of a ‘good life’ as opposed to a ‘better life’ (or 
la dolce vita for a few, as Alberto Acosta puts it). A fusion is thus sought around a new vision of 
prosperity. Both discussion and sustainability-practice have started to move beyond technological and 
market-driven solutions (von Jorck, 2014, p. 28). The surplus-meaning of established values (freedom, 
democracy, equality, individuality, science) are turned into seeds of critique and subversion, as 
apparent in aforementioned concepts such as “right to sufficiency”, “positive freedom”, or 
“transformative science” (cf. Chapter 3).  
Furthermore, transformative agents can harvest the symbolic yields of the liberal discourse which 
resonate with the self-image of Germany as a modern (leading) European nation. The European 
tradition of social-market capitalism offers grounding for Green New Deal-type of narratives and the 
like, focus on green jobs, etc. In addition, Germany prides itself, both culturally and politically, in 
being arguably the world’s ‘green standard-bearers’ and a leading force in multilateral environmental 
governance. The further deterioration not only in the state of the Earth, but also of the rate of ecological 
degradation (Steffen et al., 2015) cannot be good for this sense of national pride: the urgency of doing 
something about it could be a driver for action (e.g. increasing popular pressure for the success of the 
Energiewende). 
Moreover, Germany is famous for its ‘futuring culture’, as indicated, for example, by it high saving 
rates, politically incisive precautionary frames (e.g. decades long movement of nuclear opposition), or 
by the consciousness about the future-shaping power of current generations (as evidenced, for 
example, in the publication of Zukunftfähiges Deutschland, or by the government-funded futuring-forum 
Futurim181, located in the heart of the government district in Berlin). The central place of control as a 
German value is re-framed as self-control, instead of outward control. The strong institutionalist political 
culture grants institutional-conservative approaches – such as the liberal reformist growth critique or 
the ‘new social contract’-approach of the WBGU analyzed in Chapter 3 – greater leverage than TDs 
would otherwise have. The post-materialistic value-change, especially in younger generations, allows 
for the mainstreaming of discourses on time-prosperity, care, spirituality, and relativizing the 
importance of ownership as opposed to utilization, etc. Finally, the strongly upheld values of individual 
recognition (meritocracy) can be displaced from the capitalist market competition heading full-steam 
towards the dystopian vision of the ‘end of word’ towards a thriving collaborative P2P society. 
                                                 
181 See: https://www.futurium.de/ 
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Table 6: GT Articulation Discourse-culture 
Disruptors (‘unbuilding unsustainability’) Generators (‘building sustainability’) 
• Promise of modernity  Multiple-interlinked crisis 
(‘doomsday model’) 
• Control-imaginaryAnthropocene/pl. boundaries 
• Global development  Imperial modes of living 
• Progress, prosperity  Easterlin paradox; prospect of 
major socio-technical disruption (TiR, Industry 4.0, massive 
structural unemployment) 
• Techno-fix, decoupling  Jevon’s paradox 
• rational-choice agent  agent as carrier of practices 
• ‘better life’  Good life 
• ‘Futuring’-culture (precautionary values / e.g. nuclear 
opposition): Outward control  self-control 
• National self-understanding as world’s ‘green standard-
bearers’ and leaders in multilateral climate politics 
• Surplus meaning of modern liberal values (right to 
sufficiency, positive freedom, transformative science)  
• Market competition/ industry 4.0  collaborative P2P 
society 
 
 
Match between discourse and contingent situation / spatiotemporal context 
 
This second stage of dramaturgical analysis focuses on what in Foucaultian terms we would call the 
concrete utterance or énonciation of the discursive-typical statements (énoncés) dealt with in the first stage; 
i.e. identifying specific context-traits and matching them with specific enabling settings and material 
devices of discursive production or dispositifs. Indeed: “The underlying strains or conflicts of interest 
in a social situation simply do not ‘express’ themselves. Social problems must not only be symbolically 
plotted or framed, but also must be performed on the scene” (J. C. Alexander, 2004, p. 555). In 
dramaturgical terms, this would be equivalent to the mise-en-scène or staging process. According to 
Hajer, the mise-en-scène “refers to the deliberate organization of an interaction, drawing on existing 
symbols and the invention of new ones, as well as on the distinction between active players and 
(presumably passive) audiences” (2005, p. 631). Hence, departing from the theoretical assumption of 
a relative autonomy of symbolic action from its ‘social base’, this stage of analysis looks at the 
articulation of ideational and material, contingent and structural factors (e.g. political climate, collective 
memory of significant events in the recent past, symbolic impact of contingent events, etc.) to 
understand the contingent symbolic plausibility of the GT debate in its specific spatiotemporal 
coordinates. To this purpose, we draw on the various arenas empirically identified in the first part of 
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the chapter as stages of the GT performance: science and politics of science, political and policy 
spheres, CSOs (environmental, developmental, church, common-good oriented think-tanks), SMOs, 
grassroots and niches of alternative practice, and special interest groups (trade unions, business, think 
tanks with a particularistic agenda). 
Various disruptive factors loosening the SD-consensus can be identified. The international spotlight 
on climate change as of 2006-2007 – propelled through the almost simultaneous appearance of Al 
Gore’s ‘An Inconvenient Truth’, the IPCC’s Nobel prize, and the Stern Report (Maslin, 2014) – 
merging with the public focus on the later called Great Recession (2007 onwards) created conditions 
for a destabilization of the prevailing symbolic order: a horizon of jobless, low-growth, and the ensuing 
breakdown of the post-war class-compromise made the critique of capitalism – tabooed in the West 
since the Cold War – become again socially acceptable (Dörre et al., 2015; Sparsam et al., 2014; Streeck, 
2013). An important catalyzer prefiguring the GT debate was the Green New Deal narrative in the early 
stages of the crisis. The GT debate, as a more complex and decentralized discursive arena, catalyzed, 
as we saw, around two kick-off events: the 2010-2013 Enquete-WWL (with its countless spin-off 
forums) was driven, on the one hand, by the backwind of a political momentum for a ‘red-red-green’ 
parliamentary alliance under the GT-banner against a right-of-center ruling coalition, and, on the 
other, by contagion of a widespread international debate on welfare indicators. The second catalyzer, 
the 2011 WBGU-report, seeks to raise the bar of international SD debates calling for a ‘new social 
contract’ for a GT in the context of Rio+20 (noteworthily, the English translation replaces the term 
‘Great Transformation’ with ‘sustainability). From its very exposed site of enunciation at the interface 
between the scientific and the policy spheres, the WBGU took some risk in questioning the 
mainstream SD discourse – particularly in its demands for a steered far-reaching cultural 
transformation – supported by the social legitimacy of science. This risk-taking was likely prompted 
also by the legitimacy-crisis of science itself182, which provides the push towards greater scholarly 
engagement with normative and practical issues (in particular, regarding geostorical challenges). In 
Germany, the existence of an established infrastructure of (relatively more flexible, dynamic, and 
practice-oriented) non-academic, critical research institutions – as well as own units of research and 
                                                 
182 Also crisis of science, in terms of its legitimacy to uphold a claim to superior, authoritative 
knowledge (Beck, 1992; Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993; Gallopin et al., 2001); and its relevance and 
capacity to solve humanity’s most fundamental and pressing problems (Hackmann & Moser, 2013a; 
Mauser et al., 2013; Moser, Hackmann, & Caillods, 2013)  transformation as a vindication of the 
role of science. 
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philosophical reflection (Grundsatzfragen183) in NGOs, trade unions, state agencies, etc. – facilitated 
swift convergence of a significant part of the scholarly sphere around the GT as a discursive focus 
and research-priority. Key in this development ad intra the scientific sphere was also the existence of 
a priority focus at national state level (BMBF) on Social-Ecological Research (SÖF). The fortuitous 
coincidence of this unfolding debate under the rubric of ‘transformation’ with the official launching 
of the German Energy Transition (Energiewende) after the nuclear accident in Fukushima (2011), 
reinforced the utopian momentum. The GT debate was further exogenously spurred over time by to 
other two high-profile multilateral processes: the 2015 climate summit in Paris (which prompted the 
publication of Pope Francis’ Laudato Si’) and the SDGs-process of the United Nations that same year. 
Around these landmark events at national and international level, a variety of other (sub)political actors 
appeared on the stage. Highly organized and globally networked NGOs teamed up with growing anti-
systemic movements (Attac, Environmental and Climate Justice, Via Campesina, etc.) and the 
transformative proposals of governments in small countries in the global south who had captured the 
popular imagination, such as the indigenous-inspired Buen vivir in Ecuador and in Bolivia  (where it is 
rather called Vivir Bien)(cf. Chapter 5), but also unusual suspects like the trade unions, who had joined 
the international debate in the Copenhagen climate summit of 2009 with their “just transition” 
discourse, made the lock-in of (multilateral) politics increasingly apparent (‘G-zero’), thus prompting 
a shift in the GT-stage from mainstream politics to sub-political arenas in civil society and transversal 
platforms across state, religion, grassroot movements, NGOs, and science, in various partial 
combinations (cf. Section 4.2). Remarkably, ideas of system-change and degrowth are also prompting 
acts of protest (periodic Wir haben es Satt mass demonstrations against the agribusiness model) and 
civil disobedience (Ende Gelände). 
 
The convergent status-quo-disrupting factors above are reinforced by an array of generative stimuli 
for the emergence of the new: The narrative or symbolic plausibility of ‘radical futures’ brought about 
by the convergence of an “emancipatory catastrophism” (Beck, 2015b), destabilizing entrenched 
unsustainable symbolic orders – prompting, among others, the green-red fusion in activism and 
incipiently also in politics (cf. Section 4.2) –, and attractive future prospects such as the rise of 
alternative forms of production and consumption (collaborative commons, a prosumer P2P-society), 
together with a relative amicable context of practice with innovations which have overflown the 
                                                 
183 Transl. ‘fundamental issues’ or ‘questions of principle’. 
211 
 
boundaries of ecovillages and expanded into society at large (urban gardening, food cooperatives, 
repair-cafés, etc.). The profusion of discursive corridors in the form of cross-disciplinary, cross-
sectoral platforms served not only the purpose of spreading systemic critique, of course, but also that 
of spreading utopian counter-visions and activating collaboration.  
Even when characterized by low reflexivity and path-dependent, business-as-usual discursive 
reproduction, larger government-led, participative futuring drafting-processes (Zukunftsdialog on the 
good life, Zukunftscharta) installed broad referential topics in the public sphere (Reisch & Bietz, 2014, 
p. 16). More focused futuring forums, in turn, particularly those conceived as platforms for reflection 
and dialogue on controversial/tabooed topics, such as growth or consumption downscaling, or a 
‘democratization of science’, proved true discourse-production arenas in the GT debate: The Growth 
in Transition initiative (WiW) by the Austrian Life Ministry, the state-funded DGF-Research 
Consortium on Post-growth Societies at Jena University, the social information center and 
deliberation forum Futurim, multi-stage deliberative processes such as Wohlstand wie anders, SPDs 
Fortschrittsforum, the civil society platform for the research transition Forschungswende, etc. 
Furthermore, the GT debate has diffracted into a multitude of sub-discourses around more concrete 
topics (as summarized by the axial themes of the GT debate identified in Chapter 3); each of them 
developing a ‘life of their own’. Also, the controversial character of discussions (particularly around 
the Degrowth strand) would help both de-fuse the SD-consensus and, at the same time, fuel the 
permanence and intensity of the GT debate. Other strands of debate, in turn, allow for concrete action 
proposals goes beyond deliberative interaction. Material dispositifs, which can be regarded at once as an 
outcome of and as an input to the GT discourse, include, for example:  
- Influential publications (and their respective trailers), including the abovementioned Laudato 
Si’, the 2011 WBGU-report, Tim Jackson’s Prosperity without Growth (translated into German in 
the midst of the Enquete-WWL debates, and becoming the all-time bestseller of the publishing 
house Oekom), Miegel’s Exit (republished by the bpb: German Agency for Political Education, 
together with Jackson’s book), among others, further developed the contents of the GT debate 
and maintained public interest. Moreover, the emergence of an organic inter-textual network 
around these iconic publications (including follow-up publications, but also countless 
academic and public discussion fora, conferences, talk-series, etc.) was instrumental to the 
reproduction of the GT debate 
- in the policy-sphere: proposals for “non-reformist reforms”, for example Energiewende, UBI, 
or the emergence of a new policy sphere around the structural dimensions of time, including 
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regulations on the durability of manufactured products or on working time, the mainstreaming 
of care, etc. Other dispositifs include political programs (WiW, Plan B of Die Linke), projects 
at ministerial (especially education and research BMBF and development cooperation BMZ) 
or specialized agency levels (Federal Environmental Office UBA) 
- in civil society: collaborative platforms such as Transition Network, Wachstumswende or degrowth.de, 
and various direct-action initiatives around themes such as fossil-fuel divestment, food 
sovereignty, prosumer initiatives (e.g. do-it-yourself facilities), urban gardening, decentralized 
monetary systems (e.g. experiments with blockchain technologies) and local currencies. 
- in the field of science: the emergence of transformative science as a new scholarly orientation, 
the civil society platform for a Research Transition (Forschungswende), or the Convivialist 
Manifesto. 
 
Table 7 : GT Articulation discourse-contingent situation 
Disruptors (‘unbuilding unsustainability’) Generators (‘building sustainability’) 
• Simultaneous spotlight on climate change as of 2006-2007 and 
on the financial crisis after 2007 
• technical and cultural attacks on mainstream discourse supported 
in the socially legitimized language of science 
• knowledge about Earth-systemic megatrends 
• critique of capitalism becomes again socially acceptable 
• Breakdown of the postwar class-compromise  
• Political crisis of legitimacy (G-zero, rise of extreme right, post-
democracy) 
• Legitimacy crisis of science pushing towards greater normative 
and practical engagement of scholars (particularly with 
‘geostorical-challenges) 
 
• Sub-political institutional sphere: profusion of cross-disciplinary, 
cross-sectoral collaboration platforms as discursive corridors 
• convergence of diverse social and ecological emancipatory 
struggles (red-green fusion) 
• Narrative plausibility of ‘radical futures’ 
• Larger government-led, participative futuring drafting-processes 
installing topics on the agenda. 
• Relatively amicable context of practice (rise of alternative forms 
of production and consumption) 
• Catalyzers & Levers: new programmatic orientations 
(‘transformative science’), ‘non-reformist reform’ proposals (UBI, 
time policy, Energiewende), deliberative platforms (Enquete, 
Forschungswende), iconic publications (WBGU, Laudato Si, 
Prosperity without Growth) 
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Enabling and constraining role of social powers 
 
According to Alexander and his co-authors “Power establishes an external boundary for cultural 
pragmatics that parallels the internal boundary established by a performance's background 
representation” (J. C. Alexander et al., 2006, p. 36). Social power affects the performance of a discourse 
by mediating the access to the means of symbolic production and of symbolic distribution (the latter becoming 
more important the greater the technological mediation of the performance), and of course, through 
the power of interpretative mediation, i.e. of critique and censorship (hermeneutic power). Taken 
together, these interlocked power structures illuminate the material-structural preconditions making 
the GT debate possible – including the material (self-)reproduction of transformative agents –, and 
allow reflections on the possibility of deliberately developing (or not) material structures that embody 
the same key principles.  
 
a. Symbolic Production 
One outstanding feature of the GT debate, as we have mentioned, is its polyarchic character. There is 
no monopoly or oligopoly of meaning-production; rather shared meanings are varyingly shaped with 
inputs from diverse epicenters in dialectical mutual interrelation. Even if agents clearly present power 
differentials in terms of their visibility, public legitimacy, economic resources at their disposal, etc., 
this distributed nature of the debate yields a relatively balanced distribution in the power for symbolic 
production. Furthermore, despite the disparities mentioned, all participants have certain amount of 
resources available for their own production of content through research: indeed, most NGOs, 
technical state agencies, trade unions, etc. have their own organizational departments for dealing with 
‘fundamental questions’ (Grundsatzfragen), and for their publication (grey literature) (see point on self-
reproduction below).  
But diversity is also important ad intra each of the nodes of the GT-network, as it lowers internal 
conformity-pressures. This is a clear lesson taught, for example, by the political foundations, whose 
discursive patterns may differ significantly from the mainstream discourse within the organization, 
and also from the ‘official’ discourse of their associated political party. Hence the Rosa Luxemburg 
Foundation strongly fosters the idea of a “transformative left” over the mainstream classical 
“distributive left” (Brand, 2014b), and at the Heinrich-Böll Foundation, the two factions of so-called 
Realos and Fundis have managed to co-exist in creative tension, and share executive power through a 
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double-head directorship. Hence organizational and institutional design comes to the fore again here 
as a way of balancing discourse. 
Another aspect empowering the symbolic production of transformative discursive contents is the 
existence of cooperation infrastructures and networks linking diverse sub-systems, as discussed in the 
previous section. This plays a double enabling function: first, this transversality allows for political 
debate about fundamental issues at a supra-systemic or whole-societal level, and provides the 
possibility of a practical counterpart to deliberation (e.g. a politics of time yielding a transformative 
time policy). Secondly, the existence of crossover-platforms (e.g. the transdisciplinary of social-
ecological research) implies that agents are structurally freed, to an extent, at least, from internal 
conformity pressures with their own spheres (in our example: with academic disciplines) or self-
referential drives. 
The two above aspects are key for interrupting the prevalent symbolic order. On the side of the 
generators producing discursive novelty, the empirical material yielded two further aspects. First, 
institutional design is instrumental also here to the capacity of production of transformative symbolic 
content in the GT debate. We observe, for example, instances of institutionalized mainstreaming of 
diversity in democratic will-formation (e.g. parliamentary Enquetes184, sub-political forums such as 
political foundations, Kirchentag, etc.), protected spaces for bold imagination and experimentation (e.g. 
learning labs such as the Smart CSOs or the network Wachstumswende), or an institutionalized long-
term and high-complexity orientation (WBGU, Enquetes, specialized and semi-public forums).  
Secondly, and the importance of the abovementioned distributed character of meaning-production 
notwithstanding, the priority-setting by agents with key enabling capacities remains, of course, of great 
importance: The high-priority given to social-ecological themes in selected state-funded and/or state-
organized programs, particularly in research (e.g. SÖF, Jena DFG research consortium) but also in 
                                                 
184 Enquete-commissions constitute a singular instrument of discourse-production. Forcefully 
convened at the request of only 25% of congressional seats, minorities are given agenda-setting power 
in parliamentary debates. Political pressure for decisions is removed: they constitute a space for the 
discussion of complex long-term issues, and issue a final report with recommendations to 
governments. They can also be continued in a following legislative period (shielding from the logic of 
short electoral cycles). Fifty percent of the commission is composed by Members of Parliament, the 
rest by external stakeholders and experts, which diverts from the party competition-logic. These 
institutional features make structural room for discursive diversity and root-searching (Brand, Pühl, & 
Thimmel, 2013, p. 37) 
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facilitating public deliberation (e.g. Austrian Growth in Transition program, Futurium center in Berlin), 
play a major role in fueling the GT debate.  
 
Table 8: Articulation Discourse-power of symbolic production 
Disruptors (‘Unbuilding unsustainability’) Generators (‘Building sustainability’) 
• Separation between power of symbolic production and distribution 
• High-capillarity distribution infrastructure (state, churches, 
development sector, etc.) 
• Large non-for profit economic actors  
• Enabling and empowering distributed symbolic production 
• Shielding high-capillarity infrastructures of distribution from direct 
political, market, and cultural pressures (e.g. state channels) 
• Balancing, positive discrimination practices 
• Communicating vessels with politics, the economy, 
and the socio-cultural sphere. (agents as ‘peninsulas’, 
not ‘islands’ 
• Strategic synchronization in symbolic distribution 
(creation of framework of cross-referencing) 
• Institutional platforms for aggregation and 
systematization of local experiments and diffusion of 
institutional standards.  
• Activating practices: provide leadership, build trust, 
translate sub-cultural codes  
 
b. Symbolic Distribution 
Substantially contributing not only to creating a ‘freed space’ for symbolic contestation to emerge, but 
also for these alternative discursive projects to circulate in the GT debate is the separation between 
material and symbolic power. Indeed, by implication, the polyarchic nature of the debate means that 
symbolic production is not exclusively concentrated in the conglomerates of material power, and that 
contents are distributed in the very process of their creation. This is made possible by a basic high-
capillarity distribution infrastructure formed by institutions with sophisticated and extensive 
structures: religious institutions, the development sector, the academic (and, to an extent, also non-
for-profit extra-academic research) sector, the political foundations, and, of course, state-channels and 
state-subsidized diffusion of relevant civic-educational materials (e.g. through the Federal Agency for 
Political Education, BPB), as well as through progressive academic mainstreaming, and the spread 
though social media and other horizontal communication platforms. The existence of large non-for 
profit economic agents, such as the churches, which are the second-largest employers in Germany 
after the state, makes such far-reaching infrastructure possible. To be sure, on the flip-side, the 
autonomy of these actors from public scrutiny can be regarded as problematic in its own terms. Yet 
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their autonomy is relative: they are still subject to the rule of law, exposed to the dictates of public 
opinion, and – in the long run – dependent on funding from a democratically controlled state. 
However, the relative resilience they enjoy with respect to the political game, the capitalist profit-
motive, and the prevalent cultural model as embodied in average public preferences places these actors 
in a unique position for embodying and spreading transformation discourses challenging the prevalent 
cultural model by offering ‘counter-current’ points of orientation away from acceleration, 
globalization, commodification, quantitative growth (Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014, p. 29). 
 
In addition to the above infrastructural conditions, concrete agential practices of positive 
discrimination can play a significant role, setting either on impact or on critical-mass: media outlets 
oriented towards social, cultural, and political analysis with a non-massive yet stable readership (Blätter, 
Oekom Verlag, TAZ, etc.), bestselling authors such as Herald Welzer or Robert Skidelsky, or else self-
driven discursive agents spreading discourse through their own (often also state-subsidized185) 
publishing means, discussion forums, digital network-channels, etc.  
The infrastructures referred to above not only constitute structural destabilizers of the symbolic order, 
moreover they can be harnessed to support “a transition from narrow self-interest to social behaviors, 
or from relentless novelty to a considered conservation of things that matter” (Jackson, 2009a, p. 98). 
The state, for example, but also the churches and other large CSOs can help “spread a culture based 
on different measures of time and space and different lifestyle priorities, involving fewer things and 
fewer commodities”, they can deliberately “counterweight instrumental rationality and foster activities 
and behaviors away from all-pervasive cost-benefit calculation” (Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014, p. 66) 
and “demonstrate that such a culture is equally valid and has an equal right to be supported by the 
common institutional framework” (p. 51). 
If some form of shielding from political, economic, and cultural pressures was essential to the 
production of TDs, what is critical to their symbolic distribution-capacity is the existence of structural 
communicating vessels with the spheres of culture, politics, and/or the economy.  In the GT debate, 
                                                 
185 Worthwhile examples I came across are the producer of digital transformation-related materials 
with a critical outlook, Fairbindung (https://www.fairbindung.org/), and ecapio (http://ecapio.org/), a 
small initiative which records and makes conferences related to the topics global, social, and 
environmental justice available online. Both are partly state-funded. 
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transformative agents are metaphorically viewed as “peninsulas” and not as “islands186” (WBGU, 
2014, p. 74). Individual agents are embedded in physical or digital interconnected web of network 
structures (Future Earth, NaWis, Ecornet, Transition Towns, Wachstumswende, etc.) (cf. Section 4.2). 
Furthermore, the construction of an intertextual referential framework across networks is not the only 
relevant factor seemingly helping the GT debate emerge and spread: the near simultaneity of its build-
up likely played a decisive role in helping it reach a critical mass. As we saw, the base of the discursive 
field was constituted by and large within the sessions-period of the Enquete-WWL (2010-2013) and 
its aftermath, creating the ‘discursive corridors’ that unfolded during the following years connecting 
the ‘peninsular’ GT debate with the ‘continent’ of the larger public sphere. 
In addition, this meso-level infrastructure combining some degree of ‘shielding’ with some degree of 
‘leverage’ provides other key services linked to the distribution of TDs as symbolic projects: It allows 
for systematization, continuity, and consistency through the mutual engagement of discourses in the 
field, and creates a meso-level of implementation articulating abstract macro-perspectives such as the 
Anthropocene or the idea of ‘sufficiency’ with particular local transformation-experiments such as 
Transition Towns. This would serve the twofold objective of aggregation and systematization of 
particular experiences and the diffusion of institutionalized standards. (Ronzheimer, 2013) 
Summarizing the above in terms of practices that agents could typically rely on to reproduce 
conditions of possibility for an efficacious distribution of transformative symbolic content: First, 
enabling and empowering distributed symbolic power, independently of material power. Possible 
means to this end are countless, but facilitating the connection of small discourse-producers to larger, 
high-capillarity infrastructures of distribution (e.g. state channels) and shielding the latter from direct 
political, market, and cultural pressures – be it through institutional design, funding schemes, etc. – is 
a powerful pattern, as the GT debate attests. The creation of communicating vessels between small-
scale transformative developments and larger, more resilient networking-platforms amounts to the 
creation of structural preconditions. Yet agency will also be required to facilitate dialogue, build trust, 
provide leadership, translate sub-cultural codes, empower weaker nodes (for example, by bridging 
                                                 
186 According to Robert Brulle (2000), it was the ‘insular’ character of the hippie movement prevented 
them to foster large-scale social change in the 1960s and 1970s: they did not develop communicative 
vessels with the ‘continent’. That was arguably also part of the reason why events and actors which 
were successful in terms of public resonance, proved ephemeral in their collective learning-impacts: 
editorial successes such as Meadows et al.’s ‘Limits to Growth’ (1972) or E.F. Schumacher’s “Small is 
beautiful” (1973) spring to mind as examples.  
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information asymmetries), etc., and seek to synchronize discursive inputs to create a critical mass 
sustaining discursive counter-projects over time. 
 
Table 9: Articulation Discourse – power of symbolic distribution 
Disruptors (‘Unbuilding unsustainability’) Generators (‘Building sustainability’) 
• Separation between power of symbolic production and distribution 
• High-capillarity distribution infrastructure (state, churches, 
development sector, etc.) 
• Large non-for profit economic actors  
• Enabling and empowering distributed symbolic production 
• Shielding high-capillarity infrastructures of distribution from direct 
political, market, and cultural pressures (e.g. state channels) 
• Balancing, positive discrimination practices 
• Communicating vessels with politics, the economy, 
and the socio-cultural sphere. (agents as ‘peninsulas’, 
not ‘islands’ 
• Strategic synchronization in symbolic distribution 
(creation of framework of cross-referencing) 
• Institutional platforms for aggregation and 
systematization of local experiments and diffusion of 
institutional standards.  
• Activating practices: provide leadership, build trust, 
translate sub-cultural codes  
 
 
c. Hermeneutic power (interpretation, censorship) 
In today’s complex and largely unintelligible world, people increasingly delegate the function and the 
power to interpret (i.e. make sense) to scholarly experts, media-persons, to media-outlets (e.g. a 
prestigious newspaper or publishing house), or even – as the strong social resonance of the Encyclical 
Laudato Si’ attests, for example – also to religious authorities; that is, to organizations which are 
conventionally accorded hermeneutic or interpretative authority, or to individuals by virtue of their 
professional expertise or over-average cultural capital (Stengel, 2011). We hereafter refer to these 
agents as meaning-making elites. (Assadourian & The Worldwatch Institute, 2010; Stengel, 2011) 
In the case of the GT debate, we can see media outlets such as the abovementioned Blätter für deutsche 
und internationale Politik, Le Monde Diplomatique, or TAZ, for example, playing this role. Publishing 
houses such as Oekom are committed to diffusing GT contents through periodic publications or books, 
as are popular authors such as the aforementioned Herald Welzer or Robert Skidelsky. Through 
progressive academic mainstreaming, academic journals not only in Ecological Economics or Political 
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E c ol o g y, b ut i n cr e asi n gl y als o i n m ai nstr e a m s o ci al s ci e n c e j o ur n als s u c h as T heory, C ult ure, a n d Society  
ar e b e c o mi n g r ef er e nts f or G T - dis c ussi o ns i n t h eir r es p e cti v e cir cl es of i nfl u e n c e.  
 
Y et e v e n if t h e p o w er of i nt er pr et ati o n d o es n ot n e c ess aril y li e wit h pr o d u c ers or distri b ut ers of t h e 
s y m b oli c c o nt e nt, t h e f a ct t h at t h e G T d e b at e l ar g el y u nf ol ds t hr o u g h dis p ositifs s u c h as gr e y lit er at ur e 
a n d (s e mi) p u bli c d eli b er ati v e f or u ms i m pli es t h at pr o d u cti o n a n d i nt er pr et ati o n of s y m b oli c c o nt e nt 
ar e l ar g el y c o u pl e d a n d, d u e t o t h e p ol y ar c hi c c h ar a ct er of t h e d e b at e, hi g hl y distri b ut e d. A m a cr o -
l e v el,  str u ct ur al,  a n d  g e n er al  pr e c o n diti o n  f or  t his  c o v ar yi n g  pr o d u cti o n  a n d  i nt er pr et ati o n  is  t h e  
e xi st e n c e of a c ult ur e of d eli b er ati o n, w hi c h G er m a n y pr ais es its elf f or ( De b atte n k ult ur ). W hil e s u c h 
m a cr o -str u ct ur al c o n diti o ns ar e m or e diffi c ult t o r e pr o d u c e at will, it is cl e arl y n ot s o m et hi n g t h at 
c a n n ot b e d eli b er at el y f ost er e d as a l o n g -t er m e nt er pris e t hr o u g h a d e q u at e i nfr astr u ct ur e ( e. g. f or m al 
e d u c ati o n)  a n d  pr o m oti o n,  as  ill ustr at e d  b y  t h e  i d e a  of  pr o m oti n g  a  ‘tr a nsfor m ative  liter acy’ 
( S c h n ei d e wi n d). T h e n or m ali z ati o n a n d r o uti ni z ati o n of c o m m o n u n d erst a n di n g a b o ut t h e m ulti pl e 
crisis, its c a us es,  a n d i nt er v e nti o n o pti o ns, as w ell as t h e o p p ort u niti es a n d c o nstr ai nts f or t h e l att er, 
d e- n at ur ali z e t h e c urr e ntl y pr e v aili n g s y m b oli c or d er a n d r e n d er it a m e n a bl e t o q u esti o ni n g, i m a gi ni n g 
alt er n ati v es, a n d i n vit e c oll e cti v e l e ar ni n g.  
 
T h e af or es ai d n ot wit hst a n di n g, t h e pr es e n c e of ‘ c e ns ors hi p’ is u bi q uit o us i n t h e G T d e b at e: i n d e e d, 
t h e  i nt ell e ct u alist  bi as  of  t h e  t o pi c,  its  c o u nt er-c ult ur al  c h ar a ct er,  a n d  t h e  diffi c ult y  of  i m m e di at e  
m at eri al  d eri v ati o ns  m a k e  t h e  c o nstr ai nts  of  a  str u ct ur al,  distri b ut e d,  F o u c a ul di a n  n oti o n  of  
c e ns ors hi p- p o w er  visi bl e:  it  is  t h e  c e ns ors hi p  of  t a b o o,  t h e  c e ns ors hi p  of  p oliti c al  rit u als  w hi c h  
m a n d at e t h at “t h e ‘ri g ht’ pr o p os al b e str o k e if it s h o ul d c o m e fr o m t h e ‘ wr o n g’ p art y ” ( S c h ell n h u b er, 
i n Disc ussio n  bet wee n  H a ns -Jo ac hi m  Sc hell n h u ber  a n d  K atj a  Ki p pi ng  at  t he  Co nfere nce  “ Ge n ug  f ür  
Alle â  ” So zi al.ö ko.logisc h, ”  2 0 1 7) . D u e t o t his f or m of c e ns ors hi p, t h e G T d e b at e is str u ct ur all y li mit e d 
t o r e a c h b ot h t h e l ar g er p u bli c or m ai nstr e a m p oliti cs1 8 7 . A w a y of miti g ati n g t his t y p e of c e ns ors hi p 
a n d  p er c ol at e  t h e  l ar g er  s o ci et al  a n d  p oliti c al  ar e n a  i n  t h e  G T d e b at e  h as b e e n  t hr o u g h  c at al yti c 
i nt er v e nti o n  i niti ati v es,  h ar n essi n g  c o nti n g e nt  o p p ort u nit y- wi n d o ws: E nergie we n de ,  f or  e x a m pl e,  
r es ult e d fr o m t h e  b ott o m-u p str u ct ur al s et -u p o v er t hr e e d e c a d es m e eti n g t h e c h a n c e o p e n e d b y 
F u k us hi m a. D e gr o wt h cr e ati v el y h ar n ess e d t h e c o nt e xt of e c o n o mi c crisis a n d t h e m o m e nt o us d e b at e 
                                                 
1 8 7  F or a f urt h er d e v el o p m e nt of t h es e i d e as, s e e t h e s e cti o n o n ‘ O bst a cl es t o a f us e d p erf or m a n c e’ at 
t h e e n d of t his c h a pt er. 
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on transformation, and the UBI proposal relies on a cross-party proto-alignment in the face of a 
perceived as inevitable shrinking of the job-market.   
 
Transformative agents can thus learn the following from the GT debate in terms of turning 
hermeneutic power in favor of transformative learning: First, fostering a culture of deliberation and 
transformative literacy can be fostered as a structural enabler for learning. Secondly: a combination of 
high-impact interventions (e.g. a bestselling book) with a decentralized production of discursive 
dispositifs (grey literature, life or virtual forums, etc.) for discursive balance combines visible guidelines 
for interpretation with structural balancing through embeddedness into a textual-web, thus 
distributing hermeneutic power. Thirdly, catalyzing intervention initiatives are required to circumvent 
the inherent structural constraints (which can be understood as a diffused form of censorship), which 
requires identifying structural windows of opportunity and creative strategic framing.  
 
Table 10: GT Articulation Discourse-hermeneutic power 
Disruptors (‘unbuilding unsustainability’) Generators (‘building sustainability’) 
• Established deliberative culture 
• Decentralized symbolic production implies structurally 
decentralized hermeneutic power  
• High-impact interventions offering hermeneutic alternatives 
(affirmative action) 
• Transformative literacy 
• Catalytic intervention proposals as focal points for 
conversation, thus limiting censorship (Energiewende, 
UBI, etc.)  
 
By way of conclusion regarding the role of social powers in successful discourse- or cultural 
performance: A combination of various forms of shielding (from economic, political, and cultural 
constraints) with some form of leverage (over the field of discourse) would allow transformative agents 
to circumvent constraining powers and produce a positive contribution to the emergence of social-
ecological utopias through fostering (counter-hegemonic) discursive creativity, enabling widespread 
and synchronic symbolic dissemination, or distributing hermeneutic power. Civil society organizations 
are particularly well-suited to combine these three forms of symbolic power:  
 
through their influence on public opinion, through their structures, through their public 
impact and their political influence, they can develop new concepts and risk new visions, they 
can demonstrate the alternatives to ‘further, faster, more’ in practical projects, they can set the 
221 
 
tone within their own sphere and engage their members as agents for sufficiency. At the same 
time, they can put a spoke in the wheels of the ideology of escalation; they can win time by 
means of blockades, create public pressure for a complete re-think, and push through 
alternative solutions to problems – especially through public participation. They can help to 
transform a resigned sense that ‘there is no alternative’ into an inspiring belief that ‘another 
world is possible’ (Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014, p. 142) 
 
As per our review, all three dimensions of symbolic power are critically linked to the capacity and the 
conditions for material self-reproduction of transformative agents. Practices that could be 
purposefully undertaken to foster conditions of sustainable self-reproduction of transformative agents 
as per the above insights are related to the sources and the conditions of funding: a relatively stable, 
tax-based, or decentralized funding structure is a precondition for transformative agents’ material 
independence and security. While independence is important to limit the domination of mainstream 
discourse, security is functional to the capacity of utopian creation and the implicit risk-taking 
(Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014, p. 142). As observed in the GT debate, large non-for-profit 
organizations with economic, social, or cultural leverage are uniquely positioned to this purpose. Such 
structures are not necessarily replicable in other contexts, however: the case of church-tax, for 
example, is unique to Germany in international comparison, and has deep historical roots that can be 
traced back to the Holy Roman Empire. However, more easily replicable structures could be put in 
place in substitution: large-scale fostering of P2P collaborative platforms, structural promotion of 
voluntary work, maybe potentiated through combination with a sensible and holistic time-policy, 
particularly in relation to waged working-time, would be conducive to strengthening the resilience, 
risk-taking capacity, and transformative leverage of civil society organizations and networks. 
Proportional increase in public funding, targeted project-commissioning by the state, and other forms 
of state-driven material stimuli work to similar avail.  
 
Credibility and legitimacy of discursive agents 
 
Even if the means of symbolic production (distribution and interpretation) are sufficient, the narrative 
a powerful one, and the mise-en-scène skillfully set in place, there is no guarantee that the performance 
will succeed. There remains the extraordinary challenge of acting it out. (J. C. Alexander, 2004, p. 559). 
We can name this challenge raising credibility. A first source of credibility is the degree of authenticity the 
audience would ascribe to the performance. In everyday life and common language, a person is 
deemed authentic if he or she is “real, straightforward, truthful, and sincere”; if his or her “actions 
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appear sui generis, the product of a self-generating actor who is not pulled like a puppet by the strings 
of society” (J. C. Alexander, 2004, p. 548).  
Let us start by looking at the main factors disrupting the credibility of the Brundtland-consensus on 
SD. With regard to the comparative drag-over effect of past performances, the increasingly apparent 
failure of ecological modernization approaches to bend deleterious social-ecological trajectories 
reinforce the sense of authenticity of ‘transformation’ as an emerging paradigm (Brand, 2016c).  
In addition, the image of authenticity of mainstream SD-advocates is impaired through a fracture in 
intra-elite consensus: Even if the WBGU’s proposals fall short of fundamentally challenging the 
dominant nature-society relationship and the role of capitalist markets, its dramatic description of the 
ecological crisis alone is a sign of disruption (Brand, 2012a), which, as we saw, produced a 
bandwagoning-effect of all transformative forces. Also within the ruling coalition a fracture became 
exposed: neoclassical-neoliberals, ‘business as usual’ advocates showed divergences with part of the 
conservative factions (with the public figure of Meinhard Miegel as catalyzer) in the ruling coalition 
who acknowledge the interlinked and multidimensional character of the crisis and the need for 
fundamental transformations. Although the former remain dominant and set the tone of the official 
position, this arguably constitutes a significant political development. (Brand, Pühl, et al., 2013). 
Another source of credibility is what we above referred to as the ‘peninsular’ as opposed to ‘insular’ 
character of GT-agents: it is not the excluded of society (only) who purport a GT-imperative, but 
some individuals and organizations enjoying a high level of social recognition, be it through 
institutional prestige attached to them (general academic qualification, representative character of e.g. 
a religious institution, etc.), or through the more particularized recognition awarded to personal or 
organizational trajectories (e.g. Wuppertal-Institute, Bread for the World, Misereor), to political or 
media-caché (e.g. H. Welzer, Katja Kipping, or M. Miegel), or to personal charisma (Pope Francis). 
The generally positive public image of NGOs (Kriegman, 2008) plays a similar function (Schneidewind 
& Zahrnt, 2014, p. 142). This is largely a result of the profusion of what scholars have called “shadow 
networks” or “insider-outsider networks”, i.e. informal networks that work both outside and within 
the established system or symbolic order (B. C. Roberts & Parks, 2010; Gunderson1999; Olsson et 
al.2006; Westley and Vredenburg 1997, cited in Westley et al., 2011). The idea of a radical 
transformation appears more credible188 to the larger public (in the sense of plausible) when it is 
                                                 
188 The opposite thesis could be advanced, as well, namely that radicalism is more credible (in the sense 
of authentic) when it is embodied by non-mainstream actors. Yet in a pragmatist and cynical Western 
culture of late modernity, radical anti-systemic proposals from the margins of society are hardly taken 
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embodied by established and recognizable actors. This recognizability  increases the symbolic 
compatibility of the GT discourse with aspirational status-symbols of intended audiences, generating 
“dramaturgical loyalty” (Benford & Hunt 1992, cited in Hajer, 2005). At the same time, the 
convergence of, say, hippie-style niches, hardcore left social movements, minimalistic young urban 
milieus, and scientific elites in international Degrowth conferences, for example, blurs identity 
boundaries and facilitates the emergence of a larger ‘we’.  
In addition to these ‘soft’ sources of social recognition, the starring role of science in the GT debate 
endows agents with the ‘hard’ and key resource of scientific legitimacy. Drawing on potentially 
disruptive theoretical concepts (planetary boundaries, Anthropocene, Great Acceleration, Jevon’s and 
Easterlin’s paradoxes, post-democracy, etc.) the scientific sphere plays a prominent role not only in 
unveiling the mechanisms and contradictions of the current symbolic order and its material support-
infrastructure, but also in proposing ways out (e.g. shift in emphasis from efficiency to sufficiency). The 
danger of this legitimacy-monopoly of scientific knowledge is that it be played against the political, 
prompting a premature closure of debates about the desirability or convenience of a given course of 
action (Parker, 2015)(cf. Section 4.3 on Obstacles to a fused performance). However, the trend 
towards a ‘democratization of science’ – which is prominent in the GT debate –, on the one hand, 
and the growing normative implication of scholars in both cultural-political discourse production (e.g. 
Convivialist Manifesto), on the other, largely dilute this danger by loosening science’s “monopoly over 
socially binding definitions of truth” (Beck, 1992), without science therethrough losing its aura of 
prestige.  
 
Even though it does not play a high-profile role in the GT debate, the state similarly operates as a 
source of legitimacy through multiple forms of intervention: own content production (e.g. WBGU), 
creating platforms (Enquetes, SÖF), funding (DFG-Jena research consortium on post-growth, but also 
through fiscal structures), or else simply according institutional sponsorship. Also religion, despite 
having lost much of its prestige and influence, plays a legitimacy-transferring role, as we saw with 
Laudato Si’, but also through the cultural agora of catholic and protestant synods (Katholikentag and 
Evangelical Kirchentag), and the work of their development and social welfare organizations.  
                                                 
seriously by larger publics. Credibility, in our connotation here, is linked more to plausibility than to 
authenticity. 
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Another way of ‘hardwiring credibility’ in the GT debate, as we saw in Chapter 3, is purposefully lying 
bridges between the radical ‘non-existence’ of social-ecological utopias and actually existing 
infrastructures, hence the relatively higher leverage of radical eco-social yet institutional-conservative 
approaches (as presented i.a. in Jackson, 2009a; Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014; Seidl & Zahrnt, 2010) 
The GT debate illustrates two further useful mechanisms disrupting conventional associations 
between certain narratives and certain identity markers, which keep entrenched cultural and political 
rituals locked into stiffening antagonisms: First, we observe GT narratives embodied by ‘unusual 
suspects’ (WBGU, 2014, p. 72): the engagement of figures such as Streeck, Schirrmacher, Miegel, 
Schellnhuber, Schneidewind, etc. even the Goethe-Institute through the project Futureperfect disrupt 
the established pattern of association between identity markers and narratives. A second mechanism 
are changes in the conventional roles performed by agents: examples are environmental circles taking up 
social perspectives and vice versa (Brand, Pühl, et al., 2013, p. 84), a mainstream newspaper like The 
Guardian instigating a campaign against the extraction of fossil fuels to protect climate stability189, a 
catholic pope writing an ‘environmental encyclical’, the notions of a “transformative left” (as opposed 
to a conventional ‘distributive left’) or of a ‘transformative science’. 
Antagonism – or, more precisely, with Chantal Mouffe, agonism190 – can however also lend the GT 
discourse credibility: indeed, since “what does not exist is in fact actively produced as non-existent, 
that is, as non-credible alternative to what exists” (Santos 2006, p. 15), also non-advocates can enact 
                                                 
189 Cf. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/series/keep-it-in-the-ground 
 
190 In the theoretical categories of Chantal Mouffe (2007), this implies a shift from (anti-political) 
antagonism to political agonism. In her political theory, Chantal Mouffe (2007) takes distance from 
the conventional view of an irredeemable antagonism as inherently constitutive of the political: both 
conflict and hegemony are constitutive of the political; yet this does not imply that conflict would lead 
to the negation of the adversary. Mouffe redefines the dichotomy us/them resorting to the notion of 
“constitutive exteriority” (similar to Butler’s hetero-determination), which defines how the idea of the 
‘other’ is constructed: if seen as a ‘legitimate other’, the antagonistic relationship can be tamed and 
turned into what Mouffe calls agonism. The enemy becomes an adversary, and even if the conflict is 
not rationally resolved (the possibility of rational consensus would be but an illusion of liberal political 
culture), it is legitimated, thereby preventing the political bond from dissolving. Acknowledging 
agonism as a struggle for hegemony with no rational solution, the important thing, from a democratic 
vantage point, becomes the generation of legitimate channels for political dissidence. The sidelining 
or negation of conflict is not only a hindrance to agonistic politics, but an incentive for the emergence 
of antagonisms that put democracy itself in peril, as currently attested by the revival of rightwing 
populisms in the global north 
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the performance of the GT by way of simply acknowledging the entity of counter-narratives, thereby 
rendering them visible or socially existent. For example, as we saw in Chapter 3, while the OECD and 
UNEP do not acknowledge (let alone engage with) their discussants, Ralf Fücks unwillingly breaks 
this production of the non-existence by confronting his opponents.  
 
Table 11: GT Articulation Discourse-actor 
Disruptors (‘unbuilding unsustainability’) Generators (‘building sustainability’) 
• Rupture in intra-elite discourse (visible in Enquete 
WWL and WBGU, etc.) 
• Failure of conventional SD approaches 
• Heterogeneous identity-groupings merging in GT-
advocacy 
• Unusual suspects (Miegel, Schellnhuber, Goethe-
Institute) & changes in conventional actor-roles (The 
Guardian Keep it in the Ground campaign; Laudato 
Si’, etc.) 
• Production of in-visibility of alternatives broken: 
Antagonism  Agonism (e.g. Fücks) 
 
• Political and social rehabilitation of radical system-critique 
(‘peninsulas not islands’) 
• Critical mass of influential publications from widely respected 
institutions (WBGU, UK commission on SD, Wuppertal Institut, 
etc.) and persons 
• Symbolic compatibility with aspirational status symbols 
(habitus) for alternative patterns of subjectivation and identity-
ascription 
• Legitimacy transfers from widely recognizes authority-sources 
(science, state, religion) 
• Docking points with established ideational and material 
infrastructures 
 
Receptivity of the discourse addressees 
 
This last stage of our dramaturgical analysis raises the question of which factors affect the receptivity 
of the intended audiences of the GT debate. This last fusion is critical, since no matter how well staged 
the performance might be in terms of all previous steps, it will not enact performative fusion – that 
is: produce cultural extension effects in correspondence with the performed discourse – if it fails to 
reach its audience, i.e. to engage them psychologically. 
 
First let us consider two types of factors which condition the general receptivity of the GT debate, 
regardless of the specific expectations and demands of particularized audience-groups. The first 
element are contextual factors. As we have considered these factors already, let us just focus here on their 
226 
 
effect on the audiences’ receptiveness. At the bottom line, the GT meets as widespread demand for 
re-politization and political activation in a spatiotemporal juncture of a perceived system-crisis (whose 
precise contours vary according to specific diagnoses). For many culturally and politically engaged 
persons, the GT is already a big topic. They fill the conference rooms, participate actively in face-to-
face or digital platforms by proposing, contesting, illuminating different viewpoints, etc.; they engage 
from their scholarly, professional, or activist work. In the mainstream, the Great Recession, the debt 
crisis, unprecedented socio-economic inequality, and aggravating global ecological crisis create 
momentum for deeper, more-than-incremental change, even if the basic socio-cognitive and cultural 
matrix of Western-style late modernity is not fundamentally challenged. Both spheres thus overlap to 
a greater extent and raise the stakes higher than was the case under the earlier Brundtland-consensus.  
The second factor are collectively shared memories. Shared memories have an audience-fusing effect. 
This idea has been conceptualized both by Alexander (2004) as memory of earlier performances; and by 
Garfinkel (1981; cited in Hajer, 2005), who coined the idea of ‘contrast space’ vis-à-vis earlier successful 
discourses. As we found in Chapter 3, the ideational contents of the GT debate are mostly recycled 
from earlier discussions, especially from the system-challenging utopian discursive environment of the 
1960s and 1970s in Europe: The MIT report to the Club of Rome on Limits to Growth (D. H. 
Meadows et al., 1972), the UN Conference in Stockholm 1972, the radical critique of capitalism 
(Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005), but also some later discussions, such as discourse on post-normal 
science (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1991, 1993; Gallopin et al., 2001), or the success of the anti-nuclear 
movement from the 1980s and culminating with the official state-led Energiewende. The WBGU’s 
adoption of Polanyi’s concept of the ‘Great Transformation’ can be seen in this light, as a way of 
harnessing Polanyi’s newly gained academic prestige191 (Hann & Hart, 2009; W. Sachs, 2013; Somers 
& Block, 2014). This endows the GT discourse with a sense of historical depth, ad minimum, and with 
a lived experience of success, in the best case. Conversely, the perceived historical record of success 
of the German model of the social-market economy is a strong fusion-hindering collective memory 
(Brand, Pühl, et al., 2013, p. 15) (see section on Obstacles below), although the progressive dissolution 
of the post-war class compromise in the context of an increasing financialization of the global 
economy (Brand, 2016a; Dörre, 2009; Streeck, 2013) can be expected to further weaken this narrative 
and reinforce system-critical ones, under the premise that ‘what got us here will not take us there’. 
                                                 
191 This has raised critiques, insofar the 2011 WBGU report does not endorse a substantial part of 
Polanyi’s argument (i.e. the social-destructive effect of capitalist markets), but rather perverts it. (W. 
Sachs, 2013; Unmüßig et al., 2012) 
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Yet beyond these general appreciations, the act of reception is not that of a passive deciphering of the 
mise-en-scène, but rather a co-production of meaning in terms of the psychological-emotional 
engagement that the performance enables on the part of the audience(s). Alexander calls this catharsis. 
The audience to which the performance is targeted is not an innocent spectator: his or her own 
worldviews, cultural understanding and socio-structural placement shape his/her response. Hence, for 
the purpose of discussing the receptiveness met by the GT debate further, we need to distinguish 
concrete audience-groups, i.e. the diverse agent-arenas identified in the first part of this chapter. Yet 
first we ought to ask: who are the addressees of the GT discourses? The addressee appears rather 
blurred: It is not primarily the government or some international governance arrangement. Neither is 
it the citizenry at large, at least not de facto. To be sure, there are proposals involving all of these agents 
and beyond, but they are not addressed directly by the flows of communication. From our empirical 
inquiry, there emerges no clear-cut distinction between actors and audiences; instead, GT-agents 
rather seem, to a large extent, to be addressing each other within a closed loop. Audiences are mainly 
organizational actors (NGOs, think tanks, SMOs) or sub-public spheres (e.g. social-scientific debate, 
semi-public forums such as the Kirchentag). It is about defining and refining the own discourse, 
identifying potential allies, and working out needs for restructuration and intervention proposals. It is 
about ‘getting fit’ to eventually become transformative agents themselves. The implicit goal of GT 
participants seems to be an impulse towards self-reflection and a consequent self-transformation of 
participating agents. This matches – even if only incipiently, in sub-cultural spheres – Ulrich Beck and 
Anthony Giddens’ vision of a reflexive modernity (Beck, 1992; Beck, Bonss, & Lau, 2003; Beck, 
Giddens, & Lash, 1994).  
 
In Chapter 1 we posed the problem of audience fragmentation (orthogonal sub-cultures, multiple 
public spheres) (Fraser, 1992) as a major challenge blocking the way towards fused performances. We 
argued that this fragmentation is accentuated in the case of broad-purpose discourses, such as the GT. 
However, a paradoxical double-effect can be observed in GT performances: On the one hand, due to 
the abovementioned self-referential character of the debate leads to group-affirming performances, 
hence more prone to produce dramaturgical fusion than performances addressed at the larger public. 
Indeed: despite the transversality and holism of the discourse-content, many GT-agents seem to have 
built individual and group-identities around their respective discursive project, as showcased by the 
Degrowth movement, for example. By implication, the above referred self-reflection and self-
interpellation exercises take place within the protected environment of a new symbolic space defined 
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around the self-identification as ‘change agents’ or, as we called them, ‘transformative agents’. This 
enables a stronger cathartic and thus co-productive engagement with the GT discourse, as we saw 
above. On the other hand, however, as we saw in Chapter 3, the GT is a meta-debate actually 
connecting a range of tendentially fragmentary sub-discursive fields. Even if it is often scholarly 
analysts who have lumped these arenas together under the overarching banner of the GT, the 
empirical debate has also been proven to span across (sub-groups of) these arenas. Let us thus review 
how this fragmentary landscape is empirically bridged in the GT debate. 
 
The main observed mechanism is the building of new discursive arrangements across hitherto separate 
discursive fields. This enabled the recognition of mutual interdependences and the emergence new 
discursive coalitions or at least of discursive affinities. This reach-out motion of discursive agents can 
itself be regarded as an indicator of a disruption in the prevalent symbolic order (i.e. the Brundtland 
consensus); as a result, previously unimaginable alignments appear possible, and new discursive 
strands emerge to lay bridges between hitherto disconnected or even contentious discursive positions: 
a systemic socio-ecological activism, a conservative degrowth-strand, a movement for the 
‘democratization of science’, etc. The role of agency in bridging socially and culturally fragmented 
audiences by means of meaning-brokerage and translation (Santos, 2004), including extended 
opportunities for symbolic identity-ascription (e.g. through ‘shadow networks’), as discussed above, 
led to the creation of networks among unlikely (or at least unusual) partners. Noteworthy fusions 
across audience-groups observed in the GT debate are: 
• Fusion between political elites and their constituencies advances insofar elites develop greater 
sensibility to the more transformative or “advanced demands” from within the constituencies, 
instead of continuing to rely on lowest-common-denominator politics (WBGU, 2014, p. 113), 
as visible most clearly, perhaps, in the emergence of a ‘transformative left’. 
• Fusion across political-ideological spectrum: In Chapter 3 we learned that the GT debate 
shows potential for discursive alignments between conservatives and liberals in the right and 
the left, respectively, in that they share anti-productivist, anti-capitalist, or anti-utilitarian 
critiques (Felder & et. al, 2012; Latouche, 2009, p. 94).  
• Fusion of social and environmental activism, and potentially, through narratives such as the 
“imperial ways of life”, also of north and south activism, as their respective problems are 
reframed as two sides of the same coin (Acosta, 2014; Brand, 2015; Dietz, 2014) 
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• Fusion of old and new social-ecological emancipatory discourses: For example, the older 
sufficiency discourse (first advocated by Wolfgang W. Sachs, 1994) merges with a re-emerging 
growth-critical current in the 2010s (Holzinger, 2016) 
• Fusion between NGOs and social movements: As we saw in the first part of this chapter, the 
2009 UNFCCC COP 15 in Copenhagen led to the globalization-critical left taking ownership 
of the ecological crisis; the Mc Planet congresses united alter-globalization movement, 
developmental, environmental, and religious NGOs. Degrowth appears as rendezvous place for 
anti-systemic, emancipatory movements (Network Wachstumswende and Degrowth in movement(s) 
(Konzeptwerk Neue Ökonomie e.V. & DFG-Kolleg Postwachstumsgesellschaften, 2017; 
Misereor & IHS, 2013, p. 12) 
• Fusion of global activism and religion: The GT discourse foresees potentially global "alliances 
of solidarity" among religious actors with like-minded CSOs and social movements, drawing 
on successful experiences of the past, such as the Jubilee 2000 campaign for the relief of 
sovereign debt of the poorest countries in the world. This would constitute a singular value-
added for the governance of wicked global problems (Johannes Müller, cited in Misereor & 
IHS, 2013, p. 27) 
• Fusion of general-interest and particular-interest groups: political party representatives, trade 
unions, religious actors, and NGOs showed discursive affinities in convergent forums 
(Heiligendamm 2007) and concrete collaboration in joint publications (Felder & et. al, 2012) 
or jointly organized events (2012 Transformation Congress) 
• Fusion of civil society and science, and both with (sub)politics (A. Zahrnt, cited in Kristof, 
2010, p. 15), as exemplified in the Degrowth movement or in the civil society platform 
Forschungswende.  
• Fusion of the natural sciences and the social sciences: as showcased by the emergence of 
‘transformation science’ and ‘transformative science’, or internationally the Future Earth 
platform. 
• Fusion across policy fields: most clearly visible in the emerging field of time-policy (labor, 
consumption, product warranty, etc.) (Reisch & Bietz, 2014) 
• Generational fusion: between old and young activists, as reported about the Heiligendamm 
conference in 2007 (Brand, 2014a) 
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Worthwhile noting, lastly, is that many of the above indicated fusions arose not from the abstract 
desire to reach out for the other, but of the need to align the other for the purpose of advancing 
concrete plans and actions. Be it the need for legitimacy (provided, for example, by civil society to 
science in Forschungswende), the need for the activating force of the state (Energiewende), or the need for 
a critical mass (Degrowth movement, the UBI-agenda), or the need to co-shape emerging agendas 
(the trade unionist ‘Just Transition’) 
 
Table 12: GT Articulation Discourse-audience(s) 
Disruptors (‘unbuilding unsustainability’) Generators (‘building sustainability) 
• Generalized perception of system-crisis raising stakes 
higher and creating greater overlap among audiences 
• Status-quo-prone discourses anchored in shared 
collective memories (‘model Germany’) 
progressively loosening strength in the context of 
dissolution of post-war class compromise and 
emerging TDs 
• Growing (sub-)cultural disposition towards self-
interrogation (reflexive modernity) 
• Historical discursive references (Limits to Growth, Convivialism, 
post-normal science, etc.) and experienced TD-‘success’ stories 
(e.g. alter-globalization movement, anti-nuclear movement)  
• GT as rendezvous point for green, red, religious discourse, social-
moral conservatism; and lever for re-politization and political 
activation 
• Emerging transversal discursive arenas across hitherto separate 
discursive formations, allowing for: 
- re-alignment of discursive coalitions or at least of discursive 
affinities 
- larger, more open and inclusive identity definitions 
• Cathartic role of GT discourse for specific group-identities 
• Catalytic & clustering initiatives and practices (UBI, 
Energiewende, Transition Towns, etc.) 
 
Obstacles to a fused performance of the GT discourse 
 
We just analyzed the ‘breakthroughs’ in transformative meaning-making, as this is the focus defined 
by our research question. But, of course, the obstacles hindering progress towards a GT are worth 
considering, as well, insofar they set structural limits to the above identified enablers. Following 
structural hindrances were systematized from the coded data:  
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Ideational path-dependencies and locked-in dramaturgies: The still prevalent Brundtland consensus (whose 
latest avatar are the UN SDGs) keeps large parts of the debate blind to unquestioned assumptions and 
firmly anchored in a fixed, path-dependent frame of problem-definition and problem-solving, which 
“have produced their own dramaturgy, one in which the dramatis personae is well known and the 
different actors play their roles from a generally known script” (Hajer, 2005, p. 642). As a result, all 
observed deficiencies in the road to ‘sustainable development’ are attributed to a ‘practical gap’, either 
between policy- or institutional design and implementation, or else between individual 
knowledge/values and action (cf. Introductory chapter). The discourse on transformation risks 
becoming absorbed into this centripetal movement, yet another buzzword, another empty signifier in 
the sterile historical trail of sustainability (Brand, 2016c; Kühne, 2013). Indeed, while the problems 
associated with the prevailing societal structural dynamics are (marginally) acknowledged, they are not 
treated analytically, i.e. how these dynamics are produced and reproduced, and how to approach them. 
Furthermore, while the dominance of technically framed win-win solutions where conflict was hardly 
acknowledged (or else endowed with a negative connotation) has given way to a more politicized 
vision with culprits and victims, these discursive strands still largely talk past each other, with scarce 
signs of cross-pollination. The only conflict broadly acknowledged is between the overconsumption 
of resources and dumpsites by the north versus the demands and expectations of rapidly emerging 
countries in the south (Brand, 2014d, p. 247) 
Earlier memories of success: The ordoliberal social-market economy (‘model Germany’) sustained a 
(perceived as) mutually beneficial post-war class compromise for over half a century (Streeck, 2013). 
For the conservative political forces currently in power, this economic model is historically legitimated 
and thus beyond discussion. Hence for the political left (red-red-green), the question arises to what 
they can afford to engage in redefinition struggles around development, welfare, and the good life 
(Kühne, 2013, p. 84). For the time being, this keeps politics locked into business-as-usual and austerity 
policies with a strong market- and pro-economic growth orientation. 
Lack of broad soundboard in society: Closely linked to the above, neither the structure-conservative concept 
of a 'Green New Deal' nor the more challenging ,notions of a profound social and ecological 
reconstruction encountered a wide (civil) society soundboard or a firm practical anchor (Felder & et. 
al, 2012, p. 18). Even though environmental consciousness in Germany is considered high, an actual 
broadly anchored transformative consciousness or policy, which, in practice, do not play the social 
and the ecology against each other, is not yet in sight (Felder & et. al, 2012, p. 3). This is reinforced 
through the aforementioned fragmentation of GT-addressees in multiple, partly conflicting sub-
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cultures, and public spheres. 
Organizational, institutional, and ideological fragmentation in civil society and science: The progress indicated in 
the previous section in this regard notwithstanding, the lack of trust and networking between the 
NGOs and grassroot actors of civil society remains a major blockade to transformative movement-
building, both in terms of efficacy and of legitimacy. The NGO-scape disconnected from social 
movements is increasingly questioned with regard to whose interests they represent. (Re)connecting 
civil society agents across the spitted fields of food, energy, and climate, a separation that evolved 
from decades of solo thinking, is imperative for the activation of civil society as a political force 
(Germanwatch, 2012, p. 13; Narberhaus, 2013; Unmüßig, 2014). In the scientific sphere, ideational 
and institutional barriers which transverse disciplines and sectors continue to structurally hinder 
dialogue and collaboration. (BMBF, 2012) 
Political activation under conditions of pluralism and power decentralization: The more distributed social power 
becomes, the rarer the event of a successful dramaturgical fusion. As discussed before, with regard to 
sustainability/ transformative learning process, this is a matter of phases: the deconstruction of the 
mainstream SD consensus (de-fusion) is a necessary moment to block its cultural extension or 
reproduction (J. C. Alexander, 2004, p. 563), thus allowing a new (likely more pluralist and therefore 
more difficult) “transformative consensus” to arise in a second moment. As acknowledged in Chapter 
1, because achieving fusion under conditions of greater plurality is more difficult, the role of agency 
acquires even more prominence. 
Structural limitations of the public sphere: News shine for a while under the spot of media and are perceived 
as important by the public at large, changing perceptions and behaviors, and gaining political relevance 
and sometimes leading to reforms, but only insofar the topic remains news-relevant: as soon as the 
spot is off, the perception arises that it has lost importance. And this up-and-down dynamics has 
characterized the dictates of public opinion since the bourgeoise revolutions of the 18th century 
(Stengel, 2011, p. 315). Conversely, long term, diffuse, and complex problems which confront our 
own constituency as societies and individuals are not amenable to the typical dynamics of news. This 
means that the GT is not only unprecedented as political challenge in the managerial sense, but also 
in terms of its political-democratic legitimation mechanisms.  This both explains and makes the case 
for the fact that the GT discourse evolves in a dialectical movement between elite-circles (in the 
symbolic rather than in the material sense) and radical activism, while larger societal circles remain 
sidelined. 
‘Aura’ of science as a double-edged sword: The role of science as social-ecological watchdog has been 
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repeatedly emphasized here. Yet, at the same time, scholars may deploy the key resource of scientific 
legitimacy in the opposite sense, preserving the status quo: this has become ingrained into the current 
societal dynamics at least in two ways: first, when ‘expert’ knowledge is invoked to prematurely 
foreclose political debates about the feasibility, desirability, or convenience of a given course of action 
(Parker, 2015), or else to keep scientific (turned into public) controversies artificially alive, thus 
blocking transformations in the name of scientific certainty, and at the expense of reasonable doubt, 
as the case of  ‘climate skeptics’ or ‘deniers’ exemplarily shows (Latour, 2004) (cf. Excursus Chapter 
2) 
 
4.4. Synthesis: the role of agency in the GT debate 
 
The above description of GT-enablers may appear negligible against the weight of structural obstacles 
facing the prospects for a global social-ecological transformation. This would arguably be a fair 
appreciation. Our goal, however, was not to show that the GT debate is effecting or will ever drive 
large-scale societal changes in and of itself; rather its analysis had the purpose of illuminating pathways 
which – potentiated by a widespread enough and deliberately fostered reproduction of transformative 
agency – could eventually kick-start and drive societal learning-processes toward a transformation. 
The importance of macro-historical, contingent, material-structural factors notwithstanding, the study 
of the GT debate showed that the role of agency is central in creating and sustaining the discursive 
dynamics, as well as for the prospects of it unleashing strong waves of cultural transformation. The 
key agency-practices observed can be grouped according to the challenges in the GT debate they help 
offsetting: 
    
a. Complex and diffuse character of the GT debate: The connection of all sub-discourses (axial themes) 
of the GT debate in a meta-discourse is neither self-evident nor spontaneously self-organizing. 
Only the hermeneutic role of “meaning-making elites” allowed to stitch these diverse 
discussions into a holistic futuring-debate about sustainable societies. These meaning-makers 
raise questions to trigger collective reflection processes, create new narratives thus offering a 
‘blueprinting’ instance which becomes object of debate, and provide clues and substantial 
inputs to filter, organize and interpret the overwhelmingly complex and abundant information, 
as well as orientation for action.  
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b. Dispersion of the audience: As we saw during our theoretical inquiry in Chapter 2, agency plays a 
key role fusing audiences in broad-purpose discourses which draw disparate social groupings 
into a single discursive arena. The GT debate was shown to span across multiple spheres, 
giving rise to a heterogeneous social field which creates structural conditions for alternative 
patterns of subjectivation and identitary ascription. Required here are of translation functions 
(to articulate the specific sub-cultural codes of the social groups involved), identity-brokerage 
(to facilitate mutual recognition processes), and circulation of knowledge and discourses to 
enable a conversation across the board.  
c. Inherently marginal condition of GT proposals: By definition, the alter-systemic character of GT-
proposals places them in a realm of societal non-existence. This not only makes it difficult for 
them to achieve fusion - as the resonance board would be the ‘system’ that is to be 
transformed, but often they lack minimal material preconditions for their production, 
diffusion, implementation. Some form of positive discrimination is thus required to spur their 
emergence into the space of existence: first, a large infrastructure of communication to act as 
communicating vessels working for aggregation of micro-experiments and diffusion of macro-
elaborations (as provided distinctly by churches, development sector, specific state programs, 
research networks), and, second, a meso- and micro-level infrastructure for distributed 
implementations of the most varied sort: distributed network for energy generation, 
collaborative prosumption, fully-developed and affordable (or free) public transport in urban 
centers, food cooperatives, local money systems, UBI, etc. Targeted protection, nurturing, 
support, empowerment of concrete initiatives may be required, as well. Agency here 
necessitates agenda-setting power, requirements-mapping, institutional design, and large 
infrastructures (mainly communication networks and stable funding or self-reproduction 
mechanisms). It is hence a task chiefly for the state, but also for the churches and other agents 
with high capillarity communications infrastructure and large material resource-endowments. 
Another key resource with which these large agents can endow GT-initiatives to 
counterweight their marginal character is credibility (feasibility), authority, legitimacy. 
 
d. Structural inertias toward status quo need to be counterweighted by transformative leadership. The 
GT debate has shown that symbolic action operates with relative autonomy of its ‘social base’ 
(J. C. Alexander et al., 2006), and that institutional agents can act freely and creatively within 
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the framework of their (relatively broad) cultural or political ‘mandate’. The current juncture 
of structural imbalance working against transformative agents, however, means that strategy 
acquires central importance: this includes the holistic  analysis of likely ripple effects, 
identification of key ‘leverage points’ (D. Meadows, 1999)(i.e. identify the ‘battles worth 
fighting’) and the best ways to harness them for learning/transformative purposes, the 
articulation of complementarities and the capitalization of synergies, and windows of 
opportunity presenting themselves. The case study also showed the importance of synchronic 
activation: should this not proceed spontaneously, a suitable agent could take up a 
coordination role. These strategic considerations pertain both the ideational and the material-
practical dimension. In addition to strategic considerations, there remain the challenges of 
activation and management of transformative proposals. 
 
 
 
4.5. Conclusions: structural enablers and key agency roles and practices in the GT debate 
 
The whole purpose of analyzing the case of the GT debate was gaining insights that would help us 
understand the actual emergence of meaning-transformations and how this can be deliberately 
fostered. This concluding section seeks to synthesize the above analysis of ‘partial fusions’ into an 
integral picture showcasing the key enablers of the GT debate as a collective learning experiment 
towards a social-ecological transformation, and the key agency roles and practices therein, combining 
cultural, situational, agential, material-power, and audience-fusing perspectives.  
The GT debate finds resonance mainly with the social-ecological discursive avant-garde in German 
culture, in the broader context of a favorably evolving cultural breeding ground (with a large 
generational component, according to polls). The sense of urgency sparked by the Great Recession to 
ignite the debate, and the growing meta-consensus about the systemic character of the contemporary 
multiple interlinked crisis, provided a common roof for an increasingly organic convergence of social and 
ecological activism, and for the growing engagement of scholars with system-critique drawing on 
historical precedents, especially from the 1970s, enabled the reproduction of the GT debate. The 
combination of the ‘push’ of a radical system-critique with the ‘pull’ of a (increasingly perceived as 
plausible) socio-ecologically embedded good life utopia creates a powerful combination to destabilize the 
dominant symbolic order. Furthermore, the GT discourses – through the various meaning-
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combinations, drawing on ‘meaning-surpluses’ of established signifiers of modern culture, as analyzed 
in Chapter 3 – offer a plethora of docking points with culturally ‘recognizable’ discursive-ideational 
and material infrastructures, thus enabling the emergence of “real” or “concrete utopias”. 
In the perspective of its material reproduction, the GT debate feeds on a structural combination of 
shielding of discursive agents from economic, political, or cultural conformity pressures, with a certain 
degree of leverage over the cultural and political social-ecological debates. These structural 
preconditions depend, in turn, on specific features of institutional/organizational design and on a 
peculiar (inter-)institutional dynamics: the polyarchic symbolic production (made possible through the 
structural separation of material power from the power of symbolic production through a distributed 
communicational infrastructure), the intra-institutional mainstreaming of diversity (together with an 
inbuilt complexity- and long-term-orientation) and inter-institutional interdependent landscape are key 
shielding devices. The main structural levers identified are the enabling role played by empowered 
spaces such as the state or the scientific sphere (through both substantive inputs, the creation of 
protected spaces for experimentation, and legitimacy-transfer), the macro-economic leverage and 
high-capillarity infrastructure of large non-for-profit agents such as the churches, the academia, or the 
development sector. This infrastructure creates communicating vessels across the societal board, 
which enable a dialectical process of aggregation of micro-level experiences (e.g. grassroots’ and niche-
experiments with sufficiency-oriented ways of life) and diffusion of institutionalized patterns (e.g. the 
degrowth conceptual and theoretical framework). 
Key is also the identity-profile(s) of GT-agents: unlike the usual counter-cultural agents, who develop 
an identity as system-marginals that blocks their channels of communication with the larger society 
they seek to address, the GT debate involves ‘unusual suspects’ who perform unconventional roles, 
thus breaking chains of equivalence that equate ‘counter-cultural’ with ‘anti-social’, ‘fundamental 
transformation’ with ‘political revolution’, and so on. Instead, the GT debate constitutes a melting-
pot of identities, where intellectual and sometimes even political elites network with grassroots 
activists, trade-unionists, non-capitalist business entrepreneurs, and religious and NGO-
representatives. The GT-sphere becomes itself a site to attain social recognition. Furthermore, all this 
increases the credibility and legitimacy of GT agents in the eyes of society at large. 
With regard to bridging fragmented audiences, and closely linked to its high connectivity, the GT 
debate became a rendez-vous point for hitherto largely dispersed counter-cultural, system-critical, 
utopian discourses and struggles. While still satisfying the cathartic needs of these minorities, the GT 
remains ‘peninsular’ rather than ‘insular’ vis-à-vis the larger public sphere, thus avoiding the frustration 
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that comes with isolation. GT agents created unlikely bridges across fragmented audiences, showing 
that there is growing (sub)cultural readiness to self-interrogation and self-transformation. 
The overall degree of fusion of GT performances becomes apparent in catalytic events and initiatives, 
be they deliberative events (Enquete WWL) or deliberation-catalyzing dispositifs (WBGU report, 
Laudato Si’), programmatic orientations (‘transformative science’), or concrete intervention proposals 
(‘non-reformist reforms’: UBI, work restructuration, time-policy). 
Agency was shown to play a fundamental role in advancing the GT debate. We categorized observed 
(in practice) and envisaged (in discursive representations) roles and practices according to the 
structural obstacles to the learning process they help offsetting: 
a. Countering the complexity and diffuse character of the GT debates by providing crossover 
connection and catalytic instances, and through meaning-making agency: rising questions 
about the established order thus eliciting disruptive effects, creating new narratives (or else 
retrieving/ rearticulating forgotten or marginalized ones), interpreting the world and providing 
orientation for action. 
 
b. Bridging fragmented audiences through broker-agents performing functions of translation 
(cultural, operational, etc. codes from diverse social groups or sub-systems), matching diverse 
identity profiles, spurring the circulation of TDs, articulating diverse discursive repertoires, 
capitalizing synergies, assisting in clustering and coalition-building, etc. 
 
c. Positive discrimination or facilitation for sustainable ways of life creating structural and 
targeted fostering mechanisms. Both communicational and material infrastructure, as well as 
targeted support, are needed here. Capacities in point are agenda-setting, institutional design, 
and infrastructure provision. An additional effective form of positive discrimination is 
legitimacy (authority, credibility) transfer through institutional or individual sponsorship. The 
goal is to compensate for power, discursive, institutional-design imbalances. 
 
d. Strategizing and activating transformative proposals to counter inertias towards the status quo: 
Windows of opportunity, leverage points, ripple effects, and holistic/systemic effect analysis 
(in as far as possible), as well as strategic synchronization, are hence key tasks of transformative 
agency, preceding those of activation and management of transformative proposals, taking 
advantage of catalyzing opportunities. The structurally disadvantaged leverage of 
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transformative agents vis-à-vis the status quo makes the optimization of efforts vital for 
advancing learning and transformative processes. 
 
To what extent are the insights gained here about conditions of possibility for transformations in 
societal meaning-structures generalizable? Needless to say, many of the enablers (both ‘disruptors’ of 
the status quo and ‘generators’ of new virtuous visions and dynamics) identified here are rather 
particular to Germany; some of them can be extended to Western Europe or to the Global North, 
and yet others may be valid for other contexts, as well. The next chapter studies a contrasting TD-
process in an extremely dissimilar setting: the Latin-American debate on Buen vivir,  in order to put the 
findings of the present chapter into cross-territorial perspective. Both cases are then brought into 
resonance with each other (cf. Chapter 6), seeking to distil broadly generalizable conditions of 
possibility for transformative learning processes, which agents can draw on to advance a social-
ecological transformation. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Buen vivir as field of discursive representation and practice 
 
 
Only by imagining other worlds will this one be changed 
Alberto Acosta, 2010  
 
5.1. Introduction to the Buen vivir debate 
 
Buen vivir, as a contemporary social-ecological utopia, has become popular since its up-taking as a 
regulative ideal in the national constitutions of Ecuador and Bolivia in 2008 and 2009, respectively. It 
can be regarded as a Latin-American utopia which is potentially global in outreach (Gudynas & Acosta, 
2011b; Vanhulst & Beling, 2014a; Vanhulst & Zaccai, 2016). It can be broadly defined as a community-
oriented cultural paradigm of social organization, based on a form of life that maintains a relationship 
of respect, harmony, and balance with everything that exists, understanding that everything is 
interconnected, interdependent, and interrelated (CAOI, 2008). Three dimensions are usually 
distinguished: harmony with oneself (identity), with society (equity), and with nature 
(sustainability)(Cubillo-Guevara, Hidalgo-Capitán, & Domínguez-Gómez, 2014). However, despite 
the concept of Buen vivir, in the singular, has become discursively stabilized, there is no such thing as 
a one univocal definition of the good life in this regulative ideal. Indeed, as Buen vivir (hereafter BV) 
became progressively anchored in the socio-cognitive and cultural landscape and in certain socio-
political practices and institutions of the Andean-Amazonian region in Latin America, its content has 
diversified into a range of more or less (di)similar discourses articulated by the successive groups that 
have adopted and adapted it.  
In order to account for this constitutive heterogeneity of the Latin American discourses of BV, diverse 
authors have proposed various typologies, such as: a culturalist, an ecologist, and an eco-Marxist 
current (Le Quang & Vercoutère, 2013); an indigenist, a socialist, and a post-structuralist currents 
(Vanhulst, 2015; Vanhulst & Beling, 2014a); an indigenist-pachamamist, a socialist-state-centric, and 
an ecologist-postdevelopmentalist currents (Cubillo-Guevara, 2016; Cubillo-Guevara et al., 2014), the 
‘buenos vivires’, in the plural (Loera González, 2015), or the bifurcation between Buen vivir and sumak 
kawsay (Oviedo, 2014). Eduardo Gudynas (2011a) thus speaks of BV as a work-in-progress, as a 
dialogical platform, rather than a concept or a particular discourse. Hence, like the GT, Buen vivir can 
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also be conceptualized as a heterogeneous field of discourse. This lack of a precise definition of BV is 
probably also key to its magnetism and strength192. Yet as was the case with GT, as we will see, there 
is a distinctive common ground to all these BV-discourses, as well. I have argued elsewhere (Adrian 
E. Beling & Vanhulst, 2016b; Vanhulst & Beling, 2014a) that BV is usually understood – both in the 
academia as in public discourse – as the irruption of non-modern (traditional) ideational repertoires 
from indigenous communal cultures into modern ones, permeating the Andean-Amazonian territory 
outwards (bottom-up and inside-out process). Yet even if the role of local groups has been decisive, other 
actors have permeated the territorial context of emergence of BV from the outside, introjecting global 
discursive flows around development and sustainability into local processes by docking at local 
struggles (outside-inward process), giving way to the discursive construction of BV as a “retro-
progressive modern utopia” rooted in the cultural traditions of the aborigine peoples of the Andean-
Amazonian region, yet simultaneously embedded in global debates about alternative(s) (to) 
development(s)   
On the one hand, […] there is an ongoing dialogue with the indigenous cultural traditions, which can 
create or recreate new conceptualizations adapted to contemporary circumstances […]. On the other 
hand, this dialogue is intervened by some Western traditions questioning diverse assumptions of the 
dominant understanding of modernity. Among these we find alternative ethical positions which 
recognize legal rights to nature, contributions from feminism as a reaction to patriarchal domination, 
and new conceptualizations in areas such as justice and human wellbeing (Gudynas & Acosta, 2011a, 
p. 74) 
 
BV thus constitutes a good example of ‘‘glocal’ ’ discursive articulation (bidirectional outside-inward 
and inside-outward process) in the search for alter- and post-developmentalist utopias, which appears 
an interesting object of study, beyond an area-studies perspective, for global debates around alternative 
futures (Adrian E. Beling et al., 2018). Furthermore, in terms of its ideational repertoire, BV constitutes 
a paradoxical construction, insofar it turns the hitherto allegedly incompatible cultural matrixes of 
traditional indigenous cultures and the modern paradigm of development into a source of cultural 
innovation and fundamental redefinition of the latter. (Carballo, 2015a) 
                                                 
192 Similarly to ‘sustainable development’, in the language of the Essex-school of discourse analysis 
(headed by Laclau and Chantal-Mouffe) BV can thus be conceived of as a “floating signifier”. Like 
GT, however – and this is decisive – BV ‘floats’ at a different ‘tide level’: indeed, as has been argued 
elsewhere (Vanhulst & Beling, 2014a), the genesis of BV as an alternative to conventional development 
and to the contradictions of modernity makes it less amenable to stabilizing the status quo than the 
convergence-formula of sustainable development. (Vanhulst & Beling, 2014a)(Vanhulst & Beling, 
2014a)(Vanhulst & Beling, 2014a) 
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Because the diverse meanings of BV clearly correlate with its successive stages of discourse 
production, both the pragmatic dimension of discursive practice and the diverse representations 
emerging therefrom are analyzed in parallel in the next section. Drawing on abundant secondary 
literature, as well as on own previous elaborations in diverse collaborative efforts, five different 
discursive strands were identified, corresponding to three different historical moments (emergence, 
assemblage, dislocation), which operated as spatiotemporal instances of re-signification of the concept of 
BV:  we find a primordial BV, which was first articulated in the Ecuadorian Amazon and spread through 
the whole Andean-Amazonian region; a hybrid BV resulting from the constitutional process of political 
consensus-building in Ecuador and Bolivia; and, lastly, three re-articulations emerging from a process 
of (post-consensual) discursive dislocation: an indigenous BV advocated by many politically organized 
Latin-American indigenous movements; a socialist BV, which became the banner of the Ecuadorian 
and Bolivian governments and was conceptually developed by like-minded intellectuals; and a post-
developmentalist BV rallying non-indigenous Latin-American social movements (particularly, the 
environmental movement) and an array of humanist, critical intellectuals with a global outlook. 
(Cubillo-Guevara, 2016; Cubillo-Guevara, Vanhulst, Hidalgo-Capitán, & Beling, 2018; Vanhulst & 
Beling, 2014b) 
 
The chapter is organized as follows, seeking to parallel the analytical stages followed in the study of 
the GT debate: first, the general spatiotemporal and global context of emergence of BV is outlined as 
background reference. Next, a diachronic reconstruction of the BV debate in its material-pragmatic 
dimensions is offered, closing with an analytical synthesis of the discursive process. Section 5.3 goes 
on to systematize the discursive content of BV according to the five discursive strands just outlined. 
Then, Section 5.4 merges the two prior steps into a dramaturgical analysis, using J.C. Alexander’s 
heuristic model, as we did with the GT debate. The chapter closes by systematizing key enablers, as 
well as agency-roles and practices distilled from the study of BV representations and practice and 
drawing general conclusions. 
 
 
5.2. Context of emergence of the BV discourse 
 
The landscape of Latin-American discourses around sustainability and development is difficult to 
understand without prior understanding of the geo-political and geo-economic entanglement of the 
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region throughout the second half of the 20th century; hence a brief overview thereof is in order as a 
starting point for the contextualization of BV. 
Since the 1940s, most Latin-American countries have developed a critical stance towards the prevailing 
hegemonic equilibrium in the international order given the unbalances observable in the “Center-
Periphery” relations, as portrayed in the geopolitical-historical hermeneutics of Dependency Theory193 
and Latin-American postcolonial theories194. This trend of thought was developed intermittently 
against the backdrop of recurrent right-wing military coups that scourged many Latin-American 
countries between the early 1930s and the late 1980s. The process can thus be characterized as a 
recurrent dialectic between leftist, dependentist/ anti-colonial views and both external and internal 
pressures to conform to dictates of world market and globally dominant development discourses.  
How did Latin-America historically participate of the global SD debate? The emergence of 
environmental discourses in Europe and North America since the 1970s prompted some Latin-
American progressive intellectuals to develop a critical stance with respect to global consensual 
positions on ecology and development. Worth mentioning are the Latin-American Global Model (or 
Bariloche Model) of 1976 (Herrera et al., 1976) in reply to the report The limits to growth (D. H. Meadows 
et al., 1972); and the report Nuestra propia agenda sobre desarrollo y medio ambiente (“Our own agenda on 
development and environment”) (Comisión de Desarrollo y Medio Ambiente de América Latina y el Caribe, 
1991), as the official position adopted by Latin-American countries vis-à-vis the Brundtland report and 
the Earth Summit in Rio 1992. In the intellectual sphere, prominent contributions are, among others, 
those of Arturo Escobar, Manfred Max-Neef, Gustavo Esteva, Victor Toledo, Enrique Leff, Alberto 
Acosta, and ─ more recently ─ the emergence of the Buen vivir discourse. (Vanhulst & Beling, 2014b; 
Vanhulst & Zaccai, 2016) 
The BV discourse emerged at the turn of the century in a spatiotemporal context that can be 
characterized through the following descriptors: 
The ‘cultural turn’ in politics and public discourse, and the mainstreaming of multiculturality as a global 
discourse since the 1970s through the expansion of so-called “New Social Movements” laid a breeding 
ground for recognition struggles of historically marginalized cultural and ethnic minorities; 
                                                 
193 Represented i.a. by authors such as Raúl Prebisch, André Gunder Franck, Celso Furtado, Enzo 
Faletto, or else Fernando Henrique Cardoso. 
 
194 Represented i.a. by Aníbal Quijano, Walter Mignolo, and Enrique Dussel.  
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particularly, in many Latin-American countries, indigenous populations. Aborigine peoples are indeed 
progressively awarded increased political recognition worldwide, as attested, for example, by 
Convention 169 of the International Labor Organization in 1989 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
in Independent Countries, the report Our Creative Diversity by the Commission for Culture and 
Development of UNESCO in 1996, or the Declaration of Rights of Indigenous Peoples by the UN, 
in 2007, together with akin constitutional reforms in fifteen countries (Adrian E. Beling & Vanhulst, 
2016b). In Latin America, the rise of the Zapatista movement in Mexico in the mid-1990s (Brand, 
2015, p. 26) and the 500 anniversary of America’s ‘discovery’ by Christopher Columbus (Bretón, 
Cortez, & García, 2014; Cortez, 2010) led to particularly intense recognition struggles, resulting in a 
shift from ethnic minorities (indigenous especially) being regarded as objects of public policy to 
becoming political subjects. Cultural diversity progressively ceases to be framed as right of minorities 
to be replaced by a societal model of ‘intercultural citizenship’ (CAOI, 2008). This process was 
accompanied by a concomitant (re)structuration of civil society forces and capacity for collective 
action (see below the continentally relevant case of the Ecuadorian Indigenous movement) 
Another relevant contextual marker is the renaissance of political discourses of the good life in the 
global North, which had been outcast from political philosophy since the Enlightenment (Bretón et 
al., 2014; Sandel, 2010). This renaissance has been explained as a product of the decreasing marginal 
utility of material affluence or even its decoupling from subjective wellbeing or happiness (Easterlin 
paradox), the post-materialistic turn, the ‘cultural turn’ brought about by the New Social Movements, 
among other things (cf. Chapter 3). The Western notion of development, which draws on the 
(universalistic) classical theories of modernity, starts to be questioned more fundamentally. Faced with 
the cumulative evidence of chronic socio-political, environmental and economic crises (persistent 
poverty, growing inequality, accelerated environmental degradation, etc.), all exacerbated by the 
generalization of neoliberal policies in the world since the 1980s, and the successful diversification of 
‘trajectories of development’ (e.g. China and the BRICS) with the rise of the Global South (Nederveen 
Pieterse & Rehbein, 2009; Rehbein & Schwengel, 2008), a fundamental crisis of the "ideology of 
development" became apparent, leading to the emergence of post-neoliberal, post-colonial and post-
developmentalist utopias. 
The crisis of development as a normative ideal drew not only on the observed empirical failure of its 
implementation, but on critical reflection on the logic of the program itself.  The diagnosis of 
“maldevelopment” or “Mal vivir” (Svampa & Viale, 2014a; Tortosa, 2009), a global systemic critique of 
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development blending elements of cultural alienation, socio-economic inequity, and ecological 
unsustainability (Amin, 1990) found wide reception in Latin-American countries scrounged by two 
decades of Washington-Consensus-type political economy. Merging these ideas with environmental 
thinking, the critical intellectual sphere in Latin-America further develops this diagnosis into a full-
fledged philosophical critique of Western modernity, locating the ultimate causes of contemporary 
crisis not only in neoliberalism or capitalism, but in the dualistic ontologies of modern European 
thought – chiefly the society/nature dualism, and the monistic conception of rationality according to 
the Cartesian rationalist tradition –, the latest avatar of which would be the ‘ideology of development’. 
This diagnosis, which found allies in the increasingly politically influential indigenous movements and 
in international environmental NGOs, supersedes that of a ‘multiple interlinked crisis’ uttered in the 
context of the GT debate, pointing at a deeper civilizational crisis. (i.a. Acosta, 2010b; Brand, 2015; 
Escobar, 2011, 2013; Estermann, 2012) 
The transformative impulse incubated under the above conditions burst out at the turn of the century 
– in the heat of a juncture defined by the ‘commodities-boom’  shielding Latin-American economies 
from the Great Recession unfolding in the global North, which became progressively re-signified as 
‘anti-model’ (Beck, 2015a), while the Washington Consensus being replaced by the “Commodity-
Consensus” (Svampa, 2012): the governments of the region aligning behind a political economy based 
on large scale extraction of non-renewable natural resources to finance cash-transfers to low-income 
sectors of the population, which came to be known as neoextractivism195. Furthermore, the post-cold-
war destigmatizing of the political left created a propitious context for the so-called “left-turn” or 
“post-neoliberal turn” in Latin-American politics (Beasley-Murray et al., 2009; Castañeda, 2006; 
Santos, 2006). In the Andean-Amazonian region, especially in Ecuador and Bolivia, the mainstreaming 
of the BV discourse was embedded in (and instrumental to) this process.  
Yet similarly to the GT debate, the BV discourse did not emerge or spread through diffuse social 
interaction, but rather through the actions of concrete agents with specific goals and logics. But while 
the GT debate largely develops in parallel discursive arenas, whose interconnectedness under the 
umbrella of the ‘transformation’-weaver came later and occasionally (cf. Chapter 4), the BV debate 
had a much more clear-cut processual character, univocally defined under the conceptual BV-header, 
                                                 
195 Neoextractivism stands for the large-scale (and/or highly intensive) economic appropriation of 
natural resources (mainly oil in Ecuador and natural gas in Bolivia), giving place to so-called ‘enclave 
economies’ (or ‘zones of sacrifice’) to supply the global market.(Gudynas, 2011c; Svampa, 2012) 
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and with a more fluid inter-imbrication of the diverse participating agent-configurations: indigenous 
movements, other Latin-American social movements (with peasants and the environmental 
movement playing a pivotal role), international state-agencies and NGOs (developmental and 
environmental), political parties, state agencies and governments, intellectuals from the academia and 
occupying positions in the formal political systems, and a comparatively marginal role of religious 
currents of thought, chiefly Liberation Theology (Carballo, 2015a). Because of this greater inter-
imbrication and processual character of the BV debate, the analysis of its historical unfolding below 
proceeds sequentially and integrating all these spheres, rather than dissecting them separately, as we 
did with GT.  
 
5.3. Brief diachronic reconstruction of the BV field of debate 
 
The genealogical reconstruction of the BV discourse distinguishes four phases: the longer incubation 
phase before the concept of BV was coined, which here covers all major ideational precedents (ante 
litteram), the prolegomenon to the instance of political assemblage, the consensus phase of 
constitutional and institutional reform, and the post-constitutional phase of discursive dislocation.  
Ante litteram 
 
Although there are no explicit references to BV (or its various equivalents in diverse indigenous 
languages) before the year 2000, a number of contributions can be identified from diverse currents of 
thought (in addition to indigenous ones) and academic disciplines such as philosophy, theology, 
anthropology, or even economics, which invoke values, principles and arguments discursively 
prefiguring BV, and which accumulated and articulated over decades (Adrian E. Beling & Vanhulst, 
2016a; Belotti, 2014). The most prominent cross-articulation in the first half of 20th century was that 
between Marxism and indigenous cosmogonies, advanced by Peruvian politician and intellectual José 
Carlos Mariategui, and various figures at the Ecuadorian Socialist Party (Cubillo-Guevara et al., 2014). 
The socialist discourse in the Andean-Amazonian region has since, with successive shifts in emphasis, 
aimed at synthesizing ethnic and class-demands from the marginalized sectors of the population. 
(Cortez, 2010). In the second half of 20th century, the religious element was added to the equation by 
Liberation Theology, which purported a vision of compatibility between Christian and indigenous 
cosmogonies, based on the holistic view of harmony among people and with nature. As of the 1970s, 
this discourse was further intersected by environmentalism. In the global context of discursive tension 
between the Brundtland-vision of (weak) sustainability, which eventually prevailed, and counter-
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hegemonic proposals setting on strong sustainability196, such as Ecodevelopment (I. Sachs, 1980), the 
report Waht now? by the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation (1975), or the report by the Founex 
Conference in Swizerland (1971), which would become a significant reference to the first Earth 
Summit in Stockholm, in 1972. Ecuadorian historian Vladimir Serrano saw the indigenous 
cosmogonies as a way out of the dichotomous relationship between ecology and economy, suggesting 
three guiding principles for any ‘true development’ proposal: environmental consciousness, holistic 
science, and intermediate technology (Cortez, 2010, p. 5). The ideational affinity of Serrano’s view 
with the critical-utopian discourses in 1970s Europe that we saw in Chapters 3 and 4 (Illich, Gorz, 
Schumacher, etc.) should thus not come as surprise. 
In the sphere of social movements, to be highlighted is especially the evolution of indigenous social 
movements from a largely undifferentiated unionist-peasant movement197 with typical socialist 
demands in the decades  1920-30 (ethnic and ecological contents playing a fairly marginal role here) – 
towards the mainstreaming and systematic articulation of political and identitary demands in the 1970s 
(Altmann, 2015a, pp. 171–172; Becker, 2011, p. 51). The Ecuadorian Indigenous movement (hereafter 
EIM) is one of the most important social movements in Ecuador, and indeed in the whole of Latin 
America. Its importance resides in a noteworthy organizational and discursive development in the 
1970s and 1980s that led to an effective bottom-up structure in the national indigenous organizations 
– and therefore a great potential for mobilization (see Section 5.5 regarding social powers, this chapter) 
– and to an innovative and coherent discourse around the central concepts of ‘indigenous 
nationalities’, that is, political entities with their own juridical, economic, and cultural structures, and 
                                                 
196 This classical cleavage between sustainability discourses pits the view that so-called ‘eco-systemic 
services’ are irreplaceable, and their conservation, therefore, constitutes a non-negotiable political 
priority (strong sustainability), versus the view that the functionality ecosystems can be partially or 
totally replaced by man-made technology, giving way to possible trade-offs between (ontologically 
conceived as separated) environmental, social, and economic goals (Hopwood, Mellor, & O’Brien, 
2005)   
 
197 Although it is mainly composed of indigenous peasants, who have made claims for land their central 
demand since its first manifestations in the 1920s, the bases of the indigenous movement are, from 
the beginning, very heterogeneous, ranging from traditional indigenous communities to agricultural 
workers who are semi-integrated into the market economy, small and medium traders, parts of an 
indigenous bourgeoisie, to groups living in the jungle and which are not integrated into the national 
society or the market. However, the sense of an indigenous ‘we’ has pervaded these social divisions, 
thereby explaining the political strength of the concept of ‘indigenous nations’. 
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with the capability and right to autonomous self-determination in their territories within a plurinational 
state.  
The up-taking of the idea of ‘indigenous nationalities’ as a political banner largely explains the rise of 
CONAIE – the Confederation of Indigenous Organizations of Ecuador – and its member 
organizations to hegemony within the EIM198 (see Section 5.5 regarding fusion with contingent 
situation, this chapter). In the wake of this discursive shift, and drawing on indigenous traditions, the 
relationship between people and land was re-framed from a merely materialistic view of land as a factor 
of production to an ontologically redefined view whereby “land does not belong to people; it is rather 
people that belong to land”. This ‘cultural-territorial shift’ materializes in CONAIE’s 1997 
reformulation of its political program199, and later in its proposal for a law on biodiversity in 2004; the 
latter with an additional emphasis on the ecological dimension of the protection of indigenous 
territories, as a result of the engagement with the global discourse on sustainability. Furthermore, the 
emergence of ‘counter-hegemonic’ indigenous organizations during the second half of the 20th century 
(communist, catholic, protestant, etc.)200 potentiated the creativity, resilience, articulation capacities, and 
strength of the EIM (Altmann, 2013a). In particular, the weakening of CONAIE at the turn of the 
century as a result of its close government-ties201 led to a historically unprecedented post-hegemonic 
                                                 
198 CONAIE had emerged as the leading force behind street mobilizations that repeatedly pulled down 
neoliberal governments. (Becker, 2011). By far the most important indigenous and one of the main 
social organizations not only in Ecuador, but in Latin America as a whole, and also allegedly the most 
inclusive. Alike FENOCIN, its seed-organizations were largely shaped by catholic anti-communism 
campaigns (with support from catholic missionaries). Its party Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional 
Pachakutik Nuevo País (MUPP-NP) features the largest parliamentary representation of indigenous and 
social movements in Ecuador. 
 
199 The text repeatedly refers to a ‘way of life’ which can be traced back to the “cultural values” and 
the “cultural and spiritual richness” of the worldview of Ecuadorian indigenous peoples and nations. 
Highlighted features of this ‘way of life’ are “integral humanism”, “communitarism”, “plurinational, 
communitarian, and participative democracy”, “plurinationality”, “interculturality”, “self-
determination”, “sovereignty”, “independence”, “international solidarity”, among others. (Cortez, 
2010, p. 9) 
 
200 The influence of religious organizations was exerted also via the work of “indigenous pastoral 
work”, especially in the province of Chimborazo (Cortez, 2010, p. 10). 
 
201 The referred ties pertain the participation in the government of Lucio Gutierrez (2002-2003), first, 
and later by its power struggle for the representation of the indigenous population with the emerging 
party-movement Alianza País headed by current Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa.  
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situation within the EIM (Altmann, 2013a, p. 28). In addition to this relative power loss, the 
confrontational and allegedly conflational ethnic drive of CONAIE’s concept of ‘plurinationality’ 
prompted other organizations representing the indigenous and other ethnic minorities (such as afro-
descendants) to successfully establish counterproposals: so FENOCIN and later also FEINE – 
together with CODAE (Afro-Ecuadorian Development Corporation)202 – endorsed the more open 
concept of interculturality as a challenge to plurinationality203, creating convergence toward the lowest 
common denominator of the EIM, thereby opening its path to prominence within the post-neoliberal 
context of the Ecuadorian “citizen revolution”. 
 
Prelude to the processes of constitutional reform (2000-2008) 
 
In the prelude to the emblematic processes of constitutional reform indicative of a political and 
cultural shift in the region (particularly in Ecuador and Bolivia), and in the framework of a process of 
critical self-reflection in the Western world around the worn-down idea of development (especially 
the idea of an exogenously steered development) pushed the international development sector into 
seeking to reestablish legitimacy through cross-pollinating connections with local cultures. And so 
indigenous intellectuals, in cooperation with some international development agencies, embarked in a 
process of restating traditional cultural elements from the aborigine peoples and their way of life as a 
basis for articulating an alternative understanding of development. 
 
First efforts at discursively articulating BV can be traced back to some kichwa communities in the 
Ecuadorian Amazon – particularly the community of Sarayaku – during the 1990s. 
 
This discursive construction, which can be lumped together under the kichwa term sumak kawsay204, 
was the first version of the Latin-American Buen vivir (Cubillo-Guevara & Hidalgo-Capitán, 2015; 
                                                 
202 For a detailed account of the diverse indigenous organizations in Ecuador and their historical 
development, see Altmann (2013a, 2015a) 
 
203 Interculturality emphasizes the defense of collective rights, but withdraws the ethnic and territorial 
emphases of plurinationality. Non-indigenous ethnic minorities which do not form nations themselves, 
as many indigenous peoples do, thus saw interculturality as a common ground, and a rectification of 
the implicit discrimination contained in the political claim for a plurinational state. 
204 This discursive construction, which drew on the shiir waras of the Achuar and the penker pujustin of 
the Shuar, researched by anthropologists such as Descola and Mader, was later diffused and adopted 
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Viteri, 2002a), therefore named here primordial BV. As a joint-venture of an array of international 
organizations and indigenous intellectuals, it can be understood as an elite-construction, through one 
attentive to the everyday life of indigenous communities. This explains, at least in part, why in the 
critical academic literature it is this ‘alternative’ character of BV that is highlighted vis-à-vis the 
historical hegemony of the modern Western concept of development, which is framed as 
anthropocentric and build on a dualist system of ontological and epistemic antagonisms (Acosta, 2013; 
Dávalos, 2008). 
 
This ‘glocal’  discursive co-production of BV was instrumental to its rapid diffusion across the region. 
The German cooperation agency GTZ (later renamed GIZ, Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit), 
and the Goethe-Institute, for example, played pivotal role in the early stages through the organization 
of discussion forums and diffusion across their dense network of partners. Well documented events 
are, for example, the program Suma Qamaña in Bolivia, developed and conducted jointly by GTZ and 
the Bolivian Federation of Municipal Associations in the framework of a World Bank-sponsored 
national consultative process under the rubric “Diálogo Nacional 2000”, where the Aymara intellectual 
elite (led by Javier Medina and Simon Yampara) coined the concept of Suma Qamaña, spreading it 
throughout Bolivia and the continent (Medina, 2001), or else the GTZ-organized 2002 Symposium 
on Development Cooperation in Panama, where early definitions of the ‘primordial BV’ are developed 
and formally translated into Guaraní and Kichwa language (ñandereko and sumak kawsay) (GTZ, 2002). 
In Ecuador, sumak kawsay began to spread through the public leverage of a handful of prominent 
public figures in the media (Viteri, 2002b) and in leading positions of the EIM (Sarayaku, 2003), on 
the one hand, and internationally and politically active scholars with a strong ecologist drive, on the 
other. (Acosta, 2002) 
 
As this primordial BV was progressively adopted and adapted by diverse social groups and 
organizations (both domestic, especially indigenous and peasant organizations, and foreign 
developmental and environmental NGOs), there arises a 'creative tension' between tendencies towards 
territorialization – particularly in relation to rural and peripheral areas, in the context of struggles 
                                                 
by other indigenous intellectuals and social groups, translated respectively as suma qamaña (Aymaras in 
Bolivia), ñandereko (Guaraní), küme mongen (Mapuche), allin kawsay (Peruvian indigenous movement), 
among others. 
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against oil extraction, as recorded in the Sarayaku Manifesto (2003)  –  and de-territorialization in the 
focus of these debates205.  
 
The mainstreaming of BV in the formal political sphere takes off with its decided adoption by the 
EIM, starting with the incorporation into CONAIE’s political project (progressively shifting emphasis 
from local and rural towards national politics and international north/south articulation), and into the 
strategic plan of CODENPE, a state development agency under the control of indigenous 
organizations. Beyond the indigenous world, the National Committee for the Renewal of Socialism in 
Ecuador elaborated a project based on indigenous cosmogonies as a basis for a broad socio-cultural 
utopia, seeking to oppose a viable alternative to the then prevailing neoliberal orthodoxy. Cultural 
diversity and a harmonious relationship with nature become central categories. (Cortez, 2010, p. 15) 
 
In this period, BV also starts becoming mainstreamed into cultural institutions: in 2004, the 
Intercultural University Amawtay Wasi adopted Sumak kawsay as a foundational principle, and a widely 
diffused Handbook of Political Education by Enrique Ayala Mora portrayed ongoing cultural and 
political reconfigurations as a time of “profound historical transformations”, where diversity would 
become the cornerstone of a “renewed national project”, after centuries of homogenizing pressures 
under the concept of mestizo206 society (Cortez, 2010, p. 7) 
Finally, in 2006, Alianza País emerges in Ecuador as a political party-movement catalyzing all counter-
hegemonic forces and adopting BV as a slogan (Alianza País, 2006: 3, 10). The stabilization of BV in 
the discourse of the EIM and the Ecuadorian political sphere, however, came only as a result of its 
political legitimation through the constitutional process. (Altmann, 2016, p. 58) 
                                                 
205 From the early stages of the politization process of BV, it was framed as a process of building a 
plurinational political order. This is evident in the proposals for a new political constitution formulated 
by indigenous and peasants’ organizations in Bolivia, or by CONAIE in Ecuador. BV thus appears as 
part of a political agenda that postulates plurinationality as the first feature that should characterize 
the State. In Ecuador, however, BV was appropriated earlier by the political sphere than in Bolivia – 
the party-movement Alianza Pais, which led Rafael Correa to the presidency, had already built its 
political program around BV in 2006, even before CONAIE presented its constitutional reform 
proposal in 2007 – meant that BV here displaced the claim to plurinationality of indigenous and 
popular organizations, which remained comparatively stronger in Bolivia. (Bretón, Cortez, & García, 
2014) 
 
206 The Spanish word mestizo means the ethnic and cultural hybridation of indigenous and Spanish, of 
the colonized and the colonizers. 
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Constitutional reforms and institutional and programmatic materializations (2007-2009) 
 
The discursive construction we called hybrid BV resulting from the Ecuadorian and Bolivian 
constituent debates is the product of an agential configuration made up of social movements, state, 
and academia imbrications (Vanhulst & Beling, 2014a). This configuration combines a) certain 
principles from the ancestral tradition of Andean-Amazonian aborigine cultures (advocated by 
indigenous movements) and the outcome of participatory processes inclusive of Latin American social 
movements (indigenous, Afro-descendants, peasants, unionists, feminists, etc.); b) the contributions 
of national and foreign development-critical intellectuals (from socialist and post-developmentalist 
currents), and c) the newly emerging national political elites in Ecuador and Bolivia. Especially worth 
mentioning among the non-indigenous influences of this hybrid BV are those of post-development, 
alter-globalization, eco-Marxism, environmentalism, feminism, and Liberation Theology. (Adrian E. 
Beling & Vanhulst, 2016a; Vanhulst, 2015) 
In Ecuador, constitutional reforms are centered on the (not so clearly defined) inclusion of the 
aforementioned concepts of plurinationality (i.e. the reorganization of the State as multi-national entity, 
with each ‘nation’ being awarded territorial autarchy) and interculturality (i.e. the defense of collective 
rights without the ethnic and territorial elements) – both concepts in conflict between indigenous and 
Afro-descendant organizations (as the latter do not constitute ‘nations’) –; as well as the 'Rights of 
Nature' (Espinosa, 2015). In Bolivia, the most important innovation occurs in a deeper and more 
clearly defined conception of plurinationality, giving rise to the constitutional recognition of a 
plurinational state. 
This phase is fundamentally characterized by the centrality of the State's role in the process of 
articulation and diffusion of the BV, as well as by a tension between the decolonizing forces (with a 
strong territorial focus) and the political pressure to adapt the BV to the worldviews, institutional 
structures, and policy-trends prevailing in the international arena. This tension resulted in some degree 
of cross-pollination, yet mutual vetoes between these contending strands impeded the hybrid BV from 
becoming a true ‘alternative to development’, as advocated by indigenous and some other social 
movements (feminists, decolonialists, environmentalists), and became rather equated with an abstract 
concept of ‘welfare’ (Cubillo-Guevara, 2016), and subsumed into a "bio-socialist-republican" matrix 
(Ramirez, 2010).  
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Post-constitutional phase 
 
The ‘forced consensus’ implicit in the hybrid BV unleashed an increasingly intense struggle for the 
symbolic appropriation of the concept. With increasing ownership-taking of BV by the state, the hybrid 
BV grows increasingly conciliatory with modernist understandings of development, as clearly 
emanates, for example, from the National Plans for Buen Vivir 2009-2013 and 2013-2017 in Ecuador 
(SENPLADES, 2009, 2013), or from the Bolivian Human Development Report 2010, which 
highlights the necessity to connect the “normative horizons” of UNDP research in Bolivia, built upon 
Amartya Sen’s and Martha Nussbaum’s ‘Capability Approach’, and the ideas contained in BV or Suma 
Qamana. For the report, both ‘frameworks converge in an ideal of development that transcends the 
material scope, and above all coincide in the principles of equality, respect and social recognition’, 
overriding differences in the consideration of welfare (UNDP, 2010, pp. 49–51).  
In the case of Ecuador, the government started to increasingly watering down the BV rhetoric, 
justifying the continuity of the economic model based on oil-exports under the premise that 
“extractivism is needed in order to leave extractivism behind” (Gudynas, 2012). The conflict over the 
Water and Mining Laws in 2008 opens a gap (which would increasingly expand) between official state- 
and indigenous politics, with the EIM accusing the government of launching an attack on the essential 
principles of Buen vivir. Indigenous organizations would be increasingly marginalized from key 
government projects (e.g. the emblematic Yasuní-ITT initiative, see Excursus below) and policies, or 
else play a merely legitimizing role a posteriori (e.g. in support of the proposed inclusion of so-called 
"Rights of Nature" in the Ecuadorian constitution) (Espinosa 2015). However, CONAIE (under the 
brand-new presidency of Marlon Santi, who had been one of the authors of the Sarayaku Manifesto/ 
cf. Section 5.3., prelude to the constitutional reform), decidedly took ownership of BV as identity-
marker of the EIM. At the state level, however, the central advocates of BV – including Alberto 
Acosta, president of the Montecristi Constituent Assembly and former minister of Energy and Mines 
to the Correa Administration; and Mónica Chuji, former Minister of Communication and 
Spokesperson of the Ecuadorian Executive – distanced themselves from a government perceived as 
increasingly autistic and disconnected from the grassroots which had enabled its rise to power. 
As of 2010, the relationship between the Correa-administration and the EIM had reached a breaking 
point, after which CONAIE spoke of the state as a “colonialist system that destroys mother Earth 
and overruns all our rights”, and slammed Correa as a “false socialist, traitor, populist, genocidal fascist 
to the principles of sumak kawsay, accomplice of the colonialism of the 21st century” (CONAIE 2010, 
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cited in Altmann, 2013b). Meanwhile, in Bolivia the indigenous support to the Morales-administration 
becomes increasingly polarized between the unionized ‘cocaleros’ (coca-peasants) and the 
communitarian indigenous groups (‘comunarios’), particularly around the iconic TIPNIS conflict207. 
The ensuing struggles for the appropriation and resignification of BV in this phase yielded three main 
discursive strands: the indigenist BV, which prioritizes the retrieval and protection of an indigenous 
identity and their territorial autonomy, a statist-socialist BV prioritizing conventionally defined socio-
economic goals in the (Western) liberal-socialist tradition, and a post-developmentalist BV prioritizing a 
social-ecological transformation (Cubillo-Guevara et al., 2018). Each of these discursive strands is 
advocated by a specific (group of) actor(s), seeking to strategically align BV with their own political 
goals in the context of a struggle for political hegemony in a post-neoliberal regional landscape. 
 
 
Excursus: the Yasuní-ITT initiative 
 
Yasuní-ITT is the iconic proposal coming from Ecuadorian civil society for breaking with the 
extractivist development model, which, as of 2007, was taken over by the government.  This proposal 
is noteworthy because of its historically uniqueness and symbolic potential for balancing prevailing 
local/national and international/global interests regarding natural resources and the preservation of 
ecosystems in a novel, sustainable way, motivating an international discussion about a post-oil world  
(Alayza Moncloa & Gudynas, 2012; Arsel & Avila Angel, 2012). In a nutshell, the proposal consisted 
in the State refraining from allowing oil-extraction from the largest underground oil-reserve in 
Ecuador – the Ishpingo-Tambococha-Tiputini (ITT) area of the Yasuní National Park in the 
Ecuadorian Amazon rainforest –, thus preserving the biologically most diverse territory in the world, 
as a global public good. In exchange for keeping the oil in the ground, the Ecuadorian government 
demanded support for the initiative from the international community in amount of 50% of the 
would-be-revenues from oil extraction – in the original version of the proposal: 350 million US dollars 
per year for 10 consecutive years (Arsel & Avila 2012). The declared aim of the initiative was to 
                                                 
207 The conflict emerged around a government plan to pass a highway across a protected natural area 
and autarchic indigenous territory (TIPNIS: Indigenous Territory and National Park Isiboro-Secure). 
The ‘cocaleros’ would benefit from the highway, which would allow them to gain easier access to 
markets. Yet ‘comunarios’ argue that it would create a structural incentive to extend coca-plantations 
into the park, forcing a massive exodus of the indigenous communities settled there. 
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conserve biodiversity, protect indigenous peoples living in voluntary isolation, and avoid the release 
of CO2 emissions. It also envisioned the transition to a sustainable economy, using the funds raised 
to create jobs in economic sectors such as renewable energy, while at the same time respecting the 
region's natural and cultural biodiversity. 
The origins of the initiative can be traced back to a longstanding struggle against oil extraction in the 
Amazon, with a prominent role of Ecuadorian public intellectual Alberto Acosta and of environmental 
NGOs – mainly Acción Ecológica, and, from its creation in 1996, the Oilwatch Network. With the 
establishment of this network, a proposal for enacting an Oil Moratorium in Yasuní was raised, 
covering both oil exploitation and exploration: the Oilwatch initiative “An Eco-Logical [sic] call for 
conservation, climate and rights”, which was presented in 2005 at an experts’ meeting held in Italy on 
conservation in protected areas.  
 
A momentous debate in the Ecuadorian public sphere regarding oil extraction and sustainable 
development just before campaigning for presidential elections prompted to-become-president 
Correa to include the oil moratorium idea in his government plan in 2006, and was officially taken up 
by Alberto Acosta when he became Minister of Mines and Energy, under the label Yasuní-ITT 
Initiative. Along with Acosta, many prominent figures of environmental and indigenous rights groups 
joined the government, with mixed effects: on the one hand, it helped bring their issues onto the state 
agenda, but on the other, it weakened civil society. 
 
From the foundational stone of the official Yasuní-ITT project to its later signing with an ad hoc UNDP 
Trust Fund, however, civil society actors, and particularly indigenous organizations, were sidelined 
from the process. The proposal was primarily discussed between the Ecuadorian state and 
international actors at the institutional level. The indigenous and environmental movements were only 
mentioned in the UNDP document as pledging their support to the proposal (Arsel & Avila Angel, 
2012). Aspects of economic compensation and the instrumental value of Yasuní as a carbon-sink to 
mitigate climate change gradually took over the original, ‘subversive’ framing of Yasuní-ITT as a 
spearhead towards a post-carbon world. Voices began to raise denouncing a co-optation of the 
initiative by the government, under a business-as-usual logic. According to Acosta, the president has 
been a “reluctant environmentalist”, at times raising objections to the scheme and at others slowing 
down momentum and crucial progress (Kozloff, 2011). Despite the lofty ambitions of the proposal, 
from the outset, the Correa government had refused to rule out extraction in the Yasuní Park (which 
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was known as “Plan B”, but became official only in 2009), while simultaneously negotiating 
concessions to Chinese and Brazilian corporations to begin exploration. In fact, the build-up of 
massive infrastructure for oil exploitation in areas within the Yasuní National Park contiguous to the 
declared-as-intangible zone of the ‘ITT’ had already started as early 2007. In June 2008, the 
government requested the national oil company Petroecuador to issue a call for tender, in preparation 
for the hypothetical scenario of exploiting the ITT oil fields.  
 
By 2009 the alleged inability of Yasuní-ITT to attract sufficient serious interest from the international 
community prompted the Ecuadorian government to put forward a revised proposal, changing both 
its concrete terms and the language of its appeal: The new proposal narrowed down its focus to global 
climate change, and offered tradable Yasuní Guarantee Certificates (CGY by its Spanish acronym) 
instead of the earlier request for direct cash transfers. This proposal attracted strong support from the 
German parliament, as well as serious interest from Spain, Italy, and other nations. After closely 
coming to a deal at the Copenhagen Climate Summit in 2009, Correa unexpectedly withdrew from 
negotiations in 2010, leading to the resignation of his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fander Falconi. In 
the ensuing national debate, Correa progressively watered down his rhetoric on Yasuní, and 
announced giving serious consideration to start exploiting some of the oil fields in the ITT block with 
“minimal environmental impact”, possible through allegedly sustainable technologies. (Arsel & Avila 
Angel, 2012) 
 
Civil society sought to reclaim Yasuní-ITT: At the “People’s Summit in Rio+20 for Social and 
Environmental Justice in Defense of the Commons and against the Commodification of Life” which 
took place in parallel to the official conference, civil society organizations, movements, and 
transnational advocacy networks working in Latin America bannered the Yasuní-ITT initiative against 
the “Green Economy”, which was being promoted at official levels (cf. Chapter 3). Yet resistance 
counter-forces were insufficient: With Correa’s legitimacy reassured with his victory at the presidential 
elections on February 2013 with 57% of electoral support, the fate of Yasuní proved to be sealed. In 
August 2013, the president officially announced his decision to drop the initiative and start exploiting 
oil in the ITT block, with the ex-post consent of the National Assembly, where his party Alianza País 
had the absolute majority. A constitutionally mandatory referendum on the issue was rejected by 
Ecuador’s National Electoral Commission under accusations of civil society groups having 
manipulated signed petitions. Polls, however, showed that before its cancellation, the Yasuní-ITT 
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Initiative enjoyed very high levels of popular support (80% in favor of the initiative and more than 
66% opposed to oil exploitation) (Arsel & Avila Angel, 2012). 
 
The learning-effects of Yasuní-ITT did not stop at its official cancellation, however. Ecuadorian civil 
society groups have not given up on Yasuní, and launched post-cancellation resistance campaigns: the 
Network in Support of Yasuní RAYAS (‘Red de Apoyo al Yasuní’) and Amazonía por la vida (‘Amazon 
for life’), with its campaign Yasuní depende de tí (‘Yasuní depends on you’) are the most important groups 
of organizations supporting not only a re-enactment of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative but also fueling an 
international collective reflection towards a post-carbon civilization.  
 
The Yasuní-ITT Initiative case constitutes a perfect metonymy for the trajectory of BV as a political 
discourse: Initially, the Initiative was crucial in Correa’s discourse as a symbol of a new development 
model: “the star of the citizens’ revolution”, it was called. Progressively, however, it was watered down 
to accommodate prevailing policy-framings and made ever more contingent upon international 
compensation. To be sure, a series of contingent elements (e.g. the unexpected withdrawal of Correa 
from the post-Copenhagen negotiations, or the equally unexpected withdrawal of the support pledged 
to Yasuní-ITT by the German government, despite broad congressional approval208) played a role in 
preventing Yasuní-ITT from becoming a success-story; yet its very vulnerability to such factors 
illustrates the exogenous vulnerabilities of ‘transformation projects’ in the context of global capitalist 
entanglements. In spite of this, according to Acosta et al. (2009, p. 1), the Yasuní-ITT initiative marks 
a rupture in the history of global sustainability governance, and constitutes a prototypical measure to 
effectively mitigating the greenhouse effect causing climate change. Furthermore, it would showcase 
an alternative to the extractivist development model, and, at the same time, an option for globally co-
building a good life, understood as a life in harmony among human beings in their cultural diversity, 
and between these and nature. At the same time, Yasuní-ITT dramatically exposes the structural 
cleavages between global and national, public and private interests209, and state and civil society. 
                                                 
208 While the German parliament mostly favored the support of Yasuní-ITT, since June 2008 Merkel’s 
government did not, the main opposition coming from then Development Minister Dirk Niebel, of 
the liberal party FDP. Consequently, the case for Yasuní-ITT was also weakened in other potentially 
supportive countries. 
 
209 As also the Stern Report of 2006 on the economics of climate change convincingly showed, the 
relevant cleavage is not between economic and other forms of value, as it is often framed in the public 
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Synthesis: The discursive process of BV 
 
Analogously to what we did for the GT debate in Chapter 4, this reconstruction of the history of the 
BV debate can be synthesized in a schematic time-line view of the discursive process. The same point 
of departure be set for a common timeframe for both case studies, a first incubatory phase can be 
outlined spanning between Rio 1992 and the turn of the century. In Latin-America, this SD-consensus 
phase was strongly marked by another consensus: the Washington-Consensus. Like with GT, the 
‘cultural mood’ here ranged from a ‘neoliberal euphoria’ to a resignation in the face of post-cold war 
capitalist triumphalism, at the beginning, to catastrophic collapse in most Latin-American countries 
towards the end of the century. Unlike the case in Europe, however, social struggles continued to 
confront the all-powerful technocratic elites throughout this period, especially under the guise of 
peasant movements.  
From 2000 to 2007, we identified the period of discursive emergence of BV (‘primordial BV’), in a 
‘glocal’ conjunction of international development elites and local indigenous intellectuals, drawing on 
traditional communitarian ways of life. These reflections were enriched through agonistic dialogues 
with a variety of thought-currents, including feminist, ecologist, alter-globalist, postdevelopmentalist, 
interculturalist, eco-Marxist, and Liberation-Theologist contributions. The ‘cultural mood’ is of 
contestation or creative tension, and the arenas of discourse-production range from local cultural and 
social struggles, national politics, and global civil society. 
In the period between 2008-2009, alongside the constitutional assemblies in Ecuador and Bolivia, the 
discursive interaction is concentrated in the political arena. The consensus-oriented constitutional 
process prompted a political assemblage (‘hybrid BV’) of the various views and positions around BV. 
                                                 
sphere, but rather between private and public interest. Indeed, even if attending to the economic 
dimension alone, the case for Yasuní-ITT could have been solidly defended: according to Earth 
Economics estimations, while the Yasuní-ITT initiative demanded contributions in amount US$3.6 
billion over a time-span of 13 years in compensation for not exploiting oil reserves, the environmental 
benefits of the initiative were estimated at a net present value of US$ 9.89 billion, and the 
environmental costs of oil production in the ITT at US$ 1.25 billion. Furthermore, while Ecuador’s 
high and increasing debt-servicing is indeed dependent on oil-export revenues, fossil-fuel-subsidies 
doubled between 2006 and 2012, from 1,35 billion to 2,86 billion dollars yearly (Alayza Moncloa & 
Gudynas, 2012). The proven reserves in the ITT amount to the worldwide consumption of oil of 
merely 4 days (Fontaine & Narváez, 2007). 
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The ‘cultural mood’ is one of empowerment, where representatively is delegated to the state as the 
main bearer of hope for deep transformations in society. 
But the pragmatist drive of politics could not hold a forced consensus with fundamental underlying 
differences together, pitting territorial vs.de-territorialized views, reformist and transformative, urban 
vs. rural, and socio-economic vs. eco against each other. The struggle is conducted now in two parallel 
fronts: politics and culture. The cultural mood is antagonistic, with governments and their supporters 
clinging to their electoral legitimacy, and social movements going back to their conventional role of 
resistance, giving way to a discursive dislocation or trifurcation into three main strands: the Indigenist 
BV, the State-Socialist BV, and the Postdevelopmentalist BV, which will be analyzed in the next section 
with respect to their ideational contents. Figure 13 below visually synthesizes the above. 
 
Figure 13: BV as a discursive process 
Source: Cubillo-Guevara, A.P.; Vanhulst, J.; Hidalgo-Capitan, A., Beling, A.E. (2018) 
5.4. Buen vivir as a field of discursive representation  
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Since a proper empirical discourse analysis will not be undertaken here, replaced instead with a 
reconstruction based on a literature review, a step-by-step analytical distinction of the SKAD-
categories utilized in Chapter 3 for the GT debate is not possible. In its place, this section sets to offer 
an integral picture of the diverse BV-representations, retrieving and synthesizing existing 
categorization exercises. Due to their clearer link to discursive agents, as with the GT-representations, 
narratives will be used as the structuring category here, basing on the five basic strands of Figure 12. 
When possible, particular references or emphases on frames and phenomenal or problem-structures 
are specified insofar they add to a better understanding of the field of discourse under observation.  
 
Primordial BV 
 
In the broader crisis-context referred to above, the combination of epistemological and democratizing 
pressures has prompted both the scholarly and the political sphere to a process of exploration and 
experimentation with self-legitimizing and self-potentiating purposes. As part of this process, symbolic 
repertoires accumulated throughout history (and very much alive in the current praxis of diverse 
human collectives) were rediscovered as sources for the development of a new social and 
‘environmental rationality’ (Leff, 2004a). Not surprisingly, the strong aborigine presence in the Andean 
and surrounding regions offered itself as a repository of traditional indigenous cosmogonies, which 
would serve both as a means of restoring the social recognition of  indigenous population with their 
traditional cultural identities, on the one hand, and enabling the reconsideration of alternative 
epistemes which have been sidelined by Western-style modernity, on the other, enabling the 
emergence of new rationalities “at a middle-point between the dis-enchantment of the traditional 
world and the re-enchantment of the modern world, between science and metaphysics, between 
reason and spirituality” (Adrian E. Beling, Gomez Lechaptois, & Vanhulst, 2014, p. 160), as a source 
of cultural renovation towards the envisaged goal of a civilizational change (Estermann, 2012; Prada, 
2014) 
 
The traditional cosmogony of the Andean aborigines is holistic, i.e. it is defined by a relational 
conception of the world, which draws its unity from a mythical-symbolic super-structure. Other key 
principles of these cosmogonies include those of “oppositional complementarity”, whereby irresolvable 
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tension is understood as productive coexistence210, reciprocity, balance, and a circular (rather than linear) 
conception of time (Estermann, 1998; Estermann & Instituto Superior Ecuménico Andino de Teología, 
2006)211.  The axial principle of relationality takes material shape in the ayllu – the communitarian 
subject of Andean aborigine traditions, the habitat of the Andean runa (individual subject). While 
resonating with the communitarian tradition of the West, the omni-inclusive ethos of the ayllu goes 
beyond Western communitarianism and comes arguably closer to a radical recognition of global 
systemic interdependencies, vulnerabilities, and the imperative for reciprocity, complementarity, and 
balance, hence arguably closer to the Gaia hypothesis (Lovelock, Margulis), inspired in Edgar Morin’s 
and Fritjof Capra’s complexity thinking, which sees the Earth – including organic matter, the air, the 
oceans and the planetary surface – like a complex system that can be considered like a single organism. 
It becomes clear why anthropocentric understandings of nature (‘ecosystem services’), or linear 
understandings of the economic cycle (extractive production matrixes) or of history (progress, 
development), or the very idea of an ‘environment’ as separated from human societies (so-called 
‘nature/society divide’) are not defined in the aborigine cosmogony of the Andes. Furthermore, the 
autonomous and independent individual of the modern episteme lacks entity in the Andean 
cosmogony: the subject is constituted as such, both individually and collectively, in the framework of 
a symbolic or mythical super-structure. The Andean runa seeks his or her mythical insertion in the 
world through ceremonial representation (Van Kessel & Larraín Barros, 2000). Hence the status of 
myths in the Andean cosmogony goes far beyond their role as a space of regulation of intersubjective 
discourse, as it is conceived of in the Habermasian tradition, to become a constitutive space of 
subjectivation, i.e a space for the discursive production of a certain form of subjectivity. (Adrian E. 
Beling et al., 2014, pp. 173–174; Estermann, 1998) 
 
In the categories of Greimas, the primordial BV could be schematized as follows: 
                                                 
210 This principle, in Kichwa language: ch’exe, broadly matches the principle of the included third of 
Edgar Morin’s complexity logic, which challenges the principle of the excluded third (or principle of 
non-contradiction) of conventional logic, according to which A cannot be A and not-A at the same 
time. (Rivera Cusicanqui, 2010a) 
 
211 For an in-depth comparative and articulative analysis of the Andean and the modern epistemes, see 
Beling et al. (2014)  
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Figure 14: Primordial BV 
 
 
Hybrid BV 
 
As any political consensus formula, this narrative strand somewhat lacks internal coherence, which 
becomes apparent in the trifurcation of the discourse after the consensual momentum of the 
constitutional process. Despite proclamations of BV as an ‘alternative to development’212, what can 
be actually observed in its political translations is that the relationship between the Buen vivir and 
development is rather of (largely unspecified) hybridation. The discursive construction we named 
‘primordial BV’ comes under pressure to adapt to the symbolic frame of the broader (urban, 
bourgeois, and anti-neoliberal) ‘citizen revolution’ of Correa’s party Alianza Pais  – in Bolivia the so-
called ‘cultural democratic revolution’ remained largely movement-based (Ramirez, 2010; Walsh, 2010) 
–, to the dominant discourses in international development cooperation, particularly the liberal Sen-
Nussbaum-inspired ‘Human Development’ discourse of the UNDP (UNDP, 2010), and even to 
Western environmentalist discourses (Espinosa, 2015). The reductive and ambiguous equalization 
                                                 
212 So, the National Plan for Buen Vivir of the Ecuadorian government states that Buen vivir is “a 
commitment to change […] that allows for the application of a new economic paradigm whose end 
does not focus on the material, mechanistic and seemingly endless accumulation of goods, but instead 
promotes an inclusive, sustainable and democratic economic strategy. […] Also, ‘good living’ is built 
[…] on transition from current anthropocentrism towards biopluralism […]. Finally, ‘good living’ also 
builds on the demands for equality and social justice, and on the recognition, evaluation and dialogue 
of the peoples and their cultures, forms of knowledge and ways of life” (SENPLADES, 2009, p. 10). 
Even the updated plan in 2013 states that BV is “is not a new development paradigm, but a liberating 
social alternative that proposes other priorities for social organization, other than mere economic 
growth implicit in the development paradigm”. In Bolivia, the 2009 enacted constitution states that 
“the Bolivian economic model is plural and aims to improve the quality of life and the ‘well living’ of 
all Bolivians” (art. 306).   
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between the concepts of BV and ‘development’ – which is a common feature of both the Ecuadorian 
and the Bolivian cases – amounts to neglecting inbuilt tensions between these two concepts (Vanhulst 
& Beling, 2014a), most critically: the biocentric character of BV requires overcoming the 
society/nature dualism that has become entrenched in Western-style modernity and, by implication, a 
fundamental redefinition of the dominant idea of development. However, the ambiguous experiment 
with the hybridation of BV produced noteworthy outcomes in terms of institutional and policy-
innovation, which gained praise around the world, such as the institution of ‘Rights of Nature’ (RoN) 
– acknowledged in the Ecuadorian 2008 constitution and in Bolivia’s Law of Rights of Mother Nature 
(2010) – the constitutional recognition of a plurinational state in Bolivia, or the acknowledgement of 
a “plural economy aimed at enabling the good life for all Bolivians” (art. 306). A policy innovation 
that captured worldwide attention was Yasuní-ITT (see Excursus above). Furthermore, the re-
conceptualization of conventional political parties as ‘party-movements’ also became object of interest 
for scholarly and political analysts alike (Altmann, 2013a). 
 
 Figure 15: Hybrid BV 
 
 
Indigenist BV 
 
As reaction to the alleged Westernization or co-optation of BV as a consequence of its political 
appropriation, the indigenist conception of BV (the Spanish term ‘buen vivir’ usually neglected in 
favor of sumak kawsay) constitutes a form of symbolic-material resistance to the historical constant of 
‘subalternization’ of traditional indigenous ways of life (Oviedo Freire, 2013), and is thus more focused 
on the recovery and affirmation of indigenous identity and political self-determination than on socio-
economic or environmental goals (although these are also considered in the discourse of sumak 
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kawsay), and pursues the primary goal of plurinationalization of Latin-American states with a strong 
indigenous presence (Simbaña 2011, cited in Cubillo-Guevara et al., 2018). Cultural and particularly 
spiritual elements from aborigine traditions are also emphasized (in particular, the relationship to land 
and territory: the Pachamama) (Estermann & Instituto Superior Ecuménico Andino de Teología, 2006; 
Huanacuni, 2010). Advocates of indigenist versions of BV213 are pejoratively referred to by politicians 
and intellectuals adhering to the statist current of BV as fanatic ‘pachamamistas’ (Houtart, 2011), as 
being “stuck in infantile indigenism” and being “incapable of implementing BV” (Correa, 2007). This 
indigenist variant of BV has been assimilated to concepts of Etnodevelopment (Masabalín, 2017) and 
hybridizes more or less explicitly with certain tenets of decolonial theories, in particular, from 
intellectuals of the Modernity-Coloniality Group (represented i.a. by Anibal Quijano, Walter Mignolo, 
Enrique Dussel, and Edgardo Lander). This strand of thought sees the vindication of indigenous 
peoples as largely incompatible with (the universalistic and colonial pretensions of Western-style) 
modernity and requiring the development of an “indigenous way” (Quijano, 2011; Viteri, 2002b). This 
stark opposition between indigeneity and modernity – both framed in an essentialist way – turns it 
into a rather particularistic strand (Vanhulst & Beling, 2014a), which contributes to explain the 
discursive dislocation in the post-consensual phase of the BV debate. On the other hand, indigenist 
activism contributed to a decisive shift from ethnic minorities (or otherwise marginalized groups) 
being framed as objects to being recognized as agents of identity politics and policy-making (CAOI, 
2008) 
 
Figure 16: Indigenist BV 
                                                 
213 In this categorization, indigenist intellectuals are represented, among others, by Carlos Viteri, Simón 
Yampara, Grimaldo Rengifo, Mario Torrez, Javier Medina, Luis Macas, Nina Pacari, Luis Maldonado, 
Fernando Huanacuni, Javier Lajo, Raúl Prada, Floresmilo Simbaña, Atawallpa Oviedo, Xabier Albó, 
Rafael Bautista. 
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Statist-socialist BV 
 
Results from the appropriation of BV by the formal political system and the government, claiming for 
itself the role of sole interpreter and guarantor of the “people’s will", thus largely leaving behind its 
‘party-movement’ profile. Representatives of this strand are include neo-Marxist Latin-American and 
European scholars, as well as intellectuals associated to the governments of Bolivia and Ecuador, 
Nicaragua and El Salvador214. Key here is the importance given to welfare state-provisions, leaving 
environmental, cultural, and identitary questions in the background. This variant of BV becomes 
virtually indistinguishable, in practice, from the discourses of other leftist Latin-American 
governments at the time, both of the so-called ‘Bolivarian’ type (Venezuela, Nicaragua, El Salvador) 
and the more classical social-democratic ones (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay), and could be assimilated 
to a more classical notion of development in its neo-Marxist variant, or that of “productive 
transformation with equity” (Braña, Dominguez, & León, 2016), as becomes apparent in formulas 
such as “Buen vivir socialism” (SENPLADES, 2013), “Andean socialism”, ‘bio-republican socialism”. 
(Ramirez, 2010; Walsh, 2010), or ‘socialism of the 21st century”. (Dieterich, 2002) 
While their declared aim is resisting economic globalization and transforming the productive matrixes 
of their respective countries into post-capitalist economic systems (“not market economies, but 
economies with markets”) (Houtart, 2011), with a prominent role of social and solidarity-based 
economic relations (Coraggio, 2007), this model initially sets on a reinforced (neo-)extractivist policy 
to endow the state with the necessary economic resources for the cash-transfer policies referred to 
above. This is criticized as perpetuating secular patterns of accumulation and the prevalent extractivist 
matrixes, triggering stark opposition from civil society groups and grassroots movements, as well as 
from critical intellectuals, who have referred to the statist variant of BV as “senile development” 
(Martínez-Alier, 2010), “capitalism of the 20th century” (as opposed to the “socialism of the 20th 
century” formula of Bolivarian governments) (Santos 2014), as “savage extractivism” (as opposed to 
a sensible or “reasonable extractivism”) (Gudynas, 2011b), as a “false alternative to neoliberalism” 
                                                 
214 Among others: Rafael Correa, Evo Morales, Daniel Ortega, Salvador Sánchez-Cerén, René 
Ramírez, Álvaro García-Linera, Rosario Murillo, Iosu Perales, Fander Falconí, François Houtart, 
Pedro Páez, Ricardo Patiño, Katu Arkonada, Atilio Borón, Marta Harnecker, José Luis Coraggio, Félix 
Cárdenas, Vicente Escandell, Mariano Féliz, Valter Pomar, María Nela Prada, etc. 
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(Svampa & Viale, 2014a), or as “depriving BV of most of the innovative character canonized in the 
2008-2009 political constitutions” (Acosta, 2015b; Walsh, 2010).  
 Figure 17: Statist-socialist BV 
 
Postdevelopmentalist BV 
 
Postdevelopmentalist BV discourses draw on the current of radical development critique215, on 
environmentalist, and left-transformative currents (intellectual, social, and political), and to Latin-
American social movements. Among its main representatives in the context of the BV debate are 
Alberto Acosta, Eduardo Gudynas, Arturo Escobar, Edgardo Lander, Miriam Lang, Leonardo Boff, 
Gustavo Esteva, Maristella Svampa, José María Tortosa, Koldo Unceta, to name but a few (Cubillo-
Guevara et al., 2018). A main concern here is that the discussion around BV not be confined to the 
contingent realities of the Andean-Amazonian region (Acosta, 2010b). BV is thus framed as a 
discursive work-in-progress, directly linked to a process of intercultural dialogue around the 
fundamental question of ecological sustainability and other fundamental problems of (global) 
collective life (Bajoit, Pozo M, & Hernán, 2008); i.e. an inter-discursive dialogue with other (Western 
and non-Western) critical discourses dealing with the interface of social and ecological issues. The 
name ‘postdevelopment’ is self-explanatory in terms of the incompatibility claims between BV and 
modern development, the latter being framed as a pervasive form of symbolic-ideological domination 
(Acosta, 2015b). BV is thus framed, by contrast, as an “alternative to development”, with great 
decolonizing and humanist-utopian potential. This includes steering Latin-American economies away 
from extractivist dependence (Gudynas, 2011b). 
                                                 
215 Cf. Footnote 5 in the Introductory Chapter for background on development critique. 
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Central here is also a democratic-participatory, plural, and ‘glocal’  definition of the precise meaning of 
BV or ‘the good life’, as a collage of indigenous, peasant, syndicalist, cooperativist, feminist, pacifist, 
ecologist, socialist, religious, decolonial influences, including ‘strong’ ecological sustainability as their 
sine qua non condition of possibility (Gudynas & Acosta, 2011b), so that territorially anchored 
manifestations of BV can coexist in a plural and interdependent world. Potentially fertile discursive 
affinities can be drawn with transformation discourses from around the world (Acosta, 2014; Adrian 
E. Beling et al., 2018; Brand, 2015; Escobar, 2015), such as other reinstated tradition-based discourses 
(e.g. Eco-swaraj in India or Ubuntu in many African countries)(Kakozi, 2015), Degrowth (cf. Chapter 
3), the various global and local environmental discourses216, as well as reformist policy-currents with 
ideational affinity-potentials, such as Human Development (Adrian E. Beling et al., 2018). The 
postdevelopmentalist version of BV accords high importance to the role of civil society, especially 
social movements, in the definition and implementation of BV, regardless of their representation in 
the formal political system, as these actors are structurally and historically sub-represented, and 
discriminated against by the prevalent developmentalist ideology.  Postdevelopmentalist intellectuals 
are accused, from the state-socialist current, of lack of political pragmatism, of a certain nihilism, or 
of being “environmentalist romantics” (Correa, 2007), and, from the indigenist strand, as having 
perverted the original meaning of BV, filling it with Westernizing significations that are alien to the 
Andean cosmogony (Grosfoguel, 2016; Oviedo Freire, 2013)  
 
 Figure 18: Postdevelopmentalist BV 
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216 For a comprehensive list, see Martinez-Alier (2014) 
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The overall phenomenal or problem-structure in the GT debate comes out clearly from the above 
considerations, and can be synthesized in four categories: an ecological dimension, a socio-economic 
dimension, a cultural-traditional dimension, and a political dimension (Acosta, 2009; Belotti, 2014). 
These categories, as well as the political and cultural strategies and instruments deployed with each, 
are framed as rather harmonizable or as conflictual, depending on their narrative embeddedness in the 
above identified strands. 
In terms of framing, what comes out most clearly from the literature on BV is its ambivalent 
relationship with both development – understood as a particular discourse and dominant ideology from 
which to emancipate, and as a holy grail, at the same time – and with modernity, which is often conflated 
with understandings of Euro-Atlantic diffusionism. 
As we did with the GT, a triple question can be raised to classify the insights gained from the analysis 
of BV-representations: what unites, what divides, and what could be bridged among the diverse discursive 
strands?  
The political consensus attained around the ‘hybrid BV’ represents the lowest common denominator 
of all strands, synthesizing their commonalities (or at least the limits of their respective cognitive 
elasticity and political compromise). A common denominator is, beyond any doubt, the rejection of 
neoliberalism, largely perceived as the root of the deep socio-economic and socio-environmental crisis 
of the final stretch of the past century. The generic idea of Buen vivir as an idea of good life with a 
native flavor, but also with various foreign influences (from the Aristotelian eudaimonia to the Human 
Development indicators of UNDP), a rather abstract concern for the ecological environment, or else 
the politization of power relations and their territorial dimension are other common features (Brand, 
2015) among the diverse discursive currents that flow into the ‘hybrid BV’. Here the four dimensions 
largely converge across the discursive spectrum; but the hybrid BV, as an expression of political 
consensus, remains largely rhetorical: BV as a harmonious vision of organic community-ecological 
relationships (with nature being attributed intrinsic value), adding up to a plural, post-capitalist 
economy at the country-level, with a frictionless integration of traditional indigenous and modern 
cultural matrixes into a plural collective plurinational identity.  
The post-consensual trifurcation, in turn, expresses the key cleavages among the three discursive 
strands: the indigenist strand tends to privilege the identitary-traditional dimension over the other 
three, largely dismissive of their reciprocal local and global entanglements. Under the banner of 
decolonization, a reified essentialist view of indigenous cultures is typically played against (an equally 
reified view of) modernity. While the ecological dimension is implicit in the indigenous cosmogonies, 
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political (territorial) and cultural self-determination are envisioned as the royal road towards all these 
goals. The relationship towards the modern world is antagonistic. The socialist strand, in turn, under 
the (declared) premise of attending to the immediate and basic needs of the impoverished population 
(and assuming that the only way to do this is with a rent-capturing and -redistributing state), 
subordinates the ecological and identitary, as well as the political-democratic dimension, to the prior 
goal, whereby the relationship among these goals is framed as conflictual. Despite opposing colonial-
like economic subordination to Western powers, the relation to (Western-style) modernity is 
aspirational. Lastly, the postdevelopmentalist strand sees all dimensions of BV as interdependent or 
organically interlinked. The various dimensions can thus not be played against each other without 
jeopardizing the whole emancipatory and transformative enterprise: The ecological dimension is 
central, since all other dimensions “derive cascading from it, as it forces into rethinking the economic 
system, the cultural parameters of reference, the patterns of social interaction, and the form of political 
organization” (Belotti, 2014, pp. 43–44). The alleged prioritization of socio-economic dimension by 
the statist-socialist version implies stepping into the ‘commodity-trap’ that perpetuates colonial 
structures of power by the agents of development; and the disregard of larger socio-economic and 
ecological dimensions at the planetary scale for the sake of the cultural-territorial dimension by the 
indigenist strand undermines the very conditions of possibility of their decolonizing ambitions. 
Western-style modernity is not rejected wholesale, but rather provincialized (Chakrabarty, 2000), that is, 
removed from the place of a (false) universal and understood as a particular spatiotemporal 
constellation. Cultural dialogue and creativity is thus prescribed as a means towards emancipation in 
a global interdependent constellation. “Cognitive justice” (Santos) is deemed a precondition for global 
social justice and ecological sustainability.  
From the above, it becomes clear that the statist-socialist version of BV has largely forsaken culturally 
innovative and politically transformative aspirations towards a social-ecological transition, and rather 
taken a business-as-usual pathway towards conventional development. Rather than a post-capitalist, 
biocentric political project, as it is rhetorically proclaimed, the statist-socialist BV constitutes an 
attempt at humanizing capitalism and the liberal vision of society (with the corresponding centrality 
of ideas of ‘freedom’, ‘autonomy’, ‘inclusion’, etc.; as well as a dualist ontology). In terms of the 
discursive configuration of the BV field of debate, it can be seen as playing a similar role to that of the 
Green Economy discourse in the GT debate, taking part of discussions but not really defensible as a 
transformation discourse in and of itself, as conceptualized in the framework of this research (cf. 
Introductory chapter). 
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In the GT debate, we identified controversy-prone themes (the need for economic growth, the ideal 
of sufficiency as a political program, and the territorial re-embeddedness of economic relations), as 
well as disputed signifiers and understandings of an invariably positively connoted modernity, and 
discrepant assessment over technical matters (chiefly, the ‘decupling hypothesis’) (cf. Chapter 3). What 
key axes of conflict can be identified as traversing the BV debate?    - Anti-neoliberalism/ anti-imperialism versus post-developmentalism/ post-capitalism. This 
cleavage can be framed more broadly as one between those opposing social injustices (only) 
versus those opposing social pathologies (i.e. the way of life inspired by the ‘developed’ West and 
North). - The stance towards nature and its relationship to society: The trifurcation of the BV discourse 
correspondingly yielded three different positions. Two of them match the ones we found in 
the GT debate: the statist-socialist BV adopts a stance of pragmatic realism, whereby ecological 
prudence and the ‘Rights of Nature’ become a function of the political and economic logic of 
the prevailing order.  Postdevelopmentalists adopt an eco-realist stance, and indigenists a 
‘mystical’ stance, whereby nature is ritualized. The two latter reject the Western modern view 
of a reified and commodified relationship towards nature (Cortez, 2010), as becomes apparent 
in anti-extractivist stances (oil-moratorium, Yasuní-ITT); postdevelopmentalists on the 
grounds of precaution and cultural plurality, and indigenists on metaphysical grounds 
(Pachamama or mother earth). - De-colonialization is understood in diverse ways, which conflict with each other: a) in classical 
Dependentist theoretical categories as unequal terms of trade and a structurally disadvantaged 
international division of labor (in the rhetoric of the statist-socialist discourse), b) as unequal 
ecological exchange (Haberl et al., 2011; Hornborg, 1998), c) as epistemic colonization (Santos, 
2009; Santos et al., 2007), or else d) as unequal domestic distribution of power and resources 
between indigenous nations and the mestizo Ecuadorian society or government as its identitary 
‘other’. While the first understanding is dominant in the statist-socialist discourse, ecological 
unequal exchange and “cognitive justice” are aspirations of postdevelopmentalists, and the 
power-struggle among local forces is exclusive to the indigenist discourse. These differences 
notwithstanding, the three discursive strands also draw on each other at convenience. 
(Vanhulst & Beling, 2014b) 
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 - Stance towards modernity217: Again here, a universalist understanding of modernity (as having 
constitutive laws and principles set a priori) implicit in the statist-socialist BV clashes against a 
pluralist understanding of postdevelopmentalists, who, from their perspective of 
(interdependent) cultural plurality, oppose monolithic understandings of modernity, which 
they rather see as multiple, entangled, and embedded; and especially against a particularistic 
understanding of both modernity and indigeneity by the indigenist strand, which places itself 
in a position of (antagonist) alterity towards modernity, understood in a reified way as 
Eurocentric. - Plurinationality vs. interculturality: cultural diversity itself is understood in different ways in 
each discursive strand, particularly in Ecuador, which features greater ethnic and cultural 
diversity among the population, as compared to Bolivia: Advocates of plurinationality 
constitute a dominant minority in Ecuador (i.e. politically well represented indigenous groups), 
who fight for their collective right to identity as indigenous nations and for their self-
determination, while interculturality is advocated by marginal minorities (especially afro-
descendants), who do not constitute a demos themselves, and therefore demand more 
recognition of individual cultural rights. Both contrast with liberal multiculturalism, however, 
in that plurinationality and interculturality seek mutual engagement among distinct epistemes, 
while multiculturalism is more impregnated with postmodernist mutual indifference.  - Territoriality versus de-localization: the strongest territorial focus is found in the indigenist 
strand, and was constitutive of the primordial discourses on BV, as well. These territorial 
claims have political (plurinationality, self-determination), cultural, and ecological dimensions 
(Pachamama), and can be framed as part of a broader “eco-territorial turn” in the early 21st 
century Latin-America (Svampa, 2012). Insofar state-centered, the socialist BV retains a 
territorial focus as well, though in a conflictive stance vis-à-vis the claims of indigenous 
organizations. The postdevelopmentalist strand, in turn, is less centered on territorial claims 
and more cosmopolitan in scope. While still attributing central importance to spatiotemporal 
embeddedness, it conceives of territory as defined within a global constellation of structures 
and flows of power. 
Our third category of analysis, the bridging opportunities and practices in the BV debate, are analyzed 
in the following section on BV as a discursive performance. 
                                                 
217 This line of argumentation is developed in greater detail in Vanhulst & Beling (2014b) 
271 
 
 
5.5. Dramaturgical Analysis of the BV debate 
 
This analysis of the BV debate as a discursive staging or performance parallels the analogous analysis 
done for the GT debate in Chapter 4, which,  drawing on the insights gained from the context and 
diachronic analysis of Section 5.3, on the one hand, and on the analysis of BV-representations of 
Section 5.4, on the other, distinguishes among the same dimensions considered in the case of GT: 1) 
the matching of (foreground) discourse and cultural (background) representations; 2) the matching of 
the discourse with the contingent spatiotemporal and situational context of instantiation; 3) the 
enabling and constraining role of social powers of symbolic production, distribution, and 
interpretation; 4) the credibility/ legitimacy of the discourse performance (i.e. matching of the 
discourse with the performing actor); and 5) the reception by the discourse addressees (i.e. the 
matching between discourse and its various audiences).  As in Chapter 4, each dimension’s analysis is 
summarized in a table stating the main structural-practical enablers of transformative learning, 
discriminating between those breaking the prevailing (failed) SD consensus (‘disruptors’), and those 
fostering the emergence of the new (‘generators’). To finalize, relevant practices and roles of agents in 
the BV debate will be distilled, towards their systematization and typification in comparative 
perspective with GT in Chapter 6.  
 
Articulation discourse-culture 
In Latin-America, but especially in those territories with strong indigenous presence, there exists a 
historically cemented identitary-cultural alterity vis-à-vis the modern civilizational model of the West. 
Indeed this has historical roots: While in the West, as an outcome of the process of modernization in 
the 19th century, a modern and rationalized culture and political system became hegemonic vis-à-vis 
their non-modern predecessors, in Latin America modernization led to a long-term duality between 
different cultural patterns, giving place to a hybrid cultural matrix218 (Avritzer, 2002). This alterity is 
thus an ambiguous one: on the one hand, it is antagonistic, as results from centuries of (post)colonial, 
subaltern insertion into the world. This has made the political problematization of power relations a 
Leitmotiv in the history of social and political movements in the region (Larraín, 2005). On the other 
                                                 
218 This hybridation, as well as its entanglements between difference, inequality, and (dis)connection 
between ‘worlds’  has been theorized mainly by Nestor García Canclini (2004) 
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hand, this alterity is aspirational, an unfulfilled promise that keeps slipping out of reach. In scholarly 
and public discourse, this struggle between modernizing forces and resistance has often been framed 
as a struggle between the ‘enlightened elites’ and the ‘backward masses’ (Avritzer, 2002).  
The BV debate showcases the attempt at articulation of these hitherto considered antagonistic trends 
(Carballo, 2015b): the discredited development paradigm, confronted with accusations of linearity, 
individualism, anthropocentrism, expansionism, instrumentalization and commodification of nature, 
etc., was exposed to ideas of circularity, relationality, biocentrism, holism, and an “environmental 
rationality” (Leff, 2004b). The development sector offered the structural-institutional scaffolding, 
while the indigenous cultural heritage offered a contrast surface against which a process of self-
reflection and self-questioning of the West unfolded. While the post-constitutional phase saw a 
diffraction of the BV discourse as a result of this veritable “clash of civilizations”, cultural imaginaries 
were (and are still being) intensively re-created and transformed in the process. 
This process of cultural or epistemic dialogue was also shaped locally through the increasing 
politization of the BV debate and the re-balancing of political forces, as critique of neoliberalism and 
civilizational critique came under the same banner. Although the broader public largely relates to the 
Western imaginary of development in aspirational terms, a sub-public sphere with high leverage – the 
indigenous forces and their discursive allies – upheld a different narrative tapping into an alternative 
(indigenous) background sub-culture. 
 
Table 13: BV Articulation discourse-culture 
Disruptors (‘unbuilding unsustainability’) Generators (‘building sustainability’) 
• Critique of modernity/ development docks with 
historically established power-critical sub-culture (esp. 
in subaltern population groups: indigenous, peasants, 
etc.; and their social movements) 
• Large sub-culture in relationship of alterity to the 
modern West offering ‘resistance’ to historical colonial 
relations (also cultural)  
• Non-Western episteme offering a contrast-surface for societal self-
reflection 
• Pro-modernization discursive forces (development sector) opening 
up to dialogue with hitherto antagonized indigenous cosmogonies 
• Merger of anti-neoliberalism and civilizational critique under the 
same political banner (BV) create discursive room for inter-
epistemic dialogue.  
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Articulation discourse-contingent situation 
 
Beyond the overall contextual markers outlined in section 5.2, the successful fusion of the BV 
performance(s) can be associated with the respective particular junctures of the three broad phases of 
the BV debate identified in this chapter: emergence, assemblage or hybridation (political consensus), 
and trifurcation or dislocation (post-consensus). Furthermore, we identified a basic agential 
configuration (made of indigenous and social movements, intellectuals, and the state) and two types 
of bidirectional flows: bottom-up and top-down, on the one hand, and inside-outward / outside-
inward (between the territorial base and the global sphere), on the other. These categories are 
combined here to understand the successful fusion of the BV discourse. 
 
Phase 1: Emergence. ‘‘glocal’ ’ discursive articulation 
 
The emergence of BV takes place in the context of a global political contestation over the prevailing 
development model, with the international development cooperation seeking to establish links of 
territorial legitimacy by docking to longstanding local struggles (outside-inward). It is thus no coincidence 
that the first explicit formulations and systematization attempts of BV (sumak kawsay and suma qamaña) 
emerged in this context, with both international and local agents under pressure to provide some 
answer to the social-economic and ecological crisis that was accelerated through the global spread of 
neoliberal policy-views over the two prior decades. This constitutive ‘glocal’ entanglement also serves 
to explain why BV became entrenched, among other Western discourses, with the Human 
Development perspective so fashionable in the international bureaucratic sphere, which harnessed the 
Ecuadorian and Bolivian political experiments as an opportunity to further develop this framework. 
(Bretón et al., 2014) 
At the local level, foreground-factors coming into play are mainly two: a) the anti-neoliberal consensus 
generating a critical social mood (reinforcing the antagonistic stance vis-à-vis the Western ‘other’) and 
generating pressures towards pluralization, as manifest in the Ecuadorian ‘citizen revolution’ and in 
the Bolivian ‘cultural democratic revolution’ (inside-outward flows), or, more violently, in the so-called 
Bolivian ‘water war’ (Olivera & Lewis, 2004); and b) the recalibration of the weight and discursive 
focus of the EIM towards the national instead of the local sphere, especially in Ecuador. Indeed, the 
participation of indigenous organization in the political campaign and (though briefly) in the 
government of president Lucio Gutierrez in 2002-2003 shifted the weight of the EIM towards Quito, 
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which meant that the movement’s emphasis was placed on macro-conceptions of social reorganization 
at the national level, subordinating local and territorial aspects, as the 2001 revision of the political 
project of CONAIE illustrates. This explains the mainstreaming of political concepts such as 
plurinationality or indigenous nations (Altmann, 2013a, 2015a). 
 
Phase 2: Macro-scale, state-led transformation project away from neoliberalism 
This phase of consensual discursive construction is marked by the ambivalent role of state: indeed, on 
the one hand, the ownership-taking by the state brought BV to scale and led the debate to acquiring 
public status. At the same time, emblematic institutional and policy-designs (plurinational state, 
Yasuní-ITT, RoN) tap into the most avant-garde cultural imaginary of the West, awarding small, 
peripheral countries such as Ecuador and Bolivia international prestige – as attested, among others, 
by the influence of BV in the German GT debate (cf. Chapter 3). On the other hand, however, it 
subjected BV to the logic of the political system, creating a ‘floating signifier’ which eventually led to 
a discursive dislocation and to a watering down of the transformative character of BV as a political 
project, and back to (deepened) extractivism and economic dependence on primary-exports, market-
driven environmentalism, exclusion of social movements from the sphere of politics, and consumer-
oriented economic development.  
 
Phase 3: Discursive dislocation and cultural and political (ant)agonism 
The fragile consensus among clashing views and interests achieved at the constitutional assembly soon 
cracked as a result of its own internal tensions. The ensuing discursive dislocation led to an open 
confrontation and power struggle between government, on one side, and the ‘infantile’ indigenists and 
‘utopian’ postdevelopmentalists, on the other; or else between the ‘authentic’ indigenists and the 
‘Westernizing’ postdevelopmentalists. Yet despite exclusions, marginalization, de-legitimations, the 
discursive forces in dispute have a – in terms of collective learning – this trifurcation amounts to an 
interruption of the formerly unchallenged symbolic order (neoliberal, capitalist, developmentalist, 
modernist, or whatever universalist logic is foregrounded by the diverse actors), to be replaced by a 
situation of de facto cultural and political agonism, as the trifurcated strands maintain their relative 
autonomy and strength. The pathos of the debate has turned increasingly destructive, however, and 
thus antagonistic, with lasting transformative learning effects imperiled by the reaffirmation of 
governmental power from 2015-onwards in an increasingly adverse regional context often 
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characterized as the “end of the progressive cycle” in Latin-America. (Schavelzon, 2016; Svampa, 
2016)  
 
Table 14: BV Articulation discourse-contingent situation 
Disruptors (‘unbuilding unsustainability’) Generators (‘building sustainability’) 
• outside-inward contestation of development as a result of 
persistent or aggravating socio-economic and ecological 
crises 
• global discursive forces seeking legitimacy through docking 
with territorially anchored traditions and emancipatory 
struggles 
• inside-outward, anti-neoliberal social mood reinforcing 
antagonistic stance towards the West and pressures towards 
cultural pluralization (citizen revolution, democratic 
cultural revolution) 
• ‘glocal’ discursive entanglement for innovative cross-
fertilizations 
• local mainstreaming of macro-focus in indigenous movement 
• State bringing BV to scale and lending it public status 
• International prestige through institutional and policy 
innovations (RoN, plurinational state, Yasuní-ITT) 
• Discursive dislocation into relatively balanced discursive 
forces, leading to cultural and political agonism 
 
 
Articulation discourse-social powers 
 
In the build-up of the BV debate, the power of discursive production, distribution, and interpretation 
is distributed between two basic institutional infrastructure-systems: the indigenous movement, on the 
one hand, and the state, on the other (with their respectively associated communication devices). The 
intellectual sphere and the outside-inward flows from the global sphere also play a central role in 
discursive production, circulation, and interpretation. Yet the two latter hardly shed any light on the 
power structures that mediate those processes on the ground, and are thus largely irrelevant to this 
step of analysis (except for the impact of foreign funding on the local structure of the EIM, as shown 
below). The peculiar characteristics of the indigenous movement (we focus here on the Ecuadorian 
case, as mentioned, because it is the most influential politically and thus discursively at national and 
regional level) makes it worthwhile analyzing in some detail, as it appears critical to understanding the 
fusion of the BV performance from a material-structural perspective. 
 
The EIM is not a unified movement, but rather one made up of a plurality of politically and 
discursively heterogeneous organizations, which alternatively cooperate with or compete against each 
other, articulated in a bottom-up yet hierarchical organization fluidly connecting grassroots structures 
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or first-tier organizations (which affiliate virtually all indigenous people living in communities) with 
autarchic second- and third-tier organizations, latter at the national and even regional levels. This gives 
them a great capacity for mobilization.  The selective disconnection between the diverse tiers provides 
also the autonomy required for discursive innovation, yet negotiation, contestation, and cooperation 
make sure the discourse remains coherent and articulable.  
Within the movement, national (third-tier) organizations are the most visible ones, most of them 
networked in confederations (CONAIE, FEINE, and FENOCIN being the main organizations active 
at national level), representing the indigenous view in the formal political system at the national-state 
level. But first-tier organizations command the loyalty of their membership, as they provide for the 
local needs. Second-tier organizations, however, retain their share of power as recipients of the bulk 
of international development aid.  
This fluid yet pyramidal structure of the EIM has fulfilled a number of functions in terms of political 
and discursive innovation: 
 
- Internal political balance: At the local level, the heterogeneity of the social basis of the EIM meant 
diverse organizations historically emerging to cater for their diverse social, economic, and 
cultural needs, as well as political demands. Furthermore, the lack of control of national 
organizations over their grassroots membership historically kept third-tier organizations 
alternating in their hegemonic position within the movement, maintaining a structural 
heterogeneity that favors discursive innovation, and contributing to its resilience and 
increasing influence. The growing centralist focus of CONAIE in the 2000s prompted 
pressure from member organizations towards restoring internal balance to the structure 
through the empowerment of other national-level organizations, leading to a historically 
unique post-hegemonic situation (Altmann, 2013a) 
- Political leverage: If constitutive heterogeneity constitutes the adequate breeding ground for 
discursive innovation, the organic hierarchical institutional design structurally supports 
discourse articulation (both within the movement and outwards). Furthermore, this broad yet 
organic network structure increased the political leverage of the EIM at the macro-level, both 
through its influence on the State as a pressure group and through directly controlling 
institutional structures and resources, e.g. the indigenous-controlled state-development agency 
CODENPE, or, in the academic sphere, through own intellectual production and an own 
indigenous university. Indigenous movements represent a minority group within the 
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population (estimates vary between 7-40% according to variable definitions of ‘indigenity’ and 
the political interests of those who did the counting). Yet the ties holding the social support-
base of the movement together, in practice, are material (access to resources) rather than 
ethnic, since only a fraction of base-level organizations are purely indigenous (ca. 35%)219. 
From a materialistic vantage point, it can be argued that this peculiar organizational structure 
and identity boundary-construction largely works as a shield against social-conformity 
pressures and against resource access-constraints. It may also largely explain why the EIM has 
gained over-proportional political significance, with regard to the ethnic aspect (Becker, 2011).  
- Organizational resilience (material self-reproduction): The singular pyramidal structure of the EIM 
gives it a particularly resilient character: the material sustainability of the movement is largely 
decoupled from social humor, fad & fashion – but also from that of its own members! As 
basic form of collective organization, first-level or base organizations enjoy virtually 
guaranteed support by their members, and care for their particular daily needs through locally 
rooted interventions. Representative politics is diffracted and counter-balanced in every level: 
as beneficiaries of the lion’s share of development aid, second-level organizations have 
financial independence. Furthermore, membership within national or regional federations is a 
matter of lower-level organizations, not individuals, which adds to stability. In addition, given 
that society at large (in particular elite groups, and excluding allied organizations such as TUs 
and communal associations) is the antagonistic ‘other’ of indigenous groups, pressures to 
conform to public opinion drastically drops. (Altmann, 2013a, p. 15).  
- Democratic safeguard: From a more macro-political perspective, the three-tier structure of the 
EIM compensates (internally) for two of the historically sedimented structural barriers to a 
democratic politics in Latin-America (Avritzer, 2002): first, it fills-in the gap of institutional 
structures mediating between the state and individuals in the metizo-society; and, secondly, it 
loosens the rigid hierarchical separation between political and economic elites and the popular 
cultural and social arrangements of the masses.  
                                                 
219 According to studies conducted by Proyecto de Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas y Negros 
(PRODEPINE) in 1998 and 2002 (Martínez Valle, 2006, p. 113, cited in Altmann, 2013a, p. 15) 
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The second power-infrastructure of discursive production, distribution, and interpretation mentioned 
above is that of the State: In Ecuador, the government plan 2007-2011220 of the ruling party Alianza 
País had already adopted BV as a programmatic reference point for their government. A key 
mechanism of discursive cross-pollination here was the transfer of representative power – as well as 
of key personalities (‘insider-outsider networks’, cf. Chapter 4) and functions –  from the EIM to the 
state. This decisively flattened the path towards the inclusion of BV into the 2008 constitution. 
(Altmann, 2013b)  
Through its adoption by the state, BV is placed in the public sphere as a structuring political concept. 
This spotlighting of BV by the state potentiated interest in the topic by the national and international 
civil society, scholarly, and policy-spheres, thus amplifying the scope of the debate. Furthermore, the 
state played a key hermeneutic role in abstracting BV from its original indigenous definition-
framework towards a discourse relevant for society at large, also enabling its international 
dissemination. This is illustrated by the ideas of a “biocentric turn” in Ecuadorian politics or a novel 
“bio-socialist republicanism”, or the widely acclaimed idea of BV as a “new development paradigm 
for Latin America” (Ramirez, 2010).  
 
Table 15: BV Articulation discourse-social powers 
Disruptors (‘unbuilding unsustainability’) Generators (‘building sustainability’) 
• Polyarchic character of the BV debate + bidirectional 
‘glocal’ flows 
• EIM as a strong political and discursive force in 
identitary relation of alterity vis-à-vis Westernized 
‘mestizo’ society 
• Separation of material & political power within EIM (3-
tier structure), creating conditions for discursive 
agonism. 
• Democratizing effect of the EIM through creating 
intermediate institutional infrastructure and breaking 
• Production power: Three-tier structure of the EIM potentiating 
capacity for mobilization, discursive innovation, material self-
reproduction, macro-political influence. Spotlighting by the state 
potentiating/ magnifying debate on BV. 
• Interpretive power: State re-framing BV into a whole-societal 
alternative-development or transformative approach 
• Distribution power: State bringing BV to scale and disseminating 
internationally.  
 
                                                 
220 The original version of this government plan does not actually feature the expression “sumak 
kawsay” or “buen vivir”, but their contents are explicitly formulated in the three defining aspects of what 
we named the ‘hybrid BV’: “harmonious coexistence with nature”, ‘pluriculturalism’ as an asset, and 
a ‘sustainable’ development model as an alternative to the capitalist system (Cortez, 2011) 
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rigid hierarchical divisions between elites and the 
masses. 
 
 
Articulation discourse-actors 
 
To understand the fusion between the BV performances and the performing actors, a distinction 
becomes again necessary between the three diachronic phases of the BV debate. While in the case of 
the GT debate the perceived feasibility of a given narrative was a substantial factor in the credibility 
awarded to the respective discursive agents, in the BV debate the credibility of the performers depends 
more on linking BV to sources of broad public or cultural legitimacy, with feasibility hardly ever being 
discussed – rather, (un)feasibility is used as a disqualifying argument mainly by the government against 
indigenous movements and intellectual advocates of BV in the post-consensual phase of the debate. 
(Correa, 2007; Kozloff, 2011) 
 
Phase 1: Emergence. ‘glocal’ discursive articulation 
In the early phase of local anti-neoliberal resistance articulated with outside-inward development critique, 
the credibility of the BV discourse resided in the mutual legitimation between the international sphere 
(invoking the potentially global relevance of BV as a source of renewal of the development imaginary,) 
on the one hand, and long-standing local, grassroots’ struggles seeking external support to gather 
momentum. The result is a situation of discursive creativity and cross-legitimation between global and 
local. 
In its original elaborations, BV also drew on already legitimized, akin political discourses, in particular, 
on the discourse of ‘development with identity’221 (Cortez, 2010) 
 
Phase 2: Macro-scale, state-led transformation project away from neoliberalism 
In this phase, the state takes over as the main source of social legitimacy. As we saw, the legitimacy-
transfer unfolded initially through the re-location of civil society leaders to the state and party-
structures of the ruling parties Alianza-País (Ecuador) and MAS (Bolivia), and through the introduction 
                                                 
221 ‘Development with identity’ is an approach which was already familiar at the regional level in policy-
spheres, after being adopted by the so-called ‘Indigenous Fund’ (Fund for the Development of the 
Indigenous Peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean). 
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of BV into the sphere of development policy (first with the strategic plan of CODENPE and later 
with the government program of Alianza-Pais). But the key legitimacy-source were the constitutional 
processes (Cortez, 2010, p. 15) in both countries. Despite the growing importance of other governance 
agents, such as NGOs, the sovereign state remains unmatched in the legitimacy bestowed upon it 
domestically and internationally; indeed: whatever material translations of the abstract idea of BV may 
be conceived of, their actual implementation will be dependent on the willingness and ability of the 
state to not only “create” them, but also to back them up.  
No other agent – be they corporations, international organizations, or domestic civil society 
actors – can, at least for the time being, fulfill the same role […] no other public or private 
body is capable of matching the state’s unique capability to create and enforce a constitution. 
(Arsel & Avila Angel, 2012, p. 221) 
 
Moreover, in dramaturgical terms, the shift in the state’s conventional role from “merely making 
environmental policy to taking on the preservation of nature as a whole” creates an unexpected twist 
in the familiar narrative samples (with their fixed role-allocations) that reinforces the perception of the 
importance or legitimacy of the issue. The fact that an oil-dependent country like Ecuador would 
assume a commitment like ‘leaving the oil in the ground’, as Yasuní-ITT aimed at, can only potentiate 
this perception (Arsel & Avila Angel, 2012, p. 221) 
 
A last legitimacy-recourse identified from the literature is the articulation of the BV-utopia with 
mainstream (Western) political discourses, in coherence with the ‘glocal’  character of the primordial 
BV-formulation. The strongest articulation was established with the aforementioned Human 
Development discourse of the United Nations (SENPLADES, 2009, pp. 18–19). But also the 
epistemic link to Aristotle’s eudaimonia as the canonic Western reference for a political philosophy 
around the ‘good life’ was probably required to endow BV with public legitimacy in the mestizo-society 
(Bretón et al., 2014, p. 16). 
 
Phase 3: Discursive dislocation and cultural and political agonism 
The constitutional process, driven by the rationality of the political system, had the effect of producing 
an arguably premature, forced consensus of divergent worldviews and policy perspectives: the 
authenticity of the BV discourse(s) was perceived as being threatened. As we saw, this resulted in a 
break-up between the (self-proclaimed) ‘wardens of BV’ (indigenous and other grassroots movements, 
on the one hand, and environmental NGOs and postdevelopmentalist intellectuals, on the other) and 
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the state. Each of the dislocated discourses claims for itself a different form of legitimacy: the 
indigenist version reclaims the authenticity of the ‘original BV’ as rooted in indigenous cosmogonies222; 
the statist-socialist version claims the legitimacy of electorally backed representation, and the 
postdevelopmentalists assert the relevance of BV for a global social-ecological transformation. 
According to Arturo Escobar (2011), authenticity demands plurality and difference, but 
interdependence and vulnerability require recognition and coordination. The BV debate remains, 
therefore, a work-in-progress and in search for legitimacy, but certainly does offer a powerful platform 
for the agonistic construction of social-ecological utopias beyond the epistemic closure of 
conventional development approaches rooted in narrow definitions of modernity. (Vanhulst & Beling, 
2014b) 
 
Table 16: BV Articulation discourse- performing actors 
Disruptors (‘unbuilding unsustainability’) Generators (‘building sustainability’) 
• Creative and mutually legitimizing dialectic between local 
and global against the status quo (neoliberalism, classical 
development discourse) 
• Cross-pollination with a range of heterogeneous critical 
discourses (environmental, development-critical, religious, 
feminist, eco-socialist, etc.) 
• BV as platform for the agonistic construction of social-
ecological utopias beyond ‘development’ and Eurocentric 
modernity 
• Legitimacy transfer from related, more established discourses 
with public legitimacy (Development with Identity, Human 
Development) 
• State endows BV with constitutional and institutional 
legitimacy, as well as with programmatic content. 
• Change in conventional role of the state from making 
environmental policy to taking up the protection of nature as a 
whole 
 
 
 
Articulation discourse-audience(s) 
 
                                                 
222 As we have seen, BV or sumak kawsay as such did not exist, as a cultural concept or an organic 
practice, in the traditional cosmogonies of the Andean and Amazonian indigenous peoples, but was 
rather a  “postmodern invention of Aymara intellectuals of the 21st century (who are still indigenous)” 
(Uzeda Vásquez, 2009, p. 20), certainly building on indigenous cosmogonies and lifeworlds. This does 
not deprive what we have called ‘primordial BV’ of legitimacy, however; rather, it can be regarded as 
the product of a “cultural recreation or innovation”, that is, as “the manifestation of a living culture”. 
(Altmann, 2013b, p. 290) 
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The discursive diffraction or dislocation observed in the discourse around BV can be dramaturgically 
read, from an audience-perspective, as the result of dissimilar audiences entering the arena and co-
producing discursive variations. Given the successful mainstreaming of BV into the political and 
cultural debate in Ecuador and Bolivia, uninvolved audiences (e.g. political opposition parties, 
conservative social milieus, global public sphere) can be held to have played a marginal role in the 
performative fusion of BV, and are thus given equally marginal consideration here. 
As we saw, the common roof of the anti-neoliberal political consensus hosts diverse audiences with 
variable degrees of affinity in their respective discursive structures, ranging from anti-neoliberal or 
anti-imperialist neo-Keynesians (the state and its ‘citizen constituency’ – bourgeoise, liberal or 
working-class sector, including unionized indigenous and peasants, such as the cocaleros in Bolivia) to 
wholesale (dialogical or dismissive) critics of development and Euro-Atlantic modernity (social 
movements and intellectuals). International actors with local presence constitute yet another audience 
with a stake in the BV debate, exerting influence in both ideational and material terms (development 
cooperation, environmental organizations, and transboundary social movements, especially the alter-
globalist movement). Unlike the weaker bond built around comparatively abstract ‘discursive affinities’ 
around the idea of a ‘Great Transformation’ in Germany, the alignment of all the above mentioned 
agents behind the banner of political party-movements – Alianza País in Ecuador and Movement 
towards Socialism (MAS) in Bolivia – had an actual political impact. This produced the clearest and 
most visible instance of fusion in the BV debate. We also learned, however, that such fusion was 
short-lived and soon broke apart. The most interesting question, from a perspective of transformative 
collective learning processes, is what sustains (or ‘fuses’) the agonistic discursive dialectic among the 
trifurcated BV in the post-consensus phase.  
These diverse audiences offer, of course, distinct docking points to harness for dramaturgical fusion, 
including shared frames or storylines (see closing point of Section 5.4 for a systematic analysis of 
ideational cleavages), convergent interests and political demands, or common enemies. The 
aspirational bourgeoise and the proletarian ‘citizen constituency’, for example, demand ‘inclusion’ 
(understood as a larger share in the dominant socio-economic order). They require recognizable 
policy-concepts and indicators drawn from the conventional ‘development imaginary’. They criticize 
‘romanticized’ views of BV upheld by ‘out-of-touch-with-reality’ indigenous traditionalists and 
utopian intellectuals. In turn, politically organized indigenous sectors (representing subsistence-
peasants, ayllu-dwellers) and indigenist scholars demand ethnic-centered identity-politics plus 
territorial autarchy, including political self-determination and economic pluralism – demands 
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eventually condensing in the political concept of plurinationality. They criticize ‘Westernized 
conceptions’ of BV by Europhilic intellectuals and its discursive cooptation by the state. The ethnic-
centered project of plurinationality is regarded with distrust, however, by sub-represented minorities, 
mainly afro-descendants, who would otherwise, however, ally with the indigenous against their 
common ‘other’ (the mestizo society), largely backed by decolonial intellectuals. For their part, 
international agents praise, on the one hand, the epistemically and institutionally innovative character 
of BV (plurinational state, rights of nature, good life as policy-orientation), but demand, on the other, 
system-compatible indicators and forms of measurement for assessing the progress achieved in BV-
policies (Belotti, 2014; Cortez, 2010), thus constraining that very innovation-potential. 
Postdevelopmentalist intellectuals and movements focus on the environmental dimension as 
cornerstone or organizing principle for a rearrangement of social systems towards a social-ecological 
transformation, criticizing both the ‘retreat into the fortress’ of an essentialized indigeneity and the 
neo-Keynesian statist-socialist discourse watering-down the transformative potential of BV. Finally, 
the statist BV also faces critiques from the political opposition, both on the right of the ideological 
spectrum – who deem BV anachronic, delusional, utopian, a form of evolutive backlash, or a lever of 
leftist extremism – and on the left, for whom BV is either not radical enough, not tackling the systemic-
root causes of poverty and exclusion (traditional Marxist-Leninist left), or downplaying the ethnic-
cultural element (anticolonial left). (Belotti, 2014; Cortez, 2011) 
What bridging strategies can be observed at action to fuse these distinct audiences with their partly 
incompatible or competing demands?  
The first is, as with the concept of ‘Great Transformation’, the ambivalence of BV as a ‘floating 
signifier’. Indeed, BV oscillates between an ‘alternative to development’ and a ‘new mode of 
development’, or even a ‘more successful old-style development’, never mind that the BV-rhetoric223, 
in all of the discursive variants, remains system-subversive – also the statist version claims to seek a 
‘post-capitalist transition’ (SENPLADES, 2009). A more transformative form of fusion is pursued by 
means of discursive cross-fertilizing dialectics through two main mechanisms: first, the creative 
                                                 
223 A de facto mechanism (rather than an intended strategy) for sustaining political fusion has been 
invoking a ‘discourse-action gap’, that is, a (principally remediable) deficit in implementation of a 
(principally valid or feasible) discourse; or else a time-delay – Correa’s ‘more extractivism (now) to get 
out of extractivism (later)’ – to explain the inconsistencies between a radical discourse and a heavily 
watered-down political practice. The effect of such mechanisms is mixed: on the one hand, they enable 
the sustainment of a radical rhetoric, but in a post-structuralist conception of discourse they are better 
understood as forms of discursive cooptation. 
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tension between local and global. The discursive evolution of BV towards de-territorialization is 
resisted by (and consequently balanced through) indigenous groups foregrounding the local 
dimension. The introduction of the concept of sumak kawsay in the Sarayaku Manifesto of 2003, for 
example, could be understood as such an attempt to redirecting the political and discursive focus of 
CONAIE towards the rural and peripheral regions (Altmann, 2013b, p. 92). Yet the ‘glocal’ re-
signification of the concept of BV allowed CONAIE to integrate sumak kawsay in its struggle “for the 
construction of a post-capitalist and post-colonial society” based on a fundamental change of macro-
level socio-economic structures. A second mechanism for discursive cross-pollination is the practice 
of discursive brokerage. Insider-outsider networks (which we already saw at action in the GT debate), 
for example, emerge through the mobility of persons across sectors and levels, while carrying 
worldviews, ideas and personal networks along with them, enabling transfer processes which enhance 
institutional flexibility and facilitate change (Parks & Roberts, 2010). The most evident example is 
perhaps Alberto Acosta’s presidency of the Constitutional Assembly, bringing key ideas of the 
postdevelopmentalist strand of BV (“bio-centric turn”) onto the agenda of the new Montecristi 
constitution. When Alberto Acosta and Mónica Chuji, two of the most vocal advocates of BV, 
divorced from Correa’s government, in 2008, Marlon Santi – one of the authors of the Sarayaku 
Manifesto – became president of CONAIE, mainstreaming BV into the organized indigenous 
movement identity and strategy at Ecuadorian national level. BV was thus taken up as a central a 
concept in the discourse of the EIM at the same time it was substantially weakened in the government 
discourse. Another powerful example of discursive brokerage can be found around the juridical 
concept of ‘rights of nature’ (RoN), which is usually associated to indigenous cosmogonies, when it 
actually resulted from a métissage with discursive elements from ‘deep ecology’ (represented, i.a. by 
Arne Naess) through the political and discursive leverage of foreign environmental NGOs, particularly 
the Pachamama Alliance (Espinosa, 2015).  
 
From a socio-structural perspective, cultural and political agonism is fueled through cultural and 
material structures. In the cultural realm, as we saw, the scarce integration of indigenous organizations 
into the social structure of their respective countries led them to define their own identity in opposition 
to the ‘included’ (Altmann, 2013b). A key reproductive mechanism here is communal cohesion. The 
ayllus constitute the organizational and identitary basis of collective life of the Andean aborigines 
(Altmann, 2013a, 2015a; Vega Camacho, 2012). In material terms, an important structural factor is the 
exogenous leverage enabled by the presence of international agents exerting influence, among other 
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things, through funding structures, as in the already mentioned case of development-funds bypassing 
the state and going directly to indigenous movements at the meso-organizational level. This support 
offered to BV advocates (in particular, indigenous and intellectuals) by de-localized, disengaged 
audiences, helping challenge local balance of power (Altmann, 2013a, p. 29). 
 
 
Table 17: BV Articulation discourse-audiences 
Disruptors (‘unbuilding unsustainability’) Generators (‘building sustainability’) 
• Ambivalence of BV as a floating signifier as alternative 
to conventional development 
• Empowered spaces of cultural and political alterity vis-
à-vis the modern Western episteme 
• Exogenous levers (e.g. international funding) disrupting 
local balance of power  
• Creative-disruptive tension between local and global (or 
territorialized vs. de-territorialized versions of BV) 
• Global spotlight-effect of political consensus and its institutional 
and juridical outputs (‘biocentric’ constitutional reform, 
government plans, etc.) 
• Insider-outsider networks (bidirectional between CS and 
government or among diverse CS discursive formations) 
• Strong communal cohesion for the reproduction of alternative 
lifeworlds and political organization (e.g. ayllus) 
 
 
 
Obstacles to a fused performance of the BV discourse(s) 
 
While the ambiguity of BV as a floating signifier was framed above as a mechanism for the sustainment 
of a minimalist and agonistic political fusion, the ensuing shallowness of the concept makes it prone 
to drifting into institutional and ideational inertias or path-dependencies – not to mention the risk of 
deliberate cooptation. For example, the Human Development policy-framework, as mentioned above, 
has been systematically used both in Bolivia and Ecuador by the UNDP Regional offices, blending-in 
elements from sumak kawsay and BV, as becomes apparent in their development programs, as well as 
in their Annual Development reports. Even if some level of cross-fertilization is observable, often the 
BV-wording is adopted to re-label the same old practices, as illustrated by the adoption of the language 
of the Social Solidarity Economy movement224, which is prominent in the BV debate, with the 
promotion of an individualistic and market-based development style (e.g. micro-finance) which – 
                                                 
224 For a background on the Social Solidarity Economy movement in Latin-America, see Mutuberría 
Lazarini & Plotinski (2015) 
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leaving apart the controversy about the relative success of such practices in their own terms – reveals, 
at the very least, a shallow engagement with the ideas of BV. (Carballo, 2015b). 
An obstacle contrario sensu for the transformative fertility of BV is the risk of particularization of BV as 
an ethnocentric category, as an idiosyncratic or regressive utopia, which turns BV into an exotic 
product that is largely irrelevant for the Latin-American societies at large, let alone for the global 
sphere (Adrian E. Beling & Vanhulst, 2016a). This risk derives from the essentialist positions both 
from the indigenous side and from that of decolonial intellectuals, or from the framings of BV-
detractors in the mestizo society (Vanhulst & Beling, 2014b).  
The remaining risks identified here relate to the transfer of the discursive epicenter from civil society 
forces to the state. While we pointed out above that the ‘revolving door’ between civil society and the 
state has the effect of facilitating discursive cross-pollination and contagion effects, the catalyzing 
effect of BV being adopted as an official state program had a negative ‘brain-draining’ effect, 
effectively weakening alternative voices. This became especially problematic with the divorce between 
the state and its former social-movement base, with the latter turning into a protest tide increasingly 
criminalized by the former. This criminalization of protest meets international momentum with the 
revival of the ‘democratic security doctrine’  in the wake of the so-called ‘war on terror’, which 
introduces a discursive cleavage between the protection of civil population from upheavals and the 
respect of basic constitutional or human rights. (CAOI, 2008) 
A last obstacle identified to the transformative learning potential of BV is, paradoxically, its very own 
political success. Indeed, the recent experience and memory of the success in taking-over the state 
apparatus through popular mobilization (Brand, 2015) blends out other alternatives in the pursuit of 
societal change, which could allow the circumvention of some of the abovementioned obstacles. This 
paradox is revisited and further reflected upon in Chapter 6. 
 
5.6. Conclusions: collective learning through political mainstreaming? 
 
This chapter started with the statement that BV raised worldwide attention after being mainstreamed 
into the political constitutions of Ecuador and Bolivia. The statement simultaneously foregrounds key 
dimensions that serve as guidelines to conclude the chapter: how can the performativity of BV be 
assessed in terms of transformative learning and social change? How can the role of the state in the 
process be assessed? (or, more broadly formulated: the absorption of BV into the formal political 
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system). What relevant insights can be gained regarding the entanglements between the territorial 
context of emergence and the global sphere? 
Regarding the performativity question, BV appears as both a product and a powerful source of cultural 
transformative waves, matching long marginalized voices from the global South with a global 
momentum for a discursive shift in the imaginary of development and modernity. This has arguably 
been and continues to be its main performativity, both as a social movement and as a political project. 
Indeed, BV can be considered as the first large-scale experiment discursively articulating modern and 
non-modern ontologies, not only at the ideational level but also in the institutional-material sphere, 
bridging the hitherto unbridgeable: the holistic, relational, circular, mystical world of the Andean 
ancestral traditions and the dualistic, individualistic, linear, and rational world of development, thereby 
unleashing a process of cross-fertilization or cultural learning. The provisional outcome has been 
variously referred to as a “retro-progressive utopia” (Serrano 1999, cited in Cortez, 2011), a 
“mobilizing illusion” (Fander Falconí) or a “real utopia” (René Ramírez) (Vanhulst, 2015, p. 11).  
In the political-institutional terrain, BV came to ‘disrupt politics as usual’ (de la Cadena, 2010), issuing 
a domestic re-balancing of political forces. In its ambition regarding programmatic deliverables, 
however, the Ecuadorian and Bolivian experiments with BV simultaneously showcase the limitations 
of a political revolution without an effective transformation of the material base (Becker, 2011; Adrian 
E. Beling et al., 2018). The cultural effervescence unleashed by the intense social movement activity 
leading to the so-called “post-neoliberal” or “left turn” in the early 21st century Latin America comes 
into stark contrast with the Realpolitik-flavor of the path followed by the Correa and Morales 
administrations in Ecuador and Bolivia, respectively. To be sure, the translation of the BV discourse 
into the political arena necessarily implies a certain degree of ideologization, that may be unavoidable 
in order to accommodate the political logic of electoral competition and of programmatic government, 
at the price of introducing a level of rigidity, as well as pragmatic compromising (Monni & Pallottino, 
2013). Yet of the constitutive elements of BV highlighted in the consensual ‘hybrid BV’ recognized in 
the constitution (harmony with nature, revaluation of marginalized voices, democratic autonomism, 
and the universal satisfaction of basic needs, in addition to the critique of Western-style development 
and cultural plurality), only the satisfaction of basic needs has been met to a significant degree, though 
arguably in a precarious, unsustainable manner. Furthermore, this came at the expense of the other 
dimensions, and at the cost of deepening dependence on international commodity-markets and 
locking the national economies further into the (neo)extractivist matrix. Moreover, steeply 
accumulating evidence contradicts the principle of harmony with nature and the recognition of rights 
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awarded to subaltern groups – let alone the inclusion of their values and practices. The contradictions 
between BV and the reinforced neo-extractivist economic model show that, for the time being, the 
logic of the “Commodity Consensus” prevails in government agendas over the regulative ideal of Buen 
vivir (Vanhulst & Beling, 2014b). Furthermore, these contradictions discredit the capacity of 
governments and social movements of effectively withstanding the omnipotence of markets and their 
neoliberal base 
Does BV thus showcase a paradoxical inverse proportionality between political leverage and 
transformative impact? Answering this question lies beyond the scope of this research, and would not 
be possible based on the evidence collected alone. Yet BV does make a strong case, I argue, for 
inquiring into the conditions under which governance takes place, first: cultural and material 
preconditions to be fulfilled before a given political program can be translated into an effective 
governance action. The premature institutionalization of a transformative programme in the form of 
a political party would lead into the trap of mere ‘politicking’, i.e. political actors becoming divorced 
from social and ecological realities and being trapped in the political game (Blühdorn, 2007; Latouche, 
2009). In addition, BV shows that once the state enters the realm of traditionally civil society activity 
(e.g. defense of environment), it tends to colonize or monopolize the transformative impulse, 
weakening other agents: “The experience of the progressive governments has opened many wounds, 
not only in the social movements and organizations but also in Latin American critical thought” 
(Svampa, 2016) 
Regarding local-global entanglements, the BV debate brings the issue of the discursive locus of 
enunciation much more strongly to the foreground than the GT did. Indeed: BV is heavily influenced 
by the specific socio-historical heritage of the Latin-American region – and the Andean-Amazonian 
countries, more specifically –, as well as by their geopolitical and geo-economic situations in the 
(semi)periphery of the globalized capitalist economy. Historical experience of direct and structural 
oppression, exclusion, or subordination has left a strong cultural imprint leading to an unwavering 
discursive foregrounding of power relations and imbalances, more than is the case in the GT debate. 
Capitalism itself, for example, is framed not only as a system of production and consumption, but first 
and foremost as a system of power and domination (not least over nature) (Brand, 2015, p. 29). This 
gives way to a world of victims and victimizers: the country versus international imperialism, civil 
society vs state, minorities against majorities, marginal minorities vs. dominant minorities.  
The locus of enunciation also shapes the ambivalent relationship towards development and modernity 
observed in the BV debate, wavering between outright rejection and long deferred aspiration. 
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Modernity is not only framed in universalistic (statist-socialist strand) or pluralistic terms 
(postdevelopmental strand), but also in particularistic anti-modern terms (indigenist strand), the latter 
not being present in the GT debate. As a transformation discourse, BV appears as caught in a double 
struggle against co-optation by either the universalistic premises of the republican liberal imaginary 
(including the standard pathway of seizing state-power in the hope of enacting transformations) or 
the reified ethnocentric particularisms and their illusions of self-determination. 
Finally, as a discursive phenomenon emerging in peripheral countries, BV also showcases a much 
stronger mediation of the supra-national sphere in the situated process of discursive construction, 
where foreign forces feature as co-producers of discourse and as disruptors of the local balance of 
political forces. At the level of discursive representation, however, supra-territorial embeddedness is 
under-problematized: geopolitical and geo-economic entanglements are acknowledged at an abstract 
level of critique, but are not given serious enough analytical treatment to establish conditions of 
possibility for a social transformation (Adrian E. Beling et al., 2018). The aspiration of autonomy 
eventually proved illusory in the face of global imbrications.  
The dramaturgical heuristics of the BV debate further yielded insights as to the key enablers of 
transformative learning at play. In terms of identitary shielding from mainstream forms of social status 
recognition in a capitalist society, the key role of larger societal sub-cultures allowing for alternative 
patterns of identity-ascription and recognition stand out as the most striking resource enabling social 
learning. While historically encapsulated as a parallel world (an ‘island’ rather than a ‘peninsula’), the 
BV debate largely worked as a platform for epistemic and material convergence and inter-imbrication 
with the mestizo society. Uruguayan writer and activist Raul Zibechi even proposes replacing the 
conventional concept of social movement in the context of Latin-American transformations, as it 
cannot capture the extension or the depth of the phenomenon of what he calls, instead, “societies in 
movement” in Latin America (Zibechi & Nuin, 2008): a subset of social relations that differ from the 
hegemonic ones. Unlike the classical conception of social movements which understands them as 
means to struggle for the conquest of political power, the concept of “societies in movement” remits 
to the idea of social movements as “carriers of a different world” in motion, fighting a struggle with a 
disarticulating character, subverting institutionalized and naturalized symbolic orders: "We are on a 
civilizational debate in the continent. It is not simply to join the transition from capitalism to socialism, 
it is a much broader or different thing” (Santos, 2009). 
In terms of political leverage, the BV debate snowballed societal forces into a critical mass for political 
change, empowering agents formerly conceived of as mere objects (rather than subjects) of politics 
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and policy-making. Hence BV generated not only a cognitive, but also a political democratization-
effect, building-up intermediate political infrastructure and bridging rigid social hierarchies.  
Precondition for the consolidation of such political leverage was the structural material shielding of 
revulsive discursive agents, chiefly the Indigenous movement. We analysed the most influential 
movement in the region, the Ecuadorean indigenous movement, and identified the singularity of its 
support base as a critical factor explaining its rise to societal and political prominence. With its inbuilt 
political and economic counter-weights, decoupling the satisfaction of basic needs of the member-
base from the top of the pyramid (through strong communal cohesion in the ayllus and first tier 
organizations organizing the material reproduction of collective life at the local level), and harnessing 
international development funding as exogenous lever, this structure shields the indigenous movement 
from social humour, as well as from political and market pressure.  
Another key enabler was the engagement of individual and organizational agents (indigenous and 
postdevelopmentalist intellectuals, as well as developmental and environmental organizations) to 
interpret and strategically harness the historical window of opportunity opened through the global-
local convergence of an outside-inward global crisis of the development discourse (maldevelopment) 
and an inside-outward anti-neoliberalist momentum. In cultural terms, these agents can be described 
in terms of what in Chapter 4 we called “meaning-making elites”, involving functions of translation 
(interpreting and articulating the specific sub-cultural codes of stakeholder groups), identity-brokerage 
(to facilitate mutual recognition processes), and creation of discursive corridors to enable dialogical 
engagement across the board.  Politically, “decision-making elites” (Assadourian & The Worldwatch 
Institute, 2010; Stengel, 2011) translated this into building an anti-hegemonic balance through rallying 
heterogeneous social forces behind the floating signifier of BV against a strong ‘common enemy’: 
neoliberalism, leading to a disruption of “politics as usual”, while strengthening domestic and global 
legitimacy. 
Standing out as singular feature of BV as a transformation discourse was the State-impulse it received, 
endowing this social-ecological utopia with constitutional and institutional legitimacy, adopting an 
unconventional role as ‘champion of nature’, and giving BV a decisive push in terms of symbolic 
distribution (upscaling and international dissemination). Preconditions for this were the strategic 
generation of domestic political consensus and legitimacy in front of the global public sphere. 
Finally, pivotal in the process of discursive assemblage or articulation – as well as in sustaining 
agonistic contention in the post-consensual phase – was the establishment of communicating vessels 
among the diverse discursive formations (insider-outsider networks, cross-pollination), as well as the 
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fact that BV became a bandwagoning-banner for other TDs or even for well-established reformist 
emancipatory discourses, such as the UNDP’s Human Development. 
The above enablers can be matched with characteristic particularized roles and practices of the three key 
agents identified in the BV debate: Civil society (local social movements and foreign NGOs), the state, 
and the intellectual sphere.  
Civil society was observed to perform a complex role with at least three clearly distinguishable facets: 
a) as philosophical (civilizational critique, sumak kawsay utopia) and programmatic (Yasuní-ITT) 
architect of BV; b) reframed as “societies in movement”, working as a ferment for the broader ‘citizen 
revolution’ and the ‘cultural revolution’ in Ecuador and Bolivia, respectively; and c) as a resistance 
agent against the perceived co-optation of BV by the state. 
Regarding the enabling role of the state, we saw it had a pivotal role in scaling and re-framing BV into 
a narrative of macro-societal (also global) relevance; and that the legitimacy and visibility it acquired 
through state sponsorship prompted a global snowball of academic reflections, activist initiatives, and 
a renewed political rhetoric. This of the state can be understood as the positive byproduct of a largely 
failed implementation attempt, alongside the mentioned negative byproducts of monopolizing (and 
degrading) the transformative impulse and damaging the credibility of BV as a cognitive project. The 
role of the state is thus still a sine qua non enabling role in triggering a large-scale learning process; just 
not the straightforward type of performativity conventionally expected from the state. 
The intellectual sphere, in turn, particularly public scholars closer either to the movements or to the 
governments, was shown to provide substantial inputs to the process of societal reflection, as well as 
for its political mobilization. The leading role of Alberto Acosta in both fronts is illustrative. However, 
unlike in the case of GT, there is hardly any strategic-analytical inputs as inputs to the programmatic 
debate around the idea of a transformation here, as indicated by the virtually total absence of 
‘blueprints’ for BV. Rather, under the apparent influence of postcolonial thought, these intellectuals 
engage in far-reaching deconstructive, philosophical-critical work (chiefly, the diagnosis of 
“civilizational crisis”), thus playing a stronger role in terms of ‘unbuilding unsustainability’ (what we 
called disruptors), than in ‘building sustainability’ (generators). To be sure, he idea of BV as social-
ecological utopia is largely a product of academic reflection, as well, but it remains more of an abstract 
vision than a solid programmatic proposal. 
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PART III 
Para-governance for a social-ecological transformation 
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CHAPTER 6 
“Great Transformation” and Buen vivir:  
lessons learned for advancing transformative collective learning 
 
 
Utopia is in the horizon. If I take two steps towards it, it recedes two steps, and the horizon moves ten steps farther.  
So what is utopia good for? Precisely for that: for walking. 
Eduardo Galeano (1993) 
 
 
6.1. Introductory remarks 
 
Having reviewed the case studies of BV and GT in Chapters 3 to 5 of Part II, the empirical insights 
gained feed into this chapter seeking to answer our general research question: how to foster 
transformative CLPs; that is, by implication, how to foster transformative agency and socio-ecological 
utopias. 
To this purpose, the present chapter merges the lessons gained separately from the situated debates 
of BV and GT, bringing them into resonance with each other by comparing the respective enablers 
distilled from the dramaturgical analyses of each case, and seeking to abstract insights that would shed 
light on the more general phenomenon of the ‘enabling of transformative learning processes’. 
Needless to say, such broad comparison is compelled to highlight commonalities at the cost of 
downplaying important differences and details, yet such sacrifice is tailored to the requirements of our 
research interests. Detailed empirical insights are rather to be retrieved from Part II. 
Given the abrupt disparity not only of both cases, but also of our methodological way of approaching 
their study, this ‘mutual dialogical engagement’ of both case studies rests methodically on the common 
dramaturgical categories utilized, triangulated by insights from relevant literature. In addition, excerpts 
from the various data samples second-level coded with the labels ‘para-governance’ (see Chapter 7), 
‘insightful quotation’, ‘hypothesis supporting’, and ‘hypothesis rectifying’ were also incorporated to 
the analysis. Lastly, ethnographic observations from my own experience in the field and from 
exploratory interviews also come into play at this final stage of integral analysis.  
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 starts comparing-contrasting the GT and BV debates 
regarding the assessment of the learning effects observed. Section 6.3 undertakes a work of 
summarization and abstraction of the enablers distilled in chapters 4 and 5, following the sequence of 
steps used for dramaturgical analysis in said chapters as systematization- and display-tool for easier 
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linking with the two empirical chapters, as well as a clearer oversight. It finishes by condensing and 
clustering these enablers into three categories: structural, situational (or contingent), and agential. 
Section 6.4 further zooms into the agential dimension by modelling types of agency, providing an 
answer to the sub-research questions regarding how the predicament transformative agency (cf. 
Chapter 2) is addressed in the case studies, and outlining ideal-typical agent-configurations and their 
distinctive dynamics (agent-roles and -practices).  
 
6.2. Conceptualizing collective learning in the wake of the BV and the GT debates 
 
Drawing on Maarten Hajer’s categorization, the effects of learning in the GT-case are better described 
with the concept of discourse structruration, i.e. that the discourse has influenced how the world is 
conceptualized by a given social collective (the axial themes distilled from our main data corpus are 
already indicators), while the effects of learning in the case of BV can be understood in terms of 
discourse institutionalization, that is, that the discourse has shaped patterns of institutionalization and the 
organization or social practices (biocentric constitutions, RoN, Yasuní-ITT, programmatic policy 
contents oriented by BV, etc.). To be sure, the GT debate also features emergent material dispositifs 
in the form of cross-over networks (Wachstumswende, Konzeptwerk neue Ökonomie), deliberative platforms 
(WiW Austria, Forschungswende), research agendas (PhD programs on the GT in Heinrich-Böll and 
Rosa-Luxemburg foundations) and organizational units (DFG-research college on post-growth 
societies), new civil society movements (Degrowth, commons, Wir haben es satt), initiatives (Smart 
CSOs) and organizations (P2P Foundation), as well as policy-programs (Plan B from Die Linke) and 
blueprints (UBI); however, such material impacts are more disperse, less systematic, and less relevant 
for society as a whole as compared to those featured in the case of BV. This by no means implies that 
such effects are less remarkable or less fertile from a perspective of learning potential; rather, these 
differential impacts are consistent with the dissimilar modes of discursive articulation observed in both 
cases.  
Indeed, the integration of BV into the political process of the ‘left turn’ in Ecuador and Bolivia meant 
that the diverse stakeholder audiences (indigenous, non-indigenous ethnic minorities, urban 
bourgeoisie, environmentalist groups, etc.) are now integrated into a single constituency, and thus 
articulated through a vertical logic of aggregation, which rests on the alignment of a critical mass of 
votes behind a candidate in the logic of electoral competition. The pattern is thus one of vertical 
articulation. In the GT debate, in turn, articulation proceeds through a rather lateral logic of contagion. 
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The production of anti-hegemonic (sub)political discourse occurs in networked social and institutional 
structures, with patterns of affiliation, organization, identity building, and discursive production that 
differ from the logic of a demos (though superimposed onto and imbricated with it). The pattern of 
social construction of TDs here comes closer to Manuel Castells’ (2000) description of a network society. 
The organizing principle is not that of the critical mass, but that of a ‘critical yeast’ (Lederach, 2003) 
which contains the potential to eventually leaven the masses – hence the importance of extension and 
exogamy of networks beyond ‘small worlds’ to strengthen both the network’s resilience and leverage 
(Granovetter, 1973). The logic of contagion also accounts for the talk about ‘social labs’ and ‘protected 
spaces for experimentation’ (Grießhammer & Brohmann, 2015; Hassan, 2014), ‘pioneers’ (WBGU, 
2011, 2014) or ‘seeds of change’ (Narberhaus & Sheppard, 2015) and, more generally, the centrality 
of complexity and systems-thinking (Graham, 2010; D. Meadows, 1999; Westley et al., 2011). 
Consequently, the pattern in GT is one of horizontal articulation.  
From a cultural rather than a political perspective, in turn, GT and BV can be framed and compared 
as cases of what I will call ‘endogenous’ versus ‘exogenous learning’, respectively. Endogenous learning 
constitutes a self-regulated constructive process of societal self-observation, which can be linked back 
to the concept of ‘reflexive modernization’ (Beck et al., 2003, 1994). Risk society – in particular what 
we have termed geostorical challenges – constitute the disturbance factor unsettling the prevailing 
order and putting a learning process into motion. The process is not uncontentious, but, as a whole, 
it can be seen as a Schumpeterian “regenerative self-destruction” of Western-style modernity, whereby 
the “social imaginary signifiers” fundamentally characterizing the modern ethos – Castoriadis (1990) 
condensed them into two: autonomy and rational control of the world – are re-signified, rather than 
inherently challenged: autonomy is re-conceived in terms of interdependence, and rational control of 
the world shifts primarily from an outer control over nature to an inner control of ourselves to 
safeguard natural life-support system from anthropogenic threats (Adrian E. Beling et al., 2014; Pelfini, 
2013). Hence the preferred discursive mechanism described in Chapter 3 as drawing on the ‘surplus 
of meaning’ of modern values as a source of cultural renewal. 
Exogenous learning, in turn, refers to the inter-imbrication of dissimilar cultural models or social worlds 
(Bajoit, 2011; Bajoit et al., 2008), with often conflictive epistemological and ontological foundations 
(Escobar, 2011, 2012b; Rehbein, 2010, 2013). Furthermore, in terms of its discursive representations, 
BV constitutes a paradoxical discursive product, insofar it turns the alleged incompatibility between 
the cultural matrixes of indigenous traditional cultures and that of modernity into the source of 
innovation and radical renewal of the latter (Carballo, 2015a). Exogenous learning oscillates between 
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the fusion or hybridation of plural cultural sources (García Canclini, 2001) and the agonistic 
coexistence of multiple parallel worlds, which has no synthesis-solution, but rather remain in a 
sustained state of creative tension (Rivera Cusicanqui, 2010b). 
The above differences notwithstanding, both cases similarly showcase learning effects in terms of 
creating “docking points for the politization of alleged lack of alternatives” (Brand), and fostering a 
more or less broad social debate on emancipatory alternatives and the need to link them with a project 
of societal restructuration (Aparicio Wilhelmi, 2013; Institut Solidarische Moderne, 2011, p. 29), 
“transforming a resigned sense that ‘there is no alternative’ into an inspiring belief that ‘another world 
is possible’” (Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014, p. 141). The starting place, Tim Jackson says, “must be 
to confront the structures that keep us in damaging denial”. (Jackson, 2009a, p. 102). Their major 
contribution lies in them opening up  “a space for the inventiveness and creativity of the imagination, 
which has been blocked by economistic, developmentalist and progressive totalitarianism” (Latouche, 
2009, p. 9), enlarging “horizons of expectation” and demonstrating political and moral dissent 
(WBGU, 2014, p. 4), thus creating preconditions for agonism. Alone rendering alternatives visible is 
an important task, given the ‘spiral of scilence’ of political elites and mainstream media (Brand, 2014a; 
Ronzheimer, 2013). In so doing, GT and BV have opened the possibilities for dialogue (Acosta, 2011, 
p. 55), for a discursive democracy (Dryzek, 2000). From a perspective of collective learning, more 
relevant than the dubious success of failure at implementation by any particular actors, I would argue, 
is the collectively shared sense of “getting to maybe”. (Westley, Patton, & Zimmerman, 2007)   
 
 
6.3. Enablers of transformative collective learning: lessons from BV & GT 
 
Narrative plausibility: Articulation of discursive representations with background culture 
 
The GT and BV discourses introduce elements ‘imported’ from a locus of alterity – indigenous nations 
(BV) or anti-systemic scholarly circles, social movements, or niches of alternative practice (GT) – into 
the discursive landscape of their respective societies, problematizing issues of political, economic or 
socio-cultural exclusion – that is, issues of social justice – or the cultural blind spots or biases that 
constitute a potential threat to the survival of society itself, related to the ‘boomerang effect’ of 
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(unequal) affluence (Beck, 1992), thematized by various authors either as ‘overdevelopment’225 or 
‘maldevelopment’ (Svampa & Viale, 2014b; Tortosa, 2001) – following the distinction introduced in 
Chapter 2, we can call these social pathologies. In the cases at hand, problematized pathologies revolve 
mainly around blind spots in issues of global interdependence – critically, interlocking global 
environmental changes, but also the misrecognition of global economic imbrications, which was 
identified as a blind spot of the BV discourse in Chapter 5 – or of unequally distributed vulnerabilities. 
This implies active contestation at the symbolic level, going beyond the dominant Zeitgeist to shift 
public debate “from false opposites towards the true contradictions (Brand, Pühl, et al., 2013, p. 81) 
 
This has not led to a shift in discursive hegemony, but rather to a situation of discursive agonism: 
critical discourses highlighting power and domination are confronted with the demand to acknowledge 
interdependencies (e.g. indigenist strands of BV challenged by postdevelopmentalist ones), and naïve 
cosmopolitanism (‘we are all on the same boat’) is confronted with the demand to acknowledge that 
the society is complex, contradictory, and unequal (rather than just ‘multiple’) (Aguilar et al., 2015, p. 
124). The resulting setting of discursive confrontation and diversification (hence the definition of BV 
and GT ‘debates’ as case studies) destabilizes the prevalent symbolic order, thus allowing conditions 
for collective learning. 
Yet coupled with this destabilizing critique of the unsustainable dominant symbolic order (which we 
have called disruptors), our TDs offer a discursive generator, a cultural promise: that, which the symbolic 
project at stake is offering, contains the seed for a more comprehensive and more sustainable 
realization of the good life. In both cases, the idea of the ‘good life’ is opposed to that of a ‘better life’ 
characteristic of current trends towards increased utilitarianism, economicism, and commodification 
of all aspects of life (Sandel, 2013). However, a more specific framing of their respective ideas about 
the good life is tailored, in each case, to be recognizable for their respective audiences: in the case of 
BV, by retrieving the ancient traditions of indigenous populations – still much alive in the Andean 
ayllus), in various partly overlapping and partly competing articulations with Western frames 
(developmental, environmental); and in the case of GT, rehabilitating the old Aristotelean eudaimonia 
and multiple other sources of cultural contestation, especially from the 1970s (Asara et al., 2015), but 
                                                 
225 The idea of overdevelopment is theorized especially by in environmental, postcolonial, and Marxist 
scholars, but increasingly entering the mainstream especially due to ecological impacts of 
overconsumption or hyper-consumption. (i.a. Catton, 1982; Giddens, 2011) 
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increasingly also exploring Europe’s pre-industrial epistemes226. In the same vein, the assimilation of the 
BV discourse within the GT debate (which motivated the inclusion of Acosta, 2015a into our sample 
for the analysis of GT representations) foregrounded elements such as harmony with the social and 
natural environment, rights of nature, and the ‘wisdom’ of non-modern worldviews, while the 
postcolonial ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ that characterizes the BV debate in Latin America recedes in 
the background. 
 
Opportunity: Articulation of discursive representations with the contingent situation 
 
Similarly, the contingent situations sparking off the GT and BV debates, respectively, are discursively 
elaborated for enabling a deeper societal self-reflection process. The spark is, in both cases, a situation 
of (perceived) acute crisis – the region-wide collapse of the neoliberal experiment of the 1990s, in the 
case of BV, and the Great Recession, in the GT debate. The apparent systemic nature of these crises 
opens up a historical window of opportunity for the emergence of re-foundational narratives. In the 
GT debate, the crisis is framed in the broader context of the breakdown of the post-war class-
compromise in Europe (Dörre et al., 2015; Streeck, 2011), which becomes apparent in the accelerating 
widening of the ‘inequality gap’ (Oxfam, 2016; Piketty, 2014; Woodward, 2015), and of the global 
ecological crisis, especially with the mainstreaming of climate change by mid-2000s and the failure of 
multilateral (sustainability) governance, evidenced with the failure of the Copenhagen climate summit 
in 2009. In the BV debate, the proximate trigger of the anti-neoliberal tide was discursively elaborated 
as a more fundamental crisis of ‘maldevelopment’ (Svampa & Viale, 2014b; Tortosa, 2009), in the 
context of a global legitimacy crisis of the development discourse, with the ecological discourse of 
international environmental NGOs finding resonance with that of indigenous organizations, not least 
as a lever for their claims to territorial autarchy as ‘wardens of nature’. The narrative output were the 
diagnoses of a ‘multiple interlinked crisis’ and of a ‘civilizational crisis’, respectively, as points of 
departure for a societal self-reflexivity and cultural critique.  
 
Yet beyond these ideational exercises, the articulation of the two TDs with their respective contingent 
situations of emergence also has a practical dimension, which consists in mobilizing and organizing 
                                                 
226 This trend is illustrated by the philosophical explorations of Baroque culture as a source of cultural 
renewal in current times; see for example the work by Hersche (2011) or Echeverría (2000). 
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latent discursive forces to join the debate, thus strengthening its cultural and political leverage of TDs. 
We saw that the build-up of a network of mutual reference (in the form of content-carrying dispositifs 
such as official reports, books, manifestos, grey literature, etc.; deliberative events; programmatic 
orientations in research, civil society action, or research; etc.), the existence of catalysing instances 
(policy proposals, such as Yasuní-ITT, work reduction, or UBI; institutionalization such as the 
constitutional assemblies in Ecuador and Bolivia, or the Energiewende in Germany), and clustering 
platforms (e.g. the Degrowth movement or CONAIE), with the condensation of the above in time 
(we called it ‘synchronization’) providing for the momentous character of discussion, thus provoking 
the destabilizing effect on the dominant symbolic order and triggering the learning process. Last but 
not least, the articulation of discourse and situational contingence implies identifying and harnessing 
political windows of opportunity. In BV, this took the shape of a political project put in the hands of 
governments put in power by party-movements, while in the case of GT the most transcendent 
political instance was the Enquete-WWL. While the success of BV as a political program was limited, 
at best, from a perspective of collective learning the main effect of the state-adoption of both BV and 
the GT, as argued below, was endowing the respective debates with entity, visibility, and legitimacy. 
Legitimation: Articulation of discursive representations with performing actors 
 
The issue of legitimacy is, as we saw, a central one both in Alexander’s theoretical framework and in 
the empirical case studies. Indeed, the capability of proposing symbolic contestations that challenge 
mainstream culture and seek to re-signify collective self-understandings is not to be taken for granted. 
In order for such cultural challenges to be seen as acceptable, credible, and thus produce effects of 
cultural extension and psychological identification on the part of intended audiences, the discursive 
agents (or performing actors, in the language of dramaturgies) need to be endowed with some form 
of legitimacy in the eyes of society. Such legitimacy may be drawn from diverse sources: in the GT 
debate, we saw science, as the culturally most authoritative source of knowledge, taking up a 
prominent role as legitimacy-provider; not only the biophysical sciences with ground-breaking and 
inherently critical concepts such as Anthropocene, planetary boundaries, or Great Acceleration, but also the 
social sciences (Jevon’s paradox, Easterlin paradox, etc.) contribute to a re-shaping of deep cultural 
structures (Beck, 2015b; WBGU, 2011).  Hence, the scientific discourse, making use of its culturally-
conferred authority, can advance TDs themselves (e.g. ‘transformative science’) and legitimize other 
TD-agents. But there are other sources of legitimacy, such as establishing links with socially or 
politically established or highly reputed institutions or ideas,  as illustrated clearly, in the case of BV, 
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with the purposeful linkage to the Human Development approach of the UNDP (drawing on 
Sen/Nussbaum), or to the Aristotelian eudaimonia (Bretón et al., 2014). Also the existence of hybrid 
cultures (Avritzer, 2002; García Canclini, 2004) or pluri-epistemic cultures containing an ‘other’ to 
society within society (perfect illustration being the concept of plurinationality) (Altmann, 2013b) can 
be a source of legitimacy: the existence of a (more or less influential) sub-set of non-hegemonic social 
relations within the larger society de facto creates an exogenous vantage point for societal self-
observation and critique. When this ‘other’ is an excluded one, as is typically the case with ethnic 
minorities long excluded from political representation and culturally segregated in the mestizo society 
of Latin American countries, the wholesale critique of the dominant cultural model (‘social 
pathologies’) is combined with (and sometimes obscured by) a critique of social injustices227, leading 
– as was indeed the case with BV – to a process of political change, a “disruption of politics as usual” 
(de la Cadena 2010). In any of these cases, cultural and political democratization becomes a mechanism 
for legitimation. Similarly, as mentioned above, both in BV and in GT (though to diverse extent), the 
state plays a decisive role as a legitimacy-provider, be it though its intervention as discourse producer 
(especially in BV) and/or backing up the discourse through attaching its ‘seal of approval’: this is most 
evident in the case of BV, where a full-fledged political democratic legitimation is achieved through 
the enactment of a new constitution, but it can also be observed in the GT debate with the 
instantiation of the Enquete-WWL or the Growth in Transition (WiW) initiative of the Austrian Life-
Ministry, but also with much smaller gestures such as attaching an organizational logo indicating 
sponsorship of a ministry (BMBF, BMZ, SENPLADES) or a technical agency (UBA, DFG) to a civil 
society or academic initiative (e.g. Post-growth research group at Jena University). 
Another form of legitimation not based on drawing on a source of authority, as the above cases, but 
on being awarded credibility. In GT, for example, we see this mechanism at action in the invocation of 
dystopias of stagnating growth prospects, industry 4.0 (a ‘push’ factor), and/or in the ‘pull’ of plausible 
utopias such as collaborative commons enabled by a digital modernity and the Internet of Things. In BV, 
                                                 
227 This logic of legitimation based on amassing a ‘critical mass’ was also at work with the mass counter-
cultural movements of the 1970 in Europe – the so-called 68-generation. These counter-cultural 
movements sought to exert a seductive influence over the larger society, which eventually resulted in 
partial recognition of some of the ‘soft’ cultural demands, and co-optation of the ‘harder’ 
transformative socio-economic demands (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005). However, unlike the ethnic 
minorities in Latin America, the ‘cultural revolution’ of the 68-generation was not based on claims of 
social exclusion, but rather on a cultural critique to the Fordist culture; i.e. it was not grounded on 
issues of social justice, but on issues of social pathologies. 
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this credibility is granted through the promise incarnated in a party-movement like Alianza-País in 
Ecuador or MAS in Bolivia. Similarly, the perceived authenticity of discursive performers is another 
source of credibility that enables dramaturgical fusion, as we see in the profiling of Bolivian president 
Evo Morales as the “first indigenous president” of the country, or in Rafael Correa as caudillo of the 
Ecuadorean ‘citizen revolution’, but also in the perceived neutrality of scientists or else in the general 
cultural praise of individuals seen as authentic and coherent (‘walking your talk’) (J. Sachs, 2012; Taylor, 
1994). A noteworthy difference between both cases in terms of the credibility of future prospects of 
change is that the amalgamation of BV with a political project locates the prospect of fundamental 
changes in the immediate future (whose failure would largely explain the increasing disenchantment 
with BV since the divorce between the governments of Bolivia and Ecuador and their former 
respectively supportive social movements – see Chapter 5), while in GT that expectation is located in 
an indefinite future. The credibility based on plausibility of radical change in the future can be 
underpinned, in any case, through embracing the idea of the “futurization of politics”, that is, through 
the endogenization of radical uncertainty and a corresponding reconceptualization of time in political 
deliberation and practice. This would translate into “taking a specific time-related plan or action with 
the aim of coping better with the uncertainties of the future”, with tight deadlines in long-term policy 
help mitigate procrastination and demagogy” (Marks et al. 2006; Haderlapp/Trattnig 2013, cited in 
Reisch & Bietz, 2014, p. 31). The development and mainstreaming of management, planning, and 
communication tools such as backcasting (the exercise of backwards-planning departing from an 
envisioned long-term goal retrospective, instead of doing it from the present situation) would be fit 
for purpose.  
Power: Articulation of discursive representations with powers of symbolic production/ distribution 
interpretation 
 
In order to successfully perform a discursive challenge of culture, however, more is required than, 
legitimacy, authority, or credibility in front of the audience. Power leverage (including material 
resources) is needed as well for advancing the discursive prospects of a SET in society. Alexander’s 
categorial framework distinguished three dimensions of power as relevant for the successful 
advancement of symbolic projects (i.e. fused discursive performances): the power of symbolic 
production, of distribution, and of interpretation. A remarkable parallel we could abstract from both 
case studies is that these three dimensions of power rest on an infrastructure combining some form 
of shielding from economic, political, and cultural conformity-pressures with some form of leverage over 
302 
 
culture and, in the case of BV, over politics. The shielding-dimension provides for the independent 
production of symbolic contents, i.e. for discursive diversity, preserving spaces of alterity vis-à-vis 
mainstream culture as discursive breeding grounds, and also deflects certain types of censorship (J. C. 
Alexander, 2004). In our analyses of the debates around BV and GT we also included in this shielding 
dimension the sustainability of this capacity for independent, uncensored discursive production over 
time, that is, the capacity of material self-reproduction of TD-agents. The leverage-dimension, in turn, 
enables the dissemination of symbolic contents through communicating vessels with the public sphere 
and the institutional sphere of society at large. In both cases, the enabling infrastructure combines the 
strength of hierarchical structures exerting significant political (indigenous movement in BV) or 
economic leverage (churches in GT) with the distributed agency of networked structures (NGOs and 
micro-level initiatives). This combination allows the separation between material and symbolic power, 
enabling the emergence of meaning-making elites (Assadourian & The Worldwatch Institute, 2010; 
Brohmann & David, 2015; Stengel, 2011) – i.e. a special type of elites who exert influence as discourse-
shaping persons drawing on their symbolic, cultural, social capital, regardless of their economic or 
political power (be it indigenous organizations or Transition Towns)–, on the one hand, and a 
relatively more distributed power for symbolic production, on the other. Multi-level, cross-scale, 
matrixial organizations rendering base-membership support less dependent on aggregate macro-policy 
positions of the organizational top; and a structure of material self-reproduction relatively autonomous 
from both, seem crucial (Altmann, 2013a, p. 15; Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014, p. 142). In the case of 
the GT debate, shielding is granted mainly by CSOs with resilient and independent funding structures 
(e.g. tax-based in churches, the development sector, and the political foundations) and no vested 
interests in continuous escalation. In the case of BV, mainly through the peculiar organizational 
structure of the nationally and regionally organized indigenous movement – with its inbuilt political 
(three-tier structure) and economic (second tier direct recipient of international development funds) 
counter-weights –, on the one hand, and its identity boundary-construction, on the other, largely 
working as a shield against social-conformity pressures and against resource access-constraints 
(Altmann 2013). The above shielding mechanisms – many others could and should be added in the 
interest of transformative collective learning –, however, can simultaneously be seen as shielding the 
interests of future generations and politically unrepresented ‘others’ from the abuses of present and 
empowered political actors. They can be seen as particular cases of what Avner Offer called “societal 
commitment devices”: institutional structures of society preventing “myopic” choices undermining 
long-term social goals for the sake of short-term pursuits; that is, “mechanisms which make it a little 
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easier for us to curtail our appetite for immediate arousal and protect our own future interests, and 
indeed the interests of affected others, including future generations” (Jackson, 2009a, p. 95) 
 
Leverage, in turn, is provided for by the high-capillarity distribution infrastructure that these structures 
have, which serves not only for the diffusion of institutionalized patterns, but also for the aggregation 
and systematization of micro-experiments (Ronzheimer, 2013). From an agential rather than structural 
vantage point, the maximization of leverage is a function of, the identification of central arenas of 
intervention and key leverage points–  ‘fights worth fighting’ – from a systemic perspective (Biermann, 
2011b; Grießhammer & Brohmann, 2015; Hackmann & St. Claire, 2012; Narberhaus & Sheppard, 
2015). In the sense of collective learning, this includes not only (or mainly) institutional or policy shifts, 
but also fights that can shift the logic of the debate and make room for transformative narratives to 
emerge. (Narberhaus & Sheppard, 2015, p. 58) 
With regard to interpretative power, the sheer extension of these structures – say, the communication 
network of the churches, the academic, or the development sector – also makes it possible, especially 
in hierarchical ones, to provide vast yet captive publics with clues and orientation for discursive 
interpretation, as the structure allows for a rapid spread of communications. Yet while the above 
structures largely running parallel (i.e. bypass) the communication infrastructure of the state and the 
mass media, thus preserving relative independence in the message-contents (shielding)(Stengel, 2011, 
p. 313), grey-literature, scientific reports, and deliberative forums cannot compete with the latter in 
outreach and scope (leverage), and – most importantly, perhaps – in their role of providing a cultural 
compass and normative orientation to the masses. It is thus perhaps in terms of hermeneutic power 
where TDs are the weakest, in terms of symbolic capacities. Indeed: the role of mass media was not 
found to be prominent, in general, neither in BV nor in GT. This should not come as surprise: Media 
actors (including journalists, film- and TV-scriptwriters, advertising agencies, etc.) are unlikely to pick 
up a topic like, say, sufficiency, and play a multiplier-role for at least two structural reasons: insofar 
abiding to the commercial logic of business enterprises, the logic of the media is not an emancipatory 
one, but a seductive one, aimed at maximizing audience rating (Bourdieu, 2011)(cf. Chapter 4, Section 
4.3 on obstacles to a fused performance).  
Hence the media feature novel, attractive, controversial themes arousing the interest of the masses. 
Secondly, the logic of the “news” – and this pertains not only ‘vertical’ mass media, but also 
‘horizontal’ social media – has a short-term resonance built-in: whatever news shine under the spot of 
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the media are perceived as important by the public at large, changing perceptions, eventually gaining 
political relevance and sometimes leading to reforms, but only insofar the topic remains news-relevant: 
as soon as the spot is off, the perception arises that it has lost importance. Themes in the purview of 
the Public sphere are thus short-lived, and, as a result, the dictates of public opinion are ruled by a 
capricious up-and-down dynamics (Stengel, 2011, p. 315). It follows that, for the two reasons exposed, 
diffuse, and complex problems which confront our own constituency as societies and individuals are 
not amenable to the typical dynamics of news. According to Christiane Graefe228, a senior journalist 
at the German newspaper Die Zeit, the potentiation of mechanisms we have observed incipiently at 
action in our case studies could help strategically advance a more functional medialization of the GT 
debate: one way is fueling the politization of the topic (i.e. bring controversy to scale); another is 
connecting abstract GT narratives to more concrete, catalyzing topics: e.g. sufficiency or ‘time 
prosperity’ could be broken down into topics such as factory farming or parental leave, respectively, 
which are firmly anchored in the public sphere, or with the critical mass movement reclaiming public 
space for bicycle traffic from cars to challenge the dominant discourse on mobility. ‘Connecting the 
dots’ in a broader transformation narrative would turn what would otherwise be a linear, 
incrementalistic approach into a transformative one. Catalytic and clustering initiatives and practices 
serve the additional purpose of structurally limiting censorship, due to the seemingly reformist 
character of  “non-reformist reforms” (Bond, 2009; Gorz, 1964; G. Speth, 2016). A third mechanism 
is the strategic framing (WBGU, 2011) mentioned in Chapter 3: “less is more”, for example, was a 
popular but sterile ascetic frame coming from religious circles three decades ago; today, however, it 
has been reframed as “the fatigue of clutter” (“Überdruss am Überfluss”), which is a common experience 
(certainly at least in youth/student milieus who seek minimalistic lifestyles) to which people can 
connect. This goes in line with the positive framing of sufficiency alluded to in Chapter 3: sufficiency 
is not about curtailment, but rather about respecting the right “not to be forced to be willing to have 
ever more” (U. von Winterfeld’s ‘right to sufficiency’ argument), or enlarged: “everybody has the right 
not to be forced to live at the expense of others”. Here sufficiency becomes a moral argument against 
egoism, and a social-justice argument against discrimination. This strategic, systemic view is by and 
large missing, however, in the practice of self-denominated transformative or ‘change agents’ (Fuhr, 
Unmüßig, Heidel, Maier, & Martens, 2013; Narberhaus & Sheppard, 2015). Examples of 
                                                 
228 Speech delivered at a panel discussion organized by BUND and the Heinrich-Böll Foundation on 
the political communication of sufficiency, held in Berlin on 27.01.16  
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transformative agents starting to walk this path in our case studies are Welzer’s foundation Futurzwei,  
which seeks to convey the positive framing about sufficiency as involving not only less (material 
resources, mobility, animal protein) but also more (justice, happiness, freedom); Pope Francis 
encyclical, public intellectuals advocating a social-ecological transformation (e.g. our well-known 
figures Latouche, Acosta, Schneidewind, Tim Jackson), or the campaign “Keep it in the ground” by 
the British newspaper The Guardian. 
As the above illustrates, the  production of a persistent, coherent, and focused communication of TDs 
required to shift public opinion and therethrough gaining political leverage (Stengel, 2011) would 
require a combination of increased medialization and the creation of new agoras making the voices 
demanding and reflecting on a GT heard (Ronzheimer, 2013), as well as new formats tailored for 
stimulating deliberation and underpinning the dissemination of TDs (Grießhammer & Brohmann, 
2015), such as the mainstreaming of the abovementioned backcasting as a method of political 
communication (Raskin, 2008; Reisch & Bietz, 2014, p. 32). 
Last but not least, the role of the state entering the arena as discourse producer, hermeneut and 
distributor, as we observed especially in the case of BV, has had mixed effects: on the one hand, it 
helped fast-track, amplify, and – particularly important – generated multiplier effect and opened new 
communicative vessels with a multiplicity of actors (i.e. potentiated leverage), but the consensus-
proneness of the political system compromised discursive independence and diversification, giving 
way to a watered-down strand of BV which is irreconcilable with the practice of neo-extractivism 
(Gudynas, 2011c). The ambiguous role of the state is analyzed in further detail below.  
 Bridging: Articulation of discursive representations with intended audiences 
 
Beyond the general-purpose infrastructure mentioned above for discourse production, distribution, 
and interpretative guidance, targeted audiences or publics are diverse in their social-structural 
configuration, and, accordingly, relate diversely to the inputs of TDs: with ignorance, indifference, 
resistance, passive acceptation or active adoption and advocacy, etc. We learned from our case studies 
that there are (in practice or in discursive representations) diverse possible approaches for 
transformative agency to sensitize dissimilar publics to TDs.  
One approach is generating socio-cognitive bridges, as we explored at length in Chapter 3. Even if 
diverse publics do not share the same narratives, they might still share deeper interpretative templates 
or frames, phenomenal or categorial structures, or some other form of discursive affinity. So for 
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example Degrowth became ‘‘both a banner associated with social and environmental movements and 
an emergent concept in academic and intellectual circles, [which] are interdependent and affect each 
other’’ (Martinez Alier et al. 2010, cited in Asara et al., 2015, p. 3), while BV draws on a hitherto 
regarded as implausible alliance between the indigenous movement and the development sector. In 
GT, our analysis clearly showed these affinity structures among the four narrative strands of Green 
Economy, Conservative Contraction, Green Society, and P2P Society, and illustrated possible 
meaning-bridging possibilities with the visual metaphor of puzzle pieces. In the case of frames, for 
example, GE and CC share the same understanding of modernity, despite advocating opposite courses 
of action, while GE and GS share an emancipatory frame, but understand modernity in different ways. 
CC and GS, in turn, share the same eco-centered conception of ‘realism’, while GE and P2P have a 
more pragmatic understanding.  
While the pre-defined categories from secondary literature on which we based our analysis of BV did 
not allow for such detailed analysis, the broad points of convergence and divergence among the ‘BV 
polyhedron’ (i.e. primordial, hybrid, statist, indigenist, postdevelopmentalist strands of BV) also 
became apparent: so, for example, the primordial, postdevelopmental, and hybrid variants share a 
pluralistic conception of modernity, whereas the statist strand remains anchored in the classical, rather 
universalistic understanding of modernity; and the indigenist strand wages wholesale war on 
modernity, framing both their own traditions and that of modernity (conceived exclusively in terms 
of Western diffusionism) in a reified, essentialist fashion (Pelfini, 2013; Vanhulst & Beling, 2014a). 
Yet indigenists and postdevelopmentalists exhibit large coalition potential in terms of preferred 
courses of action, as illustrated by the case of the adoption of the deep-ecologists’ ‘rights of nature’ 
framework by indigenous organizations during the constitutional debate (Espinosa, 2015). The case 
of ‘rights of nature’ also displays the central role of discursive facilitation and mediation, in this case 
to harmonize diverse territorial-discursive coordinates: as a glocal discursive production, the ‘rights of 
nature’ balance local needs (territorial and socio-economic autonomy or pluri-ethnicity) with a de-
localized, global context (centrality of inter-culturality in the development cooperation discourse; 
restatement of the socio-sphere/biosphere equation) (Altmann, 2013b, pp. 284, 296; Bretón et al., 
2014, p. 16).  
In the same vein, debates over ‘hot’ policy-issues show that catalyzing initiatives also serve as 
discursive bridges: instead of the whole interpretative repertoire of a discourse coming into play, only 
particular aspects or dimensions relevant for handling the issue at hand are foregrounded, thus 
reducing the chances of conflictive overlapping. As Appadurai (2006) points out, understanding too 
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m u c h a b o ut  o n e’s i nt erl o c ut or c a n b e as d a m a gi n g t o di al o g u e as u n d erst a n di n g t o o littl e. S o, f or 
e x a m pl e,  i n  G T  w e  fi n d  t h at  s h ort-t er m  pr es cri pti o ns  of  b ot h  gr o wt h-criti cs  ( G S)  a n d  gr e e n  
K e y n esi a ns ( G E) ar e l ar g el y c o n v er g e nt ( S c h m el z er & P ass a d a kis, 2 0 1 1, p. 4 5); w hil e f a ci n g l o n g -t er m 
dis c ursi v e  bri d gi n g  c o ns er v ati v e  ( C C)  a n d  e m a n ci p at or y  gr o wt h  criti cs  ( G S)  c a n  ali g n  t o  o p p os e  
p oliti c al c o u nt er w ei g ht or els e t o s u p p ort i nt er v e nti o n pr o p os als f or m at eri all y a ust er e lif est yl es a n d 
r oll-b a c k  of  gr o wt h.  T h e  P 2 P  n arr ati v e,  i n  t ur n,  off ers  a  t a n g e nti al  p at h  t o  e as e  p oliti c al  t e nsi o n 
b et w e e n G E, o n t h e o n e h a n d, a n d t h e ‘ c o n v e ni e n c e m arri a g e’ of C C a n d G S, o n t h e ot h er.  
B e y o n d dis c ursi v e -c o g niti v e bri d g es, h o w e v er, t h er e ar e i de ntity bo u n d aries t h at dis c o urs e- p erf or mi n g 
a ct ors  m ust b e a bl e t o cr oss.  S c h ell n h u b er’s i nsi g htf ul r e m ar k t h at “t h e ri g ht pr o p os al will b e r ej e ct e d 
if it c o m es fr o m t h e wr o n g p art y ” (Disc ussio n bet wee n H a ns -Jo ac hi m Sc hell n h u ber a n d K atj a Ki p pi ng at t he 
Co nfere n ce  “ Ge n ug  f ür  Alle â ” So zi al.ö ko.logisc h, ”  2 0 1 7)  s p e a ks of  t h e  i m p ort a n c e  of  u n d erst a n di n g 
e st a blis h e d c ult ur al a n d p oliti c al rit u als. Tr a ns c e n di n g t h e b o u n d ari es of ti g ht i d e ntit y gr o u pi n gs will 
oft e n r e q uir e bl urri n g or er asi n g  n arr o w i d e ntit y m ar k ers fr o m tr a nsf or m ati v e pr o p os als . Multi pl e a n d 
di v ers e dis c ursi v e a n c h or a g es , f or e x a m pl e, r e d u c e t h e ris k of dis c ursi v e c o nfi n e m e nt t o  p ar o c hi al 
cir cl e s of ‘ us u al s us p e cts’ or ‘tri b es’ ( T h o m ps o n, 1 9 8 4).  
T h e o p p osit e eff e ct is eli cit e d w h e n T Ds ar e a d v o c at e d b y ‘ u n us u al s us p e cts’ or w h e n a g e nts t a k e u p 
u n c o n v e nti o n al r ol es: t h e c h ai ns of e q ui v al e n c e bi -u ni v o c all y li n ki n g c ert ai n a g e nts t o c ert ai n i d e as or 
p os iti o ns ar e br o k e n, a n d i d e ntit ar y b o u n d ari es t ur n m or e fl ui d.  P o p e Fr a n cis as a ut h or of L a u d ato Si  
m a k es  a  pri m e  e x a m pl e ;  b ut  als o  t h e  c o ns er v ati v e  st a n d ar d-b e ar er  M.  Mi e g el  i ns of ar  a d o pti n g  a  
gr o wt h -criti c al p ositi o n, pr o v o ki n g a n i ntr a -elit e dis c ursi v e r u pt ur e ( Br a n d, 2 0 1 2 a). T h e A ustri a n Lif e 
Mi nistr y l a u n c hi n g a Gro wt h i n Tr a nsitio n  i niti ati v e as a m ulti-st a k e h ol d er di al o g u e e n d o ws gr o wt h -
criti c al d e b at es wit h p u bli c c h ar a ct er, t h us bl urri n g a n y i d e ntit y m ar k ers.   
F urt h er m or e,  t h er e c o ul d b e a c c ess b arri ers ( m at eri al, dis c ursi v e, i d e ntit ar y) t o c ert ai n p u bli cs – t h us 
t h er e is als o a q u esti o n a b o ut t h e p or osit y of t h e a b o v e b o u n d ari es. Pr o bl e ms of a c c ess ( as w ell as of 
i d e ntit y- a n d dis c ursi v e- bri d gi n g) ar e oft e n bri d g e d t hr o u g h i nsi d er- o utsi d er n et w or ks: dis c ursi v e a n d 
i d e ntit y  c arri ers  t h at  h a v e  a c c ess-cl e ar a n c e  t o  m o v e  a cr oss  b o u n d ari es,  t h us  g e n er ati n g  s y m b oli c  
c o m m u ni c ati n g v ess els a n d dis c ursi v e c o nt a mi n ati o ns ( P ar ks & R o b erts, 2 0 1 0). B ot h c as e st u di es 
s h o w c as e t h e i m p ort a n c e of tr a ns v ers al i nstit uti o n al pl atf or ms all o wi n g br o k er a g e a m o n g dis c ursi v e 
w orl ds as a k e y f or s p urri n g i n n o v ati o n ( F air cl o u g h, 1 9 9 2) a n d c o u nt er w ei g ht dis c ursi v e i m b al a n c es. 
I n B V w e o bs er v e t h e m ut u al c o nt a mi n ati o n of cl ass dis c o urs es wit h et h ni c al a n d e c ol o gi c al o n es; as 
w ell as wit h a w h ol es al e criti q u e of t h e c a pit alist m o d e of a c c u m ul ati o n ( Alt m a n n, 2 0 1 3 c, p. 6 7); a n d 
G T off ers a dis pl a y of mi cr o - a n d m es o -l e v el cr oss o v er pl atf or ms a m o n g N G Os, S M Os, s c h ol arl y 
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academic and non-academic sphere, trade unions, religious organizations, technical state-agencies, etc. 
(see Chapter 4).  
The profusion of cross-over platforms also provides for the peninsular (rather than insular) character of 
GT (WBGU, 2014, p. 74). ‘Peninsular’ agents play the role of the Simmelian stranger, rather than that 
of the outsider – i.e. they are involved in society, but maintain a constitutive distance from it.  Hence, 
while both BV and GT serve as clustering platforms for a large array of counter-cultural or counter-
hegemonic identity-groups, many of the ‘transformative agents’ on the stage purposefully distance 
themselves from the image of revolutionary agitators or naïve dreamers to avoid getting attached a 
punishing image as social outcasts. 
In GT, P2P-advocates, growth-critical reformists, and advocates of a new social contract or a 
solidarity-based modernity (see Chapter 3); or – in the BV debate – discursive exponents of, e.g. the 
primordial (C. Viteri, J. Medina) or postdevelopmental (e.g. A. Escobar; A. Acosta; P. Dávalos; E. 
Gudynas) variants (see Chapter 5) are embedded in established institutional contexts (as clearly 
exemplified by the broad scholarly support-network of BV229). In some cases, they represent 
prestigious organizations: Uwe Schneidewind as head of the Wuppertal Institute and newly  appointed 
member of the WBGU, Primin Spiegel as head of Misereor, or Angelika Zahrnt as former chair of the 
biggest German environmental NGO, BUND; or Carlos Viteri as editor of one of the main 
newspapers in Quito, El Hoy; or even play leading roles in official arrangements (Tim Jackson as 
Economics Commissioner on the UK Sustainable Development Commission, Alberto Acosta as 
president of the Ecuadorean Constitutional Assembly and later minister of Correa’s Cabinet).  
Even if the data did not highlight this aspect, it becomes apparent from mere observation in the field 
that shared lifeworlds (e.g. a liberal worldview) or habitus (dressing code, body language, culinary taste, 
clues of appropriate behavior) between TD-performers and their audiences in mainstream culture play 
a role in building communicating vessels between often divergent discursive worlds (Lenger, 
Schneickert, & Schumacher, 2013). The esthetic layout of websites, organizational logos, report 
covers, feuilletons, conference venues and meals, etc.  – especially in GT – match the patterns of 
recognizability of mainstream culture and, more often than not, of its elites, thus conveying a univocal 
message: ‘we are no social outcasts’, while, at the same time, manage to remain attractive and connect 
to the grassroots, as was clearly shown in the 2014 International Degrowth Conference in Leipzig. 
                                                 
229 For an in-depth exploration of this field from a quantitative and qualitative perspective, see 
Vanhulst & Zaccai  (2016) 
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The lesson is clear: actors inhabiting multiple identitary worlds and thus capable of bonding with a 
larger variety of publics will enjoy of greater transformative leverage. 
Here again, through the abovementioned mechanisms of ‘unusual suspects’ and ‘unconventional 
roles’, subversive messages and symbolic contents irrupt into the ‘comfort zone’ of targeted publics. 
Hence, say, regular readers of The Guardian or of papal encyclicals become exposed to a different, 
destabilizing discourse, which, however, appears acceptable by virtue of the authoritative character 
attributed to the source. 
The above stated similarities notwithstanding, however, it is arguably in terms of articulation 
mechanisms of diverse publics where we find the greatest contrast between the GT and BV debates, 
as manifest in the differential logics of ‘horizontal’ versus ‘vertical’ discursive articulation discussed in 
section 6.1.  
 
Synthesis: typifying enablers 
 
The work of condensation and abstraction performed above distilled common enablers, illustrating 
and specifying differential nuances for each of the empirical cases reviewed. To close the first part of 
the chapter, these enablers are here presented in a synthetic overview, further structured in three 
categories which allow for distinctions (to be addressed in the second part of the chapter) regarding 
the variable degree of control of agents over the identified enablers or the possibility to eventually 
substitute them with a purpose-tailored functional equivalent: structural enablers are not independent 
variables in the short term, but some of them, in principle and to an extent, could be deliberately 
(re)produced by the relevant agents. Worth noting is that the term ‘structural’ here, by virtue of the 
research design, denotes meso-level structures mediating collective learning processes in a 
destabilizing macro-level context (risk society and geostorical governance challenges). Situational or 
contingent enablers, by contrast, are defined on a time-axis. They are typically harnessed by agents, rather 
than conjured at will. Lastly, under the header agential enablers I listed the systematized practices 
retrieved from the case studies, from both levels of discourse analysis (representation and practice). 
Insofar this research design is inscribed in the interpretative paradigm of the social sciences, the 
presented enablers are not to be understood as necessary (let alone sufficient) conditions for 
transformative CLPs to arise, but rather as focal points that facilitate the understanding of such 
processes in the empirical cases at hand, whose level of generalizability has been raised as a result of 
bringing two very dissimilar cases into resonance with each other. 
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Structural enablers 
- Repository of exteriority or alterity vis-à-vis mainstream culture (sub-cultures or large 
networks), featuring an existent and available context of practice that creates structural 
conditions for alternative patterns of subjectivation and identitary ascription. 
- Points of cultural/ identitary anchorage in mainstream culture (‘history’, ‘invented tradition’, 
established cultural or political discourses) enabling bridging between the above locus of alterity 
and the ‘mainland’, that is, turning metaphorically so-called here ‘islands’ into ‘peninsulas’.  
- Transformation-supportive framework conditions: institutional and juridical framework 
setting (funding, licensing, etc.), including: 
o (Intra-)institutional diversity fulfilling the double role of a) lowering conformity 
pressures vis-à-vis centralized political and economic powers, and b) preserving 
cultural and political agonism. 
o Relatively strong separation of material power from power of symbolic production, 
distribution, and interpretation (e.g. through decentralized, resilient, independent 
funding structures and, in hierarchical structures, a relative autonomy of support bases 
from their politically representative cusp)   
o Interdependent agent configurations for balanced power-structures. 
o High capillarity infrastructure of communication for bottom-up institutionalization 
and pattern-diffusion independent from those controlled by material powers and 
mainstream culture. 
Situational enablers 
- Acute (perceived) crisis as destabilizer of the prevalent symbolic order and trigger for learning. 
- Cultural and/or (sub-)political ‘transformative momentum’  
- Social legitimacy of the actors performing TDs 
- Synchronic build-up of inter-textual framework for cross-referencing and convergent activities 
in various relevant societal arenas or sub-systems. 
- Availability of (a) narrative(s) combining system-critique (‘push’) with an alternative vision of 
the good life (‘pull’) 
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- Credible prospect of fundamental alteration in the material base of society, be it a dystopian 
narrative such as Industry 4.0 or the ‘end of work’, or utopian ones such as the “collaborative 
commons” or a broad socio-political movement for transformative change. 
- State or other agents controlling large communicative infrastructures willing to play the role 
of transformative discursive agents. 
Agential enablers 
Our analytical focus being on agency, observation yielded a complex array of agential enablers. Roles 
are condensed here into six categories: Meaning-making, infrastructure provision, leadership/ 
pioneering/energizing, brokerage/bridging, strategizing/acupuncturist, and legitimacy-transfer. The 
typical practices distilled from empirical analysis are clustered under these six headers. 
 
a. Meaning-making activities (discourse production, dissemination, hermeneutics), including: 
- disrupting the unsustainable status quo (through coupled problematization of social injustices 
and social pathologies). 
- fostering a renewed sense of shared prosperity beyond mainstream SD, co-producing new 
shared horizons of possibility and expectation. 
- Communication: symbolic distribution through circulation of discourses/knowledge. 
- Providing orientation for the symbolic interpretation of concrete situations.  
 
b. Infrastructure provision: 
- Shaping institutional and normative framework conditions. 
- Diversity mainstreaming: Building discursive diversification into the institutional and material 
structure providing for epistemic or “cognitive justice” (Santos) and discursive innovation. 
- Synchronic build-up of a framework of symbolic dispositifs for mutual reference. 
- New communication forms and media: Design and implementation of deliberation, 
communication, and information formats to stimulate transformation discourses. 
 
c. Leadership/ pioneering/ energizing:  
- Mobilization and organization of material and ideational forces. 
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- Catalyzing policy and cultural initiatives and practices connecting with (and shaping) the larger 
public sphere and mainstream political debate (e.g. ‘non-reformist reforms’: Yasuní, UBI, work 
reduction). 
- Clustering platforms (e.g. CONAIE, Degrowth, Transition Towns). 
- Amplifying, generating multiplier-effect. 
- Creation, protection, and targeted support to breeding grounds for TD-utopias. 
 
d. Brokerage / bridging 
- Creating meaningful connections among clusters at various scales and scopes (generations, 
political ideologies, SM struggles, political elites and constituencies, policy-fields) to form more 
encompassing networks and transformative learning cycles, helping circumvent the barriers of 
parochial cognitive codes. 
- Discursive brokerage, including: 
o foster discursive re-combinations and re-significations through meaning-making 
activities (e.g. drawing on ‘surplus meaning’ of established values or on shared frames). 
o translating socio-cognitive codes. 
- Identity brokerage, including: 
o blurring identity markers conveying social status from transformative proposals, thus 
channeling interaction towards substantial discussions. 
o contaminations through symbolic communicative vessels (e.g. insider-outsider 
networks, TD-advocacy by ‘unusual suspects’ or actors playing an unconventional 
role). 
- Provoking rupture in intra-elite discourse through revulsive insiders (e.g. conservative growth-
critique). 
- Making interdependencies and common vulnerabilities apparent through facilitation of 
dialogue and conflict mediation. 
- Catalytic initiatives narrowing down debate to relevant aspects for the concrete proposal at 
hand. 
 
e. Cultural and political strategizing: borrowing from Narberhaus & Sheppard’s (2015), the role-label 
“acupuncturist” seems eloquent to synthesize this role in visual-metaphorical fashion, as 
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consisting in identifying and activating leverage points with maximum systemic ripple-effects. 
Activities include: 
- Identifying and harnessing historical windows of opportunity (acute emergent crises, 
breakdown of existent coping mechanisms).  
- System-analysis, identification of central arenas of intervention and key leverage points (‘fights 
worth fighting’) 
- Strategic synchronizing. 
- Articulating complementarities and harnessing synergies to build discourse coalitions. 
- Strategic communication (backcasting, strategic framing, etc.) 
 
f. Symbolic legitimation: involving also strategic practices aimed at endowing TDs with entity, 
visibility, and legitimacy through authority (e.g. through science, state sponsorship, 
democratization) and/or credibility, for example by harnessing credible prospects of 
fundamental change in the foreseeable future. 
Since the focus of this research is on transformative agency, that is, on how can transformative learning 
be deliberately fostered, the question arises: in how far can the above synthesized enablers be 
deliberately established, with relative independence from macro-societal constraints?  
Needless to say, there is no conclusive answer to this question, broadly formulated. Yet transformative 
agency, as defined here, is set out to transform rather than merely adapt to constraining structures. Hence let 
us briefly consider the room for maneuver available for transformative agents, in principle, to provide 
for the above structural and contingent conditions.   
There is no indication in our case studies that the trigger-function of an ‘acute crisis’ can be substituted 
by a deliberate agency performance, although there is no reason to rule it out, in principle. The 
perception of a contingent disruption as ‘systemic’ (i.e. as disruptive of the prevailing symbolic order), 
however, is clearly dependent upon purposeful narrative mediation, as comes out clearly from the 
data. The same is true for the prospection of a credible alternative to the current order.  
Transformative momentum can be fostered through creating ‘futuring literacy’ (Kultur der 
Zukunftsfähigkeit) (Haderlapp and Trattnig 2013, cited in Reisch & Bietz, 2014, p. 29) or ‘transformative 
literacy’ (Schneidewind, 2013a), “an ‘atmosphere for transformation’ in which innovative laboratories 
can develop particularly well” (WBGU, 2014, p. 95). A mainstreaming of a SET-perspective into the 
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formal educational system would fit the purpose (WBGU, 2011, p. 22), stressing knowledge about 
geostorical challenges and about existing discourses regarding how to deal with them, and fostering 
deliberation, as well as holistic, global, and systemic thinking. “Civic wealth” and strong civic 
institutions (Bauwens, 2012b, p. 7) channeling transformative impulse can surely also be culturally and 
politically fostered. 
Material capacity and infrastructure-provision are, of course, partly dependent and partly independent 
variables. However, purpose-suited coalition-building and institutional design are tools through which 
transformative agents can pursue the goals of shielding transformative agents from social pressures, 
cultural and political leverage, and discursive (i.e. knowledge/power) balance: Discursive diversity can 
be mainstreamed into institutional design, as well as complexity- and long-term orientation; transversal 
platforms (cross-sectoral, cross-disciplinary, trans-geographical) creating structural discursive 
instability and exogamic discursive dynamics can be established through the initiative of agents.  
Regarding identitary anchorage points, both case studies show a decisive agential element at play: BV 
draws on an “invented tradition” (J. C. Alexander, 2004, p. 530) – with the deliberate coining of 
tailored terminology such as sumak kawsay or suma quamaña; and in GT we observed the networked 
emergence of larger platforms nurturing alternative sub-cultures, such as Transition Towns, the 
commons- or degrowth-movements, which work as spheres of alternative subjectivation vis-à-vis 
mainstream culture. They also perform the role of epistemic balancing by counterweighting the 
institutionalist and rational choice approaches dominant in the mainstream sustainability debate with 
post-developmentalist, postcolonial, or feminist ones (Brand, Omann, et al., 2013), and leading to 
accelerated discursive and strategic innovation (Altmann, 2013a, p. 29). Both cases also feature 
purposeful acts of legitimacy-transfer by the state, science, or ‘unusual suspects’ playing the role of 
Simmelian strangers, which blurs identity markers and advances a multiple and diverse anchorage of 
the debates. 
Last but not least, the role of influential, creative individuals in creating momentum and structural 
conditions for TD-driven learning cannot be overstated (Altmann, 2013c, p. 67; Grießhammer & 
Brohmann, 2015, p. 18). The structural leverage of individuals is manifest, for example, with Marlon 
Santi mainstreaming BV into the political agenda of CONAIE (which he had co-developed as earlier 
president of the indigenous organizations at Sarayaku); or with Alberto Acosta in his double capacity 
as an academic discursive spearhead for BV and as a cabinet member of the Ecuadorean government 
and president of the Montecristi Constituent Assembly. 
315 
 
By way of conclusion, then, as per the insights gained from our empirical analysis, transformative 
agency does retain significant room for maneuver, regardless of prevalent structural conditions. This 
does not amount to saying that transformative agents are not constrained by these structures. The 
issue of securing integral, lasting, and coherent framework conditions favorable to transformative 
learning is a complex issue directly pertaining the implications for governance, which will be discussed 
at some length in Chapter 7.  
 
6.4. Modelling ‘transformative agency’ 
 
Having reviewed structural, situational, and agential enablers – understood as conditions or actions, 
in the latter case, i.e. the what providing for the emergence of transformative learning. The present 
section, in turn, focuses on the who of these learning processes, seeking to model the concept of 
transformative agency in a twofold manner: first, by distinguishing types of agency according to how they 
deal with the dilemmas of the ‘conflicted agent’ and the ‘missing agent’ (or deficit of enactable agency) 
outlined in Chapter 2. Thus, the concepts of ‘subrogatory agency’ and of ‘hybrid agency’ are worked 
out and defined. And secondly, by portraying an ideal model of typical agent-configurations and their 
dynamic elements (typical agency roles and their corresponding enabling practices); that is, by connecting 
the typical ‘who’ to the typical ‘what’ of transformative agency.  
On a methodological note, insofar agency features at the levels of both discursive representation and 
practice, the two transversal dimensions of discourse analysis come here into dialectic merger to yield 
an integrated picture of the findings. Although our main focus has hitherto been mainly on the 
description of observed practices, the description of normative representations is equally important 
because they provide a clearer, more systematic and coherent picture of what transformative agency 
is (or should be) like. Beyond the obvious gap between the idea and actually observable features of 
transformative agency, no contradiction arises between the two, insofar both come from data coded 
to support the theoretically underpinned hypothesis of a transformative agency at play both in BV and 
in the GT debate, as elaborated in Part I. And because the goal of this research is to develop both 
empirical and theoretical insights into the roles and practices of such ‘transformative agency’ 
advancing collective learning towards a SET, the clarity and coherence of representations are key to 
complement the fragmentary and incomplete picture that the observation of empirical practice offers 
– particularly as the object of our analysis is largely situated in the realm of non-existence (absences 
and emergences). 
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6.4.1. Circumventing the predicament of transformative agency: subrogatory agency and hybrid 
agency 
 
Our empirical inquiry has indeed yielded rich insights as to how the twin dilemma of the ‘conflicted 
agent’ and the ‘missing agent’ can be addressed and are de facto dealt with in practice, that is, if not 
resolved or circumvented, at least successfully mitigated. 
How is the predicament of the ‘conflicted agent’ addressed in our case studies? While the 
‘transformative agent’ cannot escape the circular dynamics of the (hetero)subjection process which 
creates an identitary bond between the subject and the world he or she aims at changing, it is not less 
true that, as already Alberto Melucci’s (1989) pioneering studies showed, contemporary social 
movements are not only conceived as means towards an end, but rather an end in themselves: by 
channeling their participants’ social needs, social movements themselves become loci of identitary 
construction with the potential to ‘contain’ (partially, at least) the circle of hetero-subjection. This 
becomes particularly apparent in the case of so-called “systemic activism” or “transition activism” 
(Escobar, 2012b, 2015), whose participants view themselves as change agents and variably define their 
identity in opposition to the ‘system’, i.e. to the world they seek to fundamentally change.  
A parallel can be drawn between both BV and GT, in the sense that both emerged from the breeding 
ground of a sub-set of non-hegemonic social relations, which offers alternative patterns of 
subjectivation and identity ascription. The case of BV merits probably even more special 
consideration: The sheer extension and effects of social movement activism in Latin America is such 
that it prompted Raul Zibechi to redefine the cultural and political role of conventional social 
movements, re-conceptualizing them, instead, as “societies in movement”(Zibechi & Nuin, 2008). In 
the GT debate, we identified the role of network structures as enablers allowing for different patterns 
of identity formation (yielding more open, hybrid, and de-localized identities) as compared to 
conventional social structures (Castells, 2000).  
Furthermore, institutionally secured communicating vessels with mainstream cultural and political 
debate as key to preserving ‘transition activists’ from being labeled as outliers. This ‘peninsular’ (as 
opposed to ‘insular’) character of sub-cultural groups or networks is often even associated with an 
elite-habitus, with their representatives enjoying social recognition and amassing high cultural capital. 
This is achieved through the proliferation of cross-over platforms and coalitions fostering 
interculturality and epistemic empathy or ‘multilingualism’ (Santos, 2004). Mainstreaming of cultural 
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and political diversity into institutional design, with inter- and intra-institutional discursive 
counterweights, or “anti-power” drivers (Holloway, 2002). Purposeful legitimacy-transfers from 
authoritative or prestigious institutions (state, science), organizations, or individuals to transformative 
initiatives and their advocates or promoters, in the mode of positive discrimination (e.g. right to 
sufficiency), constitute another identitary damage-control mechanism supporting transformative 
agents.   
Many of the above mechanisms are also effective against the predicament of the ‘missing agent’. Yet 
there are also mechanisms and structures more finely tailored to address what we called the ‘triple 
deficit of enactable agency’ which are worthwhile describing here.  
The ‘incapable agent’, who by his or her condition of cultural and political marginality is impeded 
from exerting influence in societal matters, is served by the resilient (i.e. non-dependent on the short-
term ups and downs of politics & business) institutional and organizational infrastructures providing 
cultural, political, and economic shielding to agents, and increasing their cultural and/or political 
leverage. Furthermore, through strategic “acupuncturist” interventions, whatever resources available 
can be concentrated in the ‘fights worth fighting’, thus maximizing their transformative impact. These 
constitute effective means of empowering incapable agents, or else those representing them on the 
public stage. 
Then there is the two missing types of agents whose agency is inevitably subrogated by someone else: 
first, the ‘absent agent’: de-localized ‘others’ which have a stake in the prospect of a SET, but whose 
Missachtungen at the losing end of the “imperial ways of life” in the global North are culturally non-
grievable (Butler, 2010) and politically unrepresented; and, secondly, the indeterminate agent, who is 
either unborn or  unidentifiable.  
Mediation mechanisms seem less developed in the face of these two cases. Since the connections in 
global entanglements are anything but self-evident, and depend on the discursive elaboration of 
complex causation mechanisms, cognitive persuasion (let alone emotional involvement) is difficult to 
elicit. Same is true for future generations or those affected by the diffuse impacts of, say, climate 
change. 
Pathways towards a more effective mediation are visible, however, in the fostering of relational 
cultures of solidarity, holism, and biocentrism; as well as ‘futuring’ and ‘transformative literacy’, and 
systemic activism. To create discursive corridors for the aforesaid, a structural rebalancing is required 
in the power of symbolic production, distribution, interpretation (e.g. through stricter separation from 
material power), as well as new forms of political and cultural communication and operation (e.g. 
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backcasting, ‘futurization of politics’), high-capillarity communication infrastructure at the service of 
TDs, and the democratization of science.  
The strength and pervasiveness of what we have called subrogatory agency – the defense of the interests 
of a (generalized) other – can be expected to directly covariate with the systematicity of such cultural 
changes. Decisive would be the establishment of institutionalized “commitment devices” (A. Offer) 
through empowered agents (chiefly, the state): same as marriage, savings accounts, or the state itself 
have developed as mechanisms providing for social stability, “commitment devices” tailored to suit 
geostorical challenges are urgently called for, but such demand has hitherto clashed against the 
indolence of the “conflicted state” (T. Jackson). Examples are the case of Yasuní-ITT in the BV 
debate, but also much overdue but ever postponed policy-measures such as those of a “carbon cap” 
or the still far-lying energy transition to renewables. 
In between of what we have called ‘enactable agency’ and ‘subrogatory agency’, however, the study of 
BV revealed a further variant which could be understood as a form of hybrid agency, a middle-ground 
between the other two, and therefore maybe also more promissory in terms of its potential of empirical 
translation than the purely subrogatory form.  
 
This hybrid form of agency emerges from processes of inter-cultural dialogue or “diálogos de saberes” 
(Leff, 2010; Santos, 2009) with non-modern cosmogonies or epistemes – what we above called 
‘exogenous learning’. As an empirical phenomenon, Buen vivir exhibits a politically effective articulation 
– though by no means free of tensions, contradictions, and co-optations, as we saw – between 
recognition struggles à la Honneth and the extension of phenomenological horizons through epistemic 
inputs exogenous to Western modernity (Adrian E. Beling et al., 2014; Adrian E. Beling & Vanhulst, 
2016a; Vanhulst & Beling, 2014a). In such altered meaning-structures, the anthropogenic degradation 
of the planet – rather than only its undesirable consequences – tend to be experienced as a direct and 
immediate Missachtung. Indeed, for the holistic and relational ethos of Buen vivir, the current ecological 
crisis represents an assault on Mother Earth or Pachamama, and, with it, not only to the biophysical 
preconditions of existence of humans and other living beings, but also to the ontological preconditions 
for their constitution as subjects: “when a tree is cut, it is like our identity were being cut” 230.  
                                                 
230Source: 
http://elpais.com/elpais/2017/06/20/planeta_futuro/1497940076_174344.html?id_externo_rsoc=
FB_CC 
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While this dynamic can still not escape the circle of hetero-subjection, it does fundamentally de-center 
the framework within which this circle is defined: the (ideal-typical) holistic-relational subject of Buen 
vivir does not stand as a representative of a missing third party in the struggle for, say, the recognition 
of ‘rights of nature’; rather, in a certain sense, he or she stands as a representative of him or herself as a 
victim of social Misachtung. Under these new assumptions, i.e. a collective of individuals capable of 
experimenting the global ecological crisis as a direct and immediate moral injury, as an attack on his 
or her own holistic-relational identity, the conceptual figures of a subrogatory and a hybrid agency would 
reinstate (to a certain degree) the validity of the assumptions of classical theories of agency-led social 
change discussed in Chapter 2. To be sure, the mediated and time-lagged experience of Missachtung 
cannot be expected to be as powerful as an immediate, present experience. But however imperfectly, 
grievance-driven transformative action without direct experience of Missachtung appears possible under 
the above structural conditions, and to the degree that these are developed. 
 
6.4.2. Typical agent configurations, roles and practices towards enhanced transformative potential 
 
As became apparent across our inquiry, agent-network arrangements are complex, diverse, variable in 
the scope of their purpose, degree of institutionalization, and duration. Adopting a classical 
institutional categorization of social actors, and drawing a free analogy with the “triple helix” model 
proposed by Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000) to explain the dynamics of innovation, the structural 
agent-configurations at work in the case studies can be synthesized in two basic types: 
The configuration emerging from the case of BV could be described as a particular “Latin-American 
triple helix” constituted by social movements (with prominence of indigenous movement 
organizations), the academic sphere, and the state (Vanhulst & Beling, 2014a). This helix is ‘powered’ 
or activated through the inside-outward (tide of anti-neoliberalism materializing in the “left turn”) and 
outside-inward flows (development critique, global environmental predicament coming from foreign 
development and environmental organizations) described in Chapter 5, with the common axis of 
rotation around the conceptual banner of Buen vivir. The interaction (deliberation, negotiations, 
contestations) among individual and organizational partners networked at institutional level generates 
an ‘ideational overlay’ that progressively contaminates the underlying ideational and material 
arrangements, with a reorganizing effect (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000), as becomes apparent in 
the evolution of the discourse visually synthesized in Figure 12 (see Chapter 5). The ideational overlay 
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and its institutional counterpart (e.g. Rights of Nature) can be considered as the retention mechanism 
of a learning network.  
Contrasting with this triadic structure at play in BV, the GT debate features a dyadic structure or 
“double helix” formed by the scholarly and the civil society spheres (with a prominent role of NGOs, 
though progressively incorporating social movements and niches of alternative practice) networked at 
individual, organizational, and institutional level in ad hoc cross-over platforms such as Konzeptwerk 
neue Ökonomie, Wachstumswende, or the Civil Society Platform for the Research Transiton 
(Forschungswende), where sub-political discussions take place. Formal institutional platforms at the state 
level have also played a prominent role (Enquete-WWL; Austrian WiW initiative), but the state plays 
here a rather passive role as an agora for deliberation, rather than as active contributor to the debate. 
This ‘double helix’ is powered through the historical convergence of the Great Recession and the 
growing public impingement of global environmental changes since the mid-2000, and the ensuing 
debate revolving around the floating signifier of a “Great Transformation”.  
Furthermore, the case studies have allowed worthwhile insights into the distinctive dynamics of these 
configurations, which reside in the groundbreaking roles performed by their agents, thus shedding 
light on the respective strengths and weaknesses of both these configurations in terms of 
transformative agency. In the following a characterization of these roles and practices is outlined. 
The scholarly sphere – especially individual scholars and organizations aligning with the agenda of a 
‘transformative science’ in GT, and the various scholarly currents (postdevelopmentalist, indigenist, 
decolonialist) facilitating discursive crossovers among contesting variants of BV –  has proven pivotal 
to fostering TD-driven learning in a number of ways231. For one thing, and perhaps most evidently, 
scholars ranging from the fields of social sciences and the humanities to the biophysical sciences have 
provided substantial discursive inputs to the debates, be it by questioning the status quo with concepts 
like ‘imperial ways of life’, ‘Great Acceleration’, or ‘degrowth’, or by creating new narratives and 
blueprint strategies articulating a systemic perspective. This is valid for both the BV and GT debates 
(Biermann, 2011b; Grießhammer & Brohmann, 2015; Hackmann & St. Claire, 2012; Narberhaus & 
                                                 
231 This may appear as a paradoxical remedy, insofar the acceleration of scientific knowledge and 
technology over the last few hundred years is one of the main factors currently leading the biosphere 
to the danger of collapse (Parra & Walsh, 2016). However, this is less attributable to science itself than 
to the global empowerment of a particular scientific culture which is functional to the reproduction 
of the status quo (Beck, 1992; Gibson-Graham, 2008; Paulson, 2017), which is being counter-weighted 
by the opening of the epistemological canon, as illustrated by the scholarly engagements reviewed in 
our case studies. 
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Sheppard, 2015). In addition, however, with Goldfarb (2000), scholars can be seen as fulfilling a 
necessary role as democratic agents in a contemporary context of structural democratic deficit, “at one 
time civilizing political contestation and subverting complacent consensus”. Goldfarb portrays 
intellectuals as a special type of Simmelian strangers, who are primarily concerned with the cultivation 
of their critical faculties, which makes them singularly well-suited to address urgent contemporary 
issues such as geostorical challenges. In this light, intellectuals concentrate the enabling agential roles 
described above under the labels of ‘legitimizing’, ‘meaning-making’, ‘broking/bridging’, 
‘acupuncturist’, and ‘leadership’. Scholars thus adopt both and indirect role (supply of overarching 
concepts, theories, and strategies) as well as direct action intervening as promoters, facilitators, and 
critical feedback-givers regarding transformative initiatives  (Brand, 2016b; Grießhammer & 
Brohmann, 2015; Paulson, 2017). 
In the activist sphere, in turn, we observe both a growing call for (Narberhaus, 2013; Raskin, 2010; 
WBGU, 2014) and arguably also the actual emergence of a new type of ‘systemic activism’, which 
jointly problematizes issues of social injustice with social pathologies (understood as being at the root 
of observed injustices). Examples of emergent “systemic movements” in the global North are the 
Commons movement, the Degrowth movement, the P2P movement, the Environmental Justice 
movement, or else the intersectional feminist movement (Narberhaus & Sheppard, 2015), while in the 
global South prominent examples come from historically marginalized social groups, including the 
indigenous movement and peasant movements such as La Via Campesina.  
 
The ‘systemic’ character of this emerging form of activism can be seen, for example, in the growing 
convergence of diverse social and ecological emancipatory struggles (Kühne, 2013, p. 84). 
Furthermore, international NGOs, think tanks and scientific advisory bodies “can operate as lawyers 
or stewards of global commons” and take up a mobilizing role, breaking deadlocks and creating scope 
for action (WBGU, 2014, pp. 4; 72). Activists “can put a spoke in the wheels of the ideology of 
escalation […] create public pressure for a complete re-think, and push through alternative solutions 
to problems […] They can help to transform a resigned sense that ‘there is no alternative’ into an 
inspiring belief that ‘another world is possible’”. (Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014, p. 141). Hence in 
spite of persistent hindrances (issue-silos, short-termism, funding-conditioned bias towards immediate 
and measurable results, etc.), civil society thus seems to be incipiently discovering its potential for 
‘orchestrating’ and rallying societal forces towards a wholesale social-ecological transformation. 
(Kriegman, 2008; Narberhaus, 2012; WBGU, 2014).  
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In addition, as per lessons gained from both the practice and the representations at play in both case 
studies, social movement organizations and NGOs are also experimenting with a rather novel, more 
proactive socio-political role beyond the usual rule-challenging (protest) or rule-taking (service provision) 
roles, towards a (sub)political rule-making role. This includes meaning-making, framing, and setting the 
tone and topics of socio-political debate (e.g. Oxfam boosting inequality into public debate, the 
indigenous movements’ transforming the liberal state into a plurinational state in Bolivia, or the 
growth-critical agenda-setting voices in the Enquete-WWL and in the Austrian WiW), co-shaping of 
programmatic agendas (Oil moratorium in Ecuador, Yasuní-ITT, constitutional debates in the Andean 
countries, long-term research orientation at Forschungswende), or empowering political actors (e.g. 
indigenous movement in Ecuador and Bolivia), etc.  
Last but not least, worthwhile insights could be gained from the case studies regarding the role of the 
state in advancing collective learning processes towards a SET. In transversal perspective, the state 
can be identified as playing diverse roles, both as institutional agent and as political agora, as well as a 
range of conventional and unconventional roles: Conventional institutional roles featuring in the GT 
and BV debates are those of the state as a regulator, implementer, or investor (i.e. as an economic 
agent), which come to the fore in mainstream SD narratives where a ‘green state’ is deemed responsible 
for setting the right regulations and allocating fiscal resources to green infrastructure; but also in BV, 
where, at least in the phase of discursive assemblage, the state becomes the sole agent empowered to 
advance BV.  
In its role as political agora, we find the state hosting rather unconventional debates (at least in current 
times of dominance of technocratic politics) dealing with fundamental transformations to the existing 
societal order, both in BV (constituent assemblies) and, less sharply, in GT (Enquete WWL or WiW 
in Austria). In the case of BV, also unusual is the constituency of these agoras, characterized by the 
unprecedented irruption of historically marginalized population groups as key actors in the political 
scene. The experiment was anything but trivial: the case of BV has disproven conservative arguments 
warning about diversity in politics as leading to ungovernability. Both in Ecuador and in Bolivia, it 
rather led to the consolidation of the indigenous voice in national and local politics. (Altmann, 2015b, 
p. 29)  
Particularly remarkable in the context of our inquiry, however, are two further roles of the state: Again 
in BV, and equally unprecedented, we find an “escalation of the state’s remit from merely making 
environmental policy to taking on the preservation of nature as a whole” (Arsel & Avila Angel, 2012, 
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p. 221). Hence the state here takes up the role of a TD-agent itself, changing horizons of expectation 
about the state’s mandate regarding the advancement of a SET. This symbolic performativity arguably 
overcompensates, in terms of collective learning, the flagrant shortcomings of the state in terms of 
effectively implementing this mandate.  
Yet the most important institutional role the state plays in both BV and GT, I argue, is not an unusual 
but certainly an often overlooked role of the state, which was stressed in the first part of this chapter: 
it is the role of endowing TDs with public entity (in this sense, the state really ‘creates’ BV) and backing 
them up (as the WiW initiative of the Austrian ‘Life Ministry’). This produces three key effects with 
learning-implications: a) an amplifying effect (making TDs visible), b) a framing effect (establishing 
interpretative keys, notwithstanding possible contestations), and c) a legitimation effect. In BV, this is 
self-evident, but also in GT we find a pro-active state fostering (though in impressionistic rather than 
systematic fashion) discursive innovation and agonism through technical, politically-shielded agencies, 
which transfer the state’s legitimacy but not political conformity-pressures. 
Regarding the first mentioned roles (regulator, implementer, investor), the BV case showcases the 
inherent limitations of state-channeled utopian politics when material-structural matrixes are not 
transformed (Becker, 2011; Adrian E. Beling et al., 2018), as indicated by the divorce between the 
governments of Ecuador and Bolivia and the social movements that had helped them reach the 
empowered space, by the reinforcement of the neo-extractivist matrix coexisting with an increasingly 
merely rhetorical and watered-down version of the statist BV. The fading of ‘Green New Deal’ 
narratives from the GT debate, in turn, shows that the capacity of the state to steer towards a ‘Green 
modernity’ through its role as regulator, implementer, and investor has hitherto proven just as elusive 
as a the biocentric order of BV. Both cases ratify the Tim Jackson’s hypothesis of the “conflicted 
state” trapped in a dilemma between short-term socio-economic stability and long term ecological 
sustainability. The more modest functions of generating, naming, illuminating, disseminating, 
connecting, and multiplying BV-agents, and endowing them with public legitimacy, however, seems 
critical to the purposes of unleashing what can arguably be regarded as the world’s first macro-scale 
collective learning experiment aimed at a social-ecological transformation.  
The answer to the dilemma of the conflicted state may thus lay in refining both the our conceptions 
about the functions of the state and the standards of ‘failure’ and ‘success’ when it comes to advancing 
transformative collective learning (Arsel & Avila Angel, 2012, pp. 221–222). In the case studies and in 
the literature, this shift in the role of the state is variously conceptualized as an “activating state” 
(Lessenich, 2008), a “shaping state” (gestaltender Staat; von Jorck, 2013b, p. 40; WBGU, 2011, 2014), 
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a “partner state” (Bauwens, 2012b), or a “meta-governance agent” (Grießhammer & Brohmann, 
2015). A detailed consideration of these concepts and their implication in the praxis of (sustainability) 
governance is provided in Chapter 7.  
 
6.5. Conclusions 
 
 
BV and GT offer two different paths for the advancement of TDs in the context of geostorical 
governance challenges. Each feature a different relative weight of agents advancing transformative 
learning, as well as differential (though partially overlapping) roles. 
At the level of representations, both converge in challenging to the modern liberal-capitalist episteme, 
which is framed either in antagonistic fashion or, less confrontative, from a position of alterity. At the 
level of discursive practice, common characteristics are multi-dimensional transversality, 
interconnected yet highly distributed agency acting synchronically, and a certain degree of 
institutionalization of discursive struggle. Key is also the role of “meaning-making elites” systemically 
linking critical debates to the goal of a SET (Aparicio Wilhelmi, 2013; Institut Solidarische Moderne, 
2011; Reisch & Bietz, 2014, p. 42). The result is a situation of political and cultural agonism, including 
a creative tension between system-change and reformism, as we saw, for example, with the case of 
social-liberal reformist growth-critics in the GT debate (sufficiency-oriented reformism), or with the 
primordial and hybrid versions of BV. 
Emergence can thus be seen as a function of combining a ‘critical yeast’ (meaning-making elites) with 
distributed and synchronized agency (aggregated vertically, as in BV, or pollinized horizontally, as in 
GT). Noteworthily, the concept of “meaning-making elites” (cf. Chapter 4) challenges the 
conventional distinctions between top-down and bottom-up, or else inside-out and outside-in. Insofar their 
elite-character resides in their power of symbolic production, distribution, and interpretation (rather 
than in their political or economic leverage), their agency (under favorable conditions) can be 
distributed across the societal structure, as we saw with the configurations of the ‘double’ and ‘triple’ 
helixes. Their performativity of meaning-making elites, as observed in our case studies, is a form of 
diffusionism triggering the emergence of collective learning processes.  
Now from the perspective of the promoters of learning processes, who are the meaning-making agents 
concentrating the transformative impulse in our outlined configurations? The gravitational center of 
transformative learning, it appears, is to be located in civil society, in multifaceted interfaces with other 
actors (intellectuals; state; pioneering initiatives in societal niches). Indeed, transformative learning as 
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concrete actor-driven change process “is at present a phenomenon deeply anchored in the (self-
)empowerment of the citizenry” (Reißig, 2014, p. 83) through, among other things, the new potentials 
unleashed by the ICT revolution (Bauwens, 2012b; Mason, 2015; Paech, 2012; Rifkin, 2014; Stengel, 
2016), which opens a window of possibility for politically paralyzed "consumerist democracies" to 
become vibrant "prosumer democracies". At present, old and new forms of intervention conceived, 
mobilized, and organized from communal, regional, and supra-regional civil society initiatives (as well 
as virtually networked, de-localized agents) are walking this path towards a social-ecological 
transformation, including NGOs, critical intellectuals and journalists, progressive business 
entrepreneurs, and sectors of the political-administrative system. Their influence on the material world 
of politics and economics, however, is filtered through structural material barriers, thus constraining 
both further learning and its translation into an actual social-ecological transformation. Yet the 
"perfect storm" of the current multiple crisis can be reasonably expected to opens up further windows 
of opportunity in the coming years and decades for learning and transformative processes to unfold 
(Reißig 2014, Raskin 2010, Gallopin et al.) 
In order to unleash a massive wave of transformative learning effects at the macro-level, these 
experiments would need to be systematized to gain continuity and coherence, creating a meso-level of 
implementation that articulates meta-perspectives such as the Anthropocene with particular local 
transformation-experiments, such as Transition Towns. This would serve the twofold objective of 
aggregation and systematization of particular experiences and the diffusion of institutionalized 
standards.  (Krügger, 2012; Ronzheimer, 2013) 
The greatest cleavage observed between our two case studies is the differential role of political mediation in 
learning. Implications of the amalgamation of BV with the arena of politics (rather than the mere 
politization of the debate232) can be observed in at least two dimensions: First, the differential logics 
of discursive articulation discussed in Section 6.2: a vertical political articulation versus a horizontal 
sub-political and cultural articulation: The fact that in Ecuador and Bolivia a larger portion of the 
population adopts BV as a political banner leads to the debate being filtered through the logic of the 
political system, which necessarily implies a certain level of ideologization and polarization, and the 
stiffening that comes with them (Latouche, 2009; Monni & Pallottino, 2013). The GT debate, in turn, 
                                                 
232 A conceptual digression is relevant here between politics, i.e. the political system as a sub-system 
in society with its own regulatory principles, and the political, which is the process of discursive 
contention characterizing the political bond  (Mouffe, 2005) 
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lacks serious political momentum, but remains ipso facto preserved from the one-sided logic of politics, 
while continuing to spread ‘transformative literacy’. 
The second dimension pertains the discursive process and its effects on transformative learning. The 
interpretative key is the differential logics of discursive assemblage or – in Alexander’s terms – of 
“dramaturgical fusion”: As becomes apparent from comparing Figure 12 and Figure 13 in Chapters 4 
and 5, respectively, the discursive processes of BV appears to be an inversion of that of the GT: 
Indeed, BV emerged out of the convergent opposition to the neoliberal and developmentalist 
discourses then dominant as a rather marginal anti-systemic discourse (primordial BV), but reaches its 
heyday when channeled into the political system, resulting in a process of discursive assemblage 
through political consensus (hybrid BV). The inherent weakness of this assemblage soon turned into 
dislocation, with postdevelopmentalist and indigenist strands disputing the state’s exclusive 
appropriation of BV.  
From a perspective of transformative learning, the pathway of political channeling carries a double 
risk of ambitious transformative projects becoming stuck into the “trap of mere politicking” 
(Latouche, 2009, p. 95), and of ambitions proposals diluting  while simultaneously suffocating 
alternative political forces. A third risk is that of going into a spiral of destructive confrontation among 
contending discursive agents, especially when the imbalance of power among the contenders is 
significant.  
By contrast, in the GT discourse we first observed a phase of incubation, with numerous ideational 
sources coming into dialogue under the common premise of “going beyond strategies that offer 
Anthropocene conditions as solutions” to the multiple crisis (Escobar, 2013, p. 3). The actual 
emergence of the GT as debate, however, was traced back to deliberations at the Enquete-WWL, 
where the cleavage between conservative political forces and the opposition became apparent, and the 
concept of a “social-ecological transformation” was agreed upon as a way of drawing boundaries 
between the opposition and the ruling parties. In other words, the emergence of GT did not happen 
through consensus-building, as was the case with BV, but through discursive dislocation. The 
following months and years, in turn, saw an intensive process of progressive integration or assemblage 
through processes of lateral coordination and agonism. The risk here is that the process dissolves by 
evaporation; or else that it creates an own resonance box isolated from the purview of larger society, 
and starts reproducing merely following a self-preservation logic (Thompson, 1984), similar to that of 
politics, thus self-defeating its transformative ambitions. 
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The differential role of politics and the dissimilar modes of discursive articulation in the two empirical 
cases can be better understood in the structural context of their respective loci of enunciation. Latin 
American societies have historically lacked an intermediate institutional layer connecting the state with 
individual citizens, leading to a rift between the political sphere and civil society (Avritzer, 2002). 
Indicators of such split are the prevalence of informal clientelist relations from the local or communal 
level, where middle-men provide for the everyday needs of people in the face of an often-absent state, 
or the cult of the figure of caudillos (strong political or military leaders), currently associated with the 
prominence of the presidential figure in political culture, on the one hand, and a highly confrontational 
civil society, on the other. In Western Europe, in turn, political culture has historically developed into 
strong institutionalist and deliberative traditions (Germans, in particular, pride themselves in their 
strong ‘debating culture’), with a highly functionally differentiated institutional infrastructure, which 
structurally enables complex forms of interaction among agents, and a rather cooperative or 
conciliatory civil society. (Kaldor, 2003) 
The discursive spatiotemporal embeddedness of TDs into their locus of enunciation, however, also 
have a ‘biasing’ effect over the discursive representations of the common goal of a global social-
ecological transformation.  
Indeed, as was shown, both GT and BV largely fail to acknowledge (or at least analytically factor in) 
the global entanglements of local contexts, turning contextual symbolic and material markers into 
‘blind spots’ of their global inter-imbrications. The lowest common denominator between GT and 
BV is to be found in the systemic interconnections and interdependencies of the globalized capitalist 
economy, as well as social and cultural structures underpinning it.  
Hence, from the perspective of the envisaged global SET, debates around BV and GT should be 
brought into convergence towards this common, systemic root of the issues both seek to address, re-
framing them as two sides of the same coin (Acosta, 2014; Brand, 2015; Dietz, 2014; Escobar, 2015) 
and the possible ways to tackle them from such systemic perspective (Acosta & Brand, 2017). The 
concept of “imperial ways of life”, for example, as well as those of post-extractivism, post-capitalism, 
post-development, as well as those predicating the ecological impacts of the Western cultural model 
(Anthropocene, Great Acceleration, global environmental justice or climate justice) point in this 
direction.  
Taking into consideration the key situational and contextual markers of the discourses analysed in this 
chapter, some promising complementary features between BV and GT enriching their respective 
understandings of systemic interconnections would be, for example, amending BV’s focus on the 
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centrality of particular identities and territory with GT’s focus on global relationships and exchanges; 
the focus on production of the former with the focus on consumption of the latter, or else the focus 
on systemic interdependences (implicit in GT) with that on power and domination (prominent in BV). 
At the level of cultural values, the anti-utilitarian, celebrative ethos of BV resonates with the aspiration 
to freedom, and so do the (self-)sufficient, time-wealthy, and less individualistic lifestyles conveyed by 
GT. Mutual support and understanding of complex and interdependent feedback loops would thus 
potentially enhance the efficacy of the respective local struggles (on which both discourses draw their 
legitimacy and the support-base needed to expand their influence) significantly. (Adrian E. Beling et 
al., 2018) 
By way of synthesis of the above: As per our case studies, collective learning processes driven by 
social-ecological utopias thus present various features deviating from the ones highlighted or preferred 
in the mainstream sustainable development discourse, in many respects:  
First, in terms of the key promoting agent: instead of a starring role of the state as regulatory and 
economic actor (as in the Green New Deal, Green Economy, or the statist variant of BV), or of 
markets (as in the Green Growth or Ecological Modernization narratives), transformative learning 
processes are driven by agent configurations (or ‘helixes’) centered around civil society initiatives, 
platforms, and actors, with a prominent role of intellectuals, and a facilitating (rather than regulating, 
implementing, or economic) role of the state, or else of parts of the state-administrative apparatus.  
Secondly, the above agents overflow the boundaries of the roles conventionally attributed to them: 
activism incipiently also plays an unconventional role as “rule-maker” in political life, rather than 
merely as “rule-challenger” (protest, resistance) or “rule-taker” (service-provision); and so do 
intellectuals, who primarily perform the role of democratic agents facilitating political and cultural 
agonism, that is, promoting both the de-fusion of the conventional sustainable development imaginary 
– which, despite a failed one, is still discursively dominant –, on the one hand, and the fusion of new 
social-ecological utopias of a good life within the biophysical limits of the planet, on the other.  
Third and lastly, as situated discursive productions, we identified a number of symbolic and material 
‘biases’ in GT and BV associated with their respective loci of enunciation, which add a further layer of 
complexity to the task of understanding and facilitating transformative learning processes.  
What are the implications of these ‘anomalies’ for the theory and praxis of global sustainability 
governance?  
This is the question leading our closing discussion and conceptualization work in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Re-conceptualizing agency and governance for a social-ecological transformation 
 
The concept of governance itself stands in urgent need of renewal.  
Tim Jackson, 2009 
 
This last chapter seeks to explore and discuss the implications of our empirical findings for the practice 
of (global) sustainability governance.  
The findings from our two empirical case studies summarized in Chapter 6 suggest some unsettling 
implications for the conventional, often-implicit assumptions of mainstream sustainable development 
and sustainability governance discourses. In terms of the who of sustainability governance, these 
unsettling character refer, firstly, to which actors are assigned the starring roles in driving sustainability 
learning processes: while the main characters in the plot of mainstream SD discourses are governments 
and business actors (with an increasingly important yet subsidiary role of NGOs), in our empirical 
case studies we found that the agent configurations at the forefront of transformative learning are the 
scientific and activist spheres, instead – though the state remains a foothold of these configurations. 
With regard to the what of governance, we found that the roles of classical governance agents are 
substantially subverted in the observed discursive processes and representations: civil society appears 
as revulsive ‘rule-maker’, rather than merely as a protestor or a service-provider to the established 
order; and intellectuals feature as energizing and democratizing agents, rather than mere suppliers of 
‘neutral’ knowledge-inputs to the political and corporate decision-making elites. The state, in turn, 
plays a crucial but rather indirect role, farther from conventional role-attributions such as rule-setting 
or intervening as investor, and rather focused in setting framework conditions fostering cultural 
change. 
In addition, our cases showed that ‘context matters’, i.e. that the locus of discursive enunciation has 
direct implications on the way themes, emphases, framings, problem-structuration, and narratives 
come to structure transformation discourses. Paradoxically, however, the global perspective of a SET 
requires ‘de-provincializing’ TDs. This does not amount to dis-embedding TDs or erasing the markers 
of their situatedness, but rather framing them into a glocal perspective. 
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In this last chapter, I argue that for not only do the above features add complexity and set sustainability 
governance up to unsuspected challenges, but that they challenge the very concept of governance 
itself.  
This challenge is suggested rather than demonstrated tout court by our empirical findings, since our 
methodological design does not support this kind of claims to generalizability. Yet our findings at the 
level of discursive representations, in triangulation with theoretical literature, strongly converge in the 
assessment of macro-level ‘unsustainability lock-ins’ which find no satisfactory answers within the 
conceptual framework in which governance is defined. Instead, they point at high-intensity 
transformative learning critically depending on a re-conceptualization of the logic of interventions 
aimed at fostering social change. Furthermore, they also offer a grounded (though sketchy) operational 
outlining of a new conceptual morphology for the stewardship of collective learning that differs from 
the logic of governance. This last chapter seeks to delineate the conceptual and theoretical contours 
of such morphology, which is framed as an alternative and simultaneously complementary approach 
to conventional governance, under the rubric of para-governance, and discuss its implications for an 
integral theory of social-ecological transformations based on the perspective of collective learning.  
 
7.1. The shortcomings of governance and para-governance as an alternative logic and 
empirical complement 
 
Sustainability governance is a concept stemming from the inter-disciplinary fields of political ecology 
and environmental politics that deals with the management (i.e. administrative) and decision-making 
(i.e. political) processes regarding the interface of the socio-sphere and the biosphere (Hannigan, 
2006). In other words, governance encompasses all elements of the agential dimension of socio-natural 
developments. Unlike the concept of government, which allocates the sole responsibility and authority 
for binding decision-making, implementation, and the policing of their observance to a formal 
governing body – the state – governance is a softer and vaguer concept referring to the stewardship 
of collective affairs by a variety of actors (including government, markets, networks, private actors) 
and a variety of means (laws, informal norms, power, etc.) (Rosenau, 1992), and emphasizes whole 
system management (e.g. water-basin, ecosystem, or bioregional management approaches) (Tàbara, 
2005). The global dimension of sustainability governance in the context of the Anthropocene is best 
captured in the concept of Earth System governance, which aims at bringing the combined, 
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interlinked, and complex impact of humans on planetary systems under its purview: “it is about the societal 
steering of human activities with regard to the long-term stability of geobiophysical systems” 
(Biermann, 2014, p. 59). 
The concept of governance has also been tailored to fit the management of far-reaching systemic 
change, as in the increasingly popular literature on “system transitions” and “transition management” 
(e.g. Geels, 2011; Loorbach, 2007)233, which stems from a blend of academic traditions in innovation, 
history, and technology studies.  
As became apparent from the reviewed case studies, a major cleavage in governance discussions is 
that regarding the preferred steering-mode, i.e. whether the regulation of socio-natural life is better 
suited to political-democratic or technocratic-managerial (including market-steering) modes of 
governance. The classical answer in the tradition of emancipatory social movements of the 1970s and 
1980s has been univocal: ecological sustainability, as well as social justice, is intrinsically bound to 
democratization and political forms of interaction. The genesis of unsustainability hence lies in the 
technocratic and corporatist takeover of the regulatory apparatus of the state, with the tacit complicity 
of a passive and apathic citizenry. Default answers to this question dominating current critical literature 
assigns a key role to a strengthened state supported by a revitalized, deepened, and widened 
democracy, furthering either greater participation in representative schemes or more direct forms of 
democratic engagements. 
Although the unsustainability lock-in effects of vested interests and supportive political elites are 
sufficiently well-documented in this same literature and beyond, I argue that notwithstanding 
significant differences otherwise, both stances of ‘democratic optimism’ and ‘technocratic 
managerialism’ share at least some of the common assumptions and goals detailed below, as a result 
of which, I argue, both fail to capture the inherent quality of (let alone to promote) transformative 
collective learning, and therefore make governance (be it democratic or technocratic) ill-suited to 
fostering whole-societal transformative processes. 
 
What’s wrong with governance? 
 
                                                 233 For a timely cautionary comment on these scholarly treads, see Shove & Walker (2007) 
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The observed limitations of governance in the face of geostorical challenges are summarized 
eloquently by Bruno Latour: 
“There seems to be a total disconnect between the scale of change required and the pallor or 
frailty of the feelings kindled by these transformations – which are nonetheless politely 
recognized as being “absolutely necessary”. As if each of us is preparing for a revolution, but 
actionlessly and from our armchairs […] The fact is that, with the ecological crises, we are 
trapped in a dual excess: we have an excessive fascination for the inertia of the existing socio-
technical systems and an excessive fascination for the total, global and radical nature of the 
changes that need to be made. The result is a frenetic snails’ race. An apocalypse in slow 
motion [...] The enthusiasts of old-style progress often complain about what they call 
exaggeration, or ‘millenarian fears’, and even a return to religion and fanaticism. Yet, on the 
contrary, what should in fact strike us is the disconnect between the scale of the manifest 
threats and the placidity with which we calmly continue as if nothing were amiss [...] Changing 
trajectories means more than a mere apocalypse and is more demanding than a mere 
revolution.  But where are the passions for such changes?” (Latour, 2010) 
 
The paradox becomes apparent from Latour’s account; yet the reasons behind it do not. Is it the mere 
apathy of the masses which, allowing the prevalence of vested interests over the common interest, 
with the complicity of corrupt, unwilling, or ignorant political elites, that explains the unsustainability 
lock-in? To me it seems clear that there are more structural reasons accounting for the failure of global 
sustainability governance, and that at least a large part of these can be linked to the inherent limitations 
of governance as a concept. Below is an attempt to summarize these reasons.  
a. Ambiguous role and status-quo proneness of the state: Dominant institutionalist theory in political 
science and governance studies sees the state as a problem-debating instance which, mobilized 
through debates and critical movements, as well as through acute manifest issues, seeks to 
provide solutions to such problems. Instead, critical theories of the state and politics in the 
Gramscian tradition view hasted assumptions that the state is de facto willing or capable of 
regulating in the service of the common good  as a liberal bias of post-war political culture 
(Acosta & Brand, 2017; Brand, 2014d), one which seems unwarranted in the face of a global 
post-democratic constellation (Crouch, 2004; Jörcke, 2008; Ritzi, 2014; Wolin, 2008). By 
contrast, such theories define the state (both those in the West as those in the postcolonial 
world) as a particular social relation mirroring existing power constellation in a society 
(Demirović, 2011). At the same time, it is an instance stabilizing these constellations. This 
implies no conspiratorial assumptions, but rather responds to the immanent logic of the 
political system referred to in previous chapters: to deflect the risk of social and political 
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instability, the state seeks to address social issues in such a way that society is not overwhelmed 
and that the balance of power is not significantly distorted. This has the positive effect of 
providing order, predictability, and often protecting from demagogical assaults, but also 
perpetuates status quo (Brand, 2014b, p. 16). Add to this the short-termism derived from the 
electoral cycle, and larger horizons of social change fall completely out of the purview of 
politics. In light of this view, Schellnhuber’s observation that current climate policy is as 
effective as “re-arranging deck-chairs on the Titanic” should come as no surprise. Hence 
viewed from a transformative perspective, in turn, the state’s structure-conservatism makes 
fertile ground for demagogical upsurge, with political candidates “queuing  up to  capitalize  as  
quickly  as  possible  on  the  (very  relative) success  of this or  that  legitimate demand” 
(Latouche, 2009, pp. 95–96). From the perspective of transformative learning, then, what is 
required is a form of governance, a form of energizing the collective spirit, that is capable of 
resisting the pressure towards achieving any fusion – to draw again on Alexander’s 
dramaturgical metaphor – for the sake of achieving the right fusion. But the cultural 
preconditions for making the option of a ‘right fusion’ available have yet to be established 
(Latouche, 2009, p. 95). As long as achieving any fusion takes precedence over achieving the 
right fusion, transformative pathways will remain locked. 
  
b. Post-political illusion of common interest: In policy circles, as well as in the underpinning scholarly 
inputs, problems are mostly viewed as curses of destiny, rather than as emerging out of specific 
social structures. Cooperation and multi-stakeholder participation in solution-making is 
regarded as inherently emancipatory and thus desirable. This policy obsession with defining 
“the problem” is misguiding, however, as there is not a problem, but rather a “plurality (…) 
of contradictory and contending problems, each one focused by the shared credibility it enjoys 
in the eyes of those who subscribe to it, and each held separate from the rest by the mutual 
incredibility”  (Thompson, 1984, p. 336). The idea of political contention as a ‘coming to 
terms’ of diverse views about how to best reach an alleged ‘common interest’ is thus a post-
political illusion (Swyngedouw, 2011). Agonism is inherent to the political condition; therefore, 
we should stop treating diversity, contention, and contradiction as pathologies that need to be 
eradicated before any progress can be made. Fücks’ (2013) suggestion that the lack of 
consensus about sustainability being compatible with economic growth being the cause of the 
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lack of progress made towards sustainability denotes the heavy bias of currently dominant 
views sustainability governance.  
 
c. Consensus and complexity reduction as precondition for governability: But Fücks’ argument is not 
misleading only for misrepresenting the rationality characteristic of politics: against his alleged 
lack of consensus, the world has now in fact seen over a quarter-century of virtually undisputed 
dominance of the discourse of ecological modernization, which purports the achievability of 
ecological sustainability within the parameters of the current system as its key ideational 
marker, with too little and too late to show for. Furthermore, this homogenization of the SD 
discourse has led to what Blühdorn (2007, 2009)calls the “post-ecologist paradox”, that is: the 
coexistence of a near-absolute consensus with respect to the unsustainability of Western 
consumer life-styles and an equally absolute determination to sustain such lifestyles. This 
paradox seems more plausible an explanation for the continued pathway of unsustainability 
than the ill-advised request for even greater homogenization. 
To be sure, political decision-making and governability require some level of pragmatic 
compromising, yet the vital point, from the perspective of collective learning, is that these “do 
not degenerate  into compromises  at  the intellectual level” (Latouche, 2009, p. 66): indeed, 
overcoming ontological and epistemological monocultures is not only a matter of democratic 
right or social inclusion (especially when there is a consistent pattern of exclusion!), but a 
matter of allowing for the necessary narrative or symbolic variations for learning to take place 
(Eder, 2008), or, from a system-theoretical perspective, for the resilience of complex systems. 
The American Anthropology Association Statement on Humanity and Climate Change (2015) 
makes clear that ontological diversity is—in itself—vital to sustainability: “The archaeological 
record shows that diversity and flexibility increase resilience to stress in complex adaptive 
systems.” (cited in Paulson, 2017) 
 
d. Pragmatism as a cultural mandate: the above requirement of overcoming ontological and 
epistemological monocultures, however, clashes against the simplifying and homogenizing 
pressures of pragmatism. In Western-style modern culture – even in activist circles devoted to 
‘changing the world’ – idealism is devaluated. Action, pragmatism, achievability, 
demonstrability have set through as the validation proof for the worth of ideas, actions, and 
persons. Yet pragmatism is inherently conservative: when prevalent definitions of ‘reality’ are 
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deliberately allowed to set the boundaries of the desirable or the expressible (provided the 
alternatives are thinkable, as a minimum precondition), interventions aimed at “improving” 
that ‘reality’ are likely to stabilize this very definition of reality and thus actually work against 
alternatives emerging.  
 
e. Dominant concept of ‘system’ lacking complexity. The pragmatist drive discussed above, along with 
material framework conditions (e.g. the administrative logic of budgeting), constrains agents 
to focus on concrete, discrete problems (issue-silos) to "solve", in a pre-specified time-horizon 
(usually short-term), rather than on underlying unsustainable cultural and social structures. For 
example, ‘transition management’ deals with problems which can often be framed as symptoms 
from a broader systemic perspective, while deeply anchored unsustainable life-styles are not 
acknowledged enough (Shove & Walker, 2007). As Eriksen and Schober (2016: 3) argue, "The 
concept of habit – in the double meaning of the word of learned pattern and addiction – may 
be a crucial component for understanding the interplay between social, political, economic, 
and cultural factors motivating our era of denial." (cited in Paulson, 2017, p. 439). Yet this 
would require institutional cross-fertilization thus overwhelming the institutional 
infrastructure organized in autopoietic functional sub-systems, as described by Niklas 
Luhmann – this is what Ulrich Beck (1992) referred to as “organized irresponsibility”. (cf. 
Section 7.2 for a lengthier discussion) 
 
f. The illusion of control: arguably the most tragic learning failure of the past four decades of 
ineffective global sustainability governance is that we still believe to be ‘in charge’ of the fate 
of socio-natural systems. In other words, the transcendental shift from history to geostory has 
gone unnoticed (Chakrabarty, 2009; Latour, 2014). Notwithstanding the necessary 
sustainment of a ‘illusion of agency’ for “motivating action and repair work”, this should not 
lead governance agents to indulge in the comforting ideas that: a) the evolution of the Earth 
System can be managed with caps, emission certificates, and allow markets ‘time to mature’; 
and b) that governance agents stand within, nor outside the systems they seek to influence. 
 
g. Politics and democracy spatially and temporally ‘out of synch’: the most dynamic and innovative sectors 
of contemporary societies generate an effect of growing complexity (translating into increasing 
functional differentiation) and overall (though de-synchronized) acceleration in the pace of 
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social evolution that overwhelms bureaucratic coping and political control mechanisms. 
Similarly, they exceed the time-consuming process of democratic deliberation. In addition, the 
pluralization of societies entails less possibility of reliance on conventions and more difficulty 
to constitute a quorum for decision-making (even to identify relevant stakeholders!), and the 
greater complexity makes the world less and less intelligible. In spatial terms, the well-
researched but ill-addressed mismatch in geographical scales of globally operating but locally 
regulated systems generating transboundary effects of global interconnectedness that 
overwhelm the structures of the ‘Westphalian system’ – key for sustainability governance is, 
for example,  the issue of “ecologically unequal exchange” (i.a. Bunker, 1984; Hornborg, 1998; 
Rice, 2007; J. T. Roberts & Parks, 2009) – adds to the worldwide crisis of politics and 
democracy. The consequences of this crisis can be summarized as follows: 
- politics becomes situational and reactive;  
- it tends to ‘delegate’ decision-making onto other institutional or informal arenas 
(judicialization, economic deregulation, ethical privatization) (H. Rosa, 2010, 2011) 
- rise of the ‘competitor state’: the state ceases to be a sovereign power regulating 
economic activity, and rather becomes a bidder on the global financial market seeking 
to offer the best conditions to attract investors (Crouch, 2004) 
- the remaining political energy becomes exhausted in "defending the already acquired 
rights", which, for affluent social groups in the global North, but increasingly also in 
the South, often implies clinging onto globally non-generalizable patterns of 
consumption (Brand & Wissen, 2017). The upsurge of right-wing populism 
desperately clinging onto privileged (imperial) ways of life seems to ratify Blühdorn’s 
warnings about the structural limitations of liberal, consumer democracies to turn the 
tide of conservative politics towards a transformative one. Furthermore, democracy is 
becoming a reactionary rather than an emancipatory force (Blühdorn, 2011), or, more 
precisely, the concept of ‘emancipation’ is increasingly becoming synonym with the 
maintenance of privileges. 
 
h. The conflicted state: Tim Jackson’s argument reviewed in Chapter 3 was that insofar the role of 
government is equated with maintaining system-immanent macro-economic stability, 
governments will systematically undermine their own capability of steering away from 
unsustainable development paths (Jackson, 2009b, p. 96). Indeed, the relentless pursuit of 
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novelty at the expense of socio-ecological commitment – both on the side of individuals 
systematically exposed to status anxiety (in a positive feedback-loop with increasing affluence), 
and on the side of businesses under the pressure of market competition (‘innovate or die’) – 
becomes a structural imperative. Hence, for an effective advancement of transformative 
learning, the role of government – or of governance, for that matter – should be fundamentally 
revised.  
 
i. Imagined boundaries of governance: One of the stumbling blocks of sustainability governance 
approaches – even of the most progressive and well-intended ones – has been assuming political 
feasibility and cultural acceptability as given, ignoring the fact that these are also ‘dependent 
variables’ of ongoing interventions in socio-political and cultural life by a variety of actors, 
including those in the formal political system. Again, this represents a blind spot of the liberal 
mindset dominant in political and management theorizing and practice, which would hold the 
idea of the state intervening in shaping culture as unacceptable government interventionism 
into the very fabric of free societies, forcing “unwilling victims to sacrifice their God-given 
freedoms and to betray innate self-interests” (Paulson, 2017, p. 440), concealing the fact that 
current political and cultural structures are already and necessarily (to a large extent, at least) 
the outcome of political action – or inaction: from the way educational systems are shaped, to 
the importance accorded to certain economic or social indicators, by the impact of planning 
on public spaces and social relations, by the influence of wage and employment policy on the 
so-called ‘work-life balance’ or on the opportunities for socio-economic mobility (and hence 
on family-structure and stability), by the influence of trade-rules and standards on consumer 
behavior, by how advertising is regulated, by public procurement and decisions on subsidies 
or targeted financial support to civil society initiatives, etc. (Jackson, 2009a, p. 95), the 
regulatory framework and individual political decisions intersect social cultural and material 
matrixes. In addition, government agency can be used to counterbalance the impacts of the 
interventions of other governance agents in the social fabric: worldwide longitudinal data 
support the thesis that behavioral trends such as fuel consumption and use of credit, or health-
patterns like obesity can be linked to the action of powerful forces purposively changing the 
shape of societies at precipitous speed (Schor 1993, 1999, cited in Paulson, 2017, p. 440). In 
spite of the above, business as usual is widely perceived as the product of apolitical and 
impartial forces. Yet from a social-constructivist perspective, the fact that we make reality as 
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much as reality makes us appears as self-evident. Gearing the leverage of the state towards 
social and ecologically sound targets, based on the most authoritative science available, 
provides no base at all for accusations of authoritarian manipulation, rather the contrary: it 
would mean fulfilling the historically unprecedented mission of political leaders in the 21st 
Century, who – once factoring in the Anthropocene – are accountable not only to their 
constituency, but by extension also to stakeholders elsewhere in the world, as well as to the 
future generations which have no say in decisions that are determinant of their fate.  
 
Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Change Impacts (PIK) and 
head of the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) eloquently articulated the 
conceptual gap emerging from current understandings of governance: adaptation is the governance 
strategy used to avoid the unmanageable; mitigation is the strategy aimed at managing the unavoidable. But 
what about the unmanageable which has already become unavoidable (or will so in the near future)?  
What room is there for governance and politics in the face of the unmanageable? 
Recalling Oskar Negt’s dictum: at a time when the continuation of ‘reality’ has become inviable, we 
can only rely on utopias to stay realistic. Our empirical findings disclosed existing potentials and 
emergent developments that, from a perspective of transformative agency, can be harnessed towards 
a global social-ecological “real utopia”. When additionally factoring in the above enounced limitations, 
a strong case can be made that the ultimate goal of a global sustainability transformation lies beyond 
the reach of conventional governance. Sustainability governance, as we define it, has reached its limits.  
 
Given the inherent limitations in our capacity to govern global environmental change, what is required 
is moving beyond conventional notions of governance towards a conception that accounts for the 
possibility of altering the (otherwise taken for granted) framework in which governance is defined, a 
“new vision of governance” (Jackson, 2009a, p. 11). The question arises, however: "how do you invent 
the political constitution that is able to absorb the Anthropocene, namely the reaction of the earth 
system to our action, in a way that renders politics again comprehensible to those who are 
simultaneously actor, victim, accomplices and responsible for such a situation?" (Latour, 2015)  
 
Since we have defined transformative collective learning as condition of possibility (necessary though 
not sufficient) for a social-ecological transformation of the globally dominant cultural model (see 
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Chapter 1), the answer to this question should be that this new vision of governance would consist, 
in turn, in the creation of preconditions and in the deliberate promotion of collective learning yielding  
“radical innovations which redefine the rules of the game; which render previously important forms 
of competence redundant and which reconfigure interpretations of value and significance” (Abernathy 
and Clark, 1985, cited in Shove, 2010a, p. 6).  
In geostorical times, learning goes beyond the adaptation to exogenously generated changes (by the 
hitherto considered to be ‘autonomous forces of nature’), out to the capacity of generating socio-
natural contexts, the capacity to create, through ‘facilitated emergence’, a new system in line with the 
biophysical boundaries of the planet. It is the capacity for creating an agential space between forecasting 
and backcasting (Pelfini, 2014; Raskin, 2008; Unger, 2004) between the possible (and thus trivial in terms 
of transformative change) and the desirable (often unreachable). Fundamental change need not be 
revolutionary change, but can rather unfold in fragmentary, piecemeal, and even contradictory fashion, 
through “a creative interpretation of the maturing possibilities” (Thie, 2013, p. 159), that is, through 
real utopias. In anticipation of an almost certain ecological Armageddon lying ahead of the business-
as-usual course of development, it means paving the transition from the “politically impossible to the 
politically inevitable”.  
Such de-centralized yet deliberate engagement to provide for the emergence of transformative learning 
and thus for the preconditions for an effective governance in the Anthropocene I call para-governance.   
The para-governance approach to socio-ecological transformations can thus be conceptualized, in 
other words, as the as the type of agency strategically engaging in the creation of ideational and material 
preconditions (i.e. discursive contexts) for transformative governance interventions to be effective or 
even viable, in the first place. 
The Greek-rooted prefix “para” is purposefully used here to connote both its ambiguous etymological 
meanings of “beside, side by side”, on the one hand, and of “beyond, past by”, on the other, indicating 
that para-governance is both an auxiliary and derivative character to the concept of governance, but a 
transcending value, at the same time, insofar a condition of possibility for effective governance in the 
Anthropocene. It serves here as an epistemic and cultural strategy opening up spaces to think 
differently about ways of dealing with (transformative) governance questions. It is also aimed at 
stressing not the continuities (here ‘extended governance’ might have proven worthier) but rather the 
ruptures with the logic of governance: 
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•  para-governance is not aimed at conquering the spaces of power with the illusion of 
straightforwardly ‘implementing’ solutions. It’s battle ground is the terrain of socio-cultural 
imaginaries and identities derived therefrom. 
• It does not substitute governance, but complements it by creating preconditions for effective 
interventions, probably in combination with exogenous systemic disruptions (environmental 
and socio-economic shocks) 
• It constitutes a social security-device fostering resilience and shielding from the phenomenon 
of “myopic choice” (i.e. a social ‘immune system’) 
•  para-governance draws no finishing line, but the starting point; i.e. fosters comprehensive 
understanding of the scale and span of the required transformation 
•  para-governance serves as a bridge between short-term, pragmatist, competitive politics and 
long-term, normative, cooperative politics. 
 
As can be inferred from the aforesaid, para-governance does not replace governance – though it does 
certainly have profound implications for the expectations we pose on governance knowledge-
repertoires, institutions, and strategies: what is governable can improve particular aspects of the 
situation, help coordinate action, etc., but is inherently incapable of transforming its own conditions 
of possibility. It also implies changing the orientation of governance interventions towards 
transformative learning rather than specific goals. All three societal levels are implied: - Micro-level: individuals as social beings need to be embedded into transformative contexts of 
practice (Shove, 2010a) and “cosmopolitan zones of contact” (Santos, 2004) for enhanced 
transformational potential counterweighting the dilemmas of the ‘conflicted’ and the ‘missing’ 
agent.  - Meso-level: institutional and material infrastructures need to be put in place to foster learning; 
e.g. through framing, orienting, shaping, and enabling guardrails (Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 
2014) (cf. Chapter 3, Section 3.3.1) - Macro-level: (post)governance arrangements oriented towards deconstructing unsustainable 
regimes need to be put in place (e.g. blueprints for macro-economic redesign) (Jackson, 2009a; 
Latouche, 2009) 
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The aim of this doctoral thesis can be now reformulated as a twofold goal: First, outlining the 
conceptual and theoretical contours of a para-governance approach to the global transformation 
towards sustainability – to a zukunftsfähige Gesellschaft, a society which is “capable of future” –; and, 
second, gaining empirical insights from grounded para-governance-experiments in meso-macro 
(sub)political settings in the Global North and in the Global South. And the dilemma posed by 
Schellnhuber may have now found a possible answer: while mitigation seeks to keep the unmanageable 
away, and adaptation to deal with the unavoidable, the agential response to the unmanageable 
inevitabilities is the para-governed transformation of socio-natural relations. 
Before undertaking a more systematic comparison between the logics of governance and para-
governance, the following sub-section offers a brief review of the precedents of this concept in the 
literature.   
 
7.1.1. Precedents for para-governance in the literature 
 
Several analysts have argued that the rise of the concept of “transformation” is directly proportional 
to the recognition of limits to global environmental governance (Brand, 2016b; Brand & Wissen, 2013; 
Newell, 2012; Park, Conca, & Finger, 2008; Stirling, 2015). Many of the limitations pointed out in the 
previous section are increasingly being acknowledged by governance scholars and critical intellectuals 
from other domains of scientific inquiry.  
There is then an increasing insight that dealing with geostorical challenges requires profound changes 
(Hackmann & Moser, 2013b; New Economics Foundation, 2009). The inadequacy of partial and 
incremental approaches to the crisis (separating, for example, climate change and biodiversity loss) is 
also increasingly acknowledged. The transversal or overarching scope of change across societal sub-
systems is brought on focus, instead  (Driessen & al., 2013). A mode of governance tailored to the 
‘wicked’ problems of the Anthropocene need to factor-in complex articulations and the danger of 
offsetting negative consequences from one field onto another (e.g. to produce crops for agrofuels by 
fostering industrialized agriculture and the eviction of peasants from their land). O´Brien (2012, p. 
668) goes even further and argues that effective climate governance implies “a questioning of the 
assumptions, beliefs, values, commitments, loyalties and interests that have created structures, systems 
and behaviors that contribute to anthropogenic climate change, social vulnerability and other 
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environmental problems in the first place”.  Similarly, Latouche holds the transformation of the 
ideational field as a precondition for the transformation of the material sphere, whereby the goal of a 
“more sophisticated project” of governance is “to  create  the  preconditions  for  that  change  of  
direction” (Latouche, 2009, p. 76). Critical scholars close to the Rosa-Luxembourg foundation in 
Germany (and to the thought tradition it represents) emphasize the field of visions, values, and 
pathways as a central terrain of contestation (Rilling, 2014). In the same vein, Enrique Leff (2004a) 
refers to building sustainability as the design of new worlds of life by changing the meaning of the 
signs that have fixed meanings of things; Giorgos Kallis (2017) argues for strategies so that material 
downsizing “not be experienced as welfare loss”; and Hans Thie, invoking Hegel, speaks of a “soft 
enlightenment” altering cultural parameters, so that what is considered right today becomes incorrect 
tomorrow (Brand, 2016a; Thie, 2013) 
Elizabeth Shove (2010a), in turn, emphasizes the material dimensions of a governance for a 
transformation, arguing for a new style of intervention: one that is more modest (abandoning illusions 
of manageability), and, at the same time, more ambitious, recognizing that any political intervention 
has an impact in the matrix of social practices, even if this is not explicitly acknowledged.  
In addition, we can find a range of concepts bearing some similarity to that of para-governance: The 
concept of meta-governance (Evans, 2012; Grießhammer & Brohmann, 2015; Kooiman, 2003; 
Soransen, 2006) refers to the “overarching steering possibilities in the face of systemic complexities” 
(Grießhammer & Brohmann, 2015), addressing the level of socio-cultural norms governing the 
governance process as a whole. However, the heavy rationalist ‘contractarian’ bias (which we also 
found in the WBGU report), which recreates the rationalist illusion of political liberalism, according 
to which the individual is the source or meaning (Aguilar et al., 2015, p. 127) keeps it anchored in the 
realm of explicit social norms, rather than in that of implicit socio-cognitive rules. (Eder, 2007)  
The open-endedness and radical agonism missing in meta-governance is emphasized in the concept 
of futuring as a process meant to “capture and interpret futures, to envision them and, therefore, to 
make them to an object of current (non-)decision and (non-)action” towards a transformation (Brand, 
2016b, p. 13; Rilling, 2014).  
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Arturo Escobar (2013) refers to the rise of ontological politics234, in the wake of which transformative 
experiments with unsustainability-related cultural matrixes have become objects of political struggle. 
Departing from the premise that unsustainability is structurally designed into our everyday life as the 
result of concrete design practices, ontological politics revolves around the “decentering of design 
from its anthropocentric and rationalistic basis and its recreation as a tool against the unsustainability 
that has become entrenched with the modern world” (Escobar, 2013) 
A common point of departure of all the above is the aspiration to identifying and unveiling established 
cultural, material, and political power structures and processes locking contemporary societies into 
unsustainability, to criticize and overcome, and new emergent real utopias to be further developed and 
stabilized (Acosta & Brand, 2017). As surfaces from this brief review, most of the contents fitting the 
bill of para-governance are suggested in more or less impressionistic or systematized fashion in the 
existing literature. Missing, however, is a conceptual-theoretical digression effort clarifying and 
emphasizing the implications of what we have named para-governance as a form of agential 
intervention contrasting with (yet not opposing or displacing) governance. 
 
7.1.2. Contrasting governance and para-governance 
 
The following exercise of conceptual contouring by contrasting proceeds through comparing the 
ethos of governance with that of para-governance in terms of the categories of goal or purpose, 
boundaries, methods, agoras, scope of intervention, context of applicability, as well as main agoras 
and agents. 
Regarding their respective goals, while governance seeks to bring about changes, para-governance 
seeks to create the material conditions and social imaginaries (or discursive repertoires) that will 
expand the scope of possible actions towards change. Para-governable social learning is thus 
foregrounded as a social goal as opposed to (assumedly) governable societal change, clinging on the 
assumption that change is a function not of learning itself, but of the systemic impacts of learning 
(Eder, 1999) – likely in combination with system-disruptive exogenous crises. In this sense, para-
                                                 234 The idea of ‘ontological politics’ arises in the wake of ‘the ontological turn’ in social theory. While 
originated in the sphere of cultural anthropology, this trend of thought overflew its original 
‘disciplinary container’. See a.o. (Chakrabarty, 2000; Connolly, 2005; de la Cadena, 2010; Escobar, 
2012b, 2013; Latour, 2004; Leff, 2010; Rehbein, 2010, 2013) 
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governance implies embracing the fundamental impossibility of ‘managing’, ‘governing’, or (techno-
)’fixing’ the Earth-System (including its human-made sub-systems) in any straight-forward sense, and 
therewith radically give up the illusion of control, thereby distancing itself from kindred concepts such 
as ‘stewardship’ of the transformation (Vogt, 2013) and even ‘meta-governance’ (Grießhammer & 
Brohmann, 2015).  
Rejecting naïve optimism, however, does not amount to renouncing the possibility of meaningful 
transformative agency: Instead, para-governance recognizes, on the one hand, non-human agency 
(such as the unpredictable consequences of climate change and of sharp erosion in biodiversity) – 
what Latour calls ‘actants’ – and, on the other hand, put human agency in the center to take advantage 
of geostorical windows of opportunity to transform structures that appear otherwise unmodifiable. 
Governance assumes the opposite: that it can control the climate, but cannot control capitalism (N. 
Klein, 2014). This is why it easier for us, says Slavoj Žižek, to imagine the end of the world than the 
serious possibility of fundamental social change. para-governance implies embracing a new style of 
intervention: one that is more modest – insofar abandoning illusions of manageability –, but, at the 
same time, more ambitious, “recognizing that policy interventions across the board have effect in 
shaping future ways of life whether they recognize it or not” (Shove, 2010a, p. 11) 
This brings us to the issue of the boundaries of each form of agency. As stated above, the assumption 
of political feasibility and cultural acceptability as given by conventional governance leads 
transformative prospects to the cul-de-sac of the “conflicted state” (Jackson, 2009a), to “simulative 
politics” (Blühdorn, 2007) and similar diagnoses. While governance is limited by this adaptive 
character, para-governance aims at the (in principle, uncontrolled) expansion of the politically possible 
and culturally acceptable; that is: para-governance is generative. Which political and social effects will 
exactly result from it and when is difficult to predict, it cannot be planned, but nonetheless demands 
an active political and social conformation. 
When it comes to valid forms of knowledge serving as a support-base, governance typically showcases 
a bias toward scientific knowledge, which is deemed necessary (particularly at government level) to 
achieve a certain level of public legitimacy, insofar scientific knowledge is culturally validated as the 
most authoritative form of knowledge – reason for which also private forms of governance rely on 
scientific and technological knowledge. The “excess fascination” that Latour observed with techno-
scientific imaginaries clashes, however, turns into disenchantment in the face of its impotence for 
effectively addressing pressing social and ecological predicaments. Indeed, the ‘excess’ character of 
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this fascination lies in the absolutizing of Cartesian rationality (and the techno-scientific knowledge 
built upon it), for all realms of human and natural existence. In the spirit of Chakrabarty’s metaphor, 
para-governance seeks to ‘provincializing’ Cartesian rationality, as one possible source of valid 
knowledge whose pertinence is contingent: if you want to travel to the moon, you need techno-
scientific knowledge; but if you want to achieve sustainability, you might be better served with 
indigenous knowledge. Indian writer and activist Roy Arundhati writes:  
The first step towards reimagining a world gone terribly wrong would be to stop the annihilation of 
those who have a different imagination –an imagination that is outside of capitalism as well as 
communism. An imagination which has an altogether different understanding of what constitutes 
happiness and fulfillment. To gain this philosophical space, it is necessary to concede some physical 
space for the survival of those who may look like the keepers of our past, but who may really be the 
guides to our future. (Arundhati, 2010) 
 
 para-governance thus seeks to generate, protect, and foster an ‘epistemic biodiversity’, as well as 
facilitating the agonistic dialogue of these multiple forms of knowledge (artistic, religious, forgotten 
or marginalized cultural models, etc.). While governance weights alternatives against fixed criteria of 
validity or acceptability, para-governance considers “alternative ways of looking at alternatives” (S. 
Santos), which redefine the rules of the game and “render previously important forms of competence 
redundant, and which reconfigure interpretations of value and significance” (Shove, 2010a, p. 6). 
Whereas governance is concerned with building sustainability (innovation), para-governance 
acknowledges the need to unbuild unsustainability first (trans-formation). 
The above invites the question of how to “handle complexities in a non-reductionist way, while at the 
same time avoid generating ever-more complexities until we submerge into chaos” (Law and Mol 
2002, cited in Clarke, 2005, p. 553). This question has both political and managerial implications. 
Political implications pertain the legitimacy and efficiency/efficacy of decision-making processes; 
managerial implications refer to the manageability of an increasingly unintelligible object of 
governance (H. Rosa, 2010). 
From a managerial perspective, governance relies on complexity reduction as a precondition to 
maintain control over the object; para-governance, instead, fosters and facilitates emergence and 
resilience through self-organization, applying instruments of ‘minimalistic management’ to help frame 
baseline issues, provide interpretive and normative orientation emerging from discursively balanced 
sustainability debates, shape infrastructural preconditions, and enable or empower individual and 
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collective transformative agents (Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014). This minimalistic management is 
understood as a way of ‘organizing the unplannable’ (WBGU, 2011) and as the best chance of 
developing resilient and thriving social structures, which are better equipped to deal with the 
"unmanageable which has become unavoidable".  
Suitable para-governance tools and practices, in this regard, would be, for example, the production of 
“societal commitment devices” (in the sense of A. Offer and Tim Jackson) as social-ecological 
guardrails offsetting the proneness to ‘myopic choice’ – i.e. preventing ‘tragedies of the commons’ and 
materializing what in chapter 2 we called, following Levinas, “responsibility in the third person”, an 
institutional mediation proportionate to the challenges of Anthropocene between individual freedoms.  
Instead of linear problem formulation-analysis-solution schemes, which are ill-suited to handling so-
called ‘wicked policy problems’ (Thompson, 1984), para-governance agents deploy open-ended 
techniques such as backstaging235, where discussions in discursively balanced stakeholder participation 
is crucial to avoid blind spots. Useful scientific inputs to these process would be those helping to 
understand the details of path-dependence; the spatial and temporal configuration of innovation (or 
trans-formation) junctions, or the potential for aligning and modulating the elements of social practice 
(De Wit, Van den Ende et al. 2002; Rip 2006 cited in Shove, 2010a, p. 8). The reliance of governance 
on control through complexity-reduction seems adequate as applied to simple, stable, predictable 
systems. For complex, unstable, unpredictable systems, however, a para-governance approach 
embracing complexity and relying on resilience (instead of control) through self-organization is much 
better-suited. 
Regarding the political implications of complexity, the abovementioned preference for a single 
epistemic yardstick in the logic of governance also makes sense regarding its operational focus on 
decision-making through the attainment of (ideally) a ‘rational consensus’. The necessarily monistic 
and universalist episteme implicit in the very idea of a ‘rational’ consensus is a precondition, at least in 
the classical liberal worldview, for efficient deliberation and decision-making. Liberal consensus is thus 
homogenizing and can only be achieved at the price of sidelining voices, negating conflict (what 
                                                 235 Worth noting, however, is that even techniques like backcasting are severely limited, considering the 
dazzling number of variables and uncertainties (known unknowns and unknown unknowns) 
potentially relevant in the process of a social-ecological transformation. They ought to be seen as a 
discussion-trigger and a learning mechanism in the sense of fostering plural rationalities to come into 
dialogue with each other – i.e. as a para-governance device –, rather than as a management tool stricto 
sensu. 
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Chantal Mouffe calls antagonism), and banishing stark polyphony to the margins of the social system. 
This homogenizing logic, however, goes against the essential precondition for collective learning, 
namely the destabilization of prevailing symbolic orders (Eder, 1999). para-governance thus implies, 
in the first place, deliberately provoking such destabilization; that is, opening the cannon of knowledge 
to allow for different ways of knowing and ways of being in the world to come into agonistic 
interaction under the premises of systemic mutual interdependence and common (even if unequal) 
vulnerability (see Chapter 2). It goes in line with what Latour (2015) calls a “radicalization of politics”. 
The role of para-governance agents is intervening to correct power imbalances, rather than achieving 
efficiency in decision-making. As stated above, it is not about “making” the transformation or 
controlling it, but rather about staying open for it and providing it with the social space to manifest 
(Vogt, 2013).  
By the same token, para-governance does not rely on seizing power, as governance does. Indeed: 
Dialectical interactive mechanisms with decentralized agency, sometimes in emergent constellations 
of myriad solo-acting acting agents, sometimes networked in polyarchic or democratic configurations 
(or combinations of both, as Bauwens suggested), seem better suited to “organize the unplannable”. 
Even today, in contrast to the stagnation in political negotiations (and imagination), a new dynamism 
is already visible at the level of cultural evolution, for instance in the potentially revolutionary advent 
of the collaborative commons through digitally potentiated P2P-networks and the emerging 
infrastructure of the Internet of Things.  
These ideas bear a strong Foucauldian flavor, remitting to Foucault’s (2006, p. 238) notion of 
“counter-conduct”, not as a mere ‘misconduct’ in the passive sense, but as rebuttal of regimes and 
practices deployed to exerting control over others, and as the proactive “proposal of new regimes of 
organization of practice”. In the same vein, John Holloway (2002) deems the idea of ‘seizing power’, 
as something that would be located in a specific empowered space such as the state, a mere illusion. 
Instead, he proposes the thesis that power would reside in the fragmentation of social relations, so 
that opposing or balancing this power – which he calls “anti-power” (as opposed to counter-power) 
– amounts to resisting and fighting the mechanisms that case such fragmentation, or – we might add, 
in a more Habermasian conceptualization – the systematic subordination of lifeworlds to the monistic 
logic of bureaucracy or the market. 
Based on the above, however, it would seem that governance and para-governance are mutually 
exclusive, rather than complementary. This could be the case if this were an ontological comparison, 
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rather than an analytical one. Governance and para-governance are rivalrous logics, rather than 
rivalrous entities. But they can have separate existences: while governance operates in the agora of 
foreground politics, para-governance is at home in the realm of background sub-politics; while the 
former is subject to public opinion and oriented toward problem-solving, the latter is shaping public 
opinion, and oriented toward processes of subjectivation and problem-framing (and thus spared from 
the logic of politics, which includes bargaining, lobbying, and seeking command)  
However, the fact that both forms of agency have separate existences does not imply that they are not 
imbricated, or that there is no interface between governance and para-governance. Indeed, para-
governance is to secure the stream of ‘fresh’ and discursively balanced (Santo’s “cognitive justice”) 
inputs into cultural and political life, on which governance draws for decision-making. Thus, para-
governance balances out the trend towards homogeneity implicit in governance, and, at the same time, 
makes it possible and effective under geostorical conditions. Now what does the interface between 
the two look like?  can the apparent contradiction between para-governance’s radical pluriversalism and 
governance’s requirement for complexity reduction in order to maintain governability be 
reconciled?236 
The dilemmas of democracy – the simulative character of liberal consumerist democracies posed by 
Blühdorn, and its inherent difficulty as a decision-making mechanism in dealing with cryptically 
complex issues and radical pluralism, as problematized by Rosa – are not satisfactorily addressed 
neither in the GT nor in the BV debates. Yet scholarly theoretical imagination comes to help: John 
Dryzek (2010) argues that ‘counting heads’ is not the only possible basis for democratic legitimacy. 
Instead, he advocates for “discursive representation” as a practical program for both democratic 
legitimacy and political innovation, as opposed to conventional forms of representation which 
overstate individual autonomy and fail to acknowledge the role of cultural and socio-cognitive or 
phenomenological horizons in shaping individual preferences. A discursive conception of democracy 
would rather emphasize the balance of discursive contestation in the public sphere from a pragmatic 
vantage point, i.e. a representative variety of the actually existing discursive spectrum. In conceiving 
of discourse à la Foucault, that is, as the product of power-knowledge regimes, it becomes clear that 
                                                 236 Note that this question differs from the classical dilemma between democratic legitimacy and 
political efficacy, insofar diversity here is a precondition for both legitimacy and efficacy of governance 
under geostorical conditions. In that sense, our dilemma is more akin to Hannah Arendt’s (1998) 
concern with reconciling poiesis and praxis. 
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striving for discursive diversity should be an end in itself from the perspective of democratic 
legitimacy237, without which it would degenerate into a “tyranny of majorities”. Furthermore, in 
accordance the argument that the main stakeholders of sustainability issues are geographically and 
temporally located outside the boundaries of political constituencies, a discursive approach to 
democratic representation would allow for some form of representation of not yet born, incapable, 
and indeterminate subjects at a global scale in socio-political deliberation processes238. Indeed: 
discursive representation allows for a conception of the deliberating polis based on the idea of networks, 
rather than of demos (see discussion supra in Chapter 7) 
An additional argument in favor of discursive democracy is that it would help correcting the bias of 
liberal democracy towards “procedural legitimation”, thereby neglecting input and output dimensions 
of democratic legitimacy (Dingwerth, 2007). The output dimensions of democratic legitimacy are 
better covered in our empirical case studies. Concepts such as that of “non-reformist reforms” break 
the dualisms of governance versus para-governance, or reform and transformation as two consecutive 
steps (today reformism, tomorrow its radicalization); rather, it sets on the design of reform proposals 
as ‘trojan horses’ containing a revulsive element (Brand, 2016a; Gorz, 1964; J. G. Speth, 2007)239.  
Lastly, with regard to the agents of governance and para-governance, as well as their roles, grounded 
insights were delivered already through the case studies: while the models of the ‘double helix’ and the 
‘triple helix’ involve the well-known characters of state, science, and civil society (business, which is a 
starring character in mainstream sustainability discourses, noteworthily plays a subordinate role) 
(Scholl & Mewes, 2015), the roles performed by them are anything but conventional, as we 
encountered a rather facilitating state (involve practices of legitimation, diffusion, targeted support, 
etc.), a creative civil society acting as ‘game-changer’, and an active role of science as change- and 
democratizing agent. Whereas the regulatory logic of states and markets as main actors in conventional 
                                                 
237 Discursive pluralism should not be equated, however, to discourse particularization or atomization. 
Chakrabarty (Chakrabarty, 2000) sheds light on the fact that fundamentalist (i.e. ideological) positions 
are found not only in hegemonic discourse but also in marginal, and makes the case to ‘decolonize’ 
both mainstream as well as decolonial and postcolonial knowledge production. 238 For an extensive treatment of procedural aspects of discursive democracy (e.g. identification of 
discourses and thir representatives, issues of scale, linguistic and cultural translation, etc.), which falls 
outside the scope of our research, see Dryzek (Dryzek, 2010) 
 239 Akin to the idea of “non-reformist reforms” in more recent formulations are concepts such as 
those of “radical reformism” by Joachim Hirsch (1994, cited in Brand, 2016a) and “double 
transformation” by Dieter Klein (2013). 
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sustainable development discourses is monistic (administrative and utility-maximizing, respectively), 
our ‘learning-helixes’ feature distributed agency with prominence of CS and plural regulatory logics. 
It should be noted, however, that our empirical findings stem from a sample of discrete interventions 
and their effects (or else discursive representations), which, according to the conceptual framework 
developed in this chapter, can be framed as fitting the bill of para-governance; yet no claim can be 
made that such interventions – at least not all of them – were deliberately (let alone systematically) 
performed as driven by or conform to a coherent para-governance framework. So while the harbingers 
of transformative science, for example, do formulate their proposals in the spirit of para-governance, 
the Ecuadorean and Bolivian government did certainly not intend to act as para-governance agents, 
but rather to implement a BV-program according to the conventional logic of governance/ 
government – and so did their supporters. Therefore, the empirical findings of this research are thus 
not to be seen as ‘evidence’ of para-governance practices, but rather as useful hints for outlining the 
contours of an emerging concept, as initial inputs to a yet-to-be-defined repertoire of para-governance 
practices, which requires systematic elaboration and development.  
A full-fledged para-governance role of the state can be developed out of forerunning ideational 
representations encountered in our data and in the literature, such as “activating state” (Lessenig), 
“partner state” (Bauwens), or “enabling state” (WBGU). Activism needs to be reimagined interactively 
in large transformative networks for greater consistency and leverage over culture and politics, 
alongside principles such as those summarized in the Smart CSOs “practical guide for the Great 
Transition” (Narberhaus & Sheppard, 2015).  
But civil society is also a place for systematizing alternative contexts of practice, with new rituals to 
school ourselves in new habits. Religions, for example, can be of central significance here240, since the 
ritual structuring of life transitions, the institutionalized celebration of hope and “encouragement to 
turning away from old habits and setting out on new paths is one of their core functions. Religion 
translates knowledge into emotionally effective ways of relating” (Vogt, 2013). For all their 
disadvantages otherwise, the often-criticized pyramidal structures of world-religions are in privileged 
position to systematically perform such a transformative role. Also the arts can play an important role 
                                                 240 Surely, religion can also play (and has often done so) the opposite role: that of educating people 
into the bourgeois morality, completely oriented to the stabilization of the status quo. (Vogt, 2013) 
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in re-educating our senses through a “re-colouring our conceptual templates of quality of life and 
progress”.  
Finally, in order to mainstream the conception of a “transformative science”, the parameters of post-
normal science necessitate wide adoption. Sterile scholarly dead heats of “contradictory certainties” 
need to give way to a risk-management approach, whereby the focus of academic actors is re-shifted 
from ever-sliding aspirations for “absolute certainty” or “greater precision” towards research agendas 
dominated by “matters of concern” (Latour, 2004), and the mainstream role of science is redefined 
from that of a service-provider of the system to that of a Simmelian stranger offering a unique, 
emancipatory-critical vantage point and pointing possible ways toward the more and more urgent, yet 
again and again procrastinated social-ecological transformation.  
Table 18: Governance vs. Para-governance 
Dimensions of 
comparison Governance Para-governance 
Agora 
Terrain of foreground politics ( 
public opinion / oriented toward 
problem-solving) 
Terrain of background sub-politics ( oriented 
toward problem-framing and subjectivation) 
Scope of 
intervention 
Avoid the unmanageable 
(mitigation) and manage the 
unavoidable (adaptation) 
 
Intervene where the unmanageable is already 
(or doomed to become) unavoidable 
(transformation = ‘creating contexts’) 
 
Applicability simple, stable, predictable systems. Relies on control 
Complex systems. Relies on resilience through 
self-organization 
Goal Management of social change Stewardship of social learning 
Boundaries 
Constrained by politically possible 
and culturally acceptable 
(adaptive) 
expansion of the politically possible and 
culturally acceptable (generative) 
Operational 
principles 
Consensus (negation of conflict) Agonism (acknowledgement of conflict) 
Complexity reduction building resilience (commitment devices) 
Planning & executing “organize the unplannable” 
innovation trans-formation 
Epistemology Positivist (scientific knowledge) Constructivist (multiple knowledges) 
Main agents 
State & markets (monistic 
regulatory mechanism: 
bureaucratic or economic) 
Decentralized agency (plural regulatory 
mechanisms) 
 
 
7.2. Discussion: towards an integral theory of social-ecological transformations? 
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While this research explored the interface of agency networks, meaning, and meso-level social 
structures as constraining or enabling upon agency in contingent spatiotemporal contexts, macro-level 
social structures have played a secondary role in our research design. But from the outset it was stated 
that our theoretical-empirical exploration was aimed at contributing to the bigger picture of an 
emerging critical “transformation theory” (cf. Chapter 1). While exploring the details of how the ideas 
of ‘para-governance’ and ‘transformative agency’ as a learning-driving agent would fit into a full-
fledged theory of social-ecological transformations exceeds the scope of our analysis, worthwhile 
insights gained in this regard throughout the research can be summarized to indicate a direction for 
future theoretical and empirical explorations. 
 
As stated in Chapter 1, collective learning is a necessary but not sufficient condition for social change 
(Eder, 1999). Socio-cultural change typically unleashes a slow, unconscious, involuntary evolution 
process with consequences which are difficult to predict; these, in turn, generating conflictive relations, 
that increase pressure towards change. Thus, the transformation of certain social conditions act upon 
both social restrictions and cultural meaning structuring social relations, simultaneously creating new 
conditions, which open the door to the collective action of new agents (Bajoit & Vanhulst, 2016). 
Furthermore: the relation between learning and change is mediated by systemic constraints and 
enablers, which can be more or less resilient (Eder, 1999) and over which agents can have more or 
less control. As shown here, however, the conditions of possibility for learning and the empowerment 
or emergence of transformative agency can indeed be largely influenced in a deliberate way, thereby 
facilitating, in turn, the emergence of both transformative agents and structural transformations. 
 
The particularity of collective learning processes with social-ecological drivers, on which this research 
put an exclusive focus, is that global macro-structures are tendentially unstable (risk society), thus 
creating structural preconditions for transformative learning, part of which can be produced or 
activated deliberately through para-governance mechanisms. From a normative vantage point, there 
is agreement that the accountability of contemporary decision-making instances in terms of 
sustainability governance (chiefly but not solely of state actors) goes beyond the constituencies defined 
by political convention, to virtually encompass all of humanity (in a geographically and temporally 
omni-inclusive sense), and arguably all of “our Common Home” (Laudato Si’, 2015). This learning, 
together with non-learning-related triggers (e.g. environmental or economic shocks), lead to 
emergence; and emergence has a loosening effect on structures, thus augmenting the margin of 
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maneuver for transformative agency (Raskin, 2008), which can then be harnessed effectively through 
governance.  
 
This allows to put the picture together of how agency, structure, contingent situation, and 
meaning/learning fit together into a single theory of transformations: while structure and agency shape 
each other (in the classical sense of the structure-agency dualism) in a given spatiotemporal context, 
emergent phenomena tend to loosen unsustainable, locked-in structures, giving transformative agency 
an extra point of leverage over structure. This dialectical process feeds back positively into collective 
learning processes pushing this whole relational system towards a transformed system-structure 
beyond the boundaries of current contingencies. (see Figure 19)  
 
Figure 19: overview of collective learning in the broader picture of a theory of social-ecological transformations  
 
Through our analysis of discursive representations, especially those in the GT debate, insights could 
be gained into macro-structural constraints to a social-ecological transformation, and how 
transformative agency can, in some cases, unlock, loosen, or circumvent such constraints through 
para-governance interventions. Let us try and synthetize these insights, classified into three categories 
of macro-structural constraints: political, material, and cultural. 
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On the political front, we have identified various problematic aspects which could be grouped in two 
polarized alternatives underpinning the same lock-in of politics, which we called ‘technocratic 
managerialism’ and ‘democratic optimism’. The depoliticizing effect of technocratic-managerial views 
of governance, which cling either on the administrative logic of ‘command and control’ or on the logic 
of utility maximization of so-called market regulation, has a hitherto failed to deliver the historical 
burden of proof in bending global evolutionary trajectories toward pathways compatible with 
sustainable human life on earth. Given the stakes and the tight time-window available to accomplish 
such transformation, it can no longer be the preferred approach to sustainability governance: after 
four decades of virtually uncontested discursive dominance worldwide with intensifying and 
accelerating degradation trends in the Earth System, techno-managerial approaches deserve careful 
scrutiny, rather than blind credence.  
However, democratizing enthusiasts setting their hopes on improved stakeholder participation should 
be cautioned against the pitfalls of deliberative mechanisms in the face of ever-increasing factual 
complexity and cultural pluralism (H. Rosa, 2010, 2016a), on the one hand, and against the risk of 
liberal consumer democracies turning into reactionary defenders of their ‘imperial way of life’ against 
outsiders (Brand & Wissen, 2017), thus leading to a post-ecologist “politics of simulation” where both 
political elites and their constituencies are tacit accomplices in a “performance of seriousness”, which, 
no matter how bombastic the transformative rhetoric, is aimed at “sustaining the unsustainable” for 
as long as possible. (Blühdorn, 2007) 
Empirical evidence appears to support this hypothesis of simulative politics: according to a recently 
published study from an Oxford research group (Pfeiffer, Millar, Hepburn, & Beinhocker, 2016), in 
order to get a fifty percent chance of attaining the politically agreed climate goal of limiting global 
average temperature increase to 2° Celsius, no new fossil-fuel-based energy plants can be constructed 
as of immediately, unless endowed with potent carbon sequestration mechanisms making them 
emissions-neutral. Furthermore, even if all 150 signatories of the celebrated Paris Agreement of 2015 
would eventually honor their Nationally Determined Contributions to curb carbon emissions (which 
given current trends seems extremely unlikely), the global aggregate energy demand would raise by 
32% and CO2 emissions by 15%, resulting in average atmospheric warming of 2,7°, well above the 
set goal (International Energy Agency, 2015). But limiting the problem to energy provision alone 
would also be misleading: the burning of fossil fuels accounts only for 70% of global anthropogenic 
emissions, while the required reduction, to stay within the 2°C guardrail, would be of 80% until 2050. 
Indeed, the problem lies not only in which type of energy is consumed, but for what purposes it is 
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consumed (Hickel, 2016a). The unattainability of the climate goals under current governance 
mechanisms is manifest, yet the Paris Agreement was unanimously praised as the “best possible” deal. 
Noteworthily, Blühdorn’s thesis challenges the widespread cleavage pitting (evil) ‘elites’ against 
(benevolent) ‘ordinary people’. Indeed, the diagnoses of “lack of political will” or “corrupt 
governments” at the service of “vested interests”, while surely overall justified, are excessively 
simplistic and inexpedient: such diagnoses foster but messianic hopes for societies to make “the right 
choice” when electing their political decision-makers, and bend the focus of politics onto an obsessive 
preoccupation with the moral quality of public officials, while obscuring the deeply entrenched social 
and political dynamics underneath. Indeed: even willing political elites would be unable to resist the 
self-stabilization pressures in the face of a divided electorate (i.e. fragmented and contradictory citizen 
interests), on the one hand, and the necessary trade-off between governability (i.e. consensus-building) 
and transformative efficacy, on the other, as is perfectly illustrated with the case of the hybrid Buen vivir 
(cf. Chapter 5). These political dilemmas are reinforced by the material blockers described below, 
which, given the short electoral cycles, push governments to indefinitely postponing the 
uncomfortable consequences of effective action (Blühdorn, 2007; Streeck, 2013). (cf. Section 7.1, this 
chapter). 
Messianic hopes (be it in political leaders or in ‘technological miracles’) lead to social immobility and 
trump prospects for the mainstreaming of a para-governance approach to the social-ecological 
transformation.  
Hence democracy, depending on its particular configuration, can be as much part of the problem as 
it can be part of the solution to the unsustainability lock-in: as long as emancipation means liberation 
from ecological and social constraints, democratic paths towards a SET will remain locked. 
Democracy will not bring about sustainability as long as there is no (para-governed) substantial 
transformation of Western consumer culture. 
We did identify potential para-governance remedies for these dilemmas, however: Dryzek’s 
conception of discursive representation instead of the classical majorities-representation of liberal 
democracy potentially offers a way out of “simulative politics” by giving TDs a greater weight in 
(sub)political life, feeding back positively, through the expansion of identity-boundaries, into the 
emergence of transformative agency. Also put forward by Dryzek, Castells, Bauwens, among others, 
are network-conceptions of a proxy-polity, such as peer-to-peer polyarchic-democratic configuations 
(Bauwens, 2012b) a “network society” as a polity displacing the conventional demos (Castells, 2000), 
thus dismantling territorial-based ‘imperial’ socio-economic relations and creating new spaces for 
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identity generation and adscription. The creation of socio-ecological “commitment devices” in the 
sense of A. Offer and T. Jackson (2009a) would structurally constrain available options for myopic, 
self-destructive collective or individual behavior, yet it would require a shift in the normative 
engagement of the state, confronting prejudices of “totalitarian interventions” towards co-producing 
the social world. 
Yet political room for maneuver is tightly constrained, as we learned also through Buen vivir, due to 
material or economic constraints. Jackson clearly lays out the dilemma of the conflicted state, which 
regardless of its transformative will, remains structurally dependent on economic growth to sustain 
the service of debt (insofar compound interest and the intricate system of financial derivatives 
continue to drive an exponential increase in debt that needs to be compensated) and keep 
unemployment rates under control (compensating for the loss to automation and labor-productivity 
increases).  
Similarly, individual business entrepreneurs may be willing to pursue broader objectives than mere 
economic profit (Scholl & Mewes, 2015); yet, from a systemic perspective, the imperative of capital-
rentability maximization in a capitalist economy means that capitalist businesses have an inbuilt 
externalization drive setting economic actors into a ‘race to the bottom’ to reduce production costs, 
which will eventually and inevitably either confine ‘ethical business’ to economic niches (relying on a 
consumer-base able and willing to pay overprices to compensate for higher costs of production) or 
drive them back into the unsustainable mainstream (Latouche, 2009). This seems an irremediable dead 
end from a governance perspective:  Indeed, “the organization of the totality of the economy towards 
a ‘better’ life has become the main enemy of a good life”. (Illich, 1973, p. 118) 
What para-governance options are available to escape the economic dimension of the unsustainability 
lock-in? A “politics of sufficiency” at the meso-level could be help creating the cultural preconditions 
to rallying people behind a process of macro-economic redesign towards sustainable degrowth, 
through the fostered emergence of plural economies beyond capitalism, as well as decentralized and 
local money-systems and other forms of currency (e.g. time banks). A decisive para-governance 
intervention in this regard would be fostering the debate around the ownership of the emerging 
infrastructure of the Internet of Things (IoT), which, according the representations lumped here 
together under the rubric of “P2P Society”, could potentially enable a wholesale transition from 
capitalism to the “collaborative commons” as the dominant economic system of the 21st century, 
embedded in a “network society”. Rifkin (2014, p. 138) eloquently points out the uniqueness of the 
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historical window of opportunity now opening towards a Polanyian-scale whole-societal 
transformation:  
The IoT is the first general purpose technology platform in history that can potentially take large parts 
of the economy to near zero marginal costs [by enabling ‘prosumers’ to produce most of the material 
artifacts they require almost for free, thus radically democratizing the ownership of the means of 
production, as happened with immaterial goods through the advent of the communications internet]. 
And that’s what makes the marginal cost controversy so pivotal to humanity’s future. Whether the 
new potential inherent in the IoT infrastructure can be realized will be determined by who finances 
the platform. The struggle for control is already well underway, mostly behind the scenes, in regulatory 
commissions, courtrooms, legislatures, corporate boardrooms, civil society organizations, and 
academic circles all over the world. As of yet, only snippets of the discussion have bubbled up to 
public consciousness. That is likely to change in the next few years as a younger generation squares 
off with itself on what kind of economic future it favors. 
 
Lastly, structural hindrances of cultural nature include, as per our analysis, change-blockers such as a 
social “status competition”, a behaviorist policy mindset, a monistic conception of modernity and of 
the good life, a pragmatist cultural bias, the dogmatic character of themes such as GDP growth-
orientation of the political economy or a territorial re-localization of most economic activity; or, 
conversely, the tabooed character of sufficiency as a political-cultural project. On the opposite pole of 
the ideological spectrum, romanticized views and hopes about ‘insular’ alternatives being upscalable 
up to the point of triggering a systemic shift (as in the “Indigenist BV”) appear equally misleading. 
Indeed: 
It seems quite possible that millions of people could embrace voluntary simplicity, vegetarianism, 
recycling, downshifting […] or ecovillage living […] without making a dent in the ongoing expansion 
of global societal metabolism and GDP. (Paulson, 2017, p. 435) 
 
An incipient shift in meaning-structures can be observed with the introduction of  concepts such as 
Brand & Wissen’s “imperial ways of life” challenging the logic of ‘global development’, the ‘good life’ 
as opposed to ‘better life’ (Acosta, 2010a; Illich, 1973), “enjoyable limits” (Schneidewind et al., 2013), 
as well as the introduction of revulsive frame-carriers (as we saw with the narratives of conservative 
contraction and P2P society in the GT debate). The holistic forms of knowing and relating, the 
celebrative (as opposed to rationalist-utilitarian) ethos of BV, and the collectivistic imagination 
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superseding individual ‘lifestyle choice’ offer similar potential, but all these endeavors would need a 
more massive, systematic, and deliberate engagement – that is, para-governance – in order to feed 
serious societal debate and cultural agonism. Table 19 summarizes the structural hindrances and the 
para-governance enablers at the macro-level just discussed. 
 
Table 19: Macro-level structural lock-ins and corresponding para-governance enablers 
 Structural lock-ins Para-governance enablers 
Political 
- De-politization and naturalization of 
technocratic/ managerial views of 
governance - Crisis of democracy and politics (simulative 
politics) 
- Discursive democracy - Networks as polity (combinations of 
polyarchic and democratic structures) - Social commitment devices 
Material 
- Structural dependence of finance and labor 
on sustained economic growth 
- politics of sufficiency,  - plural economies, - sustainable degrowth, - collaborative commons. 
Cultural 
- Narrative of ‘global development’ - status competition - behaviorist policy mindset - monistic ontologies - pragmatist bias, - dogmatic character of key-leverage issues 
(growth-orientation, sufficiency, re-
localization) - Romanticized hopes about ‘insular’ lifestyle 
alternatives 
- imperial ways of life, - good life as opposed to ‘better life’, - enjoyable limits, - revulsive frame-brokers (e.g. CC and 
P2P as frame brokers in GT debate) - Holistic form of knowing and relating, 
celebrative ethos of BV 
 
A derived discussion pits the above implicit supposition that society, as a meta-system, is amenable to 
wholesale change, in the first place, against two variants of rationalist theorizing that we have been 
arguing against, in a more or less explicit fashion: first, the Rational Choice approach so popular in 
policy as well as in the academia; and, secondly, the System-theory of Niklas Luhmann.  
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A Lumannite analysis would conclude that the super-system society is incapable of understanding 
itself as a totality, and correspondingly also to generate solutions at the level of the system as a whole. 
The rational choice approach, in turn, sees individual choice as autopoietic and society as an aggregate 
of individual agents, thus setting the tout court explanatory focus for any change at the level of 
individuals (driven by immaterial attitudes and beliefs or by material interests). The first rules out 
micro-foundations of social change; the latter rules out macro-foundations.  
While from the perspective of enabling sustainability transitions the RC approach has a sorry record, 
yielding paradoxical value-action gaps, Luhmann’s systems-approach might be, to some extent at least, 
upheld in its own terms, as accurately describing the working-mechanisms of complex, functionally 
differentiated modern societies. Yet it also has a naturalizing, self-fulfilling prophecy performativity: 
it describes well the social reality it reproduces itself.  
Instead, the prospect of a social-ecological transformation demands – hence the word – a trans-
formation of society in its mutually reinforcing unsustainable sub-systemic feedback loops abundantly 
described throughout this dissertation. The self-referential mechanisms and pressures of societal sub-
systems described by Luhmann are much alive and kicking, but they can and need to be challenged 
(Unger, 2004).  
The genocidal totalitarian experiences of the 20th century have rightly made us reluctant to think of 
the possibility of steered whole-societal change experiments. Yet in the context of the geostorical 
challenges of the Anthropocene, an antithetic moment to the rationalist and Luhmannite ontologies 
is urgently needed. But fostered transformative learning presents a non-necessitarian, non-rationalistic 
alternative: one that looks at systemic interrelations, as well, but not as a mechanistic totality: an 
alternative metaphor is that of the social system as an ecosystem (Blühdorn, 2011; Wright, 2013).  
In an ecosystem, interdependence is as important as for Luhmann, but interactions are more complex, 
open, and transversal, thereby trumping the assumption of autopoietic closure. This ecosystemic 
backbone opens up new possibilities for imagining societal change. Indeed, an ecosystem might be 
transformed by the introduction of an alien species that initially develops within a niche and gradually 
displaces certain other species, reconstituting the dynamics, structures and functions of the whole 
ecosystem (Wright, 2013, p. 9). Similarly, this is the logic of a ‘critical yeast’ (Lederach, 2003) offers an 
alternative not only to the Luhmannite system-logic, but also to that of the critical mass implicit in 
rational choice. 
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7.3. Closing remarks 
 
Under the title “The futures we want”, the World Forum of Sociology 2016 of the International 
Sociological Association (ISA) urged the discipline to become a “forward-oriented sociology, on the 
pertinent trends, risks, and opportunities of our time, on scenarios of probable, possible, preventable, 
or preferable futures”241. A kindred future-orientation – now with socio-ecological sustainability 
explicitly at the center –  is strongly advocated by the International Social Science Council (ISSC) in 
the World Social Science Report 2013. (Hackmann & Moser, 2013a)  
Sustainability (governance) research in the social sciences hitherto clustered around three major topical 
areas: the analysis of collective action (the study of environmental social movements); of institutions 
(state politics and environmental policy formation, or else the relationship between consumption and 
production institutions), or else of social-psychological behavioral drivers (environmental attitudes, 
beliefs and values). Complementary topics are the role of technology in social and environmental 
change, and issues of spatial scale – chiefly the significance of ‘the global’ in terms of ‘environmental 
scale’ and institutions (Hannigan, 2006, p. 12). Common to these approaches is that conventional 
assumptions about the who and the how of change are hardly ever problematized, be it regarding the 
role of both individual and collective agency (rationalist, naturalist, behaviorist assumptions) or the 
structural (functionalist assumptions) and dynamic mechanisms of social change (top-down vs. 
bottom-up dichotomy).   
In addition, the dualist focus on either a normative macro-critique of industrialism and capitalism –
dominant in the 1970s and 1980s (Hannigan, 2006) and resurging in the wake of the ‘Great Recession’ 
during the last decade (Brand, 2014a) – or else a descriptive/ ethnographic account of localized, 
concrete, visible, and measurable socio-environmental entanglements. The importance of real or 
concrete utopias for a fundamental social-ecological transformation as an area of study and cultural-
political action has been thereby largely neglected. 
This dissertation sought to contribute to filling in the above gaps. To this end, it built on a bold 
double-register: On the one hand, a well-delimited focus of observation allowing for a 
methodologically rigorous study, namely on network-based discursive interaction dynamics in 
spatiotemporally situated debates. Particular attention was payed to the dynamic roles and practices 
and to the structural configurations of agency at play in producing mainly two types of effects: first, 
discursive pluralization, and second, the emergence of new discursive articulations around social-
                                                 241 Source: http://futureswewant.net/about/; accessed on 24.03.2017 
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ecological utopias transcending the purview of mainstream sustainability governance and sustainable 
development discussions. Yet, on the other hand, while narrowing down its focus for analytical 
precision, our research interest taps into a horizon of change that pertains “huge structures, enormous 
comparisons”, as Charles Tilly advocates, and is thus conceived of as a building block towards an 
overarching theory to support the historically unprecedented, global task to deliberately advance a 
Polanyian-scale transformation towards sustainability. In geostorical times, such double register arguably 
becomes a sine qua non condition for inquiry in the domain of sustainability and sustainability 
governance. That this sort of approach has been marginalized in the social sciences over decades is 
inimical to the challenges facing societies worldwide. 
But this research also offers orientation to cultural and political action. By addressing the issue of 
sustainability governance from the perspective of collective learning and discursive change, this 
research endeavor seeks to open new avenues for understanding ‘sustained unsustainability’ that go 
beyond dominant yet sterile rationalist explanations such as the so-called ‘value-action gap’, and 
illuminate pathways forward towards effective, transformative interventions. The re-habilitation of the 
concept of real utopia is intended to work against the self-censorship of imagination that permeates 
mainstream current political culture in addressing sustainability issues. Our inquiry delivered insights 
and raised questions about different narratives of socially desirable change, associated ways of life, and 
alternative socio-economic, technological and governance systems. 
In order to best condense the overall insights gained through this dissertation, I will arrange them 
according to the three classical levels of social analysis involved, and their reciprocal imbrications.  
Our journey began by theoretically exploring the elasticity of classical agency-based theories of social 
change in accounting for micro-level agency driving process of transformational social learning and 
change, establishing the dilemmas of the “conflicted agent” and the “missing agent” as structural 
predicaments constraining agency. In order to find out how agency can overcome its own restrictions 
towards an enhanced transformative potential, we investigated two situated, ongoing processes of 
radical discursive contestation around social-ecological utopias as a proxy to transformative learning. 
Although our focus of observation was geared towards heterogeneous networks of deliberation and 
collective action spanning across society, the strong presence of (larger clusters of) organizations and 
institutional platforms, concentrated our attention broadly at the meso-level of analysis. Looking at 
the repertoires of both practices and representations at play in these debates, we gained insights into 
how the predicament of micro-level agency is sorted out through forms of subrogatory and hybrid agency, 
enabled through (material) institutional support structures, such as cultural diffraction mechanisms 
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for (socially non-punitive) alternative identification and subjectivation opportunities, or combinations 
of material shielding and leverage to preserve the above repository of cultural biodiversity, and the 
capacity to expand its influence across the ‘social ecosystem’. Data supporting these findings came 
mostly from the analysis of discursive practice.  
But both the data – now especially at the level of representation – and state-of-the-art literature 
revealed the superordinate constraints weighting over transformative agency and transformational 
learning operating at the macro level: we reviewed cultural, material, and political factors locking-in 
current development trajectories, thus trivializing much of the efforts attempted at lower levels.  
Even though researching these macro-level constraints was not supported by the research design as it 
fell beyond the scope of this research, putting the problematization of the trilogy agency-learning-
transformation into a macro-perspective appeared necessary to gain a holistic understanding of the 
blockades facing the required societal changes, and the implications thereof for sustainability 
governance. We thus found that the convergence of micro- and macro-level predicaments of 
transformative agency unambiguously points at a cul-de-sac of the concept of governance itself. While 
an improved governance remains crucial to manage mitigation and adaptation to the unprecedented 
challenges of the Anthropocene, it appears inherently incapable of paving the way towards the 
transformation of human societies into more resilient ones, into societies capable of “organizing the 
unplannable” and of standing up to the “unmanageable that is unavoidable”. This acknowledgement 
led to the conceptual-theoretical innovation of para-governance as an alternative (largely conflicting) 
logic and empirical complement to governance. 
As a deliberate facilitation of the creation of preconditions for transformative learning, para-
governance deliberately undermines quick and painless but ultimately incongruous cultural and 
political fusions, and channels creative energies towards creating preconditions for the ‘right fusions’, 
instead. The versatility of the concept of para-governance for addressing the macro-level lock-ins 
hampering effective sustainability governance was then proto-tested, simultaneously outlining possible 
avenues for future research.  
Transformative collective learning and para-governance appear as a powerful complement to more 
established analyses of the global situation developed in the scholarly fields of environmental 
sociology, political ecology, ecological economics, or science and technology studies, as well as cultural 
studies, critical geography, and indigenous studies. The para-governance framework links critical 
conversations in these fields with momentous developments in socio-natural life, including mounting 
worldwide struggles for social justice, environmental sustainability, and non-relativist cultural 
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pluralism, as well as worrisome further and accelerated deterioration of the conditions of stability of 
the Earth system that human societies have taken for granted and relied on throughout all of history. 
Para-governance, I argue, is the call of the hour if sustainability governance is to improve its 
effectiveness in addressing geostorical challenges. If the Anthropocene and the derived transformation 
imperative are taken seriously while unprecedented humanitarian catastrophe appears still avoidable, 
transformational social learning needs to be brought to the center of any sustainability strategy. 
Without mainstreaming of a para-governance approach, transformative agency will hardly attain the 
critical mass to make “the politically impossible become the politically inevitable”.  
The greatest hindrance in embracing para-governance may just lie in the misplaced hope awarded to 
what by now should be manifestly regarded as an illusory, compensatory utopia of attaining a socially 
and ecologically responsible social order under the aegis of the capitalist-industrialist matrix. Clinging 
on compensatory utopias rather than harnessing the potential lurking in “real utopias” implies the 
depletion of humanity’s most valuable but also scarcest resource: social energy for transformative 
change. 
Para-governance remains a normative proposal, however, in a world where “pathways of collective 
unlearning” have the upper hand, at least in the politics of a global industrialist-capitalist system set 
into a runaway collision course with ecological planetary boundaries. To be sure, however, the multi-
centric and pluralist world which will characterize the 21st century, whose contours are already visible, 
together with the major socio-environmental disruptions already in the pipeline, offer fertile ground 
for more radical learning. In a world set on course of exponential growth of private wealth, exponential 
learning curves are urgently required. A kind of learning that overturns the Hegelian conception 
according to which we can only learn what is already known (Rehbein 2010, 2013) – i.e. that all we 
can learn necessarily has to draw on the existing stock of ideas and actions, thereby negating the 
‘surplus of possibility’ lurking in the space of societal non-existence referred to by Butler and Sousa 
Santos. It is by drawing on these repositories that it becomes possible for society to lift itself above 
the constraints of its current symbolic order. Critically for this dissertation, this implies the possibility 
of a form of learning which gives place to the generation of true alternatives – better, as Santos puts 
it: of “alternative ways of looking at alternatives” – to the ecologically and socially unsustainable 
Western-mirrored symbolic and normative horizon reflected in the currently prevailing world order. 
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ANNEX 1. Main data corpus for the analysis of the GT discourse as field of representation 
 
Text 
N°. 
Author Title 
1 Acosta, Alberto Buen Vivir. Vom Recht auf ein gutes Leben 
2 Adler / Schachtschneider (Alain 
Lipietz / Wuppertal Institut) 
Green New Deal, Suffizienz oder 
Ökosozialismus 
3 Adler / Schachtschneider 
(Bennholdt-Thomsen / von 
Werlhof) 
Green New Deal, Suffizienz oder 
Ökosozialismus 
4 Adler / Schachtschneider 
(Biesecker) 
Green New Deal, Suffizienz oder 
Ökosozialismus 
5 Adler / Schachtschneider (Marko 
Ferst) 
Green New Deal, Suffizienz oder 
Ökosozialismus 
6 Adler / Schachtschneider (Martin 
Jänicke / Joseph Huber) 
Green New Deal, Suffizienz oder 
Ökosozialismus 
7 Adler / Schachtschneider (Paech / 
Binswanger / Wuppertal Institut) 
Green New Deal, Suffizienz oder 
Ökosozialismus 
8 Adler / Schachtschneider (Rainer 
Land) 
Green New Deal, Suffizienz oder 
Ökosozialismus 
9 Adler / Schachtschneider (Robert 
Kurz) 
Green New Deal, Suffizienz oder 
Ökosozialismus 
10 Adler / Schachtschneider (Sarkar / 
Bruno Kern) 
Green New Deal, Suffizienz oder 
Ökosozialismus 
11 Adler / Schachtschneider (Ulrich 
Beck) 
Green New Deal, Suffizienz oder 
Ökosozialismus 
12 Adler / Schachtschneider (Ulrich 
Brand / Christoph Görg) 
Green New Deal, Suffizienz oder 
Ökosozialismus 
13 Assadourian, Erik Wachstum im Überfluss 
14 Biesecker, Adelheid / Hofmeister, 
Sabine 
(Re)Produktivität als Kategorie Vorsorgendes 
Wirtschaften 
15 Birch, Eugenie / Lynch, Amy Ist nachhaltige Stadtentwicklung messbar? 
16 Borries, von Friedrich Zehn Thesen für die Stadt von morgen 
17 BUND; Brot für die Welt, 
Wuppertal Institut 
Zukunftfähiges Deutschland 
18 Daly, Herman Steady State Economy 
(http://www.theoildrum.com/pdf/theoildrum
_3941.pdf) 
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19 Diefenbacher, Hans Szenario Arbeitswelt 
20 Ekins, Paul Wie wird die Welt von morgen sein? 
21 Etzioni, Amitai Eine nue Charakterisierung des guten Lebens 
22 Exner, Andreas /Lauk, Christian Das Wachstum des Kapitals 
23 Fatheuer, Thomas Buen Vivir - Recht auf gutes Leben 
24 Fücks, Ralf Intelligent Wachsen 
25 Global Scenario Group Great Transition 
26 Gudynas, Eduardo Buen Vivir: Today's tomorrow 
27 Habermann, Friederike Ecommony 
28 Hahlbrock, Klaus Szenario Ernährung 
29 Haug, Frigga Arbeit jenseits von Wachstum 
30 Höpflinger, Francois Alterssicherungssysteme: Doppelte 
Herausforderung von demografischer 
Alterung und Postwachstum 
31 Hopkins, Rob Transition Town 
32 ISM Sozialökologischer Umbau 
33 Ivanova, Maria Autorität, Ressourcen, Vernetzung - Woraus 
eine neue Umwelt-Governance entsteht 
34 Jackson, Tim Wohlstand ohne Wachstum 
35 Kemfert, Claudia Szenario Energie 
36 Lachenmayer, Jan /Maier, Timo 
(Johannes Heinrichs) 
Demokratie - Ein Auslfug ins Mögliche 
37 Latouche, Serge Farewell to growth 
38 Leggewie, Claus 2050: Die demokratische Frage heute 
39 LINKSFRAKTION Plan B (https://www.plan-b-
mitmachen.de/?page_id=399) 
40 Massarat, Mohssen Die Viertagewoche 
41 Messner, Dirk Drei Wellen globalen Wandels 
42 Miegel, Meinhard Exit! Wachstum ohne Wohlstand 
43 Mikfeld, Benjamin Alte und neue Wege aus der großen Krise 
44 NEF Great Transition 
45 Paech, Niko Vom grünen Wachstumsmythos zur 
Postwachstumsökonomie 
46 Paech, Niko (2012) Befreiung vom Überfluss 
47 Schmelzer, Matthias / Passadakis, 
Alexis 
Postwachstum 
48 Pennekamp, Johannes 
(Binswanger) 
Wohlstand ohne Wachstum - Ein 
Literaturüberblick 
49 Pennekamp, Johannes (Peter 
Victor) 
Wohlstand ohne Wachstum - Ein 
Literaturüberblick 
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50 Rammler, Stephan Die Geschichte der Zukunft unserer Mobilität 
51 Rat für nachhaltige Entwicklung Visionen 2050 
52 Rätz, Werner et. al. Statt Verdammung "Falscher" Bedürfnisse: 
Demokratische Debatte über Inhalt und 
Gestalt der Produktion 
53 Felber, Christian Die Gemeinwohl-Ökonomie 
54 Renner, Michael Green Economy - eine Antwort auf die Krise? 
55 Reuter, Norbert Der Arbeitsmarkt im Spannungsfeld von 
Wachstum, Ökologie und Verteilung 
56 Ropke, Inge Konsum: Der Kern des Wachstumsmotors 
57 Schneider, Francois et. al. Crisis or opportunity? Econic degrowth for 
social equity and ecological sustainability. 
Introduction to this special issue 
58 Schor, Juliet Plenitude 
59 Stratmann-Mertens, Eckhard Schrumpfung statt Wachstum 
60 Ulvila, Marko / Parsanen, Jana Sustainable Futures 
61 WBSCD Visionen 2050 
62 White, Allen / Baraldi, Monica Visionen, Prinzipien, Veränderungen - Wie 
sich Unternehmen neu erfinden können 
63 Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen Green new Deal 2011 
64 SPD So wollen wir leben! 
65 Felder et al (ver.di, Greenpeace & 
Attac) 
Sozial-ökologischer Umbau als Projekt von 
Gewerkschaften und sozialen Bewegungen. 
66 IG Metall / IG BCE Qualitatives Wachstum für gute Arbeit und 
eine gerechte Gesellschaft 
67 Weizsäcker, Ernst Ulrich von WOYNOWSKY  ET AL 
68 Braungart, Michael WOYNOWSKY  ET AL 
69 Hiss, Christian WOYNOWSKY  ET AL 
70 Peukert, Helge WOYNOWSKY  ET AL 
71 Paqué, Karl Heinz Wachstum! Die Zukunft des globalen 
Kapitalismus 
72 WBGU Climate protection as a world citizens 
movement 
73 WBGU Gesellschaftlicher Vertrag für eine Große 
Transformation 
74 Schneidewind & Zahrnt Damit gutes Leben einfacher wird. 
Perspektiven einer Suffizienzpolitik 
75 Reisch Zeit für Nachhaltigkeit – Zeiten der  
Transformation 
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76 Muraca Gut Leben. Eine Gesellschaft jenseits des 
Wachstums 
77 Welzer & Sommer Transformationsdesign Wege in eine 
zukunftsfähige Moderne 
78 Unmüßig, B., Sachs, W., & 
Fatheuer 
Critique of the Green Economy Toward 
Social and Environmental Equity 
79 Andreae et al (INSM) Die Grüne Marktwirtschaft – Wege zum 
nachhaltigen Wachstum 
80 Misereor Weltgemeinwohl. Neue Ansätze zu 
Postwachstum und sozialer Gerechtigkeit 
81 Adloff & Leggewie Das konvivialistische Manifest 
82 Asara et al 2015 Socially sustainable degrowth as a social–
ecological transformation: repoliticizing 
sustainability 
83 UNEP Towards a Green Economy 
84 OECD Towards Green Growth 
85 Bauwens, Michael Blueprint for P2P Society: The Partner State & 
Ethical Economy 
86 Rifkin, Jeremy The Zero Marginal Cost Society 
87 Mason, Paul Postcapitalism: A guide to our future 
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ANNEX 2: Sample 2. List of selected texts for the analysis of GT as field of discursive practice 
 
Text 
N°. 
Author Title 
1 Adloff Das Konvivialistische Manifest. Einleitung der 
deutschen Fassung 
2 Brand, U Degrowth: Der Beginn einer Bewegung? 
3 Brand, U., Pühl, K., & Thimmel, 
S. 
Wohlstand -wie anders? 
4 Brie, M. Futuring: Perspektiven der Transformation im 
Kapitalismus über ihn hinaus 
5 Bund für Umwelt und 
Naturschutz Deutschland, Brot 
für die Welt, & Wuppertal 
Instituts für Klima, Umwelt, 
Energie 
Zukunftsfähiges Deutschland in einer 
globalisierten Welt: ein Anstoss zur 
gesellschaftlichen Debatte 
6 Deutscher Bundestag Schlussbericht der Enquete-Kommission 
„Wachstum, Wohl-stand, Lebensqualität – 
Wege zu nachhaltigem Wirtschaften und 
gesellschaftlichem Fortschritt in der Sozialen 
Marktwirtschaft“ 
7 Ecornet Verstehen – Bewerten – Gestalten 
8 Felder, C. et. Al Sozial-ökologischer Umbau als Projekt von 
Gewerkschaften und sozialen Bewegungen. 
9 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung So wollen wir leben! Ideen und 
Handlungsempfehlungen aus dem 
Fortschrittsforum 
10 Germanwatch The Great Transformation 
11 Germanwatch International conference Dialogue on 
Transformation/Regional Meeting 
12 Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) 
Transformation: Den großen Wandel 
mitgestalten 
13 Homer-Dixon, T. The Great Transformation: Climate Change as 
Cultural Change. Keynote Speech. 
14 Leinfelder, R., & Pilardeaux, B. Der WBGU-Comic: Die Große 
Transformation: Der WBGU und das 
Transformationsgutachten 
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15 Misereor, & IHS. Weltgemeinwohl_Neue Ansätze zu 
Postwachstum und globaler Gerechtigkeit 
(Welt Sichten) 
16 Reisch, L. A., & Bietz, S. Zeit für Nachhaltigkeit – Zeiten der  
Transformation:  Elemente einer Zeitpolitik 
für die  gesellschaftliche Transformation zu  
nachhaltigeren Lebensstilen 
17 von Jorck, G. Konzepte und Leitbilder sozial-ökologischer 
Transformation 
18 WBGU Climate Protection as a World Citizen 
Movement Special Report 
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ANNEX 3: Sample 2: Theoretical criteria used for sampling (adapted from Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 31) 
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COMMENTS
P 2: Adloff & Leggewie_2014_Das  Konvivia l i s ti sche Mani fest
x x x x x
Consensus-portra i t of the foundational  principles  for a  GT by a  large and heterogeneous  
group of intel lectua ls , drawing on convivia l i sm as  a  pol i tica l -phi losophica l  approach.
Draws  on French influences , mainly, and summarizes  the discourse of this  col lective 
actor.
P 3: Bausetel le 
Zukunft_Transformation_Flachs land_Edenhofer_Auf_mehreren
_Ebenen_agieren
x x x x Represents  the discourse on transformation (respective volume in Pol i ti ti sche Ökologie) 
from mainstream cl imate science, embodied here by Ottmar Edenhofer
P 4: Brand_degrowth_birth of a  movement x x x x x x
describes  the dynamics  of movement-bui lding s temming from the degrowth debate, 
l inking i t to the GT debate
P 5: Brand et a l_2013_Wohlstand - wie anders x x x x x
This  document provides  reflections  and ins ights  about the working dynamics  of the 
Enquette WWL
P 6: Brie_2014_Futuring_Brie (Vorwort) x x x x
on the emergence of the concepts  of transformation and trans i tion, in Germany and 
beyond.
P 6: Brie_2014_Futuring_Reißig x x x x
Noteworthy the theoretica l  reflections  of Brand and others  about transformation as  a  
speci fic type of societa l  change, as  wel l  as  i ts  characterization. 
P 6: Brie_2014_Futuring_Brand
x x x x x
Brand goes  deeper into the analys is  of the GT debate, expanding and complementing the 
data  of P5 (Brand et a l -2013-Wohls tand- wie anders ) about the dynamics  of the Enquette 
WWL
P 7: BUND et a l_2009_Zukunftfähiges  Deutschland ZDII-
Summary
x x
Signi ficant publ ication for i ts  penetration level , released by flagship organizations  in the 
development and environment sectors . Updates  the influentia l  1996 Report, showing the 
evolution in discourse and l inking i t to current (deemed fa i led) responses  of German 
pol i tics  to the multiple cri s i s
P 8: Deutscher Bundestag_Enquette Kommiss ion 
WWL_Schlussbericht
x x
Key event in the GT debate genealogy, as  pointed out in a  multipl ici ty of sources . 
Mainstreamed the concept of "socio-ecologica l  transformation" and brought the debate 
out of niches  onto the pol i ti ca l  agenda
P 9: Die Linke_2012_Plan B_das  rote projekt für einen sozia l  
ökologischen Umbau x x Officia l  pos i tion paper of DIE LINKE parlamentary block on the GT
P10: Ecornet, FONA_2012_Sozia l -ökologische Forschung-
Memorandum
x x x x x x
Memorandum and pos i tion paper by one of the centra l  networks  in the pol i ti cs  of science 
regarding research on socio-ecologica l  transformation. Gives  an overview of the recent 
his tory of the field.
P11: Felder et a l ._Sozia lökologischer Umbau a ls  projekt von 
gewerkschaften und socia len bewegungen
x x x x x x
Interesting crossover paper publ i shed jointly by an unl ikely a l l iance: Attac, ver.di , and 
Greenpeace. Provides  ins ight into the dynamics  of an emerging and s triking discourse 
coal i tion, and reflects  the resul ting consensus  in terms  of GT representation
P12: Friedrich Ebert Sti ftung_2013_so wol len wir 
leben_fortschri tts forum x x
Represents  the voice of a  "middleman" in the pol i ti ca l  field, who moved from the 
oppos i tion to the government coa l i tion.
P13: Germanwatch_Dia logue on Transformation conference 
report x x x x x
This  conference report serves  as  a  condensed col lection of utterances  by a  great number 
and variety of CSOs  in the development and environment sector. 
P14: Germanwatch_The Great Transformation_Weitbl ick 
Magazin
x x x x
Gives  a  more "personal" ins ight into the discourse of the German development sector 
through one of i ts  flagship organizations . The magazine format s ignals  a lso the 
di ffuss ion of the GT to a  wider publ ic
P15: GiZ_2012-transformation
x
Voice of the biggest German s tata l  development organization, which i s  therefore subject 
to pol i tica l  juncture. GT features  only margina l ly here -maybe mainly through the 
cooptation of the term 'transformation'- , but the actor i s  a  must. 
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P16: Heinrich Böl l  
Sti ftung_2007_gruene_Marktwirtschaft_grosse Transformation
x x x
Represents  the voice of the "Realos" faction in the German Greeens
P17: Heinrich Böl l  Sti ftung_2014_foerderschwerpunkt-
transformationsforschung clusters x x x
Represents  a  materia l  impact of the GT discourse: a  new funding l ine of the Heinrich-Böl l  
Sti ftung on SET
P18: Homer-Dixon_The Great Transformation conference 
Essen_June 2009_Keynote
x x x x
"Foreplay" to the GT debate in 2009! Homer-Dixon displays  the essentia l  contents  of the 
GT debate here, supporting my case for the origina l i ty of this  debate and for the presence 
of counter-systemic elements  s tructuring the debate.
P19: INSM_Die Wohls tandsfrage x x Reaction of the bus iness  sector to the GT debate.
P20: Insti tut Sol idarische 
Moderne_2011_Sozia loekologischer_Gesel l schaftsumbau x x x Think tank which offers  one of the most comprehens ive elaborations  on SET ava i lable.
P21: Klein_Das  Morgen tanzt im heute
x x x x x x x Shows how LINKE and RLS have taken up the banner of the GT from the beginning, and not only elaborate on their own views, but engage most thoroughly with that of others  as  wel l  
(see scenarios  in ch. 4). It a l so addresses  i s sues  of power and cooptation in chapter 3.
P22: Kri s tof_Erfolgreiche Wege zum Wandel x x x x x Represents  the voice of the State bzw. UBA
P23: Misereor_2013_Welt_Sichten_Weltgemeinwohl
x x x x x x x
One of the key rel igious  organizations  in the German development sector. This  document 
i l lus trates  the discourse of Misereor on the GT and gives  new and interesting overview 
ingights  into the GT debate.
P24: Ober_Forschungswende für die Große Transformation x x x One of the great materia l i zations  of the GT discourse in the field of pol i tics  of science
P25: Öko-Insti tut_2015_Shaping the future x x
Anual  report 2014 by one of the key players  in non-univers i ty susta inabi l i ty science in 
Germany, who was  the pioneer of the Energiewende
P26: Reisch_Zei t für Nachhaltigkei t, Zei t für Transformation
x x x
Presents  the rea lm of (UBA-sponsored)Time-pol i ti cs  as  an intense arena for the debate 
on a  GT, in connection with the goal  of a  good l i fe ("Zei tpol i tik der/für die 
Transformation"). Provides  rich ins ights  into time-relevant instances  of the GT debate.
P27: Schneidewind & Zahrnt_2014_The pol i ti cs  of sufficiency
x x x x x
Coal i tion science (Schneidewind/Wupperta l  Insti tute) -civi l  society (Zahrnt/BUND), 
breaking down the usual ly abstract vi s ion on sufficiency into concrete pol icy proposa ls , 
thereby pointing to component elements  of the GT and their respective arenas  of 
discuss ion
P28: Siebenhüner et a l_Unternehmen_Tei lhabe and einer 
nachhaltigen Gesel l schaft_GELENA WP x x x
Complements  corpus  with a  reflection on the role of Bus iness  by a  leading ecologica l  
economist in the framework of a  SÖF project
P29: SPD_2012_fortschri ttsprogramm x x Complement to the SPD/FES document in Sample A
P30: Stel leauschreibung Brot für die Welt x x x x
Materia l i zation of GT discourse: BfdW creates  a  pos i tion of "Referent für SET" and 
outl ines  the field of debate
P31: Streeck_2011_The cri s i s  in context x x x
Ins ight into the international  and loca l  context in which the GT debate emerged by a  
radica l  thinker heading mainstream Max-Planck Insti tute for the Study of Societies
P32: Unmüss ig, Sachs  and Fatheuer_2012_Cri tique of the Green 
Economy x x
Fundis  of the HBS/Greens  engaging with discurs ive contender around the idea  of GT 
transformation
P33: VENRO_2015_Rol le und Strategien entwicklungspol i ti scher  
NGOs  im Rahmen Zukunfts fähiger Entwicklung
x x x x x umbrel la  organization of the German development sector taking up a  radica l  GT 
discourse
P34: WBGU_2011_World in Trans i tion_A socia l  contract for 
susta inabi l i ty_Summary x x x x x Key cata lyzing event in the GT debate, as  underl ined by countless  sources
P35: WBGU_2014_Cl imate protection as  a  world ci ti zens  
movement x x x x x x
Fol low up of the 2011 WBGU report, adding new ideas  and voices , with ideas  supporting 
the post-governance thes is
P36: WBGU_Great Transformation_comic x x x
Synthes is  in comic format of the highly influentia l  2011 WBGU report, a l lowing emphases  
to come to the fore
P37: Zukunftscharta x
Relevant process  on the topic of SET conducted by the federa l  government, though i t 
largely ignores  the GT debate, which i s  i tsel f an interesting piece of data .
P39: Jorck, Gerri t von - 2013 - Diplomarbeit - Konzepte und 
Lei tbi lder sozia l -ökologischer Transformation
x x x x x x Only ava i lable s tudy inquiring systematica l ly into the GT discourses  and debate process . 
Proved a  frui tful  source for further data  corpus-bui lding and ins ightful  thought-leads .
P40: Schmeltzer_2014_Gutes  Leben s tatt Wachstum x x x x x x
Provides  deep yet synthetic ins ight into the his tory of the growth cri tique, international ly 
and in Germany, as  of i ts  connections  to other debates .
P41: Asara  et a l_2015_SOCIALLY-SUSTAINABLE-DEGROWTH-AS-
SOCIAL-ECOLOG-TRANSFORMATION x x x
Adds  data  to the genes is  of degrowth and related discuss ion s trands , and i ts  expl ici t 
l inks  with the GT debate
P42: Escobar_2015_Degrowth-postdevelopment-and-trans i tions x x x x x
Unique overview text in the corpus  expos ing l inkages  btw. northern and southern 
transformation discourses  by a  leading scholar in the field
P43: Brand et a l_2013_Debating transformations  in multiple 
cri s i s_World Socia l  Science report 2013 x x x x provides  synthetic overview of transformation discourses  out there. 
P44: Brohmann_2014_UBA UFOPLAN transformation s trategies  
and models  of change x x x
expands  content-wise the project referred to in P45, introducing a  conceptual  framework 
on "meta-governance"
P45: KWI_2012_UBA UFOPLAN Transformation s trategies  and 
models  of change x x
presents  contents  of current research in the UBA-SÖF framework i l lus trating the effects  of 
GT debate in that rea lm
P46: Zivi lgesel l schaftl i che Platform 
Forschungswende_Netzwerk x x x x x
presents  contents  of current research in the UBA-SÖF framework i l lus trating the effects  of 
GT debate in that rea lm
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